Dethmers, J.
I am unable to concur with Mr. Chief Justice Reid in reversal, although I am of the opinion that the decree of the trial court ought, in certain particulars, to be modified.
It is the well-established law of this State, declared in Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich 357 (32 LRA 92); Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich 684; Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich 100; and United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, 322 Mich 651, that while members of a church undoubtedly possess the legal right to withdraw from it, with or without reason, they may not, in'so doing, take with them, for their own purposes, or transfer to any other religious body, property previously conveyed to, or dedicated to the use of, the religious denomination from which they are withdrawing or one of its member churches, but such property must remain for the use and benefit of adherents to that denomination or those who represent it. Not inconsistent is the earlier case of Wilson v. Livingstone, 99 Mich 594, when viewed as having been predicated on the theory that the property involved in that ease had not been dedicated to the use of any religious denomination.
The property involved in the instant case belonged, originally, to the First Congregational Church of Stanton and was, as such, dedicated to the úse of the religious denomination- commonly [576]*576called Congregational, of which the Stanton church was a part. When, in the year 1937, members of the First Congregational Church of Stanton dissolved its corporate existence and undertook to take its property with them into the newly-incorporated United Church of Stanton (defendant), the legality of that attempt depended upon whether the new organization was a part of the religious denomination commonly called Congregational. If it was not, they could not, in leaving the Congregational denomination, take the property with them into the new church organization and convey it to the latter. This follows inescapably from the holdings in the above-cited eases. On the other hand, if the newly-organized defendant church was Congregational, then the transfer of property was, under the circumstances of this case, perfectly legal inasmuch as it left the property still in the ownership and for the use of a Congregational church, in which event it follows, under the above cited cases, that the 1948 attempt, by amendment, of defendant’s articles of association, to divert the property from the use of the Congregational denomination or members thereof was unlawful.' The question, therefore, of whether the United Church of Stanton was or was not, when it became organized and acquired the property in question, a Congregational church is, for the purposes of this suit, relatively unimportant, except as it is determinative of whether the unlawful diversion of Congregational church property occurred in 1937 or in 1948. In either event, plaintiffs (the trial court added as parties plaintiff certain members of defendant church who desired to adhere to the Congregational denomination) are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent use of the property by defendant, its officers or members, for other than Congregational church purposes and interference with plaintiffs’ use thereof for such purposes.
[577]*577In this connection, we observe that even if the unlawful taking occurred in 1937, the defense. of laches may not be urged against plaintiffs. In United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, supra, we held that defense not available because plaintiffs therein had not learned of the secret transfer of church property until shortly before suit. In the instant case, if the defendant church actually was not Congregational when organized, plaintiffs w;e.re lulled into a false sense of security by the provisions in the articles of association that members should worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the Congregational Church in the United States of America and by the continued payment of assess-^ ments by defendant church to the .Congregational Association until 1946, so that plaintiffs had-no reason to suspect, until the present controversy developed, that defendant was not a Congregational church or that the property had been diverted from Congregational church ownership and purposes. In fact, plaintiffs continue to contend that defendant church is Congregational, a view in which they were upheld by the trial judge. The fact that plaintiffs, because they entertain this view, have not claimed that the transfer in 1937 was unlawful should not be considered to operate as a bar to reaching in this case the result indicated by the above-cited cases. It consistently has been the theory of plaintiffs’ case that property which once had been dedicated to the use and benefit of the Congregational denomination was thereafter diverted to another use which they seek to enjoin. Whether they have misconceived the date of that wrongful diversion is immaterial.
