Michelle Zweede v. Department of Agriculture

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided April 3, 2024·No. DC-0752-21-0370-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHELLE A. ZWEEDE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-21-0370-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: April 3, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Christopher R. Landrigan , Esquire, and Sara A. Buchholz , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Julie Nelson , Golden, Colorado, for the agency.

Kevin Sitler , Esquire, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the agency.

Shannon L. Swaziek , Esquire, Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the appellant’s 30-day suspension and reassignment based on the charge 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

of “Appearance of Conflict of Interest.” Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

The agency did not charge the appellant with violating 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a). On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that the agency was not required to prove that the appellant violated the ethics regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a). Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 8; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 36, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-7. The administrative judge instead applied the elements of an “Appearance of Conflict of Interest” charge as established by our case law. ID at 7-8. We find that the administrative judge correctly construed the agency’s charge: the agency chose the charge of “Appearance of Conflict of Interest” without reference to the violation of any specific statute, regulation, or rule. ID at 7; IAF, Tab 10 at 73. The appellant accurately notes that the proposing official included a statement that the appellant violated 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) under Douglas 1 factor 1, the nature and seriousness of the offense, in her penalty analysis attached to the proposal notice. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8; IAF, Tab 10 at 77. However, based on our 1 Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981). 3

well-established precedent, we find that the agency was only required to prove the “Appearance of Conflict of Interest,” the label it affixed to the charge in the proposal notice. IAF, Tab 10 at 73; see Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force, 103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 19 (2006), aff’d, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D.N.M. 2009), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 932 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Diaz v. Department of the Army, 56 M.S.P.R. 415, 418-20 (1993) (distinguishing between the actual charges and the factual narratives outlining those charges in determining the elements of the charges).

The administrative judge applied the correct standard for the agency’s charge. The appellant also argues that 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) creates objective criteria that the Board should apply in evaluating whether an “Appearance of Conflict of Interest” existed. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-14. The administrative judge correctly rejected this argument in the initial decision. ID at 6 n.6, 7 n.7. We find no legal error in the administrative judge’s definition of “Appearance of Conflict of Interest.” ID at 7-8 (citing Fontes v. Department of Transportation, 51 M.S.P.R. 655, 663-64 (1991); Special Counsel v. Nichols, 36 M.S.P.R. 445, 455 (1988)).

The agency proved its charge. We find no errors of law or erroneous findings of material fact in the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency proved its charge. ID at 6-18. The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s decision not to credit her claim that she believed that there was no actual or apparent conflict of interest. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14; ID at 15. We observe no reason to disturb the credibility determinations of the administrative judge in this case. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so). 4

The agency did not violate the appellant’s due process rights. Lastly, the appellant appears to be raising for the first time on review a due process violation based on the vagueness of the agency’s charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9 n.1. She argues that, if violating 5 C.F.R. § 2635 was not the agency’s charge, then the agency did not set forth a different charge of sufficient specificity to satisfy due process requirements. Id. Because the appellant has not shown that this argument is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence, it is not a basis for disturbing the initial decision. See Pridgen v. Office of Personnel Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 34 n.10; Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Moreover, the appellant has not established a due process violation. The appellant’s detailed written response to the charge and specifications indicated that she understood the agency’s charge. IAF, Tab 10 at 31-46, 73-74. Although she argued that her relationship with her father was not a relationship described under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a), she also argued more broadly that “no reasonable person” would have had a concern about her impartiality in the matters described in the agency’s specifications. Id. at 39-40.

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Michelle Zweede v. Department of Agriculture, (Miss. 2024).

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