MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2025 ME 92 Docket: Ken-24-400 Argued: May 8, 2025 Decided: October 30, 2025
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ. *
MICHELE H.P. XAMPLAS
v.
PETER XAMPLAS
STANFILL, C.J.
[¶1] Peter Xamplas is a Greek and Australian citizen. In the divorce
action between the parties, he filed a petition under the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to return the parties’ child to
Greece. The District Court (Augusta, Daniel Mitchell, J.) denied his request and
Peter1 appealed. Peter argues that the court erred when it concluded that Peter
failed to commence a proceeding within one year and that Michele H.P. Xamplas
met her burden of establishing the well-settled-child defense and therefore
denied his petition. Peter further argues that the court abused its discretion in
* Although Justice Horton participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names. 2
deciding not to return the child to Greece. Although neither party initially
addressed the interlocutory nature of the order,2 we conclude that the trial
court’s order is reviewable under the collateral order exception to the final
judgment rule. We disagree that the court erred or abused its discretion,
however, and affirm the order denying Peter’s petition to return the child to
Greece.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] We draw the following facts from the court’s findings, which are
supported by competent evidence in the record. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d
1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013).
[¶3] Peter and Michele met in Indonesia and married in Australia in
2018. Peter is a citizen of Greece and Australia; Michele is a citizen of the United
States. The couple’s child was born in Australia on October 22, 2020, and has
an Australian passport. The family lived in Australia until relocating to Greece
on December 7, 2021.
[¶4] In late November 2022, the couple and their child traveled with
round-trip tickets from Greece to Maine, where they planned to celebrate
2 Both parties filed a letter of supplemental authorities on this issue in accordance with our invitation at oral argument. 3
Christmas and vacation for six or seven weeks. Their accounts differ regarding
the state of their relationship at this time: Peter saw the trip as a vacation, and
Michele was unsure whether she would return to Greece.
[¶5] On January 4, 2023, the day before the family’s return flights to
Greece, Peter was unable to locate the child’s passport. Upon being confronted
by Peter, Michele told him that she and the child would not be returning with
him to Greece. The following day, Peter returned to Greece without Michele or
the child. Peter knew or should have known as of January 4, 2023, that Michele
intended to remain in Maine with the child.
[¶6] Michele and the child lived with Michele’s father in Windsor, Maine,
from January through September of 2023, when Michele and the child moved
to an apartment in Bangor. The child has significant family support in Maine,
including from Michele’s father and sister. The child has secure immigration
status and is entitled to pursue citizenship through Michele.
[¶7] The child began receiving developmental services in early 2023, and
she was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder in November of that year.
She is enrolled in a therapeutic program where she receives seven hours of
therapy each day to assist her with speech and behavioral development. The
child enjoys and looks forward to attending school every day. The court 4
concluded that the child is well settled in her stable environment. Returning
the child to Greece would be disruptive of her well-settled life in Maine because
she has significant support in Maine, and she does not speak Greek.
[¶8] In June 2023, Michele asked Peter for funds to secure an apartment.
As a result, Peter contacted an attorney to begin the process of petitioning
under the Hague Convention to have the child returned to Greece. On July 17,
2023, Michele filed in the District Court a complaint for divorce against Peter.
On September 25, 2023, Peter filed with the Central Authority of Greece a
petition for return of the child. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction art. 6-7, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter cited
as “Hague Convention”] (“A Contracting State shall designate a Central
Authority to discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention upon
such authorities. . . . Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and
promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective
States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects
of this Convention.”).
[¶9] The divorce case was scheduled for a hearing on December 1, 2023,
which Peter did not attend. On December 21, 2023, the court issued an order 5
determining that it had “reason to believe [that the] matters will be contested”
because Michele was seeking (1) dissolution of the marriage, (2) division of the
couple’s property including real estate in Greece, and (3) determination of
parental rights and responsibilities.
[¶10] After retaining Maine counsel, on April 19, 2024, Peter filed in the
divorce case a motion to dismiss the complaint and a petition under the Hague
Convention for return of the child to Greece. Michele opposed Peter’s motion
and petition. The court held a two-day hearing on the petition on May 31 and
June 20, 2024. On June 25, 2024, the court issued an interim order, allocating
to Michele the right to enroll the child in a therapeutic program in Maine
pending the outcome of all legal proceedings.