I am not unmindful of the claimed high degree of autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs enjoyed by the individual congregation in the Congregational denomination as contrasted with some others. It [578]*578seems to me, however, of no profit in this case to consider the differences between the church government’ and organization of the Congregational denomination. and that of others. It is neither the concern of this Court nor in anywise determinative of the legal rights of parties whether the Congregational denomination exercised any disclipline over .defendant or ever exhorted it to more faithful observance of Congregational doctrines. The' fact remains that the churches commonly called Congregational, of which the First Congregational Church of Stanton at least was 1, together form a denomination. What this Court held in the above-cited cases relative to denominational rights in the use of property dedicated thereto was in nowise made dependJent upon the degree of authority possessed or actually exercised in ecclesiastical affairs by the denomination over its member churches, nor was it suggested in those cases that on the basis of such considerations exceptions might be made to the rule therein announced. In any event, such an exception is out of the question in the case of Congregational churches. The theory that the full autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs' reposing in the individual congregation carries with it the right of a majority of its membership to make such disposition of church property as they may desire is utterly untenable in view of the provisions of the statute applicable to the incorporation and regulation of Congregational churches-(PA 1901, No 53, as amended [CL 1948, § 458.301 et seq. (Stat Ann § 21.1881 et seg.)]), section 7 of which provides, as relates to churches coming under its provisions, in part -as follows:
.. “Provided, however, That all property .of said corporation whether real, personal or mixed or whether held in fee or in trust and the income therefrom and the proceeds thereof when sold,shall, subject to the terms of any ’trust- or -trusts relating thereto or to [579]*579■any part thereof, be held and used by said .corporation for the'benefit of said church .as a Congregational religions organization, and for no other purpose whatsoever.”
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Dethmers, J.
I am unable to concur with Mr. Chief Justice Reid in reversal, although I am of the opinion that the decree of the trial court ought, in certain particulars, to be modified.
It is the well-established law of this State, declared in Fuchs v. Meisel, 102 Mich 357 (32 LRA 92); Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich 684; Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich 100; and United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, 322 Mich 651, that while members of a church undoubtedly possess the legal right to withdraw from it, with or without reason, they may not, in'so doing, take with them, for their own purposes, or transfer to any other religious body, property previously conveyed to, or dedicated to the use of, the religious denomination from which they are withdrawing or one of its member churches, but such property must remain for the use and benefit of adherents to that denomination or those who represent it. Not inconsistent is the earlier case of Wilson v. Livingstone, 99 Mich 594, when viewed as having been predicated on the theory that the property involved in that ease had not been dedicated to the use of any religious denomination.
The property involved in the instant case belonged, originally, to the First Congregational Church of Stanton and was, as such, dedicated to the úse of the religious denomination- commonly [576]*576called Congregational, of which the Stanton church was a part. When, in the year 1937, members of the First Congregational Church of Stanton dissolved its corporate existence and undertook to take its property with them into the newly-incorporated United Church of Stanton (defendant), the legality of that attempt depended upon whether the new organization was a part of the religious denomination commonly called Congregational. If it was not, they could not, in leaving the Congregational denomination, take the property with them into the new church organization and convey it to the latter. This follows inescapably from the holdings in the above-cited eases. On the other hand, if the newly-organized defendant church was Congregational, then the transfer of property was, under the circumstances of this case, perfectly legal inasmuch as it left the property still in the ownership and for the use of a Congregational church, in which event it follows, under the above cited cases, that the 1948 attempt, by amendment, of defendant’s articles of association, to divert the property from the use of the Congregational denomination or members thereof was unlawful.' The question, therefore, of whether the United Church of Stanton was or was not, when it became organized and acquired the property in question, a Congregational church is, for the purposes of this suit, relatively unimportant, except as it is determinative of whether the unlawful diversion of Congregational church property occurred in 1937 or in 1948. In either event, plaintiffs (the trial court added as parties plaintiff certain members of defendant church who desired to adhere to the Congregational denomination) are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent use of the property by defendant, its officers or members, for other than Congregational church purposes and interference with plaintiffs’ use thereof for such purposes.
[577]*577In this connection, we observe that even if the unlawful taking occurred in 1937, the defense. of laches may not be urged against plaintiffs. In United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, supra, we held that defense not available because plaintiffs therein had not learned of the secret transfer of church property until shortly before suit. In the instant case, if the defendant church actually was not Congregational when organized, plaintiffs w;e.re lulled into a false sense of security by the provisions in the articles of association that members should worship and labor together according to the discipline, rules and usage of the Congregational Church in the United States of America and by the continued payment of assess-^ ments by defendant church to the .Congregational Association until 1946, so that plaintiffs had-no reason to suspect, until the present controversy developed, that defendant was not a Congregational church or that the property had been diverted from Congregational church ownership and purposes. In fact, plaintiffs continue to contend that defendant church is Congregational, a view in which they were upheld by the trial judge. The fact that plaintiffs, because they entertain this view, have not claimed that the transfer in 1937 was unlawful should not be considered to operate as a bar to reaching in this case the result indicated by the above-cited cases. It consistently has been the theory of plaintiffs’ case that property which once had been dedicated to the use and benefit of the Congregational denomination was thereafter diverted to another use which they seek to enjoin. Whether they have misconceived the date of that wrongful diversion is immaterial.
