MICHIGAN Ex Rel WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR v. BENNIS

527 N.W.2d 483, 447 Mich. 719

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: December 30, 1994
• Docket: 97339, (Calendar No. 5)
• Status: Published

Opinions

Riley, J.

In this case, we are required to construe various aspects of the nuisance abatement statute, MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801.¹ Specifically, we must decide whether an act of prostitution was consummated absent proof that money was exchanged. Next, we must determine whether the trial court erred in abating a vehicle used to commit an act of prostitution in a neighborhood with a reputation for illicit activity. Finally, we must consider whether a co-owner’s interest in a vehicle may be abated where the co-owner allegedly had no knowledge that the vehicle was used in proscription of the statute.

We would hold that lewdness, incidental to an act of prostitution, is activity squarely within the purview of the nuisance abatement statute. Alternatively, we conclude that proof of an exchange of money is not necessary where, as here, it is clear from the totality of circumstances that the sexual act was in exchange for payment. Additionally, we would uphold the abatement of this vehicle because the defendant entered a neighborhood that is a known place for prostitution and used his vehicle to engage in illicit activity, thereby contributing to the existing nuisance. Finally, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, we would hold that knowledge or consent is not required to abate the interest of a co-owner.

i

John Bennis was arrested for gross indecency on the evening of October 3, 1988. On that evening, Detroit police officers Jacob Anthony and John Howe set up surveillance after they witnessed a woman "flagging”² passing vehicles on the corner of Eight Mile and Sheffield. The woman was later identified as Kathy Polarchio. The officers next observed a 1977 Pontiac, driven by a man, later identified as John Bennis, turn onto Sheffield and stop near Ms. Polarchio, who approached and entered the passenger side of the Pontiac. The officers followed the Bennis vehicle, which proceeded a block, made a u-turn, and stopped. Surveillance continued until the officers noticed Ms. Polarchio’s head disappear toward the driver’s side of the Pontiac. The officers immediately approached the Bennis vehicle, shined a flashlight into the front seat, and witnessed Ms. Polarchio performing an act of fellatio on Mr. Bennis.

Mr. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency in violation of MCL 750.338b; MSA 28.570(2).³ The Wayne County prosecutor then filed a complaint alleging that the Bennis vehicle was a public nuisance subject to abatement pursuant to MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801. The vehicle was co-owned by Mr. Bennis’ wife, Tina Bennis, who claimed that she had no knowledge that her husband ever used their vehicle in violation of the statute. The trial judge held that the vehicle was a nuisance and abated the interest of defendant and his wife.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,⁴ holding first that the prosecution had an obligation under People v Schoonmaker, 241 Mich 177; 216 NW 456 (1927), to demonstrate that Mr. Bennis’ wife knew that he used the vehicle in a manner proscribed by the statute and failed to oifer such proof.⁵ The Court of Appeals next held that under State ex rel Oakland Co Prosecutor v Motorama Motel Corp, 105 Mich App 224; 307 NW2d 349 (1981), proof of a single incident of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is insufficient to establish a nuisance. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution occurred.

We granted leave to appeal⁶ and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ii

We turn first to whether the act committed in the Bennis vehicle is within the purview of the nuisance abatement statute. Consistent with the 1909 Iowa "red light abatement acts,” upon which the Michigan statute is based,⁷ the Michigan statute requires that the act be one of "lewdness, assignation or prostitution.”⁸ In State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Levenburg, 406 Mich 455; 280 NW2d 810 (1979), this Court used the rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, to define assignation in the statute.⁹ The Court upheld the abatement of a bar because it was used for accosting and soliciting acts of prostitution. In other words, "the making of an appointment for the purpose of prostitution” constituted assignation under the statute. Id. at 466. Levenburg based its decision on State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244, 246-250; 240 NW2d 460 (1976). Diversiñed essentially held that while lewdness, assignation, and prostitution are set forth in the alternative, the conduct constituting lewdness or assignation must be incidental to or in furtherance of an act of prostitution.¹⁰

In the instant case, the prosecution maintains that an act of lewdness, within the context of the nuisance abatement statute, occurred. Although this aspect of the statute has yet to be defined,¹¹ we agree with the contention put forth by the prosecution.

