Michrotech International, Inc. v. Fair, No. 32 83 08 (Sep. 18, 1992)

1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 8866, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 1198
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedSeptember 18, 1992
DocketNo. 32 83 08
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 8866 (Michrotech International, Inc. v. Fair, No. 32 83 08 (Sep. 18, 1992)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michrotech International, Inc. v. Fair, No. 32 83 08 (Sep. 18, 1992), 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 8866, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 1198 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (#102) AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (#103) The plaintiff, Microtech International, Inc., has filed a complaint against the defendant, Thomas Fair, alleging in the first count that the defendant violated General Statutes35-51(d), the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, by misappropriating the plaintiff's customer account names, pricing and marketing strategies, and product information. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant was employed by the plaintiff between 1986 and 1991, and the defendant has disclosed or threatened to disclose trade secrets that he "acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limits its use [,] or . . . derived from . . . a person who owed a duty to [the plaintiff] to maintain its secrecy or limit its use. . . ." CT Page 8867

The second count of the complaint alleges that the defendant breached a "Confidentiality Agreement" entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, by disclosing confidential information protected under the agreement, including customer lists, call sheets, product information, and addresses and telephone numbers.

In the third count, the plaintiff alleges that it will suffer irreparable harm if the defendant continues to disclose the plaintiff's trade secrets or confidential information.

The defendant has filed an answer and counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff's lawsuit constitutes abuse of process tortious interference with a business expectancy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Before the court are the plaintiff's motion to compel and the defendant's motion for protective order. The plaintiff's motion requests an order directing the defendant to answer deposition questions and produce documents relating to customer contacts and product sales made by the defendant as an employee with Loviel Computer Corporation ("Loviel") after leaving the plaintiff's employment. The defendant opposes the motion to compel claiming that an agreement with Loviel bars him from divulging the information requested, since the information constitutes confidential information. The defendant also argues that he faces civil liability pursuant to General Statutes 35-51 if he answers the plaintiff's questions and requests for production, since the information sought by the plaintiff constitutes trade secrets owned by Loviel.

The defendant's motion for protective order requests that the plaintiff be precluded from inquiring into "customer specific information of the defendant [o]r his employer until the plaintiff first can show probable cause that the defendant has engaged in wrongdoing." The plaintiff has stated that it is willing to comply with protective measures issued by this court in connection with its motion to compel.

The plaintiff is moving to compel the defendant to answer questions and produce documents relating to customer accounts shared by the plaintiff and the defendant's present employer, Loviel. The plaintiff contends that the questions and documents are relevant and necessary to a determination of the plaintiff's CT Page 8868 claim against the defendant, since the defendant's misappropriation of trade secrets can only be proven by evidence concerning the defendant's conduct in soliciting business from plaintiff's customers.

The defendant responds in opposition, however, that the information sought by the plaintiff constitutes trade secrets owned by the defendant's employer, Loviel. The defendant argues that he does not retain "possession, custody and control" of these secrets, and it would be "oppressive and burdensome" to require the defendant to divulge his employer's trade secrets when he is legally bound to avoid disclosure of such information.

Practice Book 218 states:

In any civil action . . . a party may obtain . . . information . . . or documents . . . which are not privileged, . . . and which are within the knowledge, possession or power of the party to whom the discovery is addressed. Discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure.

Thus, where the information requested is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," disclosure is proper. Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134,139, 491 A.2d 289 (1985).

It appears that Connecticut law does not address whether trade secrets constitute privileged information that is beyond the scope of discovery. Both parties cite case law from other jurisdictions, however, which support the view that trade secrets are discoverable. See Friction Division Prods., Inc.,658 F. Sup. 998, 1006 (D.Del. 1987) (the party opposing discovery must "show that the requested information is a trade secret and that the disclosure . . . might be harmful . . . [Then] the burden shifts to the moving party to establish that the requested information is relevant and necessary to the cause of action."); Exxon Chemical CT Page 8869 Patents, v. Lubrizol Corp., 131 F.R.D. 668, 671 (S.D.Tex. 1990) ("there is no absolute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential information"); Duracell, Inc. v. SW Consultants. Inc., 126 F.R.D. 576, 579 (N.D.Ga. 1989) (the court must "balance the potential harm to the defendants from disclosure against the need plaintiff has shown . . . [and] determination of whether the need outweighs the harm falls within the sound discretion of the trial court").

It is clear that the information which the plaintiff seeks concerns customer accounts and product markets shared by the plaintiff and the defendant's present employer, Loviel. The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff's claim for misappropriation of trade secrets necessitates discovery relative to whether the defendant solicited customers for Loviel by utilizing confidential information he obtained while in the employ of the plaintiff.

The defendant points out that since the information requested is owned by the defendant's employer, the defendant does not maintain "possession, custody and control" as required by Practice Book 218. However, 218 requires merely that the information requested be "within the knowledge, possession or power of the party," and in the present case, the defendant's duties as an employee of Loviel entails the direct use of customer lists and product and marketing information which the plaintiff seeks to discover. Insofar as the questions and documents requested by the plaintiff concern the activity and knowledge of the defendant while in his employment at Loviel, the information is within the knowledge of the defendant and must be disclosed.

Since no Connecticut case has held that trade secrets are barred from discovery, and further, since it appears to the court that the questions and documents at issue are relevant and necessary to a determination of the plaintiff's cause of action, the plaintiff's motion to compel is granted, subject to the protective orders hereinafter set forth.

As indicated above, also before the court is the defendant's motion for protective order. Practice Book 221, governing protective orders, states:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Automation Systems Integration v. Autoswage-Prod., No. 128808 (May 6, 1996)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4310 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)
Filstein v. Filshtein, No. Cv93 070 47 23 (Dec. 9, 1994)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 12507 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 8866, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 1198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michrotech-international-inc-v-fair-no-32-83-08-sep-18-1992-connsuperct-1992.