Midstate Theatres, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors

46 Cal. App. 3d 204, 119 Cal. Rptr. 894, 1975 Cal. App. LEXIS 1766
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 18, 1975
DocketCiv. 2060
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 46 Cal. App. 3d 204 (Midstate Theatres, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Midstate Theatres, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Cal. App. 3d 204, 119 Cal. Rptr. 894, 1975 Cal. App. LEXIS 1766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

Opinion

BROWN (G. A.), P. J.

On August 23, 1972, appellants, Midstate Theatres, Inc., a corporation, and Redwood Theatres, Incorporated, a corporation, (hereinafter “applicants”) timely filed with the Board of Supervisors of Stanislaus County sitting as a county board of equaliza *207 tion (hereinafter “the board”) applications for reduction in their 1972-1973 property tax assessments on their land, hotel, theater and parking garage located in the City of Modesto. The applications were made on printed forms provided by the county, and though amended on August 30 and September 25, 1972, the applications as amended were rejected by the county counsel as invalid because they did not show the “facts relied upon to support the claim that the board should order a change” in the assessment of value of the subject property.

Applicants petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate directing the board to conduct a hearing on the applications. The superior court ordered that the applications be set for hearing on condition that at least 20 days before the hearing the applicants furnish to the board complete appraisal reports by all appraisers applicants intended to call as witnesses. The trial court also found that the board’s action was not arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of Government Code section 800 and denied attorney’s fees.

Applicants appeal from the judgment, contending that (1) the trial court acted beyond its legal authority in conditioning applicants’ right to a hearing on furnishing the appraisal reports at least 20 days prior to the hearing; and (2) the applications for reduction in assessments were sufficient as a matter of law; and (3) the refusal to accept the applications was arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law, entitling applicants to attorney’s fees pursuant to Government Code section 800.

Conditioning Approval of the Application on Applicants’ Furnishing Appraisal Reports

The trial court avoided passing on the sufficiency of the applications by conditioning approval thereof upon applicants’ furnishing appraisal reports to the board at least 20 days prior to the hearing. 1 For the reasons to be stated, however, we hold the condition exceeded the court’s authority and is void.

Revenue and Taxation Code section 1608.7 at the times relevant herein provided that at any time prior to 20 days before the hearing an applicant may initiate an exchange of information with the assessor by submitting data as specified in the section, and at least 10 days prior to the hearing the assessor must reciprocate by furnishing the applicant *208 with his data. Under section 1608.7 as it then read, this two-way exchange could only be initiated by the taxpayer and was therefore wholly voluntary on his part. The court, by its order herein, in effect turned this around and gave the assessor the right to obtain the appraisal data from the taxpayer without any corresponding obligation on the assessor to disclose his data to the taxpayer. The order, therefore, violates section 1608.7 in two respects: it transfers the initiative from the applicant to the assessor, and it converts an exchange procedure into a one-way street going the assessor’s way. 2

Thus the applicants are entitled to a judicial determination of the sufficiency of their applications, unfettered by the condition, and the court is required to make a finding on this issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 232 (e); Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co. (1947) 29 Cal.2d 561, 576-577 [177 P.2d 4, 172 A.L.R. 1107] (findings are required upon all material issues).) The necessity for such a finding is emphasized by applicants’ request to the trial court for a specific finding on the issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Morris v. Thogmartin (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 922 [105 Cal.Rptr. 919].)

The Sufficiency of the Application

A taxpayer has a right to a hearing on his property tax assessment, and if an application for a hearing is denied for insufficient legal reason there is a denial of due process. (Nickey v. Mississippi (1934) 292 U.S. 393 [78 L.Ed. 1323, 54 S.Ct. 743]; Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 229-230 [82 P.2d 185].)

The facts relied upon to support the claim of overassessment as set forth in the original form application of August 23, 1972, the first letter amendment thereto dated August 30, 1972, and the final letter amendment of September 25, 1972, are contained in Appendix I attached.

Revenue and Taxation Code section 1607, subdivision (a), establishes the basic guideline by which to measure the sufficiency of an application for a reduction in assessment: “A reduction in an assessment on the local *209 roll shall not be made unless the party affected or his agent makes and files with the county board a verified, written application showing the facts claimed to require the reduction and the applicant’s opinion of the full cash value of the property.” (Italics added.) 3

The statutory language that the claim shall show the “facts claimed to require the reduction” does not require that the applicant follow technical rules of pleading or that he set forth evidentiary facts. In recognition of the reality that many, if not most, applicants are laymen who would be denied hearings if formalized technical rules were followed, it has been the judicial policy of this state to construe such applications liberally in favor of the applicant. It has been stated that an application is adequate and “the purpose of the statutory requirement is served if the board may know from said application ‘or have some reasonable means of ascertaining’ therefrom what the claim of the applicant is, to the end that such claims may be investigated by the assessing authorities prior to the hearing.” (County of Los Angeles v. Ransohoff (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 238, 241 [74 P.2d 828].)

Thus, in County of Los Angeles v. Ransohoff, supra, the court held the statement “unequal value” sufficient. In Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 227, the application stated merely “excessive valuation.” In Birch v. County of Orange (1922) 59 Cal.App. 133, 135 [210 P. 57], the allegation was “ ‘unfair, unjust, and excessive as compared with other property of substantially the same character and value and similarly situated.’ ”

Accordingly, when measured by these established criteria, the applica *210

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46 Cal. App. 3d 204, 119 Cal. Rptr. 894, 1975 Cal. App. LEXIS 1766, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/midstate-theatres-inc-v-board-of-supervisors-calctapp-1975.