Judgment rendered November 17, 2021. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 54,112-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
MICHELLE WILLIAMS AND Plaintiffs-Appellees NICOLE WILLIAMS GROSS
versus
CENTERPOINT ENERGY Defendants-Appellant- RESOURCES CORP., AND THE Appellee CITY OF SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 600967
Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge
PHELPS DUNBAR LLP Counsel for Appellant, By: H. Alston Johnson, III CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.
PLAUCHÉ MASELLI PARKERSON LLP By: G. Bruce Parkerson James K. Ordeneaux Scott H. Mason
BARHAM & WARNER, L.L.C. By: Vicki C. Warner AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, BENSON Counsel for Plaintiffs/ & PAINE, LLC Appellees, Michelle By: Curtis R. Shelton Williams and Nicole Lee H. Ayres Williams Gross Jody T. Benson
COLVIN, SMITH, McKAY & BAYS Counsel for Defendant/ By: Jennifer P. McKay Appellee, The City of Shreveport, Louisiana
Before STONE, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.
The defendant, CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., appeals a trial
court judgment awarding expert witness fees in the amount of $238,047.10,
associated with services and testimony provided by three plaintiffs’ experts.
The plaintiffs, Michelle Williams and Nicole Williams Gross, have
answered the appeal, seeking a reversal of the trial court’s denial of their
claim for expert witness fees associated with work completed by others at
the behest of the experts. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 31, 2016, the decedent, Dr. Richard Williams, lit a cigar in
the back yard of his home in Shreveport, Louisiana. An explosion and fire
occurred, and Dr. Williams sustained severe burns. He later died as a result
of his injuries.
The plaintiffs, Michelle Williams and Nicole Williams Gross, the
widow and daughter of Dr. Williams, filed a lawsuit against defendants,
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. (“CenterPoint”) and the City of
Shreveport, Louisiana (“the City”). The plaintiffs alleged the explosion and
fire were caused by a major leak in a natural gas line immediately adjacent
to the home of Dr. and Mrs. Williams, CenterPoint was the operator and
transporter of the natural gas, and CenterPoint was responsible for the
condition and maintenance of the gas line. Further, the plaintiffs alleged the
City, which maintained and operated the utility rights of way in Shreveport,
was liable for failing to replace and maintain the gas pipeline. A bifurcated trial was held, and a jury considered the claims with
regard to CenterPoint’s alleged liability.1 The issues of liability and
damages were hotly contested, and multiple expert witnesses testified at
trial. After the conclusion of the presentation of testimony and evidence, the
jury apportioned 80% fault to CenterPoint, 15% fault to the City, 5% fault to
the decedent, and 0% to Michelle Williams, and awarded $8,369,536.83 in
damages. Thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs in accordance with the jury’s verdict, plus “such costs as are fixed
by the Court with judicial interest according to law until paid in full.”
CenterPoint satisfied the judgment against it, paying $6,695,629.49 in
principal and $699,968.44 in judicial interest.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs and expert
witness fees in the amount of $318,605.25, in addition to “all other costs
incurred.” Relevant to this appeal are the expert witness fees attributable to
three experts retained by the plaintiffs: Rick Jones, an expert in fire cause
and origin, Robert Bartlett, a mechanical engineer and metallurgist, and
Edward Ziegler,2 an expert in gas pipeline safety and human factors. As to
those experts, the plaintiff requested fees as follows: $67,386.96 for Jones,
$100,667.44 for Bartlett, and $144,850.85 for Ziegler.
CenterPoint opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiffs were
“attempting to recover pre-trial costs that [were] not ‘incurred directly in
1 In the bifurcated trial, a jury considered the claims against CenterPoint, while the trial judge considered the claims against the City. After considering the evidence, the trial court found the City was not at fault. The plaintiffs did not appeal that judgment. 2 In some portions of the record, Ziegler’s last name is misspelled “Zeigler.” However, when he spelled his name for the record during his deposition, he spelled it, “Ziegler.” Additionally, his named is spelled “Ziegler” on the correspondence from his limited liability company contained in the record. Therefore, with the exception of direct quotations, for the purposes of this opinion, we will utilize the spelling “Ziegler.” 2 connection with the expert’s assistance at trial.’” According to CenterPoint,
the plaintiffs’ expert costs should have been limited to the costs associated
with testifying at trial and preparing to testify at trial, and should not have
included time spent assisting plaintiffs’ counsel in preparing for trial or time
spent collecting and evaluating evidence prior to the filing of the lawsuit.
