Supreme Court
No. 2024-375-Appeal. (WC 22-455)
Michelle A. Blechman et al. :
v. :
Donald Woodward. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. In this property dispute between
neighbors, Michelle A. Blechman and James W. Blechman (collectively, plaintiffs),
appeal from a Superior Court judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of the
defendant, Donald Woodward.1 The plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred: (1)
in her determination that they failed to show hostile and adverse use of the disputed
area by clear and convincing evidence; (2) by failing to conduct a proper analysis of
each element of adverse possession under G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; (3) by finding that
the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite ten-year period necessary to succeed on
1 In the original complaint, Michelle A. Blechman was the sole plaintiff. She filed suit against SB 222, LLC; the only members of SB 222, LLC were Donald and Dayna Woodward. After trial, the trial justice granted plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint in order to add her husband, James W. Blechman, as a plaintiff. Further, the trial justice ordered that Donald Woodward be substituted as the named defendant because the property previously owned by SB 222, LLC, had been transferred to him personally. For clarity, when necessary, plaintiffs will individually be referred to by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. -1- an acquiescence claim; and (4) in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive
easement without complying with Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case
may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel2
The parties in the present dispute are neighbors, owning and residing on
abutting lots in the Town of South Kingstown, Rhode Island. The plaintiffs
purchased their property (the Blechman property), located at 31 Shortie Way, on or
about January 22, 2010. The defendant purchased his property (the Woodward
property), located at 41 Shortie Way, on or about October 13, 2021. The Blechman
property abuts the Woodward property along the northerly border of the Blechman
property and the southerly border of the Woodward property. It is a portion of land
2 The following facts are derived from the parties’ agreed-upon statement of facts filed in the Superior Court as well as from the two-day bench trial that was held before the Superior Court on April 1 and May 29, 2024. -2- at this intersection, which plaintiffs contend comprises approximately 1,134.9 square
feet (the disputed area), that is the subject of the current dispute. Per the metes and
bounds description of the properties in their respective deeds, it is uncontested that
the disputed area is included in defendant’s deeded property. However, plaintiffs
claim to have acquired title to, or alternatively, an easement over the disputed area
by continuous use and maintenance, as if it were their own, for over ten years.
The parties obtained their respective properties from a common developer,
EFC Development, LLC (EFC), owned and operated by Edward Ferland. At trial,
Ferland testified that EFC owned the entire residential development at one point and
built all the houses therein, necessarily including both plaintiffs’ and defendant’s
houses. He further testified that an engineering company, DiPrete Engineering, had
staked the boundary lines of the lots in the development around 2005 or 2006, years
prior to the construction of either party’s house.
The plaintiffs moved into their home on 31 Shortie Way in January 2010.
Michelle testified that she and James began to maintain their yard and the disputed
area in the spring of the same year. At the time, both areas were “[j]ust dirt.”
Michelle and James started to perform basic upkeep, including planting grass and
trees, fertilizing, and raking. She testified that they treated the disputed area “like
[they] did the rest of the yard.”
-3- Aside from physical maintenance of the disputed area, Michelle testified to
several other purported uses by her family, stating that they would “walk on it, walk
our dogs on it, play on it, use it as a means from getting from the front yard to the
back.” Further, for at least some portion of the alleged statutory time period, she
testified, water from an irrigation system installed on her property would spray onto
the disputed area, she regularly kept the area free of all kinds of debris, and her
children would play on it in the winter when there was snow. Moreover, she testified
that they used the disputed area to store bins, pool supplies, and a woodpile.
Before defendant purchased the Woodward property from EFC in October
2021, the lot remained a vacant piece of land. Ferland testified that the Woodward
property was cleared “[p]robably within 30 feet” of the boundary with the Blechman
property. The defendant moved into the Woodward property in September 2022.
Michelle indicated that the first time she met him was that fall when she was outside
mowing her lawn and the disputed area. She described their ensuing relationship as
“confrontational, * * * aggressive, [and] frightening.” She stated that defendant
“came up to me, behind me, and just appeared and was very intimidating, and
overbearing, and had this large shovel, and just started yelling at me.” Additionally,
Michelle stated that she found a property stake in the corner of 31 Shortie Way and
the disputed area, claiming that the message, “We are watching you. Smile for the
camera” was written on it and that it was written by Ferland.
