JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:
This case arises out of a child custody dispute. Michelle Gomez Berezowsky filed a petition under the Hague Convention, asserting that Pablo Angel Rendon Ojeda had wrongfully removed their child, PARB,1 from Mexico to Texas. The district court granted Berezowsky’s petition and ordered that PARB be returned to Mexico. Because Berezowsky failed to meet her burden of establishing that Mexico was PARB’s place of habitual residence, we VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND with instructions to dismiss.
I.
Berezowsky and Rendon are both Mexican nationals. They met in Mexico City in May or June of 2008. In September 2008, Berezowsky learned that she was pregnant and she and Rendon became engaged. By March 2009, their relationship had deteriorated to the point that Berezowsky moved to her parents’ home in Kingwood, Texas, and cut off communication with Rendon. During this time Berezowsky attended Lonestar Community College in Texas. Berezowsky was living in the United States on a student visa, and she later testified that she intended to raise PARB in the United States if she was able to obtain a work visa after completing school. Her parents began the process of transferring or conveying their house in Texas to her. According to Berezowsky, they never finalized the conveyance. Rendon made repeated attempts to gain information about his unborn child during Berezow-sky’s pregnancy. He received no response. Berezowsky gave birth to PARB on May 31, 2009, in Kingwood, Texas. Approximately one month after PARB was born, Rendon learned his child’s name, sex, and date of birth through a private investigator.
The legal proceedings that followed PARB’s birth have been convoluted to say the least. PARB is now five years old. In his short time on this Earth, PARB has changed hands, and countries, many times. By our count at least 12 different courts— including our own — have been implicated in this near-constant custody dispute. In order to give a sense of how contentious the parents’ court battles have been, we will summarize the proceedings, which have spanned multiple years and both [460]*460sides of the border. Indeed, the parents have been involved in almost continuous proceedings — sometimes litigating in several courts simultaneously — since PARB’s birth. More often than not, the two parents seem to be fighting out this battle in completely separate courts from one another. Both parties have obtained orders by default, which the other party has subsequently appealed.
The fight began in Mexico, but quickly moved to Texas. Rendon first filed a criminal complaint against Berezowsky in Mexico alleging that he feared that PARB was being neglected and that Berezowsky had hidden information from him related to PARB. Through the accompanying investigation, he obtained a copy of PARB’s Mexican and Texas birth certificates. After discovering that PARB’s birth certificates did not list a father, Rendon filed a suit in Mexico City in December 2009 to establish his paternity. The case was assigned to the 24th Family Court in Mexico (24th Mexican Court). According to Ren-don, he was unable to personally serve Berezowsky in this Mexican suit, because she was in Texas, and instead served her through publication. The suit was dismissed without prejudice.
In February 2010, Rendon moved the custody dispute to the 410th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas (410th District Court of Texas), where Berezowsky and PARB were living at the time. The parents litigated PARB’s custody in the Texas state court system for the next two years while PARB continued to live in Texas with his mother. In response to Rendon’s suit to adjudicate parentage and a suit affecting parent-child relationship in the 410th District Court of Texas, Bere-zowsky filed an answer and a counter-petition, seeking to be appointed PARB’s sole managing conservator. Rendon then non-suited his petition in the 410th District Court of Texas, challenged the 410th District Court of Texas’s jurisdiction, and filed a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention), seeking to have PARB sent to Mexico. The 410th District Court of Texas denied Rendon’s Hague Convention petition, and concluded that it had jurisdiction.
Rendon filed a writ of mandamus, which he appealed all the way to the Texas Supreme Court. As the 410th District Court of Texas later explained, Berezowsky “strenuously asserted residence and jurisdiction over the child in Texas and in [the 410th District Court of Texas].” According to the 410th District Court of Texas, Berezowsky
insisted that the determination of the custody of the child be made in [the 410th District Court of Texas], in Texas, and not in Mexico; and submitted briefs to [the 410th District Court of Texas], the appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing in favor of a finding of jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child in Texas. Both the appellate court, and the Supreme Court of Texas found that jurisdiction to determine the custody of the PARB was and is proper in [the 410th District Court of Texas.]
More than a year later, Berezowsky and Rendon finally agreed to stipulate that Rendon was PARB’s biological father. A jury trial was then held in the 410th District Court of Texas. Both parents were present and represented by counsel. In August 2011, the jury rendered a unanimous verdict, awarding primary custody to Rendon. The 410th District Court of Texas entered an order awarding Rendon and Berezowsky joint parental rights, and giving Rendon the right to determine PARB’s residence (Texas Order).
[461]*461The Texas Order limited PARB’s primary residence to three geographic areas in Mexico “until further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or agreement of the parties.” It also required each parent to give notice to the other before traveling with PARB outside of Mexico. The Texas Order gave Berezowsky standard visitation rights and ordered her to pay child support. It further required the parties to cooperate with each other and take any and all actions necessary for the child’s name to be changed in the Mexican birth records, and to ensure that Rendon be named as the biological and legal father of PARB in Mexican birth records.2
Berezowsky filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both were denied. In September 2011, Berezowsky appealed the case to the 9th Court of Appeals in Beaumont, Texas (Texas 9th Court of Appeals). Berezowsky argued on appeal that while the 410th District Court of Texas correctly found that Texas was PARB’s home state and that it had jurisdiction over the custody suit, its exercise of that jurisdiction was improper because the suit in the 24th Mexican Court was filed first. The Texas 9th Court of Appeals affirmed the jurisdiction and judgment of the 410th District Court of Texas. See In the Interest of A.B.G., No. 09-11-00545, 2013 WL 257311 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, Jan. 24, 2013) (unpublished).
Pursuant to the Texas Court Order, Rendon drove across the border with PARB to Cuernavaca, Mexico, in October 2011. Rendon notified the 410th District Court of Texas that he had no intention of returning to Montgomery County, where the 410th District Court of Texas was located. According to Berezowsky, she did not find out that Rendon had left the country with PARB until after the father and son had already reached- Mexico. Berezowsky moved to Mexico City on October 18, 2011, and then moved to Cuerna-vaca two weeks later. Berezowsky filed a notice of change of address, “[bjecause my son was living in Cuernavaca.” She moved into the home of a friend “until I found somewhere to live.” Meanwhile, Berezow-sky’s appeal was still pending before the Texas 9th Court of Appeals.
Once in Mexico, the parents spared little time before renewing their legal battles. Within the thirteen-month timespan that PARB lived in Mexico, his parents filed or continued actions in seven Mexican courts, and continued to litigate matters in Texas. Just weeks after her arrival, Berezowsky filed a suit to terminate Rendon’s parental rights in Cuernavaca, in the State of More-los (7th Mexican Court). In her initial complaint, Berezowsky made a number of accusations against Rendon, ranging from claims that he had harassed her in the past, to allegations that he was serving her son “foods that are not nutritious and that are high in sugar, such as pizza, ‘cokes’, ice cream and juices.” She also heavily emphasized a public policy in Mexico that gives preference to the mother in custody determinations for “children of a tender age.” Berezowsky argued that it was therefore in PARB’s best interest for her to take care of him.
The 7th Mexican Court granted Bere-zowsky temporary custody of PARB, only allowed Rendon one hour of weekly supervised visits with PARB, and required Ren-don to pay child support. In her complaint Berezowsky had requested that the [462]*462suit be kept secret until Rendon received a summons. Rendon reports that he did not learn that Berezowsky had filed this suit until December 16, 2011. Rendon then filed an appeal to the appellate court in the State of Morelos (Morelos Auxiliary Chamber), arguing that the 7th Mexican Court lacked jurisdiction to make this ruling.
While that appeal was pending in the Morelos Auxiliary Chamber, Rendon sought relief from the 410th District Court of Texas. In December 2011, Rendon filed a motion to enforce the Texas Order, which had given him custody of PARB just months before. In January 2012, Rendon filed an amended motion to enforce and to clarify the Texas Order with a request for a writ of habeas corpus, a petition to modify the Texas Order, and a suit for interference of child custody. Berezowsky did not file an appearance or a response, and later argued that she was never properly served.
On January 12, 2012, the 410th District Court of Texas found that Berezowsky was in violation of the possession and access, as well as the passport provisions of the Texas Order, and had wrongfully withheld PARB from Rendon for a period of time greater than one month (Second Texas Order). The 410th District Court of Texas noted that Berezowsky had “claimed to the courts of Morelos[, Mexico,] that the child was abducted from Texas by his father” and then concluded that Rendon was in compliance with the Texas Order, had not abducted PARB from the United States, and had a superior right to possess PARB. The 410th District Court of Texas issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding Bere-zowsky and her parents to immediately and safely deliver PARB to the 410th District Court of Texas, and to personally appear to show cause and defend against the motion filed by Rendon. Berezowsky did not do so.
The 410th District Court of Texas also issued a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Berezowsky from interfering with Rendon’s right to possess PARB, hiding or secreting PARB, disturbing the peace of PARB, and making disparaging remarks regarding Rendon or his family within the presence or hearing of PARB. The 410th District Court of Texas suspended Bere-zowsky’s rights to possession of, and access to, PARB pending a further order from that court. A hearing was set for February 9, 2012, to determine if the temporary restraining order should be made a temporary injunction. This temporary restraining order was served on Berezowsky outside of the 7th Mexican Court by hand delivery on February 17, 2012, along with a petition for damages from interference with possessory rights and a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, and an order setting a hearing on the temporary orders. The 410th District Court of Texas also ordered Berezowsky to submit to regular counseling by a licensed therapist.
On the same day, the 410th District Court of Texas also signed an order clarifying that Berezowsky and her parents were misrepresenting the Texas Order “to the courts of Morelos or the United Mexican States.” The 410th District Court of Texas explained that the Texas Order “is a valid, existing, final and enforceable order, and the matter of the primary custody of the child PARB is res judicata.” In addition, the 410th District Court of Texas clarified that unless and until an appellate court reversed the Texas Order, that it would remain both final and enforceable.
The 410th District Court of Texas held the hearing on these temporary orders on February 23, 2012. Despite receiving notice by hand delivery, Berezowsky did not appear. The 410th District Court of Texas then appointed Rendon PARB’s sole man[463]*463aging conservator. The 410th District Court of Texas gave Rendon sole custody and the exclusive right to designate PARB’s primary residence with no geographic restrictions. Berezowsky was appointed possessory conservator with only the right to receive information from Ren-don regarding PARB’s health, education, and welfare. Berezowsky was given supervised visits with PARB on the first, third, and fifth Saturdays of each month for four hours at the Access Builds Children Supervising Agency in Montgomery County, Texas. Despite this order, Bere-zowsky continued to maintain possession of PARB in Mexico. In August 2012, she moved from Cuernavaca to Mexico City.
Meanwhile, Rendon’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the 7th Mexican Court, which had granted Berezowsky temporary custody was still pending before the More-los Auxiliary Chamber. On August 16, 2012, the Morelos Auxiliary Chamber determined that the 7th Mexican Court did not have jurisdiction, rendering any ruling by that court null and void. The Morelos Auxiliary Chamber forwarded Berezow-sky’s suit to the 24th Mexican Court in Mexico City where Rendon had initially filed his suit to establish paternity in 2009. Berezowsky, who was still in possession of PARB, sought custody of PARB from the 24th Mexican Court. On August 27, 2012, the 24th Mexican Court refused to accept Rendon’s acknowledgment of paternity because PARB’s Mexican records were registered only by Berezowsky, and because there had been no final or definitive judgment as to his paternity in Mexico. The 24th Mexican Court awarded Berezowsky exclusive parental rights and rights of possession of PARB.
Rendon challenged the jurisdiction of the 24th Mexican Court to enter findings and filed a motion to dismiss his 2009 petition for acknowledgment of paternity. In September 2012, Rendon filed an action in the 11th Court in Mexico City seeking to enforce Texas Orders (11th Mexican Court). Whether by accident or design, this suit was filed with the wrong heading or caption and misnamed the parties. On September 18, 2012, the 11th Mexican Court recognized and enforced the Texas Orders and ordered Berezowsky to immediately surrender PARB to Rendon.
On October 11, 2012, Rendon arrived at PARB’s school with a group of men just as PARB was being released to go home. According to Rendon, this group consisted of the Secretary of the 11th Mexican Court and police officers sent to enforce the 11th Mexican Court’s order. A member of this group restrained Berezowsky, who was waiting in carpool line, and served her with notice of the law suit in the 11th Mexican Court.3 Meanwhile, Rendon left with PARB.
The following day Berezowsky reported to the 24th Mexican Court that Rendon had abducted PARB. The 24th Mexican Court issued an order to search and locate PARB, and ordered the parties to appear with PARB on October 18, 2012, or else face arrest. Rendon did not appear on October 18 as ordered, and the 24th Mexican Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In response, Rendon filed an amparo (federal constitutional challenge) in the 4th Civil District Court in Mexico (4th Mexican Court) to stay the 24th Mexican Court’s orders on October 25, 2012. The 4th Mexican Court suspended the 24th Mexican Court’s orders for DNA testing [464]*464and the arrest warrant for Rendon pending the appeal, but all other orders remained in effect.
On November 1, 2012, Rendon drove across the border and entered Texas with PARB. On November 6, 2012, the 24th Mexican Court ordered that the proceedings in the 11th Mexican Court be consolidated with the case in the 24th Mexican Court. The 24th Mexican Court then revoked or nullified the orders of the 11th Mexican Court, which had given Rendon custody. The 24th Mexican Court explained that the only matter before the 24th Mexican Court was a petition to acknowledge paternity, and since there was no legal father, the 24th Mexican Court could not make a custody determination. The 24th Mexican Court reaffirmed that Berezowsky had exclusive rights to, and custody of, PARB.
On November 7, 2012, Rendon filed an application for a protective order in the 410th District Court of Texas. The 410th District Court of Texas ordered both parties to appear on December 6, 2012.
On November 15, 2012, Rendon appealed the 24th Mexican Court’s orders, including: (1) the 24th Mexican Court’s order refusing to dismiss his petition; (2) the order revoking the 11th Mexican Court’s orders; (3) the order granting possession to Berezowsky; (4) the order for DNA testing; (5) the arrest warrant; and (6) the immigration alert to the 5th Chamber of the Federal District of Mexico (5th Mexican Court). The 5th Mexican Court accepted Rendon’s appeals, but refused to stay any of the 24th Mexican Court’s prior orders.
On November 30, 2012, Berezow-sky filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Southern District Court) under the Hague Convention. In January 2013, the Southern District Court issued an order holding that PARB had been wrongfully removed from Mexico and ordered his immediate return. The order awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Berezowsky. Ren-don then filed a notice of appeal to this court. On appeal, Rendon contends that the district court erred in holding that: (1) Mexico was PARB’s habitual residence; (2) Rendon wrongfully removed PARB from Mexico; and (3) Berezowsky had not consented to PARB’s removal by consenting to the jurisdiction of the 410th District Court of Texas. In their appeal before this court, the parties have filed supplemental briefs, a motion to dismiss the appeal and responses,4 and eight different [465]*465letters of supplemental authority under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j). Both parties contend that the other has made numerous misrepresentations to the various courts along the way.
II.
The Hague Convention was adopted to address the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes. Lozano, 134 S.Ct. at 1228 (citing Abbott, 560 U.S. at 8, 180 S.Ct. 1983). Specifically, the Convention is aimed at preventing parents from engaging in international forum shopping and gamesmanship by moving a child to a new country in hopes of obtaining a more favorable custody determination from a different court. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20, 130 S.Ct. 1983 (noting the “Convention’s purpose of deterring child abductions by parents who attempt to find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial disputes”); Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310 (noting that the Convention was designed “to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases”). This case presents a textbook example of parents engaged in international forum-shopping. Although Berezowsky comes before this court seeking relief under the Hague Convention, the procedural history in this case demonstrates the extent to which she has ignored court orders and sought “friendlier forums” to adjudicate this dispute.
One of the Convention’s primary objectives is “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”5 Id. at 306 (citing Convention art. 1). In other words, a parent should not be able to evade the order of one court simply because he or she has moved the child into another court’s jurisdiction.
When evaluating a Hague Convention claim, we do not assess the merits of the underlying custody dispute. Rather, our inquiry is limited to determining whether or not the child has been wrongfully removed from their country of “habitual residence.” See Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4)); see also Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir.2010). Simply put, the narrow question before us is whether Rendon wrongfully removed PARB from his country of habitual residence by bringing him back to Texas. Because Berezowsky filed this action under the Hague Convention, she must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Mexico was PARB’s habitual residence in order to establish her claim that PARB was wrongfully removed. See Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310.6
The district court’s habitual residence determination presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. Id. at 306. The mixed standard of review “means that the court ‘aceept[s] [466]*466the district court’s historical or narrative facts unless they are clearly erroneous, but exercis[es] plenary review of the court’s choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the facts.’ ” Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1251 (citations omitted). “After scrutinizing the circumstances of a particular case, we must determine whether the discrete facts add up to a showing of habitual residence.” In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting an Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.2004)).
[Although the term “habitual residence” appears throughout the various Hague Conventions, none of them defines it. The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is not formulaic; rather it is a fact-intensive determination that necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case. At core, however, the inquiry balances the interests of the child, who is the ultimate focus of the Convention, and the intentions of its parents, who usually effect the removal or retention giving rise to a Convention petition.
Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.2004) (“[C]ourts must consider the unique circumstances of each case when inquiring into a child’s habitual residence.”).
“Courts use varying approaches to determine a child’s habitual residence, each placing different emphasis on the weight given to the parents’ intentions.” Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310. Like the majority of circuits, we have “adopted an approach that begins with the parents’ shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child’s residence.” Id. (citing Nicol-son v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, n. 2 (1st Cir.2010)). “This approach does not ignore the child’s experience, but rather gives greater weight to the parents’ subjective intentions relative to the child’s age. For example, parents’ intentions should be dispositive where, as here, the child is so young that he or she cannot possibly decide the issue of residency.” Id. at 310 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In such cases, the threshold test is whether both parents intended for the child to abandon the [habitual residence] left behind. Absent shared intent, prior habitual residence should be deemed supplanted only where the objective facts point unequivocally to this conclusion. Notably, when the child’s initial move from an established habitual residence was clearly intended to be for a specific, limited duration[,] ... most courts will find no change in habitual residence. Mere retention in another country and “private reservations” or intentions that are made “manifest and definitive” only after the child has left its country of origin are generally insufficient to establish intent to change a child’s habitual residence.
Id. at 310-11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We affirm the district court’s determination that the parents shared an intent to make a particular country their child’s habitual residence unless it is implausible in light of the record as a whole. See Larbie, 690 F.3d at 306 (“A factual finding survives review so long as it is plausible in the light of the record as a whole.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).7
[467]*467At least one court has found that it is possible for a young child to have no habitual residence when there is no evidence of a shared intention for the child to be settled in any particular location. See Delvoye v. Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir.2003) (“[A] newborn child born in the country where his ... parents have their habitual residence could normally be regarded as habitually resident in that country. Where a child is born while his ... mother is temporarily present in a country other than that of her habitual residence it does seem, however, that the child will normally have no habitual residence until living in a country on a footing of some stability.” (quoting Dr. E.M. Clive, “The Concept of Habitual Residence,” The Juridical Review part 3, 138, 146 (1997))); id. at 333 (“[W]here the conflict [between the parents] is contemporaneous with the birth of the child, no habitual residence may ever come into existence.”).
The mere fact that the parents have consented for the child to move to a new country does not prove that they share the necessary intent to make that new location the child’s habitual residence. Indeed, we and our sister circuits have held that parents have not established a new habitual residence despite a significant amount of time in a new country. See, e.g., Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1083 (“These facts certainly show that the Mozes children, as the district court remarked, spent a very full year in the United States. But they do not point unequivocally to the conclusion that, at the time Michal petitioned for their custody, the children had ceased to be habitually resident in Israel.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
In Mozes, both parents were Israeli citizens. 239 F.3d at 1069. The father consented for the mother and the children to “remain in the United States for fifteen months, though they disagree as to what understanding existed beyond that.” Id. The district court found that the United States had become the children’s habitual residence, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, explaining that context, rather than specific periods of time spent in one location or another, is key to the concept:
Being habitually resident in a place must mean that you are, in some sense, “settled” there — but it need not mean that’s where you plan to leave your bones. Nor could we justify limiting [468]*468habitual residence to persons who settle in an area for some particular motive. All of this is true. None of it is very useful, however, when attempting to decide a borderline case. Even the child who goes off to summer camp arguably has a “settled purpose” to live there continuously “for a limited period.” No one would seriously contend that the summer camp is the child’s habitual residence, but the notion of “settled purpose” alone is powerless to tell us why not.
Id. at 1074 (internal citations omitted).
As multiple courts have noted, “the difficult cases arise when the persons entitled to fix the child’s residence do not agree on where it has been fixed.” Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1253; see also Mazes, 239 F.3d at 1074. Much of the existing case law discussing a child’s habitual residence involves situations where the parents were still together at the time of the child’s birth, made plans for the child’s future, and only later did the family unit begin to dissolve. In these situations, the court’s task is usually to try to determine when the parents last had a shared plan regarding their child’s future, and what that plan entailed. See, e.g., Gitter, 396 F.3d at 133; Mazes, 239 F.3d at 1074-76. In contrast, Rendon and Bere-zowsky’s relationship ended before PARB’s birth, and the record does not indicate that the two parents have ever shared any plans regarding his upbringing or future.
A.
The district court concluded that Ren-don and Berezowsky intended to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence. The district court devoted only one paragraph to the habitual residence analysis, and made the following statements in support of its conclusion that Mexico was PARB’s habitual residence:
Although [PARB] was born in the United States, the facts establish that the parents intended to make Mexico [PARB’s] habitual residence. Specifically, [Berezowsky] and [Rendon] are both Mexican nationals, they met while residing in Mexico, they are not citizens of the United States, do not own real property in the country, and do not have immigration status that allows them to permanently reside here. Moreover, [Rendon] moved [PARB] to Mexico pursuant to a Texas court order that designated Mexico as [PARB’s] place of residence. In the Texas [0]r-der, both parents listed Mexico as their place of residence. [Rendon] admitted, and the evidence establishes, that he represented to the Mexican courts that his residence was Mexico. In other words, the evidence establishes that neither parent has meaningful or deep-rooted ties to the United States. Moreover, [PARB] resided in Mexico for approximately thirteen months and was attending school there before [Rendon] removed him to the United States. Therefore, based on these undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Mexico was [PARB’s] habitual residence.
Berezowsky v. Ojeda, No. 4:12-CV-03496, 2013 WL 150714, at *4 (S.D.Tex. Jan. 14, 2013). Only the first line of this paragraph references parental intent.
In reaching this conclusion, it appears that the district court misunderstood what is required to form a shared parental intent for purposes of the habitual residence determination. A shared parental intent requires that the parents actually share or jointly develop the intention. In other words, the parents must reach some sort of meeting of the minds regarding their child’s habitual residence, so that they are making the decision together. See, e.g., Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310; Mozes, [469]*469239 F.3d at 1081 (reversing the district court’s habitual residence determination when “the district court was able to say only that Arnon and Michal had discussed the possibility of extending the stay for one additional year, and that they may have even come to such an understanding. The district court did not find that they had actually reached such an understanding.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Gitter, 396 F.3d at 133 (“Once courts have resolved where the parents mutually intended the child’s habitual residence to be, they have generally concluded that the child’s habitual residence, in fact, accords with that parental intent.”) (emphasis added). Here, the district court did not find that the parents reached an agreement to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence. Instead, the district court focused on the fact that “neither parent has meaningful or deep-rooted ties to the United States.” In doing so, the district court ignored the primary consideration in the habitual residence determination: shared parental intent.
Even accepting all of the facts cited by the district court as true, those facts cannot support a finding of shared parental intent as understood for purposes of the Hague Convention. In the district court’s brief analysis, the court never found that Rendon and Berezowsky reached an agreement or meeting of the minds regarding PARB’s future. Likewise, the district court did not make a finding that Berezowsky and Rendon intended to abandon Texas as PARB’s habitual residence. Nor does the record here support a determination that the parents formed a shared intent to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence. Berezowsky does not even argue that she and Rendon reached an agreement on this issue. Instead, she tries to establish that both she and Rendon separately formed the intent to change PARB’s habitual residence, and then argues that this could serve as the basis for a shared parental intent. We disagree, and hold that Berezowsky has failed to meet her burden to establish that she and Rendon shared an intent to change PARB’s habitual residence.
In an effort to defeat the 410th District Court of Texas’s contrary determination, Berezowsky concedes that Texas was originally PARB’s habitual residence, but argues that Mexico has supplanted Texas as PARB’s current habitual residence. Berezowsky asserts that the Texas Order, which limited PARB’s primary residence to one of three areas in Mexico, established Mexico as PARB’s new place of habitual residence. In doing so, Bere-zowsky mistakenly conflates that idea of a primary residence with a habitual residence. Berezowsky offers no support for the proposition that the two terms are interchangeable. The Texas Family Code does not define “primary residence” and we are not aware of any cases that interpret it in a way that would suggest that the term means “habitual residence” under the Hague Convention. As a result, the fact that the Texas Order designated Mexico as PARB’s primary residence is insufficient to prove that Mexico also became his habitual residence. Cf. Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 921 (“Sagi’s claim that the consent judgment and repatriation agreement determine his children’s habitual residence fails for the simple reason that those agreements are not stipulations of habitual residence. Sagi’s characterization of them as such, with virtually no reference to their actual terms, is little more than ipse dixit. Neither of them uses the term ‘habitual residence’ or says anything about the relevant facts.”); Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir.2003) (“A person [470]*470may have only one habitual residence, and it should not be confused with domicile.”).
In addition, nothing in the Texas Orders suggests that the 410th District Court of Texas ever gave up jurisdiction over this case. Indeed, the 410th District Court of Texas issued a clarifying order in February 2012 explaining that the Texas Order “is a valid, existing, final and enforceable order, and the matter of the primary custody of the child PARB is res judicata,” and that unless and until an appellate court reversed the Texas Order, that it would remain both final and enforceable. This subsequent action by the 410th District Court of Texas is a strong indication that the court did not think that it had lost jurisdiction over this custody dispute.
Moreover, Berezowsky has not demonstrated that the Texas Order evinces the necessary shared parental intent to establish a habitual residence under the Hague Convention. In Barzilay, both parents were Israeli nationals who had lived in Missouri for several years when they decided to divorce. As part of the divorce, the parents agreed to move the children back to Israel if either parent decided to return to Israel. 600 F.3d at 915. The father subsequently returned to Israel, but the mother refused to permanently follow with the children. Id. The father then filed an action for wrongful removal under the Hague Convention, arguing that Israel was the children’s habitual residence as a result of the parents’ “repatriation agreement” in the divorce decree. Id. at 916. Despite this “repatriation agreement,” the Eighth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court’s holding that the United States — rather than Israel — was the children’s place of habitual residence. Id. at 919. As the Barzilay court explained:
We also reject the claim that either the Kfar Saba consent judgment or the Missouri repatriation agreement is an enforceable stipulation of the children’s habitual residence.... The notion that parents can contractually determine their children’s habitual residence without regard to the actual circumstances of the children is thus entirely incompatible with our precedent. Indeed, Sagi has not cited a decision by any court anywhere in the world embracing such a proposition.
Id. at 920 (emphasis added).8
Likewise, the mere fact that the Texas Order designates Mexico as PARB’s primary residence is insufficient to demonstrate a shared parental intent for Mexico to become his habitual residence. Indeed, there is an even weaker case for such an argument here: In Barzilay, the parents agreed to the divorce provision that would require moving the children to Israel. Here, Berezowsky has not presented any evidence indicating that she and Rendon jointly asked for, or agreed to, the 410th District Court of Texas’s decision to choose Mexico as PARB’s primary residence. Finally, the Texas Order itself makes clear that PARB’s primary residence can be changed. Indeed, Rendon [471]*471requested and received a revised order from the 410th District Court of Texas just four months later, which lifted the geographic restriction on where PARB would primarily reside.9 On these facts, we cannot say that the Texas Order demonstrates a shared parental intent to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence.
Because the Texas Order does not establish that Mexico became PARB’s habitual residence, we now turn to Berezow-sky’s other arguments.
In arguing that there was a shared parental intent to abandon Texas and instead make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence, Berezowsky does not even try to claim that the two parents reached an agreement to raise PARB in Mexico. Instead, she contends that they each individually decided to abandon Texas as PARB’s habitual residence, and that this “mutual intent” is sufficient. Berezowsky does not point to any case law supporting her novel argument that parents can form the shared intent necessary to abandon a prior habitual residence without — at some point in the child’s life — making a joint decision to raise the child in the new country. Absent evidence of a parental agreement, Berezowsky has not shown that she and Rendon possessed the shared intent to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence.
Even assuming arguendo that the separate, uncoordinated intentions of two parents could form the necessary shared intent to change a child’s habitual residence, Berezowsky has not met her burden in proving that each of the parents here had such an intent. First, Berezow-sky has not demonstrated that she intended to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence. Although she now asserts that she intended to abandon Texas, we agree with our sister circuits that “[i]n cases where there is a dispute regarding a child’s habitual residence, ‘the representations of the parties cannot be accepted at face value, and courts must determine [habitual residence] from all available evidence.’ ” Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 252 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135). We therefore examine the evidence presented by Berezowsky, and conclude that she has not demonstrated that she had such an intent.