CenterPoint maintained the costs should not have exceeded $42,920.81
(80% of that amount would total $34,336.65).
A hearing on the motion to tax costs was held on September 9, 2019.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:
[T]he costs to be taxed relating to expert witness fees in the instant matter apply only to the work performed in preparation for trial on behalf of testifying expert witnesses. *** This lawsuit began in May of 2017 and continued into October 2019. The trial lasted over two weeks, spanning from March 13, 2019 through March 29, 2019. The initial request on behalf of the Plaintiffs exceeded $30,000,000.00 and was reduced to an award amounting to 80% of $8,369,536.83. Expert witnesses were presented on behalf of both parties, and the amount spent on expert witnesses by Defendants was comparable to the amount requested in Plaintiffs’ Motion.
Plaintiffs conducted several depositions, wherein each of the expert witnesses with fees in dispute testified as to their hourly rates and time spent in preparation for trial. According to Plaintiffs’ depositions of the expert witnesses, the hourly rates were charged as follows: Mr. Jones, $155.00 per hour; Mr. Bartlett, $325.00 per hour; and Mr. Zeigler, $295.00 per hour. Each expert witness testified that their rates were reasonable and customary for someone in their field with similar education, training and experience. In addition, each expert witness affirmed that their hours spent in preparation for trial were what was needed for each to be prepared for trial. The hours spent by the expert witnesses in preparation for trial were paid for in full by the Plaintiffs prior to bringing the Motion. *** This multimillion dollar case involved a myriad of complex scientific and human factors. As such, the Plaintiffs’ experts were required to be thorough, collect and analyze sufficient facts and data, and apply reliable principles and methods. 3 Certainly, any shortcomings on any one of those requirements would have subjected the Plaintiffs to the possibility that an expert’s testimony would not be allowed. The work conducted in preparation for trial by each expert witness was necessary for the Plaintiffs in proving their case. The Court recognizes both parties’ efforts to provide a thorough and analytical review of the pertinent facts to this case, and considered the factors as to each expert accordingly. ***
The trial court awarded expert witness fees as follows: $41,060.56 for
work completed by Jones, $48,919.69 for the work completed by Bartlett,
and $144,866.85 for the work completed by Ziegler. The court also awarded
additional costs of other experts, exhibits, video depositions and transcripts,
clerk of court and sheriff costs, transcription of audio calls, certified copies
of medical records, and trial exhibit costs.
Additionally, relying on this Court’s decision in Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v.
Jackel Int’l Ltd., 52,615 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 269 So. 3d 1136, writ
granted, 2019-0749 (La. 10/8/19), 319 So. 3d 854, and rev’d on other
grounds, 2020 WL 499164, 2019-0749 (La. 1/29/20), ___ So. 3d ___, the
trial court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for expert witness fees associated with
the costs of work completed by others at the behest of the expert. The court
stated:
I took a long time working on this opinion, and also I was waiting for the Supreme Court to come back with their opinion in Luv N’ Care. *** And it did address expert witness fees at the Second Circuit, but the Supreme Court did not address it in their opinion, but I did want to wait to see if they were going to address it. *** But I also took a long time going through all of this – each expert and some of the other expenses, because it was a lot of money that was involved in this, and I really did give this a lot of thought. And one of the main things that formed the basis of my opinion is the Luv N’ Care opinion that I can only award those fees for actual preparation for trial, not for consultation with the attorneys and things of that nature.
4 And so that was a reason why I reduced the amount that the plaintiffs were requesting. ***
CenterPoint appeals; the plaintiffs have answered the appeal.
DISCUSSION
CenterPoint contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
expert witness fees exceeding $235,000.00, for the fees associated with
Jones, Bartlett, and Ziegler. According to CenterPoint, expert witnesses are
only entitled to reasonable compensation for costs associated with preparing
to testify at trial and the actual participation in the trial. CenterPoint
maintains the trial court erroneously awarded costs for all of the time the
experts expended on this case over the course of two and a half years.
Additionally, CenterPoint asserts much of the work and investigation
performed by the expert witnesses commenced prior to the lawsuit being
filed, and the experts should not be compensated for that work, as it was not
conducted to prepare the experts to testify at trial. Furthermore, CenterPoint
urges this Court to adhere to the “American Rule,” by which each party
would bear its own litigation costs.
Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the
party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause. La. C. C. P. art. 1920.