-4- Michelle testified that she continued to maintain the disputed area until
defendant erected a fence on a date stipulated as being in October 2022. In
November 2022, Michelle filed a complaint in the Washington County Superior
Court, claiming, among other assertions, ownership of the disputed area by adverse
possession and acquiescence, or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement.3 A trial
ensued, and the trial justice heard testimony from both plaintiffs, Ferland, and Steven
Kline, who was qualified as an expert witness in the field of “digital media forensics,
which includes image comparison.”
Ferland testified to several conversations he had with James, both before and
after selling plaintiffs the Blechman property. Ferland began construction on the
Blechman property in 2009, and he stated that plaintiffs wanted the house built as
close as possible, within local zoning regulations, to the left side of the lot (the side
that abuts the Woodward property) in order to have room for a wider driveway on
the other side. Accordingly, he testified that the house was built with a twelve-foot
setback from the Woodward property.
There was inconsistent testimony at trial as to conversations between James
and Ferland concerning James inquiring about purchasing the Woodward property.
3 Michelle made several other claims for relief in her original filing, including claims for a declaratory judgment, to quiet title, trespass, injunctive relief, ejectment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land. Such claims are not pertinent to the appeal before this Court. -5- Ferland testified that, after the Blechman house was built, but prior to selling the
Woodward property to defendant, he talked to James on “several occasions.”
Importantly, in a couple of these conversations James expressed to him that “he was
looking to buy the two lots on either side of him * * * but it never went anywhere
because he didn’t want to pay for a buildable lot.” Formal terms were never
negotiated or committed to writing; however, Ferland definitively testified that there
was an inquiry and that James was interested in purchasing the lot so that he would
not have a neighbor. Conversely, James testified that he never had conversations
with Ferland about the Woodward property.
Ferland also testified to other conversations with James during this time
period. Specifically, he noted that they had a conversation about James wanting to
plant trees “[a]long the property line between [the two properties].” Ferland stated
that he thought it “was a good idea because it separates the two and it helped me out
as far as privacy goes.” When asked by opposing counsel on cross-examination if
James specifically asked for his permission to plant the trees, Ferland said, “I don’t
know if he asked permission or he wanted to know if I had a problem with it, but we
had a conversation about whether there would -- that would be an issue.” After being
confronted with his deposition testimony, Ferland stated that he agreed with his prior
statement that James told him he was going to plant the trees. James testified
-6- generally that he planted several trees in the disputed area, and specifically
referenced two birch trees that were purchased in 2014.
Further, although James testified that he had no conversations with Ferland
about the Woodward property, when specifically asked when the last time they spoke
was, James recalled a conversation during which he asked Ferland if he could take
some rocks from the Woodward property for a tree that had fallen down on the
Blechman property. He originally testified that he got the rocks from the disputed
area, but immediately changed his testimony and stated that he retrieved the rocks
from “randomly about beyond the margins of the disputed area.”
The plaintiffs also put forth an expert, Steven Kline, to testify at trial. Kline
testified that he owned two digital media companies, one of which focuses on “the
examination, comparison, and evaluation of digital media for legal matters.” He
testified that he reviewed photographs of the site, aerial photographs from the Rhode
Island Geological Information Services database, and pictures from years both prior
to and after construction of plaintiffs’ house. In overlaying these pictures, he
explained how the disputed area had changed and testified to the texture and color
of the disputed area over time.
On September 10, 2024, the trial justice issued a bench decision. In regard to
the adverse possession claim, she began, and ended, with the element of hostility.
The trial justice stated that “[w]ith respect to the conversations between Mr. Ferland
-7- and [James], the [c]ourt concludes that Mr. Ferland’s recollection is the most logical
and credible.” She found that “after January, 2010, and before October, 2021, * * *
[James] offered to purchase the property from the actual owner on two occasions.
This evidence is significant and it negates the required element of hostility.”
In addition, the trial justice pointed to further evidence “indicating plaintiffs’
acknowledgment of EFC’s superior title during the statutory period[,]” including the
fact that “[James] sought permission from Mr. Ferland to retrieve rocks from the
property” and “sought acquiescence from Mr. Ferland to plant trees in 2014 and 2015
* * *.” The trial justice determined that all of these conversations, “when taken
together and viewed objectively, clearly demonstrate the plaintiffs’ recognition of
EFC’s superior title.” She added that “[Michelle] noticed the property stake with
indications of Mr. Ferland’s ownership but did nothing to dispute it.” Moreover, she
found that Kline’s testimony “did not provide a scintilla of assistance to this [c]ourt.”