We analogize the definition of "assignation” in Levenburg with the definition we now give to "lewdness.” Levenburg looked to the common meaning of "assignation” and concluded that the common definition of the term is limited to those instances in which the act of assignation is "for the purpose of prostitution.” Id. at 466. In this manner, the common definition of "lewdness” includes a lustful and obscene display of illicit sexual activity.¹² Utilizing the common meaning of "lewdness,”¹³ we also conclude that it is limited to those instances in which an act of lewdness occurs in furtherance of or for the purpose of prostitution.

This result is consistent with Michigan decisions in Diversiñed and Levenburg, supra, as well as other jurisdictions interpreting similar language.¹⁴ For example, in Pennsylvania v MacDonald, 464 Pa 435, 460-461; 347 A2d 290 (1975), the court addressed the issue of lewdness and concluded:

Far more important than mere dictionary definitions is the statutory context in which the word "lewdness” appears. . . . That context proscribes use of any building "for the purpose of fornication, . . . assignation, and/or prostitution.” All of these forbidden purposes involve illicit sexual conduct, thus strongly indicating a legislative intention to proscribe only purposes of this type when it used the word "lewdness.” Such a construction has the further advantage of obviating any problems of vagueness which might be entailed by construing the term "lewdness” in a broader fashion. [Emphasis supplied.]

In the case at bar, Mr. Bennis’ conduct constitutes lewdness because it occurred in a residential neighborhood and was in furtherance of an act that traditionally forms the basis of a prostitution charge, i.e., fellatio.¹⁵ This result is consistent with the definition of assignation in Levenburg, supra at 466. Indeed, we find particularly persuasive the fact that Mr. Bennis engaged in this act with a known prostitute in an area reputed for illicit activity.¹⁶ Therefore, while no money was exchanged, the conduct clearly satisfies statutory requirements and is subject to abatement.

Moreover, even if we did not find the conduct lewd within the meaning of the nuisance abatement statute, we are persuaded that from the totality of the circumstances, an act of prostitution occurred. We primarily rely on the uncontroverted testimony of Detroit police officer Jacob Anthony who, along with his partner, witnessed Ms. Polarchio "flagging”¹⁷ passing vehicles on Eight Mile and Sheffield. His testimony is a compelling indication that an act of prostitution occurred. As previously stated, the officers witnessed the Bennis vehicle stop in response to Ms. Polarchio’s "flagging” and saw her enter the vehicle posthaste. The vehicle proceeded and within minutes again came to a stop. Ms. Polarchio’s head immediately disappeared, and the officers then observed the two engaged in fellatio. The dissent fails to address this most persuasive testimony.

We are additionally persuaded by the following facts which support our conclusion. One witness, Sammie Parham, a security guard at a business located at Six Mile and Woodward, testified that he had seen Mr. Bennis in the area during the summer before Bennis’ October 3, 1988, arrest. Mr. Parham saw Mr. Bennis talking to a prostitute on two separate occasions and ushered the prostitutes away in both instances just as they were about to enter the Bennis vehicle.

Furthermore, it is uncontested that Ms. Polarchio had been arrested several times for solicitation and disorderly conduct. The arresting officer testified that Mr. Bennis stopped at the waving, or what he perceived to be the "flagging,” by Ms. Polarchio. Additionally, we are persuaded by Mr. Bennis’ admission at trial that he normally proceeds home across Eight Mile and turns north onto Woodward. It is uncontested that on the evening in question, Mr. Bennis drove down Eight Mile and proceeded south on Sheffield, the opposite direction of his home. It is also undisputed that minutes after he turned onto Sheffield and picked up Ms. Polarchio, two officers found them engaged in fellatio.

While the officers did not actually witness an exchange of money, from the testimony elicited at trial, a clear inference may be drawn that the sexual act was in exchange for monetary compensation. In his defense, Mr. Bennis has not asserted that he and Ms. Polarchio had a relationship or even knew one another, precluding any inference that the act was consensual, rather than for hire. We do not shift the burden of proof to defendant on this issue. We clearly have sufficient testimony on the record which supports that an act of prostitution occurred. We merely find it noteworthy that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Bennis has not asserted in his defense that there was a prior or existing relationship between himself and Ms. Polarchio.