Additionally, La. R.S. 13:3666 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Witnesses called to testify in court only to an opinion founded on special study or experience in any branch of science, or to make scientific or professional examinations, and to state the results thereof, shall receive additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to the value of time employed and the degree of learning or skill required.
5 B. The court shall determine the amount of the fees of said expert witnesses which are to be taxed as costs to be paid by the party cast in judgment either:
(1) From the testimony of the expert relative to his time rendered and the cost of his services adduced upon the trial of the cause, outside the presence of the jury, the court shall determine the amount thereof and include same.
(2) By rule to show cause brought by the party in whose favor a judgment is rendered against the party cast in judgment for the purpose of determining the amount of the expert fees to be paid by the party cast in judgment, which rule upon being made absolute by the trial court shall form a part of the final judgment in the cause. ***
An expert witness is entitled to reasonable compensation for his court
appearance and for his preparatory work. The trial judge is not required to
set an expert witness fee at the amount charged by the expert witness. The
trial judge has great discretion in awarding and fixing costs and expert
witness fees. Boone v. Top Dollar Pawn Shop of Bossier, LLC, 50,493 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d 1093; Hammock ex rel. Thompson v.
Louisiana State Univ. Med. Ctr. in Shreveport, 34,086 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/1/00), 772 So. 2d 306.
Relevant factors in fixing expert witness fees include the time spent
testifying, time spent in preparation for trial, time spent away from regular
duties while waiting to testify, extent and nature of the work performed, and
the knowledge, attainments of the expert. The court may also consider the
helpfulness of the expert’s report and testimony to the court and the
complexity of the problem addressed by the expert. Boone, supra.
A trial court’s assessment of costs can be reversed by an appellate court only
upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Ryan v. Case New Holland, Inc.,
6 51,062 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So. 3d 611; Allstate Enterprises, Inc.
v. Brown, 39,467 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05), 907 So. 2d 904. An abuse of
discretion occurs when such discretion is exercised in a way that deprives a
litigant of his day in court. Anderson v. Cunningham, 34,859 (La. App. 2
Cir. 5/9/01), 786 So. 2d 940; Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry v. Baker,
D.D.S., 33, 828 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/00), 768 So. 2d 683. Generally, an
abuse of discretion results from a conclusion reached capriciously or in an
arbitrary manner. Quality Env. Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Co., Inc.,
2016-0230 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 219 So. 3d 349, writ denied, 2017-
0915 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So. 3d 833.
In Albright v. S. Trace Country Club of Shreveport, Inc., 37,725 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 10/17/03), 859 So. 2d 238, 243, writ granted, 2003-3413 (La.
3/26/04), 871 So. 2d 331, and aff'd, 2003-3413 (La. 7/6/04), 879 So. 2d 121,
this Court defined the terms “arbitrary and capricious” as follows:
Capricious is defined as “governed by or showing caprice; unsteady; changeable; fickle; fanciful; as, a man of a capricious temper.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition, 1972. Further, caprice is defined as “whim, arbitrary, seemingly unfounded motivation. Disposition to change one’s mind impulsively.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979. Further, in Jemison v. City of Kenner, 277 So.2d 728, 729 (La.App. 4th Cir.1973), writ denied, 281 So.2d 753 (La.1973), the court noted that “... The words arbitrary and capricious are practically synonymous and mean without reasonable cause and do not necessarily imply an opprobrious connotation. Arbitrary action is based upon one’s will and usually implies an abuse of one's authority or power ....” (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to
assess fees and costs. The parties presented the court with the invoices
submitted by Jones, Bartlett, and Ziegler, and the deposition testimony of the
three experts. 7 Richard (“Rick”) Jones, Jr.
CenterPoint argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
$41,060.56 for expert witness fees attributable to Rick Jones. CenterPoint
maintains Jones spent approximately 20 hours traveling to and attending the
trial, including the two and a half hours he testified, and, as such, the
plaintiffs should have only been awarded $12,165.00, the amount which
reflects the time Jones testified he spent actually traveling to and preparing
to testify at the trial. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for
295 hours Jones allegedly spent “preparing for trial.” CenterPoint also
asserts Jones’ testimony was neither complex nor helpful because it
(CenterPoint) had submitted documents which showed the explosion was
caused by “the unintentional release of natural gas from its cast-iron main.”
Although the trial court described Jones’ testimony as “helpful to both this
Court and the jury,” the court did not mention the report submitted by Jones
when it ruled in favor of the City.
