Micron Technology Inc. v. Longhorn Ip LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: 23-2007
• Status: Published

Opinion

Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 1 Filed: 12/18/2025

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC., MICRON TECHNOLOGY TEXAS, LLC, STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

LONGHORN IP LLC, Defendant-Appellant ______________________

2023-2007 ______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in No. 1:22-cv-00273-DCN, Judge David C. Nye.

-------------------------------------------------

KATANA SILICON TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC., MICRON TECHNOLOGY TEXAS, LLC, STATE OF IDAHO, Defendants-Appellees ______________________

2023-2095 Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 2 Filed: 12/18/2025

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in No. 1:22-cv-00282-DCN, Judge David C. Nye. ______________________

Decided: December 18, 2025 ______________________

ANDREW DUFRESNE, Perkins Coie LLP, Madison, WI, argued for Micron Technology, Inc., Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc., Micron Technology Texas, LLC. Also repre- sented by AMANDA TESSAR, Denver, CO; JONATHAN IRVIN TIETZ, Washington, DC.

MICHAEL ZARIAN, Idaho Office of the Attorney General, Boise, ID, argued for State of Idaho. Also represented by STEPHANIE N. GUYON, ALAN M. HURST, RAUL R. LABRADOR, JAMES J. SIMERI.

SCOTT W. BREEDLOVE, Carter Arnett PLLC, Dallas, TX, argued for Longhorn IP LLC and Katana Silicon Technolo- gies LLC. Also represented by OMER SALIK, Hermosa Beach, CA. ______________________

Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. LOURIE, Circuit Judge. Longhorn IP LLC (“Longhorn”) and Katana Silicon Technologies LLC (“Katana”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho denying Appellants’ motions to dis- miss and imposing a bond of $8 million pursuant to the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act (“the Act”). Katana Silicon Techs. LLC v. Micron Tech., Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 3 Filed: 12/18/2025

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Inc., 671 F. Supp. 3d 1138 (D. Idaho 2023) (“Bond Deci- sion”). Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss. BACKGROUND The Idaho legislature passed the Act in 2014, “seek[ing] to facilitate the efficient and prompt resolution of patent infringement claims, protect Idaho businesses from abusive and bad faith assertions of patent infringe- ment[,] and build Idaho’s economy, while at the same time carefully not interfering with legitimate patent enforce- ment actions.” IDAHO CODE § 48-1701(2). Under the Act, it “is unlawful for a person to make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in a demand letter, a complaint[,] or any other communication.” Id. § 48-1703(1). Those tar- geted by a bad faith assertion of patent infringement may bring a private cause of action seeking a combination of eq- uitable relief, damages, costs and fees, and punitive dam- ages. Id. § 48-1706(1). The Act also contains the following bond provision: Upon motion by a target and a finding by the court that a target has established a reasonable likeli- hood that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in violation of this chapter, the court shall require the person to post a bond in an amount equal to a good faith estimate of the tar- get’s costs to litigate the claim and amounts rea- sonably likely to be recovered under this chapter, conditioned upon payment of any amounts finally determined to be due to the target. A hearing shall be held if either party so requests. The court may waive the bond requirement if it finds the person has available assets equal to the amount of the pro- posed bond or for other good cause shown. Id. § 48-1707. Micron Technology, Inc., together with its subsidiaries Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. and Micron Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 4 Filed: 12/18/2025