In sum, we are persuaded by the testimony of the officer witnessing the act and the stated additional facts that augment our decision. Under these circumstances, proof of an actual exchange of money is not required. An action will not be denied merely because the witnessing officers do not allow the illicit activity to proceed to the point where money is exchanged. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution occurred in the Bennis vehicle.

hi

As noted above, MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801 provides for the abatement of a vehicle used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. However, the statute does not define the extent of activity required to constitute a nuisance. Therefore, we must next determine whether an act of prostitution committed in a neighborhood known for illicit activity is within the purview of the statute.

A

Although the issue has not been resolved by appellate decisions of this state, an attempt was made to clarify the definition of nuisance in Motorama Motel, supra. Citing People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Bitonti, 306 Mich 115; 10 NW2d 329 (1943), Motorama held that "[a] nuisance involves the notion of repeated or continuing conduct and should not be based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless the facts surrounding that incident permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited conduct was habitual in nature.” Id. at 229-230. However, Motorama’s reliance on Bitonti is belied by the fact that only four of the eight justices in Bitonti held that a single act was sufficient to constitute an abatable nuisance.¹⁸

As a result, existing Michigan precedent does not specifically require more than a single incident of conduct. However, cognizant of the activity that has implicitly constituted a nuisance in previous actions,¹⁹ we must determine whether the activity in this case properly falls within the definition of nuisance as used in MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801.

B

Because the public nuisance statute allows the abatement of property used in a proscribed manner without specifying the activity that will constitute a nuisance, we are aided in the definition of a nuisance by general public nuisance law. This Court has defined a public nuisance as involving "not only a defect, but threatening or impending danger to the public . . . .” Kilts v Kent Co Bd of Supervisors, 162 Mich 646, 651; 127 NW 821 (1910). Similarly, this Court has declared a public nuisance where an act "offends public decency.” Bloss v Paris Twp, 380 Mich 466, 470; 157 NW2d 260 (1968).²⁰ Finally, Garfield Twp v Young, 348 Mich 337, 342; 82 NW2d 876 (1957), held that to constitute a nuisance

the activity must be harmful to the public health, or create an interference in the use of a way of travel, or affect public morals, or prevent the public from the peaceful use of their land and the public streets. [Citations omitted.]

The rationale is that a nuisance involves a continuing detrimental effect on the public. The nuisance abatement statute serves the same general purpose. Therefore, mindful of the activity that generally constitutes a public nuisance, we apply these principles to the context of the nuisance abatement statute.

c

In construing the nuisance abatement statute, "effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section.” Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182; 189 NW 221 (1922). Moreover, to discover the legislative intent, "the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.” Id. at 182-183. However,

[w]here the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, a court must look to the object of the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy, and strive to apply a reasonable construction that will best accomplish the Legislature’s purpose. [Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). Citations omitted.]

Pursuant to these rules of construction, we consider MCL 600.3815; MSA 27A.3815 in our analysis of whether an abatable nuisance exists. The section provides:

In any action brought under this chapter, evidence of the general reputation of the building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or place is admissible for the purpose of proving the existence of the nuisance. [Emphasis added.]

The nuisance abatement statute’s use of the disjunctive "or” allows us to consider the reputation of the vehicle or the place to determine whether a nuisance exists. The Random House College Dictionary defines "place” as "an open space, or square, in a city or town,” "a short street, court,” and "an area of habitation, as a city, town, or village.” Given the unique facts in this case, we focus on the word "place” set forth in MCL 600.3815(1); MSA 27A.3815(1). We conclude that the word "place” may encompass a neighborhood, and we therefore consider the general reputation of the area surrounding the Eight Mile and Sheffield intersection for purposes of determining the existence of a nuisance.²¹

Several members of that neighborhood testified about numerous incidents where they had personally been accosted and solicited. The arresting officer confirmed that many arrests for prostitution were made in that neighborhood. Several neighbors testified that they had been solicited on more than one occasion. One witness testified that he had observed acts of prostitution near the corner of Eight Mile and Gardendale and that on one occasion he found his young son staring at strange vehicles parked near that corner in which men and women were apparently committing acts of prostitution. These incidents reflect concerns identical to those cited in Garñeld and Bloss, supra.

