DeCosta v. DeCosta

819 A.2d 1261, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 81, 2003 WL 1701897
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 1, 2003
Docket2001-619-Appeal
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 819 A.2d 1261 (DeCosta v. DeCosta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 81, 2003 WL 1701897 (R.I. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the Supreme Court on February 4, 2003, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time.

This case presents a boundary line dispute between the plaintiffs, Frederick R. and Helen C. DeCosta (plaintiffs), and the defendants, Joseph and Mary DeCosta (defendants). The plaintiff, Frederick R. DeCosta, and defendant, Joseph DeCosta, are brothers; the record discloses that each assisted the other in the construction of their respective dwellings. Also, in keeping with the harmony and fellowship *1263 that existed between the families in 1969, defendant planted a hedgerow in the vicinity of the east-west boundary line, which, according to defendant, was considered the boundary line for the parcels. Initially, the parties jointly maintained both sides of the hedgerow, an arrangement that advanced the amicable affiliation between the families. However, by 1991, their relationship had deteriorated greatly and culminated in this dispute. According to the parties, disagreements about the maintenance of the hedgerow led to the rift between the brothers. The defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action for trespass and ejectment and the denial of his counterclaim for adverse possession.

The evidence disclosed that in 1992, after removing a portion of the hedgerow, defendants erected a ehainlink fence on plaintiffs’ side of the shrubbery. According to plaintiff, this fence was one foot north of the existing hedgerow and two feet north of the property line and was a further encroachment onto his property. 1 The plaintiff sought to have the fence removed, and retained the services of a certified professional engineer and land surveyor, Joseph G.A. Riccio (Riccio), to determine the actual boundary line. At trial, plaintiffs submitted that the Riccio survey outlined the boundary between the parcels, and urged the trial justice to order defendants to remove the hedgerow and fence. Riccio, testifying on behalf of plaintiffs, said that the fence and hedge did in fact encroach approximately two feet onto plaintiffs’ property. 2 The defendants counterclaimed and asserted ownership by adverse possession, arguing that the law of adverse possession and the doctrine of acquiescence applied to the facts in this case because plaintiffs’ silence for such a long period demonstrated clear acquiescence to the boundary between the parcels.

The trial justice found Riccio’s expert testimony to be persuasive and held that the proper boundary line between the parcels should be drawn according to Riccio’s survey. As a result, the trial justice ordered defendants to remove the shrubbery and fence that encroached upon plaintiffs’ property. In denying defendants’ counterclaim, the trial justice concluded that certain elements of adverse possession were not satisfied, particularly because the installation of the hedgerow was neither exclusive nor hostile. In short, the trial justice held that the brothers jointly planted and maintained the hedgerow by mutual assent, an agreement that led to a symbiotic relationship between the parties. Therefore, the trial justice found, defendants failed to establish all of the elements required to prove adverse possession. Although he determined that plaintiffs never objected to the placement or location of the hedgerow or the fence, he concluded that the elements of hostility and exclusivity were not satisfied because both parties maintained the shrubbery. The trial justice also concluded that the fence, although an encroachment and an act that was hostile to plaintiffs as “not innocently undertaken,” was erected in 1992, and fell short of the statutory ten-year period for adverse possession.

Likewise, the trial justice found that the doctrine of acquiescence was unavailable because plaintiffs “simply did not acquiesce to the relocation of the boundary *1264 line.” In fact, the trial justice noted that at the time the fence was constructed, defendant “physically removed one of the stone boundary markers to a location * * * where he wanted the fence constructed.”

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial justice failed to properly apply the doctrine of acquiescence. The defendants primarily rely on DelSesto v. Lewis, 754 A.2d 91 (R.I.2000) (per curiam), which recognized that a claimant may gain title to a defendant’s property by operation of the doctrine of acquiescence. “[The] party alleging acquiescence must show that a boundary marker existed and that the parties recognized that boundary for a period equal to that prescribed in the statute of limitations to bar a reentry, or ten years.” Id. at 95 (quoting Locke v. O’Brien, 610 A.2d 552, 556 (R.I.1992)). Further, recognition of the encroachment “may be inferred from the silence of one party or their predecessors in title who [were] aware of the [actual] boundary.” Id. The plaintiffs on the other hand, counter that the trial justice did not err in ordering defendants to dismantle the hedgerow and fence. In light of the evidence that the parties shared in the maintenance of both sides of the hedgerow through 1991, plaintiffs agree with the trial court’s finding that the elements of exclusivity and hostility were not satisfied. Further, plaintiffs allege the requisite period of ten years necessary to establish ownership by adverse possession was not met in this case because the parties were in agreement about the hedgerow until 1991, and any encroachment after 1991 falls short of the statutory ten-year period.

To establish a claim for adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate by strict proof, the elements set forth in G.L.1956 § 34-7-1 that the possession was “ ‘actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive’ for the statutory period of ten years.” Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 409 (R.I.2001) (quoting Locke, 610 A.2d at 555). This Court has determined that the term “strict proof’ is synonymous with clear and convincing evidence. Locke, 610 A.2d at 555.

The doctrine of acquiescence provides that “owners of adjoining estates are precluded from denying a boundary line recognized by both owners for a length of time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitations barring a right of reentry.” Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting Locke, 610 A.2d at 556). Although the original use of the parcel may be permissive, the doctrine of acquiescence provides that when there is an “observable physical boundary line * * * a claimant can gain title to the real estate encompassed by that boundary line, even though another party clearly possesses record title to that land.” Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Michelle A. Blechman v. Donald Woodward
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2026
Kristina Urbonas v. John Gullison
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2025
Donna Banville v. Peter Brennan
84 A.3d 424 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2014)
Nye v. Brousseau
992 A.2d 1002 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2010)
Bert v. Makowski
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 2008
Washington Village v. Island Green Golf
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 2007
Acampora v. Pearson
899 A.2d 459 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2006)
Gardner v. Baird
871 A.2d 949 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2005)
Smith v. Hart, 99-109 (2005)
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 2005
Smith v. Hart, 99-109 (r.I.super. 2005)
Superior Court of Rhode Island, 2005

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
819 A.2d 1261, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 81, 2003 WL 1701897, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/decosta-v-decosta-ri-2003.