[¶11] On August 15, 2024, the court issued an order denying Peter’s
petition to return the child to Greece. Although the court found that Michele
wrongfully retained the child beginning on January 4, 2023, the court also
found that Peter waited over a year before filing a petition to return the child
and that Michele met her burden of establishing that the child is well settled in
Maine. The court therefore exercised its discretion and determined that the
child should not be returned to Greece. Peter timely appealed, see M.R. App. P. 6
2B(c)(1), and on September 18, 2024, the court issued an order staying the
divorce proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal, see M.R. App. P. 3(c).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Final Judgment Rule
[¶12] Because we generally do not hear interlocutory appeals, we first
determine whether the appealed-from order constitutes a final judgment and,
if not, whether it falls within an exception to the final judgment rule. Bond v.
Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 5, 30 A.3d 816.
[¶13] The United States and Greece are both contracting parties to the
Hague Convention, which governs the procedure for determining whether
wrongfully removed or retained children3 should be returned to their country
of habitual residence. See Hague Convention; U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Hague
Convention Treaty Partners, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
International-Parental-Child-Abduction/abductions/hague-abduction-
country-list.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2025) [https://perma.cc/Z8YG-P2BV].
The United States incorporated key parts of the Hague Convention into
3 The term “wrongfully removed or retained” includes the “removal or retention of a child before
the entry of a custody order regarding that child.” 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(f)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 119-36). 7
implementing legislation known as the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C.A §§ 9001-9011 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 119-36).
[¶14] The Convention aims to (1) “secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and (2) “ensure
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” Hague Convention, art. 1.
When a child is wrongfully retained in a country other than the child’s country
of habitual residence, the Convention “generally requires [the] country [in
which the child is wrongfully retained] to return the child immediately if the
other parent requests return within one year.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez,
572 U.S. 1, 4 (2014); Hague Convention, art. 3, 12; see 22 U.S.C.A. § 9001(a)(4)
(“Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the
Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions
set forth in the Convention applies.”). For petitions filed more than one year
after the child’s removal, the court “shall also order the return of the child,
unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.”
Hague Convention, art. 12.
[¶15] This case began when Michele filed a divorce complaint against
Peter. Peter petitioned pursuant to ICARA and the Hague Convention for the 8
return of the child to Greece not as an independent action but as a request in
the pending divorce action. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(b). There is no final divorce
judgment.
[¶16] “The long-standing final judgment rule requires that, with limited
exceptions, a party may not appeal a decision until a final judgment has been
rendered in the case. A final judgment is a decision that fully decides and
disposes of the entire matter pending before the court[,] leaving no questions
for the future consideration and judgment of the court.” Safety Ins. Grp. v.
Dawson, 2015 ME 64, ¶ 6, 116 A.3d 948 (alteration, citation, and quotation
marks omitted). “Accordingly, an interlocutory order that does not resolve all
pending claims as to all of the parties in an action is not a final judgment for
purposes of the rule.” Est. of Dore v. Dore, 2009 ME 21, ¶ 11, 965 A.2d 862.
[¶17] Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we must
determine whether any exceptions to the final judgment rule justify our review.
See Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 6, 30 A.3d 816.
[¶18] We have recognized a collateral-order exception when “(1) the
decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the
litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would 9
result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review.”
Id. ¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶19] We conclude that the collateral-order exception justifies our
review of this interlocutory appeal for the following reasons. First, the Hague
Convention claim is separable from the issues to be adjudicated in the divorce
action. Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rural Hous. Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103, ¶ 9,
799 A.2d 1232. The Hague Convention claim is fundamentally about
jurisdiction: whether a court in Maine or Greece should hear the custody
matter, see Lozano, 572 U.S. at 5. It is preliminary to and separate from the
determination of parental rights and responsibilities under 19-A M.R.S. § 1653
(2025).4 There is no meaningful overlap between the Hague Convention claim
and the other divorce and property issues. Compare Hague Convention, art. 3,
12, with 19-A M.R.S. §§ 902, 953 (2025).
[¶20] This conclusion is bolstered by the language of the Convention and
ICARA. Petitions for the return of children can be, and frequently are, brought
as independent actions, separate from any divorce or custody proceeding; in
such cases the order on the petition is a final judgment disposing of all claims.
4 “A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” Hague Convention, art. 19. 10
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(b) (“Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings
under the Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access to a child may
do so by commencing a civil action by filing a petition for the relief sought in
any court which has jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to
exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the
petition is filed.”); see, e.g., Lozano, 572 U.S. at 8. That the petition may be filed
as an independent action strongly suggests the issue is collateral to the other
issues in the divorce action.
[¶21] Second, this appeal presents a question of law that, although not
novel, is unsettled in Maine. We have not previously had the opportunity to
interpret the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention as to what
constitutes commencement of a proceeding for return of a child, and our lack
of precedent supports reaching the merits.
