Michelle Smith v. Dysart Unified School District

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03407
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Michelle Smith, No. CV-25-03407-PHX-JZB

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Dysart Unified School District,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss” (doc. 37). Defendant 16 seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) stay-put action based on res judicata, 17 collateral estoppel, and an argument that her Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 18 relief may be granted. (Doc. 37 at 1) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has filed a 19 Response, and finding a Reply unnecessary in this matter, the Court orders as follows. 20 Although the Court is unpersuaded that res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable 21 here, it will grant Defendant’s Motion on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 22 state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 23 I. Background. 24 A.M.—Plaintiff’s son—is a six-year-old first grader who has been diagnosed with 25 multiple cognitive disabilities and impairments.2 (Doc. 10 at 71–72.) A.M. was first

26 1 The parties fully consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action on October 31, 2025. (Doc. 25.) The parties re-affirmed their consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction 27 on January 12, 2026. See (doc. 34.) 2 Those include Autism Spectrum Disorder, Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Cerebral 28 Palsy, variant RAB-11A, Depression, and Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. (Doc. 37-1 at 15.) A.M. requires “braces for daily walking, uses a walker at home, and uses a 1 identified as eligible for special education and related services by Buckeye Elementary 2 School District (“Buckeye”) in April 2023 during his preschool year. (Doc. 37-1 at 14–15.) 3 On August 20, 2024, A.M.’s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) team at Buckeye 4 drafted his annual IEP, where he was assigned to a Level C placement. (Id. at 16.) This IEP 5 called for A.M. to be provided “special education services and accommodations within a 6 regular education classroom for less than 40% of the school day[.]” (Doc. 15 at 2.) This is 7 A.M.’s last implemented IEP. (Doc. 10 at 19.) 8 A.M. “did not make any progress on his IEP goals from August 20, 2024, through 9 his IEP addendum date of December 16, 2024.” (Doc. 37-1 at 16.) Because of this lack of 10 progress, a Multidisciplinary Evaluation Team (“M.E.T.”) at Buckeye convened to amend 11 his IEP on May 21, 2025. (Id.) In the proposed amended IEP, the M.E.T. reassigned A.M. 12 to a Level D placement, where he would be in a separate day school more than 50% of the 13 school day. (Id.) 14 On June 27, 2025, Plaintiff objected to the proposed amended IEP and requested am 15 Independent Educational Evaluation (“IEE”) and Functional Behavioral Assessment 16 (“FBA”) from Buckeye. (Id. at 17.) On July 30, 2025, Buckeye notified Plaintiff that they 17 would provide A.M. with an IEE and FBA. (Id.) 18 Thereafter, Plaintiff transferred A.M. to Defendant Dysart Unified School District 19 (the “District”) in 2025, where he was scheduled to begin classes in early September. See 20 (doc. 10 at 19); see also (doc. 15 at 2–3.) Prior to A.M.’s first day of school, the District 21 offered A.M. “educational services at a private day school placement as commensurate 22 placement” with his last implemented IEP. (Doc. 15 at 3.) This program was the “Autism 23 Center for Exceptional Students (“ACES”), a Level D private day school.” (Doc. 37-1 at 24 14.) Plaintiff was notified that A.M. “would not have the opportunity to interact with 25 general education peers at ACES.” (Id. at 18.) 26 Plaintiff filed an initial complaint with the Arizona Department of Education 27 alleging four violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) on 28 medical stroller for outdoor ambulation.” (Id.) 1 September 2, 2025. (Id. at 11.) The Arizona Department of Education set this matter for a 2 hearing on October 20, 2025, before the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), an 3 independent state agency. (Id.) 4 Additionally, Plaintiff notified the District of her objection to the District’s proposed 5 placement on September 4, 2025. (Id. at 18.) On September 5, 2025, the District notified 6 Plaintiff that it would offer A.M. placement in a Level C Positive Engagement, High 7 Expectations, Achievement, Student Centered, and Effective Communication” (“PHASE”) 8 program at Countryside Elementary School. (Id.) On September 8, 2025, A.M. commenced 9 his first-grade year at Countryside Elementary School. (Id.) 10 On September 15, 2025, the District notified Plaintiff that A.M. would be 11 transferred to a Level C “Structured Teaching Classroom” (“STC”) program at Countryside 12 Elementary School. (Id.) District explained that this transfer “provides [A.M.] the 13 opportunity to safely access . . . needed supports in a specialized setting . . . . [and] the team 14 is concerned about [A.M.’s] safety due to the high magnitude behaviors experienced in the 15 PHASE classroom.” (Doc. 10 at 21.) Additionally, Defendant noted that “[t]he STC 16 classroom better meets [A.M.]’s cognitive, academic, adaptive[,] and communication 17 needs . . . . [and that] all supports and services will be provided as documented in the IEP 18 dated 12/16/2024.” (Id.) 19 On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint with this Court requesting 20 enforcement of § 1415(j) due to the ongoing OAH hearing. (Doc. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff 21 sought a court order requiring the District to return A.M. to the PHASE program from the 22 STC program. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff supported her request by arguing that the District’s 23 transfer of A.M. from PHASE to the STC program amounted to a change from A.M.’s 24 then-current educational placement, in contravention of § 1415(j) of the IDEA. See (doc. 25 1 at 5–6.) It is important to note that Plaintiff’s Complaint is not an appeal of a state Agency 26 decision; It is based solely on a § 1415(j) claim for an injunction. See generally (id.) 27 On September 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint before the OAH. 28 (Doc. 37-1 at 11.) Included in the amended complaint was a claim for a stay-put violation 1 under § 1415(j) of the IDEA. (Id. at 11–12.) 2 On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed an “Emergency Motion to Enforce Stay-Put 3 Placment” in this Court. (Doc. 10.) Due to the motion, this Court ordered expedited service 4 by the U.S. Marshals Service on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 11.) 5 On October 7, 2025, service was executed upon Jason Yeager, the Director of 6 Security at the District. See (doc. 15 at 4–5); see also (doc. 12.) Because Yeager was not 7 authorized to accept service on behalf of Defendant, Defendant filed an initial motion to 8 dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 (Doc. 15.) After full briefing, this Court found that service was not properly executed, 10 preventing it from exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (Doc. 25.) However, 11 this Court, in its discretion, treated the motion to dismiss as a motion to quash and quashed 12 service. (Id.) The Court required Plaintiff to serve an individual authorized to accept service 13 on the Defendant’s behalf. (Id.) 14 Before proper service was executed in this action, the OAH adjudicated Plaintiff’s 15 IDEA claim. On December 9, 2025, the OAH dismissed Plaintiff’s state agency action with 16 prejudice, including her stay-put claim. (Doc. 37-1 at 30–31, 35.) 17 Returning to the instant action, the Court, seeing as proper service was imminent, 18 held a hearing between the parties on January 12, 2026. (Doc. 34.) At the hearing, 19 Defendant notified the Court of its intention to file the instant Motion to Dismiss. (Id.) the 20 Court set a deadline for Defendant to file the instant Motion after service was received. 21 (Id.) 22 On January 20, 2026, service was properly executed. (Doc. 36.) Thereafter, on 23 January 29, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion. (Doc. 37.) 24 II. Legal Standards. 25 Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where “the complaint either (1) lacks a 26 cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 27 theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to 28 dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 1 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 2 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff 3 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining 5 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 6 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 7 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a 8 constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” 9 for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 10 In analyzing a pro se Plaintiff’s filings, the United States Court of Appeals for the 11 Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. 12 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of L.A., 13 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The allegations of a pro se complaint, however 14 inartfully pleaded, should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 15 by lawyers[.]”) (cleaned up). However, “[e]ven as lawyers must, pro se litigants must 16 become familiar, and comply, with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of 17 Practice for the District Court for the District of Arizona.” Warmack v. Riveria, No. CV- 18 20-02298-PHX-SPL, 2021 WL 1662691, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 28, 2021) (cleaned up). 19 III. Discussion. 20 Although the Court is not persuaded that res judicata or collateral estoppel3 are