Thus, the present case involves a condition that, on the basis of the record below, is a public nuisance in this neighborhood. It cannot be contested that a significant threat to public peace and safety exists in the Eight Mile and Sheffield neighborhood. Vehicles that enter the neighborhood in order to solicit acts of prostitution are being "used for” the continuance of this nuisance. Therefore, we would hold that the nuisance abatement statute allows the abatement of a vehicle where the driver entered into and thereby contributed to an existing condition that is a public nuisance.²²

D

This remedy is also buttressed by our review of the overall objective of the nuisance abatement statute. We note that in 1988, minor changes were made to the statute.²³ It appears clear from the amendment that the Legislature intended to remedy the inevitable decline of vice-laden neighborhoods. In the amendment, references to "narcotic and/or hypnotic drug” were changed to the broader and more encompassing phrase, "controlled substance.” The arguments presented in support of the amendment stated: "Dope houses are a plague upon the city neighborhoods in which they occur. Drug trafficking, violent crime, and theft endanger and disrupt the lives of law-abiding citizens. The appearance of dope houses can put an entire neighborhood into decline.”²⁴

The legislative objective was also addressed in People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Sill, 310 Mich 570; 17 NW2d 756 (1945). In Sül, this Court held that the purpose of the nuisance abatement statute²⁵ was "to eliminate effectively, by statutory procedure, the use of property, real or personal, in connection with gambling, prostitution, and illicit sale of liquor . . . .” Id. at 575 (emphasis added). Similarly, State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Bernstein, 57 Mich App 204, 208; 226 NW2d 56 (1974), held that "[t]he padlock law is designed to facilitate the elimination of certain situations which have been found to interfere with a substantial community interest.” Thus, we believe that our position is consistent with the intent of the Legislature.

E

Moreover, the holding in State ex rel Attorney General v Robinson, 250 Mich 99; 229 NW 403 (1930), is analogous to our position in the present case and conclusively persuades us that we have achieved a remedy consistent with the legislative intent. In Robinson, one apartment in a fifty-unit building was abated where proof of a single incident of prostitution was submitted. A police officer witnessed a solicitation by a prostitute and the entry of the apartment to commit the act. Although there was proof of only one act of prostitution in the abated apartment, this Court considered the general reputation of the building and the fact that the woman pleaded guilty to charges of prostitution and concluded that "the nuisance use of the premises . . . can be found without drawing on the imagination.” Id. at 104.

The dissent maintains that reliance on Robinson is misplaced. The dissent’s recitation of the facts of Robinson, however, only confirms that it is persuasive authority , for the proposition that a single act sufficiently constitutes a nuisance where a larger nuisance condition exists. The dissent correctly states: "A police officer witnessed a solicitation outside the building, watched two persons go into the building, and arrested the pair when they came out of the building.” Post, p 746 (emphasis added). It is vital to note that ultimately the only apartment abated was the one in which a single act of prostituion occurred. Further, it was only abated after consideration of the reputation of the larger nuisance condition existing in the building itself, which could not be abated in that case.

As previously stated, the nuisance abatement statute has remained virtually unchanged since Robinson, and our position therefore would apply a priori to the present case. The one act of prostitution in Robinson was considered with regard to

the general reputation of the entire building. Similarly, the one act of nuisance by Mr. Bennis in his vehicle must be viewed in light of the larger and continuing nuisance occurring in the neighborhood. Where testimony surrounding proof of an incident of prostitution unequivocally establishes that the neighborhood has a reputation for prostitution, the property contributing to the continuance of the nuisance may be abated pursuant to the statute. To hold otherwise would allow the criminal actors to circumvent the statute where a different vehicle was used in the commission of each offense. The result would permit the continuing blight of neighborhoods, contrary to the clear intent of the statute. Accordingly, we would hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the act of prostitution occurring in the Bennis vehicle in a neighborhood known for prostitution was not an abatable nuisance.

IV

Finally, we consider whether a co-owner’s interest in a vehicle may be abated where the co-owner had no knowledge that the vehicle was used in a manner proscribed by the nuisance abatement statute. Despite the clear and unambiguous language of the statute indicating that a property owner’s knowledge or consent is not required,²⁶ decisions of this state have nonetheless reached different conclusions with respect to this issue. We would resolve the conflict and would hold that knowledge is not required._

A

The schism has its underpinnings in Schoonmaker, supra, a pre-1988 case. Schoonmaker seemingly required proof of an owner’s consent to the illegal use of the property to be abated. The clear language of the nuisance abatement statute abrogates the requirement of knowledge.²⁷ In Schoonmaker, certain illegal acts were committed by people attending a dance hall. However, those acts were not committed inside the dance hall; instead, patrons consumed intoxicating liquor outside the hall. In this manner, all proscribed activity was divorced from the property sought to be abated. The property itself was not in any way used to facilitate the proscribed act, unlike the set of facts before us.