[¶22] Finally, absent our immediate review, Peter could irreparably lose
his claimed rights under the Hague Convention. If successful on any of the
issues on appeal, Peter would be entitled to have the child immediately
returned to Greece for a custody determination to take place there, rather than
in Maine. See Hague Convention, art. 12; Lozano, 572 U.S. at 4-5. Awaiting a 11
final judgment in this case would inherently and substantially delay the return
of the child to Greece and thus infringe on Peter’s rights under the Hague
Convention. See Hague Convention, art. 1, 12.
[¶23] Accordingly, we conclude that the collateral order exception to the
final judgment rule justifies reaching the merits of this interlocutory appeal.
B. Denial of Petition to Return the Child
[¶24] The parent petitioning for return of a child bears the initial burden
of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child was
“wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention.”
22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(e)(1)(A). If a child has been wrongfully retained, the court
must order the return of the child if “at the date of the commencement of the
proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting
State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date
of the wrongful removal or retention.” Hague Convention, art. 12. As relevant
here, when proceedings are commenced more than one year after the wrongful
detention, the court shall nonetheless order the return of the child “unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” Id. The
parent opposing the petition has the burden to establish by a preponderance of 12
the evidence the well-settled-child defense. See 22 U.S.C.A § 9003(e)(2)(B).5
Even when a court finds that the well-settled-child defense has been
established, the court still has the discretion to order the return of the child.
Hague Convention, art. 12; see Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16.
1. One-Year Commencement Period
[¶25] Peter contends that the court erred in finding that he waited more
than a year to petition for the return of the child and, therefore, the court was
required to order the return of the child to Greece without consideration of the
well-settled-child defense. He asserts that the court erred in finding that the
child was wrongfully retained on January 4, 2023, instead of July 17, 2023,
when Michele filed for divorce, and therefore a year had not passed before
commencement of the proceeding to return the child. He further argues that
even if the child was wrongfully retained on January 4, 2023, he commenced
the proceedings within one year because he filed a petition for return of the
child on September 25, 2023, with the Central Authority of Greece.
5 Although ICARA refers to this as an exception, 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(e)(2)(B), courts generally have
referred to it as a defense and we continue this practice. 13
a. Date of Wrongful Retention
[¶26] “A wrongful retention occurs when a parent exercising lawful
custody rights authorizes the child’s transfer to another country, but then the
child is retained in that country in breach of the parent’s custody rights.” In re
S.L., 503 P.3d 244, 258 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021); see Hague Convention, art. 3 (“The
removal or the retention of the child is to be considered wrongful where . . . it
is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, . . . either jointly or alone,
under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident
immediately before the removal or retention; and . . . at the time of removal or
retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”); see also Abbott v.
Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2010); Swett v. Bowe, 733 F. Supp. 3d 225, 274-75
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d sub nom. Urquieta v. Bowe, 120 F.4th 335 (2d Cir. 2024). “To
establish a prima facie case of wrongful retention under the Hague Convention
and ICARA, a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the habitual residence of the child immediately before the date of the
alleged wrongful retention was in a foreign country; (2) the retention is in
breach of custody rights under the foreign country’s law; and (3) the petitioner 14
was exercising custody rights at the time of the alleged wrongful retention.” Id.
at 263 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶27] We review the court’s factual findings, including the date of
wrongful retention of the child, for clear error. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 10. We
“will affirm those findings as long as they are supported by competent evidence
in the record, even if the evidence might support alternative findings of fact.”
Bergin v. Bergin, 2019 ME 133, ¶ 12, 214 A.3d 1071 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶28] When a petitioner originally consents to a child’s travel with a fixed
return date, retention may be considered wrongful as of the date on which the
child ought to have returned. Swett, 733 F. Supp. 3d at 274-75. Here, the court
did not clearly err in finding that the child was wrongfully retained beginning
January 4, 2023. The parties came to the United States with a fixed return date.
There is competent record evidence that Michele communicated to Peter her
plan to leave him, that she told him on January 4, 2023, that she did not intend
to return with him or permit the child to return to Greece, that she did in fact
stay in Maine with their child, and that Peter knew or should have known in
January 2023 that Michele intended to remain in Maine. Despite Peter’s
contention to the contrary, the record supports the court’s finding that the child 15
was wrongfully retained as of January 2023, before Michele filed her divorce
complaint in July 2023.
b. Date of Commencement of Proceeding
[¶29] Peter also argues that even if wrongful retention of the child began
in January 2023, he nonetheless commenced a proceeding for return of the
child within one year, necessitating that the child be returned. We review
de novo whether Peter’s September 25, 2023, filing with the Central Authority
of Greece commenced the proceedings under the Convention. See Yaman,
730 F.3d at 10.
[¶30] ICARA provides that “the term ‘commencement of proceedings,’ as
used in article 12 of the Convention, means, with respect to the return of a child
located in the United States, the filing of a petition in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section.” 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(f)(3). Subsection (b) provides
that “[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention
for the return of a child or for arrangements for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of access to a child may do so by commencing a civil
action by filing a petition for the relief sought in any court which has
jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in 16
the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” Id. § 9003(b)
(emphasis added).