The trial justice noted that plaintiffs’ failure to establish hostility by clear and
convincing evidence was fatal to their adverse possession claim.
Further, she found that plaintiffs’ acquiescence claim failed because they were
unable to establish the requisite ten-year period wherein both parties recognized that
a boundary existed, also evidenced by the fact that James asked for Ferland’s
permission to retrieve rocks from the Woodward property and Michelle noticed
stakes “with indications and did nothing.” Lastly, she stated that “[w]ith respect to
-8- the remaining claims, the denial of the claims for adverse possession and
acquiescence is dispositive * * *.” Final judgment entered in favor of defendant on
September 18, 2024, and plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Standard of Review
“It is well settled that this Court will not disturb the findings of a trial justice
sitting without a jury unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial
justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.” Clark v. Buttonwoods Beach
Association, 226 A.3d 683, 690 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Quillen v. Macera, 160 A.3d
1006, 1010 (R.I. 2017)). “[T]his Court ‘gives great deference to the trial justice’s
determinations of credibility because it was the trial justice who had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses’ live testimony and the witnesses’ demeanor.’” Sepulveda
as Trustee of 7 Half Mile Road Living Trust v. Buffum, 334 A.3d 98, 103 (R.I. 2025)
(brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting Anton v. Houze, 277 A.3d 695, 705 (R.I.
2022)). “When the record indicates that competent evidence supports the trial
justice’s findings, we shall not substitute our view of the evidence for his or hers
even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached.” Clark, 226 A.3d at 690
(quoting Quillen, 160 A.3d at 1010).
-9- III
Discussion
On appeal, plaintiffs first assign error to the trial justice’s conclusion that they
failed to meet their burden, by clear and convincing evidence, of showing hostile
and adverse use of the disputed area. On this point, plaintiffs proffer three main
contentions. First, they argue that the trial justice “relied on testimony that did not
exist” in finding that Ferland testified that James “explicitly asked for permission to
plant trees along the property boundary of 31 Shortie Way.” They add that there was
no discussion as to the location where the trees would be planted, and “[w]ithout any
request for permission or discussion regarding the location of the alleged trees, there
is no basis for the [c]ourt to conclude that [James] was granted permission to plant
trees on the [d]isputed [a]rea.” Further, they submit that the trial justice’s reliance
on Ferland’s testimony that James wanted to plant trees to block the view of a
neighboring house was “entirely unfounded” as a house was not built on the
Woodward property until years later.
Second, plaintiffs question the credibility of Ferland’s testimony recalling
conversations with James in which James inquired about buying the two lots on
either side of his property. They contend that, even if this testimony were to be
accepted as true, any purported discussion between Ferland and James regarding
acquiring the Woodward property “does not legally constitute an acknowledgment
- 10 - of superior title or disrupt the continuous, hostile possession required for adverse
possession” because there was no testimony or evidence establishing when the
inquiries occurred. The plaintiffs assert that title vested in them on or about April
2020 and “[w]ithout any indication of whether the conversation took place before or
after the statutory period had run, there is no basis for the [c]ourt to conclude that it
could have disrupted the continuity of the [plaintiffs’] adverse possession claim.”
Third, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice improperly relied on evidence that
Michelle confirmed she saw a stake in the corner of the Blechman property as
manifesting acknowledgment of Ferland’s superior title, as “[t]he mere presence of
property stakes does not affect the validity of the Blechman[s’] claims, particularly
since the Blechmans continued to occupy, maintain and improve the [d]isputed
[a]rea without any interference from Ferland.”
For his part, defendant claims that Ferland actually did testify that sometime
between 2009 and October 2021 James “sought his permission to plant trees along
the common border of 31 Shortie Way and 41 Shortie Way” and thus the trial justice
properly relied on this evidence. Further, he argues that the trial justice determined
that the timeframe in which James inquired about purchasing the Woodward
property was also within this period, pointing to the fact that Ferland testified that
on at least two occasions between January 2010 and October 2021, James inquired
about purchasing the Woodward property. The defendant notes that plaintiffs’
- 11 - recitation is an inaccurate reflection of the record, and Ferland’s testimony did
support the trial justice’s conclusion that the offers to purchase occurred during the
statutory period.