On the basis of these facts, it appears that Justice Wiest in Schoonmaker did not intend a result inconsistent with the nuisance abatement statute. Additionally, it is apparent that Justice Wiest did not intend to contradict the provision of the abatement statute because only three years later in Robinson, supra at 103, Chief Justice Wiest concluded that the statute "expressly obviates need of knowledge on the part of the owner of nuisance use of his premises.”

Schoonmaker, however, begat confusion regarding the statutory requirement of knowledge. Subsequent cases have ruled consistently with the result that an owner’s knowledge is not required. Bitonti, supra, and People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Tate, 306 Mich 667; 11 NW2d 282 (1943), involved the abatement of a- motor vehicle illegally used for gambling. Both cases relied on the statute, holding that an owner’s knowledge is not required.²⁸ However, several other cases apparently read Schoonmaker to require the owner’s knowledge.²⁹ In light of the plain language of the nuisance abatement statute and the Michigan Supreme Court decisions in Robinson, Bitonti, and Tate, we would hold that the statute expressly obviates the requirement that an owner consent to or acquiesce in the illegal use of property.³⁰ We likewise would hold that Schoonmaker is distinguishable because in that case "[i]ntoxicating liquor was not used in the dance hall but secreted by patrons outside of the hall and secretly visited.” Id. at 182.³¹

Finally, therefore, we consider the constitutional significance of the abatement of Mrs. Bennis’ interest in the vehicle. We assume, arguendo, that Mrs. Bennis did not have knowledge of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis vehicle, of which she was co-title owner. Historically, consideration was not given to the innocence of an owner because the property subject to forfeiture was the evil sought to be remedied.³² As recently as the landmark forfeiture case, Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 US 663, 683; 94 S Ct 2080; 40 L Ed 2d 452 (1974), the United States Supreme Court has reflected this view: "the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.”

In Van Oster v Kansas, 272 US 465, 467; 47 S Ct 133; 71 L Ed 354 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture and sale of an automobile used to transport liquor as proscribed by a Kansas statute. In declaring the vehicle a common nuisance, the Court rejected the innocent owner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because "the offense of unlawful transportation was committed by one entrusted by the owner with the possession and use of the offending vehicle.”

In Calero, supra, the Supreme Court forfeited a lessor’s interest in a yacht used to transport marijuana. The lessor had no knowledge that the yacht was used illegally.³³ Consistent with Van Oster, supra, the Court stated that it "has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent.” Calero, supra at 689. Calero went further and stated in dicta that "the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property . . . .” Id.

Applying the principles of Van Oster and Calero, it is evident that Mrs. Bennis’ claim is without constitutional consequence. Mrs. Bennis was a joint owner who explicitly or implicitly entrusted Mr. Bennis with the use and possession of their vehicle. Van Oster, supra. It is clear from Calero that the abatement of property stolen from the owner or taken without the owner’s knowledge would be prohibited. However, on the basis of the facts before us, the argument cannot be made that the vehicle was stolen or initially driven without Mrs. Bennis’ knowledge.

Moreover, in the Michigan forfeiture case, People v One 1979 Honda Automobile, 139 Mich App 651, 655-656; 362 NW2d 860 (1984), the Court of Appeals held that knowledge by one co-owner of the illegal activity was sufficient to forfeit the interest of both owners. The car was forfeited³⁴ in that case even though one of the titled owners had no knowledge of the illegal activities committed within the car. Id. The unconstitutionality of the forfeiture was not even considered.³⁵

Having concluded that the abatement of the Bennis vehicle is not constitutionally infirm, we address the dissent’s contention that "the trial court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy.” Post, p 753. It is not contested that this is an equitable action. That being the case, it is critical to recognize that the trial judge considered alternatives on the record and, in the exercise of his discretion, fashioned an appropriate remedy, abating the entire interest in the vehicle. We merely sanction the trial judge’s action, which is clearly permitted under the nuisance abatement statute, and find that such action was not an abuse of discretion.