Technology Texas, LLC, (collectively, “Micron”) is a semi- conductor manufacturer headquartered in Boise, Idaho. Bond Decision, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1146–47 & n.1. In March 2022, Katana sued Micron for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Id. at 1147. Katana asserted infringement of three expired patents: U.S. Patents RE38,806 (“the ’806 pa- tent”), 6,352,879 (“the ’879 patent”), and 6,731,013 (“the ’013 patent”). Id. The patents relate to inventions to shrink semiconductor devices. With its Answer, Micron asserted a counterclaim for bad faith assertion of patent infringement pursuant to the Act. Id. Katana then filed a motion to dismiss Micron’s counterclaim, arguing that the Act is preempted under fed- eral patent law. Id. After the district court transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho pursuant to a motion from Micron, the State of Idaho intervened to defend the Act’s legality and filed a memo- randum in opposition to Katana’s motion to dismiss Mi- cron’s counterclaim of bad faith assertion of patent infringement. Id. In addition to its counterclaim against Katana, Micron sued Longhorn in Idaho state court for the same bad faith assertion of patent infringement and asked the court to im- pose a $15 million bond on Appellants. Id. In its suit, Mi- cron alleged that Longhorn controlled Katana. Id. Longhorn removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss on the same preemption grounds asserted by Kat- ana. Id. The State of Idaho again intervened to defend the Act’s legality. Id. The district court decided both motions to dismiss in its Bond Decision. Id. The district court first decided that fed- eral law does not preempt the Act, id. at 1149–55, and then imposed a bond of $8 million on Appellants pursuant to the Act’s bond provision, id. at 1159–60. Appellants appeal. Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 5 Filed: 12/18/2025

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DISCUSSION “On matters relating to this court’s jurisdiction, we ap- ply Federal Circuit law.” Spread Spectrum Screening LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 657 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal taken from a district court decision is a question of law which we address in the first instance.” Pause Tech. LLC v. TiVo, Inc., 401 F.3d 1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Under the final judgment rule, parties may only appeal a “final decision of a district court.” Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)). A final decision is “one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Cat- lin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The founda- tion of this policy is “one against piecemeal litigation.” Id. at 233–34. Here, there has been no final judgment, as the Bond Decision only denied motions to dismiss and imposed a bond; it did not end the case on the merits. See id.; see gen- erally Bond Decision, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1138. Appellants do not contend that there has been a final judgment. See Appellants’ Op. Br. at 11. Rather, Appellants contend that we have jurisdiction pursuant to (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1292 as an injunctive order; (2) the collateral order doctrine; or (3) the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Id. at 3–15. Appellants also contend that we have pendent jurisdiction over the motions to dismiss. Id. at 12. Micron disagrees and argues that we ought to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Micron Resp. Br. at 26–34.* We address each jurisdictional argument in turn.

* Appellee State of Idaho only argued that the Act is not preempted by federal law. See Idaho Resp. Br. at 1. It Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 6 Filed: 12/18/2025

I Appellants argue that we have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Appellants’ Op. Br. at 3. “Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal . . . is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1).” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Taken together, these subsections pro- vide that this court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders ‘granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), in any case over which this court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under § 1295. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1).” Id. (inter- nal citations in original). We also have jurisdiction over orders that have the “practical effect” of granting or deny- ing injunctions. Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic So- famor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287–88 (1988)). Appellants argue that the district court’s imposition of the bond is of an “injunctive nature” and that the bond is “coercive and punitive . . . such that meaningful appellate review must be interlocutory.” Appellants’ Op. Br. at 5, 7; see also Oral Arg. at 2:08–2:20, available at cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/23-2007_11102025.mp3 (Appellants’ counsel contending that the imposition of the bond is an injunction). They also argue that “[e]ven if the [Bond Decision] were not considered a literal injunction, in- terlocutory relief would still be required given th[e] grave

did not take a position on jurisdiction. Id. at 1 n.1. We have also benefitted from amicus curiae briefs filed by 28 states and two associations. See States Amicus Br.; App Assoc. Amicus Br.; CCIA Amicus Br. They too did not take a position on jurisdiction. Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 7 Filed: 12/18/2025

