A. Duty and Breach of Duty
Possession and control are generally required to establish that an occupier
of land owes a duty of care to those present on the premises. See Quadrino, 588
A.2d 303 (Me. 1991). For example, in Quadrino, the plaintiff was walking from a
motel and restaurant towards the downtown of MiIlbridge, and as he crossed the
defendant bank's driveway, he tripped on a curb on a curb constructed and
maintained by the Department of Transportation on the motel's property. 588
A.2d at 304. Although he landed on the bank's property, the Law Court held that
the bank did not control the particular area where the plaintiff fell and thus owed
him no duty of care. Id. at 305. The relevant inquiry was whether "the defendant
was, in fact, the possessor of the land at the time of the injury." Id.
However, mere ownership of the land is not a necessary prerequisite to a
finding of possession and control. See Pelletier, 666 A.2d 220 (Me. 1995); Quadrino,
588 A.2d 303, 304 (Me. 1991). In Pelletier, a woman was injured at a golf club
when a golf ball she hit ricocheted off the railroad tracks crossing a fairway and
struck her nose. 662 A.2d at 221. The golf club argued that it owned no duty to
plaintiff because the railroad tracks were not located on its property. Id. The Law
Court disagreed, holding that the club did have a duty to the plaintiff because it
"possesse[d]" the land by "manifest[ing] an intention to have control over" it. Id.
at 222. Furthermore, the club had "invited golfers to use" the land by
incorporating the tracks into the course. Id.
While possession and control are generally required to establish a duty of
4 care for occupiers of land, business invitees are also entitled to reasonably safe
means of ingress and egress. Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 535 (Me. 1973). In Libby,
a man slipped on an icy rut in the ground as he was leaving a dance at the
Augusta State Armory. Id. at 529. The Armory Committee argued that it owed no
duty of care to the plaintiff because it did not possess or control the area where
he fell. Id. at 535. The Law Court acknowledged that the place where the plaintiff
fell was not part of the Armory Committee's lease, but held that they did owe a
duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff "to provide him with walkways or
areaways reasonably safe from unreasonable risk and harm." Id. at 536.
Poirier correctly argues that that there is no evidence that Poirier
possessed the parking lot. Plaintiff's reliance on Hankard v. Beal, 543 A. 2d 1376
(Me. 1998) is misplaced because in Hankard, unlike the facts in this case, the
question was whether the landlord reserved control for a dangerous condition
within the meaning of Nichols v. Marsden, 483 A. 2d 341 (Me. 1984).
Raceway owned the property and leased it to the State of Maine. Poirier's only
relationship to the property was that it entered into a contract to provide
snowplowing, handwork and sanding. By agreeing to provide these services,
Poirier did not occupy or manifest an intent to control the property. See
Alexander v. Mitchell, 2007 :ME 108, <]I 25, 930 A. 2d 1016, 1023.
B. Dangerous Condition
Plaintiff argues in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment
that even without a possessory interest in the property, Poirier owed a duty of
care to Michaud because it negligently created a dangerous condition. Plaintiff
argues that Poirier created a dangerous condition because it plowed snow into
5 banks above the area where the plaintiff fell, knowing that the slope of the
parking lot created specific areas susceptible to ice formation. The record
discloses that the facts relevant to this issue are contested.
The Law Court has provided that a "nonpossessor who negligently
creates a dangerous condition on the land may be liable for reasonably
foreseeable harm. " Colvin v. A. R. Cable Services-ME, Inc., 1997 ME 163, en 7, 697
A. 2d 1289, 1290. See also Quirion v. Geroux, 2008 ME 14, en 10. Poirier did owe a
duty to the public who used the parking lot to not cause an unreasonably
dangerous condition through its snow plowing and sanding of the parking lot.
The evidence cited in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements generates genuine issues
of material fact about whether Poirier breached that duty, or whether any such
breach was the cause of Michaud's injury. Thus, the court denies Poirier's
motion for summary judgment on Michaud's negligence claim.
II. Intended Beneficiary of Contract between Raceway and Poirier
In count four, plaintiff contends that he was an intended beneficiary of the
contract between Raceway and Poirier. In Denman v. Peoples Heritage Bank, Inc.,
1998 ME, 12, 704 A. 2d 411, the plaintiff claimed she was an intended beneficiary
of a contract between a property owner and a snow removal contractor. Id. at en 8.