“In Rhode Island, obtaining title by adverse possession requires actual, open,
notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive use of the property under a claim of
right for at least a period of ten years.” Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 88 (R.I. 2011).
“A possessor’s use is hostile if it is a use inconsistent with the right of the owner,
without permission asked or given, such as would entitle the owner to a cause of
action against the intruder for trespass.” Clark, 226 A.3d at 691 (quoting DiPippo v.
Sperling, 63 A.3d 503, 508 (R.I. 2013)). “Hostility of possession necessary to
establish adverse possession implies the denial of the owner’s title; and possession,
however open and long it may be, is not adverse without the denial of the owner’s
title.” Picerne v. Sylvestre, 122 R.I. 85, 92, 404 A.2d 476, 480 (1979). “[T]he
pertinent inquiry centers on the claimants’ objective manifestations of adverse use
rather than on the claimants’ knowledge that they lacked colorable legal title.”
Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 351 (R.I. 2003).
In her decision the trial justice cited the correct standard for determining
hostile use, and then referenced several critical pieces of evidence in finding that
plaintiffs had acknowledged EFC’s superior title to the disputed area during the
statutory period and, accordingly, that their claim was not hostile. She made note of
- 12 - conversations between James and Ferland in which James offered to purchase the
Woodward property sometime after January 2010, stating that it was not
unreasonable to conclude from this evidence that James’s objective manifestations
indicated that he was aware of Ferland’s superior title because “the [plaintiffs’]
house was positioned so close to the defendant’s property and the [plaintiffs]
expressed desire for privacy.”
Further, the trial justice noted that “the trial record is laced with additional
evidence indicating plaintiffs’ acknowledgment of EFC’s superior title during the
statutory period.” She went on to reference Ferland’s testimony that James asked
his permission to retrieve rocks from the Woodward property, Michelle’s
acknowledgment of the property stake with “indications of Mr. Ferland’s ownership”
and failure to dispute it, and Ferland’s testimony detailing his conversations with
James about planting trees on the property line. In referencing the conversations
pertaining to planting trees, at separate points in her decision the trial justice stated
that James sought “acquiescence from Mr. Ferland to plant trees in 2014 and 2015”
and James “asked [Ferland] for permission to plant trees along the property boundary
of 31 Shortie Way.” Ultimately, the trial justice concluded that “[w]hile there is
evidence that the plaintiffs utilized portions of the disputed area, that use was not
adverse to the defendant’s claim of title.”
- 13 - It is clear to us that the trial justice considered multiple pieces of evidence put
forth during trial and deemed that, as a whole, they demonstrated plaintiffs’
acknowledgment of Ferland’s superior title of the disputed area. As it pertains to
Ferland’s testimony regarding James planting trees, our review of the record
indicates the following. Ferland originally testified that “[James] asked me about
planting trees * * * and I said it was fine.” When probed about this conversation on
cross-examination, he stated “I don’t know if he asked permission or he wanted to
know if I had a problem with it, but we had a conversation about whether there would
-- that would be an issue.” After being confronted with his deposition testimony,
Ferland then stated that he agreed with his prior statement that James told him he
was going to plant the trees.
While it appears that the trial justice may have misstated Ferland’s testimony
by indicating that Ferland testified that James asked for his permission to plant the
trees (although there was varying testimony from Ferland on the matter), we deem
this alleged error harmless. This evidence was supplemented, critically, by James’s
inquiries about purchasing the Woodward property, Michelle’s acknowledgment of
the property stake with Ferland’s message seemingly objecting to plaintiffs’ use of
the disputed area, and Ferland’s granting permission to retrieve rocks from the
Woodward property. The trial justice evidently considered all of this evidence in
- 14 - reaching her ultimate conclusion that plaintiffs’ use of the disputed area was not
hostile.
