MIDFIRST BANK v. POE

2020 OK CIV APP 63, 479 P.3d 250
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedOctober 23, 2020
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 OK CIV APP 63 (MIDFIRST BANK v. POE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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MIDFIRST BANK v. POE, 2020 OK CIV APP 63, 479 P.3d 250 (Okla. Ct. App. 2020).

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MIDFIRST BANK v. POE
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MIDFIRST BANK v. POE
2020 OK CIV APP 63
Case Number: 117615; Cons. w/118056
Decided: 10/23/2020
Mandate Issued: 12/02/2020
DIVISION I
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I


Cite as: 2020 OK CIV APP 63, __ P.3d __

MIDFIRST BANK, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JENIFER ANN POE, Defendant/Appellant,

ALICE J. POE, personal representative of the estate of Jerry Daniel Poe, Deceased, Defendant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE MARY FITZGERALD, JUDGE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Jessie V. Pilgrim, Clint T. Swanson, SWANSON LAW FIRM, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant,

Robert P. Skeith, RIGGS, ABNEY, NEAL, TURPEN, ORBISON & LEWIS, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

B.J. Goree, Judge:

¶1 MidFirst Bank (Bank) filed a petition to interplead funds. It alleged it could be exposed to double liability with respect to $32,830.44 which it held on deposit and to which it claimed no interest. Bank named two defendants, Jenifer Ann Poe (Poe) and Alice J. Poe, personal representative of the Estate of Jerry Daniel Poe. The interpleader was granted before Poe had notice and an opportunity to be heard. We hold this was a denial of due process of law.

¶2 On the same day the petition was filed, the district court signed an order directing Bank to deposit the funds with the court clerk. The order was filed a few days later. Afterward, and in due time, Poe filed her answer and an amended answer. She denied Personal Representative was asserting a claim, she denied Bank may be exposed to double liability with respect to the funds, and she asserted Bank failed to state a claim. Poe raised affirmative defenses that Bank had acted in bad faith and with unclean hands, and she asserted a counterclaim that Bank was liable for conversion.

¶3 Poe filed an application requesting a hearing on her affirmative defenses and a motion to vacate the order directing deposit of the funds, arguing it was entered without notice and before she had an opportunity to object. Bank responded that the answers of the two defendants present opposing claims to the subject funds, thereby supporting its claim that it could be exposed to the potential for double liability. Bank explained that it merely tendered a proposed order to the district court when it filed its petition, and the fact that the order was filed without advance notice to Poe is of no legal consequence under the circumstances. Reiterating that it claimed no interest in the money, and that it was properly within the safekeeping of the court pending disputes between the two defendants, Bank asked the court to dismiss Poe's counterclaims and discharge it from the action.

¶4 The court (1) granted Bank's motion to dismiss Poe's counterclaims, (2) ordered Bank released and discharged from any and all liability to Defendants, and (3) ordered an attorney fee to be paid to Bank from the deposited funds in an amount to be determined in a future proceeding. By a separate order, the court awarded Bank $9,476.50 for attorney fees and $733.49 for costs. Poe appealed.

1

¶5 In a proceeding commenced pursuant to

12 O.S. §2022, the district court's order directing a pleader to deposit the subject of the action into court is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Farmers Ins. Co. v. VanWinkle, 2018 OK CIV APP 40, ¶3, 417 P.3d 1262, 1264 (holding that interpleader proceedings are equitable in nature and are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Review may encompass a claim of legal error or lack of an evidentiary basis, and both implicate the de novo standard. Id.

¶6 Oklahoma's interpleader statute provides that a party potentially exposed to double or multiple liability for wrongful payment may tender the claimed property into court for a decision on the priority of claims. Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers,

1992 OK 20, ¶22, 826 P.2d 603, 611. According to Title 12 O.S. §2022(A), persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability. "When the party seeking such relief claims no interest in the subject of the action, and it has been deposited with the court, the court should discharge the pleader from the action and from liability as to the claims of the other parties." §2022(C).2 Bank's argument suggests that this language makes no provision for objection, affirmative defense, or counterclaims. If the party seeking relief claims no interest in the funds and they have been deposited with the court, then "the court should discharge the pleader" both from the action and from liability for claims of the other parties.

¶7 Although actions in interpleader are part of the Oklahoma Pleading Code,

3 its applicability is subject to an exception "where a statute specifies a different procedure." §2001. We must consider whether the Legislature intended by the language of §2022(C) to dispense with a defendant's right to file an answer and permit the court to order relief instanter after the petitioner states a claim.

¶8 Long before its codification at §2022, an action in interpleader was within the inherent power of the court. Waggoner v. Johnston,

1965 OK 192, ¶8, 408 P.2d 761, 765. The court had the initial task of determining whether interpleader was proper. Id. If so, the petitioner was to be discharged and the case advanced to a second stage where the validity of the competing claims to the fund would be determined on the merits. See Stanford v. Stanford, 1996 OK CIV APP 156, ¶13, 936 P.2d 352, 355.

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Hammonds v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Ass'n
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Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2020 OK CIV APP 63, 479 P.3d 250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/midfirst-bank-v-poe-oklacivapp-2020.