Our review of the record reveals the plaintiffs requested $67,386.96
for expert witness fees associated with the work performed by Jones. As
stated above, Jones, a certified fire investigator, was retained as the
plaintiffs’ origin and cause expert. Two days after the fire and explosion,
Jones sent two of his employees to Shreveport to begin processing and
investigating the scene. During his deposition related to costs, Jones
testified he charged $155.00 per hour for his time spent working on this
case, as shown by the invoices issued by his firm. Jones testified with
regard to the time, effort, travel, and preparation required to testify in a case
he described as “very complex.” He testified as follows:
8 *** This [case] had a lot of players, a lot of evidence, a lot of testing, a lot of history, a lot of research. I mean, this goes back over 100 years that the pipe was in the ground. So they had history to go along with this that you needed to research and learn when the pipe was put in. So this was a very complex case. ***
With regard to Jones, the trial court specifically found his services as
an expert required multiple site and off-site inspections, the interviewing of
witnesses, inspection of artifacts, the review of documents and depositions,
and applying the proper analysis to the facts he gathered. The trial court also
found the testimony of Jones “provided crucial expertise pertaining of the
ignition as well as its source,” and enabled the jury to “understand the
evidence and to determine facts [at] issue at trial.” The trial court ultimately
awarded $41,060.56 in expert witness fees for services rendered by Jones.
Jones testified with regard to the number of hours he and his employees
expended on this case, and he submitted the invoices as evidence thereof.
Other than arguing the amount awarded to Jones was excessive, CenterPoint
has presented no evidence to support the amount of time expended, or the
charges therefor, as being excessive. Nor did CenterPoint present any
evidence to show the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously or abused its
authority in ordering the amount. Based on the record before us, we find the
amount awarded is supported by the record, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding to the plaintiffs $41,060.56 in expert witness fees
for the expertise and testimony of Jones.
Robert (“Bob”) Bartlett
Additionally, CenterPoint argues the trial court erred in awarding
$48,919.69 for fees associated with Bob Bartlett’s expert testimony.
9 Bartlett, a mechanical and metallurgical engineer, testified on behalf of the
plaintiffs as an expert in metallurgy. CenterPoint maintains Bartlett spent
only 18.5 hours traveling to and attending the trial, and his testimony lasted
one hour and 44 minutes. Yet, the plaintiffs requested, and were awarded
fees for, 130 hours for Bartlett’s “preparatory work for trial.” CenterPoint
does not dispute Bartlett’s knowledge and skill. However, it notes Bartlett’s
written report was not introduced at trial and, therefore, it could not have
been “helpful” in assisting the judge or the jury. Further, CenterPoint
maintains Bartlett’s trial testimony did not contain any information not
already in CenterPoint’s public filings, and any work expended by Bartlett
may have assisted plaintiff’s counsel in framing and presenting the case, but
did not help the trier of fact. CenterPoint urges the fees for Bartlett’s
testimony should be reduced from $48,919.69, to $11,667.50.
As stated above, the plaintiffs requested $100,667.44 for expert
witness fees associated with the work performed by Bartlett, who testified
with regard to the cast iron gas pipe which leaked and ignited, resulting in
the death of Dr. Williams. During his deposition testimony relative to the
motion to tax costs, Bartlett testified he conducted testing and research
which were incorporated into the opinions he formed in this case. He also
stated he attended inspections and reviewed documents which were
necessary to formulate his opinions. Bartlett testified he charged an hourly
rate of $325.00, and his engineering firm submitted invoices to reflect the
hours expended by Bartlett and his employees related to this case. Bartlett
also testified the rate he charged was “a reasonable and customary rate” for
someone in his field with similar education, training, and experience. He
further testified other mechanical engineers and engineering technologists 10 employed by his company performed some of the work in this matter, and
some of the invoices billed for work completed by them. Bartlett stated the
work performed by his employees was at his behest and was necessary in the
preparation for his trial testimony. He also testified the issues he was asked
to address were “complex.” He stated:
Well, this is typical of the type of work that we do. But it is complex. But after you develop patterns of addressing them, it’s not that challenging. But it is a complex interpretation of facts, metallography and metallurgical evaluation and various types of technical evaluations that we did. There is certainly some complexity to this. This is not just common sense material.
During his testimony on cross-examination, Bartlett testified he
initially became involved in this case after he was contacted by Rick Jones.
He also testified he was retained to work on this case before the lawsuit was
filed, and any work he performed prior to the filing of the lawsuit, including
developing alternate protocols, was “definitely in preparation for gaining the
information we needed in order to testify at trial.” Bartlett submitted
invoices to reflect the hours he and his employees spent working on this
case.