Review of the controlling cases persuades us that no constitutional violation results from the abatement of Mrs. Bennis’ interest in the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court indisputably allows forfeiture of an innocent owner’s property, unless evidence was submitted that the property was stolen or used without the consent of the owner.³⁶ Van Osier; Calero, supra. Other jurisdictions addressing the issue have allowed the abatement of a co-owner’s interest on strikingly similar facts.³⁷ The Michigan nuisance abatement statute specifically obviates the requirement of proof, and because the statute does not violate the constitution, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that proof of knowledge of the proscribed activity is required. Additionally, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy, abating the entire interest of the vehicle.

v

In summary, we would hold that an act of lewdness as defined herein occurred and made the vehicle abatable. Moreover, reviewing the entire record, we find that an act of fellatio occurred so as to create a clear inference that it was for monetary compensation. Proof of an actual exchange of the money is not required by the statute or decisions of this Court. Thus, alternatively, we would hold that a complete act of prostitution occurred in the Bennis vehicle. Additionally, because the act occurred in a neighborhood that was a place reputed for prostitution and therefore a public nuisance, Mr. Bennis’ vehicle contributed to that continuing nuisance and may be abated. Finally, we would hold that the clear and unambiguous language of the Michigan nuisance statute obviates the requirement of an owner’s knowledge of the proscribed activity and that the statute unquestionably passes constitutional muster. For all the foregoing reasons, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Boyle and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Riley, J. Griffin, J., concurred only in the result.

1 Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, or used for the unlawful manufacture, transporting, sale, keeping for sale, bartering, or furnishing of any controlled substance as defined in section 7104 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.7104 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or of any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous, or intoxicating liquors or any mixed liquors or beverages, any part of which is intoxicating, is declared a nuisance, and the furniture, fixtures, and contents of the building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place and all intoxicating liquors therein are also declared a nuisance, and all controlled substances and nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.

2 "Flagging” is the manner in which prostitutes solicit business from potential customers in passing vehicles.

3 Ms. Polarchio was arrested the next day for accosting and soliciting. She had formerly been arrested on several occasions for disorderly conduct, accosting and soliciting, and indecent and obscene conduct.

4 200 Mich App 670; 504 NW2d 731 (1993).

5 Schoonmaker was based on a predecessor statute, 1925 PA 389; however, the relevant language is virtually identical to the present statute. See n 26.

6 445 Mich 862 (1994).

7 State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244, 246; 240 NW2d 460 (1976).

8 See n 1 (emphasis added).

9 The doctrine should be applied where legislative intent is not clear, so that "when two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be limited and qualified by the special word.” 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 47.16, p 183. See also Williams & Works, Inc v Springfield Corp, 408 Mich 732, 746; 293 NW2d 304 (1980).

10 Diversified relied on State v Morley, 63 NM 267, 270-271; 317 P2d 317 (1957), which stated "we are led to believe that the legislature intended 'lewdness’ to be limited to acts in connection with 'assignation’ or 'prostitution’ ” and further noted that "[t]he term 'lewdness’ is a broader and more general term than 'assignation’ or 'prostitution.’ ” See also State ex rel Oakland Prosecuting Attorney v Ginell, 159 Mich App 679, 681; 407 NW2d 59 (1987), in which the Court of Appeals held that the activity must not be consensual in nature, whether lewd, obscene, or disorderly; State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Dizzy Duck, 203 Mich App 250, 260; 511 NW2d 907 (1994), where the Court of Appeals concluded that lewdness "as used in the nuisance abatement statute, refers to those sexual acts . . . performed on another where done for hire.”

11 In Diversified, we did not define lewdness, but simply held that no interest was abatable because the conduct was unrelated to live acts of prostitution on the premises.

12 See also 50 Am Jur 2d, Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity, § 1, pp 450-451:

Lewdness has been defined as the unlawful indulgence of lust. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and is generally used to indicate gross indecency with respect to the sexual relations. Illicit intercourse may under some circumstances constitute lewdness, but there may also be lewdness without any such act.