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 302 and 315 (1981), the Law
Court observed that Denman was required to show that the property owner
intended that she receive an enforceable benefit under the maintenance contract.
Id. at en 9. ''It is not enough that [plaintiff] benefited or could have benefited from
the performance of the contract. The intent must be clear and definite, whether it
is expressed in the contract itself or in the circumstances surrounding its
execution." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
6 As in Denman, there is no language in the contract that generates an issue
that the property owner intended to create in the plaintiff enforceable rights as
an intended beneficiary. And, the plaintiff offered no evidence of any
circumstances attendant to the execution of the contract that would support a
finding of a clear intention to create in the plaintiff enforceable rights in the
contract. [d. Whether the public benefits from the contract is not the focus.
Rather, the focus, as directed in Denman, is whether Raceway and Poirier
intended the public to have enforceable rights in the contract. Michaud has
failed to demonstrate that there is any genuine issue of fact with regard to his
third-party beneficiary claim; therefore, summary judgment is granted on count
IV of the comlaint.
III. Breach of Contract and Contribution
Poirier argues that Raceway is unable to present sufficient evidence that it
breach its contract with Raceway, and furthermore, the express terms of the
contract provided a disclaimer for any liability. The contract provided: "Note:
We are not responsible for any slip or falls due to weather conditions." Because
the court concludes that the parties' Rule 56(h) statements disclose that there are
genuine issues of material fact about what caused Michaud's injury, whether
either Raceway or Poirier owed any duty to Michaud, and whether Poirier
breached its contract with Raceway, the motion for summary judgment is
denied.
CONCLUSION
Poirier's motion for summary judgment on count III of the amended
complaint is DENIED. Poirier's motion for summary judgment on count IV of
7 the amended complaint is GRANTED. Poirier's motion for summary judgment
on the third-party complaint is DENIED.
The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
DATED: August 1,2008
8 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. AUf; o( .2008 CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-07-115 /\1\10 nOSCO('(') if)""" " /.. . i .:1\, ''-, Jr" ,} 71D T, -f,j!L/ r, ,:::·t.r f,,··.,ll(}'!:) ("'0 1 In co' ,,~"..,~.,.~tJ'~\,l ~ I~I ~.
ROGER MICHAUD .', . • • 1.
v. ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
This matter is on the civil jury list for the month of October and is now
before the court on defendant Poirier's motion in limine requesting that evidence
of plaintiffs medical expenses be limited to the amounts paid by MaineCare.
Raceway also filed a motion in limine, joining with Poiriees motion to exclude
evidence of medical bills in excess of amounts paid by MaineCare. Plaintiff
objects, arguing that defendants' motions lack any legal or factual basis, would
unnecessarily complicate the proof in this case, and seek an unjust result. In
short, plaintiff argues that payments by MaineCare do not represent reasonable
value of medical expenses and defendants have proffered no evidence from
which the court could reach such a conclusion.
On December 19,2005, Michaud was injured when he slipped on ice and
fell while he was crossing a parking lot after conducting business at the
Department of Motor Vehicles in a building located at 36 Mollison Way on
December 19, 2005. At, or subsequent to, the time of plaintiffs accident, MaineCare, a government program that provides health coverage to eligible
recipients, covered him. MaineCare paid the plaintiff's medical providers less
than was originally billed for the services provided. Under federal and state law,
the MaineCare payment represent full and final payment of plaintiff's medical
bills and the plaintiff is not responsible and cannot be responsible to pay the
amounts written off by the medical care providers. At issue is whether the
evidence of plaintiff's medical expenses should be limited to the amounts paid
by MaineCare.
DISCUSSION
Maine law provides that an injured party is entitled to the reasonable
value of medical services that have been reasonably required and actually used
in treatment of the plaintiff and related to the injury complained of. Stubbs v.
Bartlett, 478 A. 2d 690, 692 (Me. 1984). The collateral source rule generally applies
when determining the reasonable value of medical services. The collateral
source rule provides that payments made or benefits conferred by other sources
are not to be subtracted from a plaintiff's recovery. Werner v. Lane, 393 A. 2d
1239 (Me. 1978). See also Hoitt v. Hall, 661 A. 2d 669, 673-74 (Me. 1995).