PARB is an American citizen, and spent the first two years of his life in the United States because Berezowsky chose to move to the United States while pregnant. Ber-ezowsky argues that moving to Mexico, and subsequently staying there with PARB for thirteen months, demonstrated her intent to make Mexico his new habitual residence. But as Berezowsky herself makes clear, her move had little to do with a settled intention to raise PARB in Mexico. She admits that she “originally opposed the move to Mexico, but intended to live in the same place as her son.” She claims that “even if she had initially hoped that PARB would only temporarily reside in Mexico, she chose to remain in Mexico after obtaining sole custody and had no [472]*472intention of moving back to Texas.” By her own account Berezowsky made the move to follow PARB, not because she intended to raise him in Mexico. While she did remain in Mexico with PARB after obtaining custody of him from a Mexican court, this decision was no doubt influenced by the fact that a Texas court had previously given, and again subsequently gave, Rendon primary custody. The Hague Convention was designed to prevent this exact kind of forum-shopping in child custody cases. To hold that a parent may unilaterally establish their child’s habitual residence by taking actions actually designed to keep the child in a favorable forum, while thwarting valid court orders, would undermine that purpose.
Courts have also looked at the circumstances of the family’s move when assessing parental intent. Selling the family’s home or cars, for example, may indicate the intention to make a more permanent move. See, e.g., Nicolson, 605 F.3d at 102 (mother packed or shipped large quantity of belongings from Australia to the United States and transferred the title to the family’s car); Silverman, 338 F.3d at 898 (family sold home in the United States and shipped household goods to Israel). Here, Berezowsky’s move does not unequivocally demonstrate the same permanence. She left her parents’ home in Texas, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that she could not return to living in this house at any time. Indeed, her parents previously began the process of conveying their house to her.
In other cases, parties have presented specific evidence about the belongings that they brought with them to the new country in order to demonstrate an intention to make a more or less permanent move. See, e.g., Larbie, 690 F.3d at 299 (mother left substantially all of her belongings in United States when flying to England); Nicolson, 605 F.3d at 102; Maxwell, 588 F.3d at 248 (mother brought a number of household items from the United States to Australia, including bedding, dishes, kitchen supplies, and summer clothing); Koch, 450 F.3d at 714 (family took all possessions except a few large items from the United States to Germany); Silverman, 338 F.3d at 898; Delvoye, 329 F.3d at 332 (habitual residence not established when mother brought only a few suitcases to Belgium and left the rest of her belongings in New York).
In contrast, Berezowsky offers only the broad assertion that she brought all of her belongings with her to Mexico. The only evidence in the record to support her claim is her own vague testimony that it took her two days to pack her things to move because “[she] had too much stuff to take to Mexico.” The Southern District Court did not make any findings about the items that either Berezowsky or Rendon brought to Mexico or left in Texas. Rather, the Southern District Court found only that both parents were residing in Mexico after October 18, 2011. In addition, Berezowsky has already conceded that she was hoping to only temporarily reside in Mexico, which undermines her claim that she moved these belongings out of a desire to settle outside of the United States.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that this kind of evidence has the same relevance in a case such as this one, where the parents’ moves are driven by an attempt to be near the child, to move the child away from the other parent, or simply a desire to avoid the effect of court orders, rather than a cohesive plan to raise the child in a particular place. Berezowsky testified that she only returned to Mexico after learning that Rendon had moved there with PARB. She filed a suit seeking custody of PARB within weeks of arriving, which at the very least suggests that she and Rendon had [473]*473not reached a shared intention to raise their child together in Mexico.
Likewise, Rendon’s decision to remain in Mexico during the ensuing months while he battled with Berezowsky over PARB’s custody does not indicate a shared intent to raise PARB there. It is perfectly reasonable for a parent who has been stripped of his custodial rights to a child, and who is still actively fighting to get them back, to remain in the country where the child is located without forming any intent to stay there with the child. Allowing either party to impact the habitual residence determination through judicial gamesmanship, or by hiding the child in a favorable forum would be at odds with the stated goals of the Hague Convention. See Larbie, 690 F.3d at 310 (noting that the Hague Convention is meant to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases); see also Gitter, 396 F.3d at 134 (“The object of the Convention is to dissuade parents and guardians from engaging in gamesmanship with a child’s upbringing in order to secure an advantage in an anticipated custody battle.”); Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255 (upholding the district court’s determination that the children’s habitual residence had not changed despite the fact that both parents moved to Mexico with the children for almost three years, the father began working for his family business, and they began construction on a home in Mexico because the “family was in limbo during its stay in Mexico”).
B.
Berezowsky also asserts that — despite his arguments to the contrary — ;Rendon demonstrated an intent to make Mexico PARB’s habitual residence. In support of this argument, Berezowsky offers an email from Rendon’s attorney to her attorney sent just before Rendon and PARB moved to Mexico in October 2011. The email states that:
[T]he decree is very explicit as to the residences of both Pablo and [PARB.] [PARB] lives at Pablo’s home — his address is in the decree. There is a domicile restriction to three different areas, but the address in the decree is set forth as is Michelle’s address is in the same place in the decree (which is Kingwood[, Texas]). The decree very specifically sets forth (unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties) when and where the possession takes place at Pablo[’s] home [in] Mexico. Pablo has no intention of returning to Montgomery County. If either he or Michelle change their residences, then they must give timely notice to both the court and each other. Accordingly, if Michelle chooses to go to Mexico, Pablo will continue to act as if she resides in Kingwood unless she provides notice as set forth in the decree. Pablo will always have [PARB] at his home for pick up and drop off.... Michelle does NOT have a residence in Mexico and Pablo does NOT have a residence in the United States.