Further, the record does not support plaintiffs’ contention that no timeframe
was established for when James’s inquiry to purchase the Woodward property
occurred. Ferland testified that “a couple of times he asked me -- he was looking to
buy the two lots on either side of him, um, and but it never went anywhere because
he didn’t want to pay for a buildable lot.” Counsel then inquired, “[S]o, after the
house was built at 31 Shortie Way but before you sold the property to the [defendant],
you had a couple of conversations with [James] about buying 41 Shortie Way?”
Ferland answered affirmatively, “Yes.” Michelle previously testified that plaintiffs
moved into their house in January 2010, and it was stipulated that defendant acquired
title to the Woodward property in October 2021. Thus, the majority of the time in
which the inquiries to purchase may have occurred is within the ten-year period that
plaintiffs contend their adverse possession claim accrued.
However, it is true that a fraction of time, whether that be from January 2020
or April 2020 through October 2021, falls outside of the ten-year period in which
plaintiffs claim their title vested in the disputed area. The plaintiffs appear to latch
onto this period, citing this Court’s decision in Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82 (R.I.
2011), and asserting that if the offers to purchase were made outside of when title
already vested in the adverse possessor, the inquiries to purchase are irrelevant.
- 15 - While we recognized in Cahill that “an offer to purchase does not automatically
invalidate a claim already vested by statute,” we also held that “the objective
manifestations that another has superior title, made after the statutory period and not
made to settle an ongoing dispute, are poignantly relevant to the ultimate
determination of claim of right and hostile possession during the statutory period.”
Cahill, 11 A.3d at 93 (emphasis added). As there is no contended ongoing dispute
prior to defendant purchasing the Woodward property, plaintiffs misstate the
relevance of these inquiries, even if made after the purported statutory period had
elapsed. See DiPippo, 63 A.3d at 509-10 (holding that the trial justice did not err in
considering a letter evincing the plaintiff’s acknowledgment of the defendant’s
superior title made after the ten-year statutory period had run in determining that the
plaintiff’s use of the disputed area was not hostile). Keeping in mind the poignant
relevance of the inquiries to purchase and giving deference to the trial justice’s
credibility determinations and additional findings, we are persuaded that the trial
justice was not clearly wrong in her conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove hostility
by clear and convincing evidence.
The plaintiffs also contend that the trial justice erred in failing to conduct a
proper analysis of each element of adverse possession “as required” under § 34-7-1.
They claim that in only addressing hostility, the trial justice’s analysis was
- 16 - incomplete and warrants reversal. We disagree, and swiftly dispense of this alleged
error. In full, § 34-7-1 provides:
“Where any person or persons, or others from whom he, she, or they derive their title, either by themselves, tenants or lessees, shall have been for the space of ten (10) years in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments for and during that time, claiming the same as his, her or their proper, sole and rightful estate in fee simple, the actual seisin and possession shall be allowed to give and make a good and rightful title to the person or persons, their heirs and assigns forever; and any plaintiff suing for the recovery of any such lands may rely upon the possession as conclusive title thereto, and this chapter being pleaded in bar to any action that shall be brought for the lands, tenements or hereditaments, and the actual seisin and possession being duly proved, shall be allowed to be good, valid and effectual in law for barring the action.”
As addressed supra, it is well settled under Rhode Island law that obtaining
title by adverse possession requires that the claimant establish “actual, open,
notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive use of the property under a claim of
right for at least a period of ten years.” Union Cemetery Burial Society of North
Smithfield v. Foisy, 292 A.3d 1205, 1214 (R.I. 2023) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Clark, 226 A.3d at 690). Notably, this standard necessitates that the claimant
establish all of the above stated elements by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
In their papers, plaintiffs cite to McGarry v. Coletti, 33 A.3d 140 (R.I. 2011),
without explanation, for their contention that the trial justice’s “incomplete analysis
warrants reversal.” In McGarry, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s - 17 - determination that the claimant failed to satisfy the open and notorious elements of
adverse possession, giving deference to the trial justice’s finding that the claimant’s
“less-than-obvious” maintenance of the disputed parcel was insufficient to rise to the
clear and convincing evidence standard. McGarry, 33 A.3d at 146-47. We are unable
to find any support for plaintiffs’ contention in McGarry or elsewhere in our
jurisprudence. Further, we are aware of no requirement that obligates the trial justice
to analyze every element of adverse possession after determining that a claimant’s
failure to prove a single element defeats their claim. We refuse to impute this
requirement onto the trial justice here, and accordingly, we decline to reverse on this
ground.