I am not unmindful of the claimed high degree of autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs enjoyed by the individual congregation in the Congregational denomination as contrasted with some others. It [578]*578seems to me, however, of no profit in this case to consider the differences between the church government’ and organization of the Congregational denomination. and that of others. It is neither the concern of this Court nor in anywise determinative of the legal rights of parties whether the Congregational denomination exercised any disclipline over .defendant or ever exhorted it to more faithful observance of Congregational doctrines. The' fact remains that the churches commonly called Congregational, of which the First Congregational Church of Stanton at least was 1, together form a denomination. What this Court held in the above-cited cases relative to denominational rights in the use of property dedicated thereto was in nowise made dependJent upon the degree of authority possessed or actually exercised in ecclesiastical affairs by the denomination over its member churches, nor was it suggested in those cases that on the basis of such considerations exceptions might be made to the rule therein announced. In any event, such an exception is out of the question in the case of Congregational churches. The theory that the full autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs' reposing in the individual congregation carries with it the right of a majority of its membership to make such disposition of church property as they may desire is utterly untenable in view of the provisions of the statute applicable to the incorporation and regulation of Congregational churches-(PA 1901, No 53, as amended [CL 1948, § 458.301 et seq. (Stat Ann § 21.1881 et seg.)]), section 7 of which provides, as relates to churches coming under its provisions, in part -as follows:
.. “Provided, however, That all property .of said corporation whether real, personal or mixed or whether held in fee or in trust and the income therefrom and the proceeds thereof when sold,shall, subject to the terms of any ’trust- or -trusts relating thereto or to [579]*579■any part thereof, be held and used by said .corporation for the'benefit of said church .as a Congregational religions organization, and for no other purpose whatsoever.”
Section 8 provides, concerning the property of any such church, that, when it is no longer used for the benefit of that church as a Congregational' religious organization, -the Congregational denomination may take certain steps leading to acquisition of title to the .property.
The trial court’s decree provides that the 1948 amendments to defendant’s articles of association are set aside and held for naught and that defendant, its officers and members are enjoined from amending them so as to make defendant a non-Congregational church. In this the court erred. Whether or-hot defendant church was organized as. n Congregatioh'ál church in 1937, in any event it was not organized under nor did it ever vote to come under the provisions of PA 1901, No 53, as amended, providing for the organization and incorporation of Congregational churches and, hence, the inhibition of that act against amendment of articles of association in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of that act does not apply to defendant. The court also erred in decreeing that defendant, its officers and members be enjoined from permitting certain persons, under certain circumstances, from serving it as pastor. In church disputes courts may concern themselves with property rights only and not with the ecclesiastical affairs of the church. Berry v. Bruce, 317 Mich 490; White v. Mt. Beulah Baptist Church, 319 Mich 392; United Armenian Brethren Evangelical Church v. Kazanjian, supra.
The trial court properly added as parties plaintiff those members of defendant church who had signified a desire for continued adherence to the Con[580]*580gregational denomination. CL 1948, § 612.13 (Stat Ann § 27.665); Windoes v. Colwell, 247 Mich. 372. Whatever its previous status, defendant is, since the 1948 amendments, definitely not Congregational and, accordingly, the decree of the trial court properly provided, in effect, that defendant should be enjoined from use of the property in question and its officers and members from interfering with plaintiffs’ use thereof and that the latter are entitled thereto. The decree should have provided for transfer to and quieting of title in plaintiffs for Congregational church purposes.
A decree may enter in this Court in accord herewith. Costs to plaintiffs.
North, Btjtzel, Carr, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.