13 The Random House College Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged Edition defines "lewd” as:

1. inclined to, characterized by, or inciting to lust or lechery; lascivious. 2. obscene or indecent, as language or songs; salacious. 3. Obs. a. low, ignorant, or vulgar, b. base, vile, or wicked, esp. of a person, c. bad, worthless or poor, esp. of a thing.

14 See Levenburg and Diversiñed and cases cited therein.

15 We do not decide whether property may be abated for an act of lewdness where the conduct is not that which traditionally forms a charge of prostitution.

16 The record is. devoid of any evidence that Mr. Bennis raised in his defense that this activity was consensual or that he and Ms. Polarchio had some prior relationship.

17 See n 2.

18 Four justices held that a single act was sufficient, three held it was not, and one concurred in the reversal of the abatement but "without expressing the opinion that proof of a single violation would be insufficient to establish the existence of a nuisance under all circumstances.” Id. at 120.

19 We acknowledge that many abatement cases in this state based on identical predecessor statutes involved a nuisance where more than a single act of conduct was proved or could be inferred. People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Sill, 310 Mich 570, 572; 17 NW2d 756 (1945), abated the interest of a vehicle where proof was submitted that the owner was engaged in the "numbers racket” and had in his possession a number of betting slips. State ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Martin, 314 Mich 317, 322; 22 NW2d 381 (1946), held that "[t]he testimony of defendant would of itself be a sufficient basis for the court’s finding that defendant had used the automobile in question on the very day of his arrest and the preceding day for the illegal purposes [gambling] claimed by plaintiff” and therefore was abatable pursuant to the nuisance abatement statute. Levenburg, supra at 466-467, upheld the abatement of a Detroit bar where there was testimony that prostitutes frequently solicited customers to perform sexual acts elsewhere. In State ex rel Macomb Co Prosecuting Attorney v Mesk, 123 Mich App 111, 123; 333 NW2d 184 (1983), the Court relied on Motorama, requiring that the prosecution establish that the nuisance was continuing in nature. A continuing nuisance was established where four undercover police officers made separate visits to a massage parlor over a nine-month period and each time a model agreed to perform sexual services.

20 In Bloss, supra, this Court upheld the lower court’s injunction of the operation of an outdoor theater showing explicit movies where neighborhood children could view the films from outside the drive-in. Id. at 468-469. The Court held: "It is our judgment that the foisting off of a display of pictures not fit for children to see onto places within their view on public streets, on residential properties and in private homes, without the consent of the property owners and the parents, is a public nuisance.” Id. at 470.

21 See State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney v Bernstein, 57 Mich App 204, 206; 226 NW2d 56 (1974), upholding the abatement of a bar under MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801 where "officers testified to numerous arrests for accosting and soliciting, and to the general reputation of the Ver nor Bar as a place where the services of a prostitute can easily be obtained.” See also People v Lee, 307 Mich 743, 753; 12 NW2d 418 (1943), upholding admission of testimony of three witnesses about the "general reputation in the vicinity” of a house of prostitution in an action to convict the owner of the house.

22 We note that our position is limited to situations in which a nuisance condition exists, regardless of the city. Therefore, a vehicle could not be abated if the same situation arose in another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods, where certainly no such nuisance condition exists.

23 The 1988 amendment was in effect when the act occurred in the Bennis vehicle.

24 House Legislative Analysis, HB 4317, May 13, 1987.

25 The present statute is almost identical to its predecessor on which the Sill case is based. The statute read as follows:

Any building, vehicle or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, or used for the unlawful manufacture, storing, possessing, transporting, sale, keeping for sale, giving away, bartering, furnishing or otherwise disposing of any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicating liquors or any mixed liquors or beverages, any part of which is intoxicating, is hereby declared a nuisance and the furniture, fixtures and contents of any such building, vehicle or place, and all such intoxicating liquors therein are also declared a nuisance, and all such nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as hereinafter provided. Any person, or his servant, agent or employe who shall own, lease, conduct or maintain any building, vehicle or place used for any of the purposes or by any of the persons above set forth or where any of the acts above enumerated are conducted, permitted or carried on, is guilty of a nuisance. [1929 CL 9093. Cfi, n 1.]

26 "Proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required.” MCL 600.3815(2); MSA 27A.3815(2). The language is nearly identical to the original language of the public nuisance statute: "Proof of knowledge of the existence of such nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, shall not be required.” 1925 PA 389, § 9.

