Mickelson v. Anderson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 2, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01471
StatusUnknown

This text of Mickelson v. Anderson (Mickelson v. Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mickelson v. Anderson, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

KIRK ROBERT CHRIST MICKELSON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-CV-1471-JPS

v.

ORDER TARZE ANDERSON, EMPLOYERS OF TARZE ANDERSON, DEED OWNERS OF THE NAMED AND DESCRIBED PROPERTY, DERREK POLZIN, and ALICIA WOITOWICZ,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Kirk Robert Christ Mickelson, an inmate confined at the Ozaukee County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of federal and state law. ECF No. 1. This Order screens Plaintiff’s complaint and resolves his motions for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. 1. MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 27, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $18.00. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff paid that fee on February 24, 2025. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2, and will deny the duplicative motion, ECF No. 7, as moot. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff and his fiancé began renting an apartment from Defendant Tarze Anderson (“Anderson”) on February 10, 2023. ECF No. 1 at 2. They paid rent and the security deposit on the spot. Id. About a month later, they heard that Anderson had attempted to pressure women into trading sex for rent. Id. Plaintiff took precautions with Anderson and was responsible for all interactions with him. Id. The first few months went great, and Anderson thanked them for taking good care of the apartment. Id. Anderson assured them their backgrounds were not an issue. Id. at 3. Both Plaintiff and his fiancé had a lifetime of drug abuse and mental health issues and were considered disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Prior to entering the rental agreement, Plaintiff had finished a ten-year sentence and came out of a halfway house. Id. After approximately one year, they experienced leaking in the roof during a rainstorm. Id. at 3-4. Anderson said he would fix the issues within a few days. Id. at 4. Anderson sent a man to fix the issue, but it was not resolved; Plaintiff caught this man smoking crack behind their garage on several occasions. Id. They also contacted Anderson about a leaking faucet and a roach infestation; Anderson did not fix these issues either. Id. at 4–5. Plaintiff gathered evidence and later informed Anderson that he was not obligated under state law to continue paying rent until the issues were resolved. Id. at 6. Anderson threatened Plaintiff as a result of this conversation. Id. Two days later, while Plaintiff was napping, a man kicked in Plaintiff’s door and broke the locks; the man got away in what appeared to be Anderson’s truck. Id. at 7. Plaintiff called the police immediately but did not get help. Id. Plaintiff contacted Anderson but got no response. Id. At that point, Plaintiff decided he needed to take Anderson to court and did not pay any more rent. Id. Anderson continued to threaten Plaintiff. Id. at 8. Plaintiff decided to install security cameras for his fiancé’s safety. On September 11, Plaintiff was arrested and taken into federal custody. Id. Anderson was present during the arrest and spoke with the marshals. Id. Plaintiff did not give Anderson permission to access his home. Id. Plaintiff later learned that supposed friends, Defendants Derrek Polzin and Alicia Woitowicz, made an agreement with Anderson and stole all his property. Id. at 9–10. Plaintiff has tried to file a police report while incarcerated at the Dodge County Detention Center, but he was not allowed to do so. Id. at 10. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $50,000 for his lost property and $10,000 for what he still owes on the stolen furniture. Id. at 11. 2.3 Analysis Based on the complaint filed, the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim that Plaintiff has presented. “Courts . . .

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Bluebook (online)
Mickelson v. Anderson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mickelson-v-anderson-wied-2025.