Midwest Regional Bank v. Caribou Energy Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 6, 2020
Docket4:18-cv-01217
StatusUnknown

This text of Midwest Regional Bank v. Caribou Energy Corporation (Midwest Regional Bank v. Caribou Energy Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Midwest Regional Bank v. Caribou Energy Corporation, (E.D. Mo. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

MIDWEST REGIONAL BANK, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:18 CV 1217 RWS ) CARIBOU ENERGY CORPORATION, ) et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER This matter is before me on Plaintiff Midwest Regional Bank’s motion for summary judgment against Individual Defendants Robert Williamson and Christopher Scott Yenzer. Williamson and Yenzer do not contest any of Midwest Regional Bank’s statement of material facts; they instead argue their affirmative defenses that I do not have jurisdiction in this case and that the Bank has failed to mitigate its damages. For the reasons below, I will grant Midwest Regional Bank’s motion for summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND On April 20, 2016, Caribou Energy Corporation executed a Note in favor of Midwest Regional Bank under which Midwest Regional Bank agreed to loan Caribou $1,923,000, to be paid back with interest in equal monthly installments. See Pl.’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (SUMF), ECF No. 48, ¶ 4. In addition to the repayment terms, a condition of the loan was that Caribou’s ownership was not to change without Midwest Regional Bank’s prior written

consent. See Ex. 4 to Pl.’s SUMF, ECF No. 48-4, ¶ 4(L). Another condition was that Defendants Robert Williamson and Christopher Scott Yenzer (“Individual Defendants”) had to personally guarantee repayment of all amounts owing under

the loan. See id. Exs. 6, 7. Caribou defaulted under the terms of the Note when it missed monthly payments and late charges and when the Individual Defendants, in their capacities as the sole owners and shareholders of Caribou, transferred ownership of Caribou

without the Bank’s consent. When Caribou defaulted, Midwest Regional Bank wrote to Caribou and the Individual Defendants to inform them of the default and acceleration of the balance due under the Note. Despite the Bank’s demand for

payment of the total balance due pursuant to the Note and the Unconditional Guarantees executed by the Individual Defendants, the Individual Defendants have not paid the amount due. Caribou did not enter an appearance or answer the Complaint, and I entered

a Default Judgment against Caribou on December 19, 2018. The Individual Defendants have appeared at case proceedings pro se; they have argued that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them and that Midwest Regional

Bank has failed to mitigate its damages. II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving parties, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving parties may not rest on their pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of

the essential elements of their case on which they bear the burden of proof. Id. at 324. III. DISCUSSION The Individual Defendants do not contest Midwest Regional Bank’s factual

representations regarding the terms of the Note and Unconditional Guarantees, and I find that the Individual Defendants have admitted the factual statements contained in Midwest Regional Bank’s Statement of Uncontested Material Facts.

See Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The movant’s facts will be admitted unless specifically controverted. If no objections have been raised in the manner required by the local rules, a district court will not abuse its

discretion by admitting the movant's facts.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, the Individual Defendants oppose summary judgment on two

grounds: (1) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, and (2) Midwest Regional Bank failed to mitigate the damages that resulted from Caribou’s default. I find that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants and that there is no factual dispute that Midwest Regional

Bank has sufficiently mitigated its damages. Furthermore, I find that Midwest Regional Bank has established that it is entitled to summary judgment and that the Individual Defendants are liable to the Bank for the amount due under the Note.

a. Personal Jurisdiction The Individual Defendants argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. They are not residents of Missouri and assert that they “have no connections to Missouri, do not do business here, and do not travel or

reach out to Missouri for any business or personal reasons.” Def.’s Opp’n to Summ. J., ECF No. 50, pp. 2-3. The Individual Defendants first asserted lack of personal jurisdiction in the affirmative defenses section of their Answer [ECF No. 30, p.10], and I find that they have not implicitly waived their personal jurisdiction objection through their conduct in this litigation.

“A federal court in a diversity action may assume jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state and by the Due Process Clause.” Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380

F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir.1991)). Missouri’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over defendants who transact “any business within this state” or make “any contract within this state.” § 506.500 RSMo. Because the “Missouri long-arm statute

authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permissible under the due process clause,” the question before me is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would violate the due process clause.” Romak USA, Inc. v.

Rich, 384 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court’s exercise of “[j]urisdiction over a defendant does not offend due process’s ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ if the defendant has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state.” Henry Law Firm v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, 950 F.3d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 2020)

(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)). Courts apply a five-factor test to determine the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts: (1) the nature and quality of the contacts, (2) the quantity of the contacts, (3) the relationship of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents, and (5) the convenience or inconvenience of the parties.

Henry Law Firm, 950 F.3d at 532 (citing Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 2014).

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Related

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
444 U.S. 286 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Dever v. Hentzen Coatings
380 F.3d 1070 (Eighth Circuit, 2004)
Linwood State Bank v. Lientz
413 S.W.2d 248 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1967)
ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp.
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Pelligreen v. Century Furniture & Appliance Co.
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Joan Roe v. St. Louis University
746 F.3d 874 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Technologies Corp.
760 F.3d 816 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Henry Law Firm v. Adel Atalla
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Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc.
923 F.2d 1277 (Eighth Circuit, 1991)

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Midwest Regional Bank v. Caribou Energy Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/midwest-regional-bank-v-caribou-energy-corporation-moed-2020.