27 See n 26.

28 Also, in State ex rel Oakland Prosecuting Attorney v Weaver, 74 Mich App 462, 464; 254 NW2d 68 (1977), the Court of Appeals again considered the knowledge requirement of the nuisance statute and concluded: "Considering the clear language of the statute, we are convinced that Robinson, Bitonti and Tate are correct.”

29 In State ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Weitzman, 21 Mich App 705, 711; 176 NW2d 463 (1970), the Court held that an owner must have knowledge of acts of prostitution before padlocking the premises. Weitzman acknowledged Robinson and its progeny, but chose the course initiated by Schoonmaker. Id. Likewise, in Motorama, supra at 228, the Court of Appeals returned to the Schoonmaker decision, after Weaver, n 28 supra, stating that it had never been formally overruled. Motorama also cited dicta from Levenburg, supra, supporting its decision requiring an owner’s knowledge:

[W]e acknowledge that a judgment for abatement in a prosecution of this nature cannot be rendered without a finding of knowledge of the accosting and soliciting on the part of the owners or operators of the place found to be a nuisance and their acquiescence in those activities. [Id. at 462, n 1.]

30 As explained in McKibbin v Corp & Securities Comm, 369 Mich 69, 81; 119 NW2d 557 (1963), "[w]e have no other duty to perform than to construe the legislative will as we find it, without regard to our own views as to the wisdom or justice of the act.”

31 To the extent the reasoning of Schoonmaker may be read to imply that an owner must know that the property is being used in proscription of the statute, we choose not to follow it.

32 See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 US (12 Wheat) 1, 14; 6 L Ed 31 (1827), in which Justice Story held that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing . . . In United States v The Little Charles, 26 F Cas 979, 982; 1 Brock 347 (CC D Va, 1818) (No. 15,612), Chief Justice Marshall held that the proceeding was "against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which is not less an offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture, because it was committed without the authority, and against the will of the owner.” Dobbins’ Distillery v United States, 96 US 395, 400; 24 L Ed 637 (1877), stated that "[bjeyond all doubt, the act of Congress in question attaches the offence to the distillery, and the real and personal property connected with the same . . . .” Harmony v United States, 43 US (2 How) 210, 238; 11 L Ed 239 (1844).

33 The Court ultimately held that' the boat subject to forfeiture was voluntarily entrusted to a lessee who illegally used it and that, because there was no allegation or proof that the innocent lessor "did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use,” forfeiture was appropriate, despite the company’s lack of knowledge. Id. at 690. The Court further stated that the contested forfeiture statutes "further the punitive and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against constitutional challenge, the application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of innocents.” Id. at 686.

34 The car was used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction.

35 See also In re Forfeiture of $53, 178 Mich App 480, 495; 444 NW2d 182 (1989), in which the Court again considered the issue and this time determined that the forfeiture statute "was intended to establish a separate defense for each claimant who has a personal interest in the property as an owner.” Although the Court did not forfeit the interest of the innocent owner, the decision was based on statutory construction, not a constitutional violation.

36 We note the distinction between the situation in which a vehicle is used without the owner’s consent and, although the owner consented to the use, it is used in a manner to which the owner did not consent. In the former, the innocent owner’s interest could not be abated. Van Oster; Calero, supra. In the latter, as in the present case, the innocent owner’s interest may be abated.

37 Similarly, in People v Garner, 732 P2d 1194, 1196 (Colo, 1987), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the entire ownership of an abated vehicle could not be vested in the innocent co-owner wife. The court stated that the district court had "inherent equitable authority” to allocate a portion of the proceeds after costs to the innocent owner. Under the statute, however, the court was not obliged to do so. Further, in any event, the court could not award the innocent co-owner wife full ownership of the vehicle.

In In re 1976 Blue Ford Pickup, 120 Ariz 432, 435; 586 P2d 993 (Ariz App, 1978), the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld forfeiture of a truck jointly owned by a mother and son where the mother had no knowledge of the prohibited use of the truck. The son’s illegal possession of marijuana subjected the truck to forfeiture, and the mother’s status as an innocent owner could not "salvage the vehicle from the forfeiture occasioned through the activities of the joint owner.”