The plaintiffs further aver that the trial justice erred in finding that they failed
to establish the requisite ten-year period necessary for an acquiescence claim
wherein both parties recognized that a boundary existed. They contend that “[t]he
physical boundary line between the Blechman [p]roperty and Woodward [p]roperty
was established back in the [s]pring of 2010 when the [plaintiffs] planted grass in
the [d]isputed [a]rea right up to the large boulders situated on the Woodward
[p]roperty.” From that date, until at least October 2021, plaintiffs argue, “all parties
treated the grass line up to the large boulders as the property line” and, had defendant
not acquiesced to this boundary line, he “would have cleared the [d]isputed [a]rea at
the time ECF cleared the lot on 41 Shortie Way.” Further, plaintiffs argue that the
- 18 - trial justice’s reliance on testimony relating to Michelle’s acknowledgment of the
property stake and Ferland’s permission to retrieve rocks from the Woodward
property was clear error because both events occurred “after title had already vested
in the [plaintiffs].” (Emphasis omitted.)
The defendant claims, however, that “[v]irtually no evidence was offered by
the [plaintiffs] to establish when the requisite period to prove their acquiescence
claim started or ended during the course of the trial.” In response to plaintiffs
mention of large boulders or a “rock wall” being a boundary marker, defendant notes
that, when asked when the boulders were installed, Michelle testified that she was
not sure of the date; and, further, James testified it was at the time they started
construction on the Woodward property, this being October 2021. As such, he
contends that the requisite ten-year time period was not established to prove an
acquiescence claim.
“This Court has stated that the ‘doctrine of acquiescence provides that owners
of adjoining estates are precluded from denying a boundary line recognized by both
owners for a length of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations
barring a right of reentry.’” Urbonas v. Gullison, 337 A.3d 673, 683 (R.I. 2025)
(quoting DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261, 1264 (R.I. 2003)). This is a two-part
test, as “[t]he party claiming ownership by acquiescence must show ‘that a boundary
marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to
- 19 - that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.’” DeCosta,
819 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 2001)). “A
determination of acquiescence is a mixed question of law and fact.” Banville v.
Brennan, 84 A.3d 424, 431 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002,
1009 (R.I. 2010)). “The issue of what constitutes the boundaries of a parcel of land
is a question of law, but the determination of where such boundaries are is a question
of fact.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Nye, 992 A.2d at 1009). “Finally, ‘whether
the boundary is sufficiently obvious to command notice is a question of fact.’” Id.
(quoting Acampora v. Pearson, 899 A.2d 459, 465 (R.I. 2006)).
In her decision, the trial justice rejected plaintiffs’ claim for acquiescence,
finding that it “fails because they are unable to establish the requisite ten-year period
wherein both parties recognized a boundary existed.” She went on to say that
“[James] asked Mr. Ferland’s permission to retrieve rocks from his property, and
[Michelle] noticed the stakes with indications and did nothing.”
It is undisputed that the respective properties sit on adjoining lots. However,
upon our review of the record, it is clear that the trial justice did not err in finding
that plaintiffs failed to establish an observable boundary marker for the requisite
statutory period. The plaintiffs contend that the boundary marker was established at
trial as (1) the grass line and/or (2) the boulders/rock wall. In relation to the grass
line, both plaintiffs testified that Michelle first planted grass on the disputed area in
- 20 - the spring of 2010 following their January 2010 occupancy. However, upon
reviewing a photograph of the disputed area taken in the fall of 2010, both admitted
that they did not see any “stems of grass” or “grass.” Michelle further testified that
she began to mow the grass in the area in the spring of 2011, a year after she alleged
to have planted the grass, claiming she began “[a]s soon as the grass was coming
up.”
Further, plaintiffs suggest in their papers that the boulders seen in multiple
photographs presented at trial established the boundary line “[f]rom the [s]pring of
2010 to at least October 2021 * * *.” This contention is simply at odds with the
record. Michelle testified that Ferland placed them there “at the behest of [her]
neighbors * * *.” When asked when they were put there, she stated that she did not
know the exact date. James testified that he believed the boulders were placed when
construction began on the Woodward property. The parties stipulated that defendant
acquired title to the Woodward property in October of 2021, and Ferland testified
that construction began thereafter.