With regard to Bartlett’s testimony, the trial court stated:
Mr. Bartlett provided opinions related to CenterPoint’s cast iron main that leaked and ignited, leading to the death of Dr. Williams. These opinions also tied to the opinions of Mr. Zeigler, as they related to the inherent dangers found in CenterPoint’s gas distribution system. Mr. Bartlett’s testimony on CenterPoint’s cast iron main provided crucial evidence as to the inherent dangers of cast iron pipes and their threat to the safety of the general public and to Dr. Williams. Further, Mr. Bartlett provided testimony as to the complexity of the case. Specifically, Mr. Bartlett spoke as to the complex interpretation of facts, metallography and the metallurgical evaluations as well as technical evaluations conducted.
11 We have reviewed this record, including the invoices submitted
by Bartlett’s firm, and his deposition testimony related thereto.
Bartlett testified with regard to his hourly fee, and he provided
invoices detailing the hours spent working on this case. There is no
evidence of record the trial court abused its discretion or acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in awarding to the plaintiffs expert witness
fees, in the amount of $48,914.69, associated with Bartlett’s trial
preparation and testimony.
Edward Ray Ziegler
Additionally, CenterPoint contends the trial court erred in awarding
$144,866.85 in expert witness fees for the preparation and testimony of
Ziegler. CenterPoint argues Ziegler’s testimony lasted four hours and eleven
minutes, and he allegedly spent approximately 40 hours traveling to and
from Shreveport to attend the trial. Further, according to CenterPoint,
Ziegler admitted he copied and pasted certain portions of this case from a
report he had previously prepared for another case; therefore, it is “doubtful”
he spent the more than 80 hours he claimed for “preparing for trial.”
Further, CenterPoint asserts Ziegler’s trial testimony did not reference most
of the information contained in his report. CenterPoint argues this Court
should not “confuse the standard of ‘time spent in preparation for trial’ with
‘time spent working on a case.’” CenterPoint also urges Ziegler billed the
plaintiffs for the time he spent “working on the case,” but he did not make
any effort to segregate the time he spent genuinely preparing for the trial.
Ziegler, an expert in pipeline safety and human factors, testified via
deposition with regard to the expert witness fees. He testified he was
retained by plaintiffs’ counsel in July 2018, and he began working, gathering 12 facts and information necessary to prepare a report and to testify in this case.
Ziegler testified as follows:
As I started to review material, looked at the documents, gathered facts and information, it was all the beginning of the process that continued over the next series of invoices that we’ll probably be talking about, which the ultimate goal was to prepare to testify in a trial. So, everything I did in this process and the time that was billed was geared toward gathering that information for ultimate trial testimony. ***
Ziegler also testified with regard to the invoices he submitted to reflect the
number of hours he expended working on this case. He stated his fee for
working on this case was $295.00 per hour. According to Ziegler, the fee
was reasonable and customary in his industry, and his “rates are probably on
the low end of the industry for people who do similar work and have similar
experience.”
During cross-examination, Ziegler testified everything he did
pertaining to this case “was preparation for and gathering information to
testify at the trial.” He stated whenever he is retained in a case, “the only
purpose of performing the work, preparing, reviewing for, as I work on the
case, is to testify at the trial.” Ziegler admitted the word “trial” did not
appear in his 47-page report. Nevertheless, he stated:
But I’m analyzing these issues, and the purpose of preparing the report and learning about the case and gathering information and looking at what the other experts did in their approach, et cetera, is to go to the trial and explain these issues to the jury. That’s the sole purpose of this entire consulting project on my part.
Ziegler also testified he utilizes a “standard format,” and some aspects
of his reports are similar. For example, he stated he typically does not
rewrite the section pertaining to his background in every report he generates.
13 With regard to Ziegler, the trial court stated:
Mr. Zeigler provided testimony on safety, pipeline safety, and human factors. Mr. Zeigler reviewed thousands of pages of documents produced in discovery by CenterPoint, as well as dozens of depositions. His work also included a review of the federal Pipeline Safety Regulations and CenterPoint policies and procedures. Mr. Ziegler was accepted as an expert in pipeline safety and human factors by this Court, and his knowledge and skill set was helpful to the trier of fact to understand the evidence and to determine facts in issue at trial. Specifically, Mr. Zeigler’s testimony was offered in support of a finding of fault on CenterPoint and a finding of no fault on the part of Plaintiff, Michelle Williams.