Although the collateral source rule does not specifically address the issue
presented in this case, there is no reason that this rule should not also apply here.
In the case at hand, plaintiff was eligible for MaineCare during his care
and treatment. MaineCare is Maine's version of Medicaid, a program jointly
funded by the state and the federal governments in accordance with the Social
Security Act, 42 U.s.c. 401 et seq. Fryeburg Healthcare v. Department of Human
Services, 1999 ME 122, 734 A. 2d 1141. The State of Maine pays for medical care
of eligible recipients and makes adjustments to bills submitted by providers for
2 items it deems unreasonable. Sebasticook Valley Healthcare Facility/ Inc. v. State of
Maine/ 484 A. 2d 595 (Me. 1984). By federal law/ the medical providers cannot
charge the patient for the difference between their charges and the amount paid
by the state. 42 U.s.C 1396(a)(25)(C); 42 CF.R. § 447.15; 42 CF.R. § 447.20.
Health care providers who accept MaineCare payments accept such payments as
payment in full for the services.
To accept defendanfs position/ this court would have to rule that the
reasonable value of the medical care received by plaintiff is the amount paid by
MaineCare. Given the federal and state payment scheme/ this simply is not the
case since reimbursement rates are often based on administrative rulemaking
and vary greatly depending on the service and provider. Furthermore/
reimbursement rates are set for public purposes as much as any other factor.
Reimbursement rates are not set with an eye towards what is fair and reasonable;
but rather/ what the public purse can barely afford to provide the most amount
of coverage for the most amount of people. See Me. Dep/t of Health & Hum.
Serv./ 10-144 CMR 101-1.08-1 and 101-1.02(A).
Maine courts have long applied the collateral source rule in order to allow
negligence victims to recover the reasonable of medical services for which they
incurred no cost/ either through insurance/ gratuities or some other
advantageous benefit. Although the Law Court has not addressed the precise
issue raised in defendants/ motions/ the Court has reasoned:
If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit/ as by maintaining his own insurance or by making advantageous employment arrangements/ the law allows him to keep it for himself. If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or established for him by law/ he should not be deprived of the advantage that it confers. The law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits/ so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him. One way of stating
3 this conclusion is to say thatit is the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives.
Hoitt v. Hall, 661 A. 2d 669,673 (Me. 1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979)1; Werner v. Lane, 393 A. 2d 1329, 1333-1337 (Me.
1978).
Alexander's MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL 7-108 (4 th ed. 2008)
reflects this legal analysis. Instruction at Section 7-108 provides:
Medical expenses includes the reasonable value of medical services including; examination and care by doctors and other medical personnel, hospital care and treatment, medicine and other medical supplies shown by the evidence to have been reasonably required and actually used in treatment of the plaintiff, plus a sum to compensate the plaintiff for any medical care, medicines and medical supplies which you find are reasonably certain to be required for future treatment of the plaintiff caused by the defendant's negligence.
The comment to section 7-108 relies on Werner and explains that I/[m]edical
expense damages may be recovered for charges paid by or for the plaintiff,
charges paid by a collateral source or a third party, or charges actually incurred
but later written off or otherwise not collected. Mention to the jury of collateral
source payments or writeoffs should be avoided." Quoting Werner, Alexander
recites:
[T]he fact [that] necessary medical and nursing services are rendered gratuitously to one who is injured as a result of the negligence of another should not preclude the injured party from recovering the reasonable value of those services as part of ... compensatory damages in an action against a tortfeasor. 393 A. 2d at 1335.
I Under section 920A, which the Law Court has cited with approval, the rule that "collateral benefits are not subtracted from the plaintiff s recovery applies to the following types of benefits: (1) [i]nsurance policies ...; (2) [e]mloyment benefits; (3) [g]ratuities ... ; and (4) [s]ociallegislation benefits." Id cmt. c. See also Hoitt, 661 A. 2d at 674.
4 The parties cite to case law elsewhere in the country, which is divided on
this issue and not controlling here in Maine. Under existing Maine law, it is for
the factfinder to decide what the "reasonable value" of plaintiff's medical
services is, based on the evidence of the amounts billed by the medical service
providers and any other relevant evidence not implicating the collateral source
rule.
Defendants' motions in limine are DENIED.
The clerk shall incorporate this Order into the docket by reference
DATED: August 4,2008 o ce A. Wheeler, Justice