The lack of a recognized boundary line is further buttressed, as the trial justice
noted, by the fact that Michelle noticed and ignored a property stake designating the
deeded property line and displaying a message seemingly objecting to plaintiffs’ use,
and that James asked permission from Ferland to retrieve rocks from the Woodward
property. Although no concrete dates for these facts were established at trial, James
- 21 - asking Ferland for permission to retrieve rocks suggests that Ferland still owned the
property at that time, and while Michelle testified that she “believe[d]” defendant
owned the property at the time she saw the stake, she also stated that Ferland wrote
the message on it. In reviewing all of this evidence and giving substantial deference
to the trial justice’s findings, we cannot say that the trial justice’s determination that
plaintiffs failed to establish a clear boundary marker for the statutorily required
ten-year period was clearly wrong.
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the trial justice committed error in dismissing their
claim for a prescriptive easement without complying with Rule 52(a) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. They contend that “to the extent title to the
[d]isputed [a]rea has not been acquired by adverse possession or acquiescence, the
Blechmans had a prescriptive easement that allowed them to maintain, utilize and
enjoy the [d]isputed [a]rea.” The plaintiffs further submit that the trial justice
dismissed this claim “without findings or conclusions,” violating Rule 52(a) and
necessitating remand.
“Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires a trial
justice in a nonjury case to make specific findings of fact upon which he or she bases
his or her decision[,]” and further, “find the facts specifically and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon.” Wilby v. Savoie, 86 A.3d 362, 372 (R.I. 2014) (brackets
and deletions omitted) (quoting Connor v. Schlemmer, 996 A.2d 98, 109 (R.I. 2010)).
- 22 - This Court has held that a trial justice “need not engage in extensive analysis” to
comply with the requirement of Rule 52(a). Id. at 372 (quoting Connor, 996 A.2d at
109). It is well settled that “[e]ven ‘brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if
they address and resolve the controlling and essential factual issues in the case[.]’”
Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., 965 A.2d 429, 434 (R.I. 2009) (quoting
Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 2008)).
The trial justice specifically acknowledged the requirements of Rule 52(a),
and after setting forth her findings and conclusions with respect to plaintiffs’ adverse
possession and acquiescence claims, found that the denial of such “is dispositive of
the remaining claims.” Thus, she held that “those claims are denied and dismissed.”
After a careful review of the entirety of the trial justice’s bench decision, we are
satisfied that her decision did not run afoul of the requirements of Rule 52(a).
Hostility is an identical element necessary to succeed on both an adverse
possession and a prescriptive easement claim. See Clark, 226 A.3d at 690 (brackets
omitted) (“To obtain property by adverse possession, * * * a claimant must prove
actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive use of * * * property under
a claim of right for at least a period of ten years.”) (quoting DiPippo, 63 A.3d at
508); Drescher v. Johannessen, 45 A.3d 1218, 1227 (R.I. 2012) (“To establish an
easement by prescription, a claimant must show actual, open, notorious, hostile, and
continuous use under a claim of right for at least ten years.”) (quoting Hilley v.
- 23 - Lawrence, 972 A.2d 643, 651-52 (R.I. 2009)). Thus, it is evident that the trial
justice’s determination that plaintiffs failed to prove hostility by clear and convincing
evidence for their adverse possession claim precludes a finding that plaintiffs could
succeed on their prescriptive easement claim.
As the trial justice sufficiently addressed hostility as to the plaintiffs’ adverse
possession claim, we are persuaded that her decision provides a complete
confrontation and resolution of the issue. See Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747
(R.I. 1998) (stating that this Court has “never demanded that a trial justice make
findings with respect to every witness or issue in which ‘a full understanding of the
issues’ and the conclusions of the fact finder ‘may be reached without the aid of
separate findings’”) (quoting Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420,
423-24 (R.I. 1983)). Accordingly, we see no cause to remand on this ground.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Superior Court judgment is affirmed. The
record of this case shall be returned to the Superior Court.
- 24 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Michelle A. Blechman et al. v. Donald Woodward.
No. 2024-375-Appeal. Case Number (WC 22-455)
Date Opinion Filed March 16, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Washington County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
For Plaintiffs:
Ryanna T. Capalbo, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Timothy J. Robenhymer, Esq.