21 3 Defendant’s first two arguments attempt to apply state law grounds pursuant to the Constitution and federal statute. See (doc. 37 at 4–6); see also Valenzuela v. Union P. R.R. 22 Co., 194 F. Supp. 3d 918, 922 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). However, these arguments appear—in effect—to apply a faulty interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. As 23 stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:

24 We have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those 25 determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality. When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed 26 issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to 27 enforce repose. . . . The principle holds true when a court has resolved an issue, and should do so equally when the issue has been decided by an 28 administrative agency, be it state or federal, . . . which acts in a judicial capacity. 1 applicable here, the Court, for the following reasons, finds that Plaintiff has failed to state 2 a claim upon which relief may be granted. 3 “The IDEA provides federal funds to help state and local agencies educate children 4 with disabilities while conditioning the funds on compliance with specific goals and 5 procedures, primarily the obligation to provide a free appropriate public education 6 (“FAPE”).” R.F. by Frankel v. Delano Union Sch. Dist., 224 F. Supp. 3d 979, 985 (E.D. 7 Cal. 2016) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412). “The IDEA primarily seeks to make public education 8 available to handicapped children who were previously excluded from any form of public 9 education.” K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 665 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 Specifically, the IDEA is aimed at curbing “the apparently widespread practice of 11 relegating handicapped children to private institutions or warehousing them in special 12 education classes.” Id. 13 One requirement under the IDEA is the creation of an IEP for each child with a 14 disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Where a parent disagrees with the contents of an IEP 15 created for their child, that parent may challenge that IEP by requesting an administrative 16 due process hearing. See Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 868 F. Supp. 17 2d 1015, 1016–17 (D. Haw. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Marcus I. ex rel. Karen I. v. Dep’t of 18 Educ., 506 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A)). 19 During the pendency of a due process hearing, “unless the State . . . and the parents 20 otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the 21 child[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis added). Although the IDEA does not define ‘then- 22 Courts do not, of course, have free rein to impose rules of preclusion, 23 as a matter of policy, when the interpretation of a statute is at hand. In this context, the question is not whether administrative estoppel is wise but 24 whether it is intended by the legislature. The presumption holds nonetheless, for Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law 25 adjudicatory principles. . . . Thus, where a common-law principle is well established, as are the rules of preclusion, . . . the courts may take it as given 26 that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. 27 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1991) (cleaned up). 28 Defendant has not convinced the Court that Congress enacted IDEA with the expectation that the common-law principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply. 1 current educational placement,’ the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2 has “interpreted the phrase to mean the placement set forth in the child’s last implemented 3 IEP.” L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 2009); Johnson 4 ex rel. Johnson v. Spec. Educ. Hearing Off., Cal., 287 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002) 5 (“For the purpose of § 1415(j)’s ‘stay put’ provision, the current educational placement is 6 typically the placement described in the child’s most recently implemented IEP.”). 7 Generally, a motion to stay put acts as an “automatic preliminary injunction, 8 meaning that the moving party need not show the traditionally required factors (e.g., 9 irreparable harm) in order to obtain preliminary relief.” Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. 10 Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009). However, this automatic standard only applies 11 where the motion is brought before the original adjudicative body—here, the Arizona 12 Office of Administrative Hearings—or a court hearing the due process appeal. See N.D. ex 13 rel. Parents Acting as Guardians ad Litem v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1112 14 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The preliminary injunction would order the [Department of Education] 15 to recognize the invocation of the stay-put provisions. The alleged violation is that Hawaii 16 is not providing the protection of the stay-put provision. The claim underlying the 17 preliminary injunction is that the stay-put provision applies. In essence, the preliminary 18 injunction is an injunction for an injunction.”). 19 Because this case amounts to “an injunction for an injunction,” the traditional 20 preliminary injunction balancing test applies. See id. To receive a preliminary injunction, 21 Plaintiff must show that: “(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to 22 suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips 23 in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” Sierra Forest 24 Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 25 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 26 Turning to the case at hand, Plaintiff has not plead sufficient factual matter, taken 27 as true, to state a plausible claim to relief because she “fails to allege sufficient facts to 28 support a cognizable legal theory.” Somers, 29 F.3d at 959. Namely, Plaintiff has not 1 presented any facts establishing that Defendant has transferred A.M. from his then-current 2 educational placement. Here, both A.M.’s original program, PHASE, and his new program, 3 STC, are both Level C programs in the same school that match his last implemented IEP. 4 Neither the facts of this case nor Ninth Circuit caselaw lend credence to the assertion that, 5 by moving A.M. from PHASE to STC, Defendant has transferred A.M. from his then- 6 current educational placement. 7 For example, in S.S. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, the United States Court of Appeals for 8 the Ninth Circuit addressed a situation where a child’s program was modified while the 9 child remained in the same school after the district underwent after programmatic changes. 10 See J.S. by and through S.S. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, No. 23-35522, 2024 WL 4750499, at 11 *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2024). Although the child’s program underwent modification, the 12 school district “had no obligation to provide services in the District’s [new] program []in a 13 manner identical to the services provided in [prior] program [.]” Id. Because both programs 14 satisfied the child’s last implemented IEP, the change did not violate the IDEA. Id. 15 In analyzing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds 16 that switching A.M. from one LRE C classroom to another does not amount to a violation 17 of the IDEA stay put provision. Because A.M.—under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 18 § 1415(j)—has remained in his then-current educational placement, Plaintiff’s claim fails 19 to state a plausible claim for relief. See L.M., 556 F.3d at 902; see also S.S., 2024 WL 20 4750499, at *1. Hence, Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed. 21 IV. Leave to Amend. 22 “Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally and may be dismissed for failure to 23 state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 24 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 25 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The Court may only dismiss a 26 pro se complaint without leave to amend where “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 27 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 28 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). 1 Because it appears, as a matter of law, that the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint || cannot be cured by amendment, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without leave 3 || to Amend. However, it is important to note that this holding does not preclude Plaintiff 4|| from filing an appeal of the OAH’s determination. Rather, this holding solely precludes || Plaintiff from refiling a § 1415() action for injunctive relief based on A.M.’s transfer from 6 || PHASE to STC. 7\| Vz Conclusion. 8 While the Court is empathetic to Plaintiff's desire “to protect [her] child’s 9|| development and enforce the rights that federal law gives him,” (doc. 39 at 2), such empathy does not overcome the critical factual and legal flaws in her Complaint. 11 |} Consequently, the Court shall dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.* 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 37) is GRANTED. |} The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 37) under 16]| seal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3). 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (doc. 1) is DISMISSED 18|| WITH PREJUDICE. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are DISMISSED and any □□ scheduled hearings are VACATED. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to terminate this action. 22 Dated this 5th day of February, 2026. 23 24 lon — 5 United States Magistrate Judge 26 4 As a final note, the Court will seal Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 37) because it contains A.M.’s full name. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3) (‘Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court that contains .. . the name of an 28 individual known to be a minor, . . . [the] party .. . making the filing may include only... the minor’s initials[.]”). -9-