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risk of irreparable harm and the chilling effect of the [Bond Decision].” Appellants’ Op. Br. at 9. Appellants’ arguments are unavailing. The bond is not an injunction. See Bond Decision, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 1160– 61 (no injunctive relief awarded). And the bond fails the Carson test for injunction-like orders. See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). Under Carson, a dis- puted interlocutory order must (1) have the “practical ef- fect” of an injunction, (2) cause a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” and (3) be “‘effectually chal- lenged’ only by immediate appeal.” Id. at 84–85. Appellants cannot make such a showing. First, the Bond Decision does not have the “practical effect” of an in- junction. An injunction is “an equitable decree compelling obedience under the threat of contempt.” See Int’l Long- shoremen’s Ass’n v. Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 75 (1967). But here, Appellants can challenge the bond be- fore the district court. See IDAHO CODE § 48-1707 (party may request a hearing regarding the bond). Thus, the im- position of the bond is more akin to a conditional stay until it is paid or waived. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 429 (2009) (“A stay simply suspends judicial alteration of the status quo, while injunctive relief grants judicial interven- tion that has been withheld by lower courts.” (cleaned up)). That is, the imposition of the bond does not prohibit Appel- lants from engaging in any conduct or require them to take any action other than satisfying a procedural precondition to proceed, unlike an injunction. See id.; cf. Int’l Longshore- men’s, 389 U.S. at 75. Second, Appellants did not demonstrate that the bond imposes any “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.” See Carson, 450 U.S. at 84. There is no record evidence suggesting that Appellants cannot continue the litigation due to the imposition of the bond. See Oral Arg. at 2:32– 3:00 (Appellants’ counsel acknowledging that “there is no evidence in the record about anyone’s ability to pay [the Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 8 Filed: 12/18/2025

bond]”); id. at 7:50–7:59 (“There was no evidence of the ability or inability to pay a specific bond.”). Without evi- dence that the bond impairs their ability to litigate or im- poses some non-speculative hardship, Appellants cannot show the kind of “serious, perhaps irreparable, conse- quence” required for interlocutory review. See Carson, 450 U.S. at 84. And third, it cannot be said that the Bond Decision “can be ‘effectually challenged’ only by immediate appeal.” See Carson, 450 U.S. at 84 (emphasis added). As noted above, the Act allows the court to waive the bond “if it finds the person has available assets equal to the amount of the pro- posed bond or for other good cause shown.” See IDAHO CODE § 48-1707. Because the record is bereft of any evi- dence showing Appellant had insufficient assets, it could very well be the case that waiver was attainable. See Oral Arg. at 2:32–3:00; id. at 7:50–7:59. Without having pur- sued the mechanism that the Act provides to relieve any burden, Appellants cannot plausibly claim that immediate appeal is their only avenue of relief. We thus do not have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292. II Next, Appellants argue that we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine as set forth in Cohen v. Bene- ficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Appellants’ Op. Br. at 3. In Cohen, the Supreme Court held an order denying imposition of a bond to be immediately appealable, as it involved “a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and [did] not re- quire consideration with it.” 337 U.S. at 546–47. It ex- plained that the order was “in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and col- lateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 9 Filed: 12/18/2025

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require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Id. at 546. “The collateral order doctrine is a narrow exception, whose reach is limited to trial court orders affecting rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immedi- ate appeal.” Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1985) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the collateral order doctrine, explain- ing that it should ‘never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be de- ferred until final judgment has been entered.’” Mod. Font Applications LLC v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 56 F.4th 981, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)). “To fall within the exception, an order must at a mini- mum satisfy three conditions: [i]t must [(1)] ‘conclusively determine the disputed question,’ [(2)] ‘resolve an im- portant issue completely separate from the merits of the action,’ and [(3)] ‘be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 431 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). “If any one of these conditions is not met, the collateral order doctrine does not apply, and we lack jurisdiction to review the order in question.” Copan Italia SpA v. Puritan Med. Prods. Co., 101 F.4th 847, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Here, at a minimum, conditions two and three are not satisfied. In contrast to Cohen, the bond issue is “an ingre- dient of the cause of action.” See 337 U.S. at 546–47. In- deed, the bond issue is intertwined with the ultimate merits question of Micron’s state-law bad faith claims be- cause the same factors which can demonstrate bad faith in the motion to dismiss analysis implicate whether to impose a bond. See IDAHO CODE § 48-1707 (requiring a bond where “a target has established a reasonable likelihood that a Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 10 Filed: 12/18/2025