This e-mail does not indicate that Ren-don intended to abandon Texas as PARB’s habitual residence. Instead, the e-mail explains that the Texas Order required Ren-don to take PARB to this particular region of Mexico. It does not make any statements about Rendon’s plans for PARB’s future, and does not indicate how long he intended to live with PARB in Mexico. It mentions the ability of the parties to change their addresses and “when and where” possession of PARB will take place. While Rendon did notify the 410th District Court of Texas that he had no intention of returning to the particular Texas county where the 410th District Court of Texas was located, he made no such statements about his intentions to stay or remain in any other part of the [474]*474United States or Mexico. Nor does this email indicate any shared intentions by the parents for PARB to be settled in Mexico. It explicitly notes that Berezowsky did not have a residence in Mexico, and indicates that Rendon would continue to act as though she resided in Texas. Far from suggesting a settled intent by the parents, this e-mail instead shows that the parents had not yet clarified issues related to PARB’s future.
Likewise, the Texas Order designating Mexico as PARB’s primary residence does not establish Rendon’s settled intent to raise PARB in Mexico. This is especially true in light of the fact that Rendon requested and received a revised order lifting this geographic restriction just four months after receiving the Texas Order. By that time, Rendon was no longer in possession of PARB, and was not in a position to determine where PARB would live. Just weeks after Rendon regained possession of his son, he moved back to Texas. These are not the actions of a man with a settled intention for his son to habitually reside in Mexico.
As part of the parental intent inquiry, our sister circuits have also looked to whether the parties quit their jobs in one country and sought new employment in the country where they have moved. See, e.g., Maxwell, 588 F.3d at 252. Given the particular facts in this case, the parents’ employment is not especially illuminating in assessing their shared intent. Here, the record indicates that both Berezowsky and Rendon worked for businesses owned by their respective families. Berezowsky testified that she worked for her family’s business beginning 2002, left to attend school for the two years while she resided in Texas, and began working from home for her family’s company once she returned to Mexico. As the parties were engaged in custody battles for nearly the entirety of this time period, it seems equally likely that the location of their employment was driven by a desire to be near PARB until the custody issues were resolved, rather than a long-term plan to raise him in a particular location.
The Southern District Court made much of the fact that both Berezowsky and Ren-don are Mexican nationals, with no immigration status that allows them to permanently reside in the United States. While these facts might indicate that Texas was not PARB’s habitual residence, they do not prove that the parents established Mexico as the child’s habitual residence. Indeed, given the constant cross-border battle over his custody, it is possible that PARB has no habitual residence. See Delvoye, 329 F.3d at 334. While it is true that both parents listed locations in Mexico as their residences on the Texas Order, the record also shows that neither parent was living in Mexico at the time that they made these representations to the 410th District Court of Texas. Like Berezowsky, Rendon’s parents also had a home in the greater Houston area where he was able to reside with PARB. Indeed, he did so during the proceedings in the Southern District Court.
It does not appear that the decision for PARB to reside in either Texas or Mexico was connected to a shared intention to settle their son in that place; rather, the geographic decisions seem wholly dependent on where the parents happened to be fighting their court battles at the time, and where each parent thought they could gain an advantage. Within the year that he spent in Mexico, PARB was moved from his father’s home to his mother’s home, and then further uprooted when Berezow-sky moved from Ceurnavaca to Mexico City. Unfortunately, in this case it is hard to say that either parent “planned” for anything other than to keep PARB in the friendliest forum possible. Such forum shopping does not evince a plan to raise [475]*475and settle a child in a particular location. Cf Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1259 (noting that a new habitual residence was not established when “attempts to salvage the marriage, rather than commitment to staying in the new locale are what determined the length of the stay”).
Given the constant disagreement and multiple cross-border moves in the span of a few years, Berezowsky has not met her burden in proving that she and Rendon shared an intent or settled purpose regarding their child’s habitual residence. Indeed, it does not appear that Berezow-sky and Rendon have shared any intention or settled purpose regarding their child since his birth.10 “In conclusion, the district court’s determination of habitual residence in this case appears to have relied upon an understanding of that term that gives insufficient weight to the importance of shared parental intent under the Convention.” Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1084.11
We are without power to reach the merits of the underlying custody dispute. See Hague Convention art. 19 (“A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.”); 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4). We cannot provide PARB with the certainty which he has thus far been deprived, but it is our great hope that his parents will find a way to bridge their differences for the sake of the child that they have brought into the world together.
III.
For the reasons stated in this opinion we VACATE the district court’s order and [476]*476REMAND with instructions to dismiss. We DENY Berezowsky’s interim motion requesting that this appeal be dismissed as moot.