Our review of this record reveals no abuse of discretion with regard to
the amount of expert witness fees, $144,866.85, awarded to plaintiffs for the
services of Ziegler. The invoices reflect Ziegler expended numerous hours
examining documents and records in the case and in formulating his
opinions in preparation for his testimony at trial. Further, as the trial court
noted, his trial testimony was helpful to the jury in allocating fault in this
matter. Our review of the record has revealed no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
Consequently, we find the rates charged by the expert witnesses,
Jones, Bartlett, and Ziegler, and the total number of hours expended by the
experts for preparing and testifying were reasonable, given the facts and
complexity of this case. We find the amounts awarded were sufficient to
fairly compensate the expert witnesses for their court appearances and their
preparatory work. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or authority in awarding to plaintiffs expert witness fees in the
amount of $238,047.10, for the testimony and preparatory work performed
by Jones, Bartlett, and Ziegler.
14 Answer to Appeal
In their answer to this appeal, the plaintiffs contend the trial court
committed a legal error by concluding it could not award expert fees for
work ancillary to the expert’s work. According to the plaintiffs, they were
entitled to an award of fees for work completed by employees of the expert
witnesses, at the behest of the experts.
In Luv N’ Care, supra, this Court held the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding expert witness fees for “work done by persons other
than [the expert].” Id. at 1143. However, the plaintiffs argue, this particular
issue was not raised by either of the parties in the case, and this Court did
not cite any statutory or jurisprudential authority to support its statement.
According to the plaintiffs, Luv N’ Care, supra, “was decided wrongly and
should be abrogated by this Court.”
In the instant case, the record reflects Jones and Bartlett submitted
invoices which included hours of work and travel by other engineers and
technicians employed by their companies. Both experts testified some of the
underlying background work, including processing of the scene, gathering of
information, and analyses of data, was actually completed by some of their
employees. Nevertheless, they testified the work was vital to this case
because it assisted them in forming their conclusions and opinions and
preparing for the trial in this case.
The plaintiffs assert R.S. 13:3666, which permits the trial court to
award “additional compensation, to be fixed by the court, with reference to
the value of time employed and the degree or learning or skill required,” and
the language of the statute does not limit the award to include only the work
of the expert witness. The plaintiffs also point out courts have not limited 15 attorney fee awards to services provided by the attorney alone, but have
allowed the recovery for paralegal services when awarding attorney fees.
See Hanley v. Doctors Hosp. of Shreveport, 35,527 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/6/02),
821 So. 2d 508.
Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself.
Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So. 3d 307.
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its
entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter, and placing a
construction on the provision in question that is consistent with the express
terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting
it. City of Pineville v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3352, 00-1983 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So. 2d 609.
Courts are bound to construe all parts of a statute and to construe no
sentence, clause, or word as meaningless if a construction giving force to
and preserving all words legitimately can be found. McGlothlin v. Christus
St. Patrick Hosp., 10-2775 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So. 3d 1218, 1228-29.
As stated above, La. R.S. 13:3666(A) permits the trial court to tax
additional compensation for “witnesses called to testify in court only to an
opinion founded on special study or experience in any branch of
science[.]” (Emphasis added). Further, R.S. 13:3666(B) mandates the trial
court to “determine the amount of the fees of said expert witnesses which
are to be taxed as costs[.]” (Emphasis added). R.S. 13:3666(B)(1) provides
the trial court shall determine the costs of “said expert” to be determined
from “the testimony of the expert relative to his time rendered and the cost
of his services adduced upon the trial of the cause[.]” (Emphasis added).
16 We find nothing in the language of R.S. 13:3666 permits courts to tax
additional compensation for any person other than “witnesses called to
testify in court” as to their field of study or scientific experience. Although
the work performed by the employees of the experts in the case was
characterized as essential or vital to the ultimate conclusions and opinions of
the experts, the plain language of the statute does not permit courts to award
fees for work completed by anyone other than the expert witness who
testifies in court pertaining to his or her area of expertise. Consequently, we
adhere to this Court’s ruling in Luv N’ Care, supra, and conclude the trial
court did not err in concluding invoices reflecting the charges for work done
by persons other than the expert witnesses are not recoverable under La. R.S.
13:3666.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment awarding expert
witness fees in the amount $238,047.10 is hereby affirmed. Costs of the
appeal are assessed to the defendant, CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.
AFFIRMED.