person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringe- ment in violation of this chapter”); id. § 48-1703 (enumer- ating nine factors for a court to consider “as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringe- ment”); see also Bond Decision, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 1160 (“The . . . analysis on the motion to dismiss [regarding the statutory factors] serves also to show that, under the Act, a bond is required”); Appellants’ Op. Br. at 24–25 (disput- ing the merits of the bond imposition by disputing the bad faith factor analysis); id. at 12 (requesting we exercise pen- dent jurisdiction over the motion to dismiss because the bond and dismissal would be “inextricably linked”). Thus, the bond issue is not “completely separate from the merits of the action.” See Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 431. Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Appellants argue that the Bond Decision, because it was based purely on Micron’s allegations, does not go to the fi- nal disposition of the merits of the case. Appellants’ Op. Br. at 9–10. As stated above, however, an evaluation of the bond is intertwined with the merits of Micron’s counter- claim. See Bond Decision, 337 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. Any such evaluation would thus violate the second requirement of the collateral order doctrine. See Mod. Font, 56 F.4th at 986 (citing Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 439–40). Furthermore, the Bond Decision is not “effectively un- reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See Richard- son-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 431. A claim that remains “adequately vindicable” on final judgment is not effectively unreviewable under Cohen. See Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 881 (1992). Generally, a requirement to post a security is not effectively unreview- able following final judgment because repayment of the se- curity with interest would furnish complete relief to an improperly granted bond. See Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Re- public of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2006); Carib- bean Trading & Fid. Corp. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 948 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Habitat Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 11 Filed: 12/18/2025

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Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2010); Hitachi Zosen Clearing, Inc. v. Tek-Matik, Inc., 846 F.2d 27, 29 (6th Cir. 1988). To the extent that Idaho law governs, it appears that Idaho recognizes the recovery of bond premiums to a prevailing party as a matter of right. See Bldg. Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 759 P.2d 931, 935 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). Nothing prevents Appellants from seeking a review of the propriety of the bond after final judgment. Appellants argue that “[t]he punitive aspect of the bond requirement will have already done its irreparable damage if Appellants . . . wait for a final judgment on the merits before they could one day appeal the bond.” Appellants’ Op. Br. at 11. As previously stated, however, there is no evidence in the record that Appellants cannot pay the bond. See Oral Arg. at 2:32–3:00, 7:50–7:59. The speculative na- ture of Appellants’ harm thus weighs against finding juris- diction. See Mod. Font, 56 F.4th at 985–86 (speculative prejudice weighs against jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine). And “[e]ven if [Appellants] were to suffer financial hardship from the [Bond Decision], that financial interest is ‘not sufficient to set aside the finality require- ment imposed by Congress.’” Id. at 986 (quoting Richard- son-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 436). Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction under the col- lateral order doctrine. See Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 431. Indeed, jurisdiction here would permit a “piece- meal, prejudgment appeal” which would “undermine effi- cient judicial administration and encroach upon the prerogatives of district court judges.” See Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (cleaned up); see also Mod. Font, 56 F.4th at 984 (“The limited application of the collateral order doc- trine reflects the important policy concerns that ‘piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge’ and hinder judicial efficiency.” (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981))). Case: 23-2007 Document: 111 Page: 12 Filed: 12/18/2025

III Appellants next argue that we have mandamus juris- diction over the case pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We disagree. For us to exercise this “ex- traordinary remedy,” Appellants must, inter alia, “have no other adequate means to attain the relief [they] desire.” See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (cleaned up). As discussed at length above, Appel- lants cannot make this showing because they can challenge the bond in district court by requesting waiver. See IDAHO CODE § 48-1707. We thus do not have mandamus jurisdic- tion. IV Finally, Appellants argue that we may review the de- nial of their motions to dismiss under pendent jurisdiction. Appellants’ Op. Br. at 12. We again disagree. We may ex- ercise the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction over an interloc- utory order which would ordinarily be nonappealable when it is interrelated factually and interdependent with a properly appealable interlocutory order. See Procter & Gamble, 549 F.3d at 846 (citing Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129, 134 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). As we explained, the decision to impose the bond is not a “properly appealable interlocutory order.” See id. Ac- cordingly, we do not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the denial of the motions to dismiss. See id. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Appellants’ ap- peal for lack of jurisdiction. We do not reach the issues of preemption or whether the district court abused its discre- tion in requiring the $8 million bond. DISMISSED