[¶31] Accordingly, courts have consistently held that to commence
proceedings under the Hague Convention, a petition must be filed in a court
where the child is located and not in the Central Authority of the country of
habitual residence. See, e.g., Monzon v. De La Roca, 910 F.3d 92, 98-99 (3d Cir.
2018); da Costa v. de Lima, No. 22-cv-10543, 2023 WL 4049378, at *7 (D. Mass.
June 6, 2023), aff’d, 94 F.4th 174 (1st Cir. 2024); de Jesus Joya Rubio v. Alvarez,
526 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1203 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Because the child was in the United
States and not Greece, Peter did not commence the proceedings until he filed
his petition in a Maine court on April 19, 2024.
[¶32] We therefore discern no error in the court’s conclusion that the
child was wrongfully retained as of January 2023 and that Peter commenced
proceedings under the Convention on April 19, 2024, more than a year later.
2. Well-Settled-Child Defense
[¶33] Peter next argues that the court erred in concluding that the child
is settled in Maine. Michele bore the burden to establish the well-settled-child
defense. 22 U.S.C.A. § 9003(e)(2)(B). We review the court’s finding that the 17
child is well settled in her new environment for clear error. See Yaman,
730 F.3d at 10; da Silva v. de Aredes, 953 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2020).
[¶34] “The ‘well-settled’ defense grew out of the understanding of the
framers of the Convention that there could come a point at which a child would
become so settled in a new environment that repatriation might not be in its
best interest.” Swett, 733 F. Supp. 3d at 273-74 (quotation marks omitted).
“Courts look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a child
is now settled.” da Silva, 953 F.3d at 75. When analyzing whether a child is well
settled, courts often consider the stability of a child’s living arrangements, the
child and family’s support network including family and friends, participation
in community activities, the parent’s employment and financial stability, the
consistency with which the child attends school or daycare, the age of the child,
and the stability of the child’s immigration status. See, e.g., id.; Alcala v.
Hernandez, 826 F.3d 161, 174 (4th Cir. 2016); Rodriguez v. Noriega,
732 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1001 (D. Minn. 2024); Swett, 733 F. Supp. 3d at 280.
[¶35] We conclude that the court did not err in determining that Michele
met her burden of establishing the well-settled-child defense. The court’s
factual findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, including
Michele’s testimony explaining the stability of her and the child’s living 18
environment, the support they have from her father and sister who live nearby,
her current employment and plan to work as a teacher, the extensive services
the child receives to support her in her development and behavior challenges
due to her autism spectrum disorder, and the child’s enthusiasm for going to
school. The court further considered the young age of the child—which the
court weighed against finding her settled. The court appropriately applied its
findings to the well-settled-child defense, and we affirm its determination that
Michele established the defense.
3. Decision to Not Return Child to Greece
[¶36] Finally, Peter argues that the court erred in declining to use its
discretion to return the child to Greece. We review for abuse of discretion a
court’s decision to not return a child after finding that a defense applies. See
Yaman, 730 F.3d at 10.
[¶37] As noted above, even upon the successful showing of the
well-settled-child defense, the court retains discretion to order the return of the
child. Hague Convention, art. 12; da Costa v. de Lima, 94 F.4th 174, 180 (1st Cir.
2024). The First Circuit has termed this determination “a matter of equitable
discretion.” da Costa, 94 F.4th at 180 (quotation marks omitted). “Given the
elasticity of that term, a court may consider the abducting parent’s misconduct, 19
together with any other relevant circumstances, such as whether return would
not be harmful or disruptive even though the child has become settled, in
deciding whether to order [the child’s] return.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶38] The court engaged in a thoughtful analysis, weighing appropriate
facts, including Michele’s conduct, the disruption in the child’s life should the
court order her return to Greece, the importance of the child’s maintaining a
relationship with her father, and the policies underlying the Convention. The
court concluded that “[t]o remove her now from the place where she has
important supports to a country whose language she does not speak would
strike the wrong balance, notwithstanding the countervailing considerations.”
We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to not return the child
to Greece, and accordingly we affirm the court’s order denying Peter’s petition.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Dana R. Prescott, Esq. (orally), Prescott Jamieson Murphy Law Group, LLC, Saco, for appellant Peter Xamplas
Jed Davis, Esq., and Jennifer S. Sparda, Esq. (orally), Jim Mitchell and Jed Davis, P.A., Augusta, for appellee Michele H.P. Xamplas
Augusta District Court docket number FM-2023-240 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY