Michael v. Domulewicz and Mary Ann Domulewicz v. Commissioner

129 T.C. No. 3
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedAugust 8, 2007
Docket10434-05
StatusUnknown

This text of 129 T.C. No. 3 (Michael v. Domulewicz and Mary Ann Domulewicz v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael v. Domulewicz and Mary Ann Domulewicz v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. No. 3 (tax 2007).

Opinion

129 T.C. No. 3

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

MICHAEL V. DOMULEWICZ AND MARY ANN DOMULEWICZ, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 10434-05. Filed August 8, 2007.

As part of a Son-of-BOSS transaction designed to create a basis of approximately $29.3 million in publicly traded stock purchased at a relatively minimal cost, P entered into a short sale of U.S. Treasury notes and contributed the proceeds of that sale and the related obligation to a partnership (DIP) in which P was one of three partners. Neither P nor DIP treated the obligation assumed by DIP as a liability under sec. 752, I.R.C., and P did not compute his basis in DIP by taking the obligation into account. After DIP satisfied the obligation and received contributions of the publicly traded stock from its partners, the partners transferred their interests in DIP to DII, an S corporation of which they were shareholders. The transfer of partnership interests was followed by DII’s receipt of DIP’s distributed assets; i.e., the stock and cash. DII sold the stock and claimed a resulting capital loss of $29,306,024. On Ps’ 1999 Federal income tax return, P claimed his $5,858,801 share of the reported loss as a passthrough capital loss from - 2 -

DII. P claimed that the loss offset a $5,831,772 capital gain that P realized during the year. In an FPAA pertaining to DIP, R determined that the basis of the stock distributed by DIP was zero and that accuracy-related penalties under sec. 6662, I.R.C., applied. When no petition was filed as to the FPAA, R did not assess any tax or accuracy-related penalty as to DII’s sale of the stock. Instead, R issued an affected items notice of deficiency to Ps as a predicate to assessing those amounts. Ps now move the Court to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the deficiency procedures of subch. B of ch. 63, I.R.C. (deficiency procedures), do not apply to R’s disallowance of the passthrough loss or to R’s determination of the accuracy-related penalties. Held: Sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), I.R.C., makes the deficiency procedures applicable to R’s disallowance of the passthrough loss from DII. Held, further, R’s determination of the accuracy-related penalties is not subject to the deficiency procedures by virtue of the parenthetical text added to sec. 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), I.R.C., by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, sec. 1238(b)(2), 111 Stat. 1026.

David D. Aughtry, Eric M. Nemeth, and Paul L.B. McKenney,

for petitioners.

Meso T. Hammoud, for respondent.

OPINION

LARO, Judge: This is a Son-of-BOSS case that is currently

before the Court on petitioners’ motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction. See generally Kligfeld Holdings v. Commissioner,

128 T.C. 192 (2007), and Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, for a

general description of Son-of-BOSS cases. Petitioners petitioned - 3 -

the Court to redetermine respondent’s determination of a

$2,398,491 deficiency in their 1999 Federal income tax and a

$946,750.80 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).1

Those determinations were reflected in an affected items notice

of deficiency issued to petitioners after no partner of DMD

Investment Partners (DIP) timely petitioned the Court with

respect to a notice of final partnership administrative

adjustment (FPAA) mailed to Michael Domulewicz (petitioner) as

DIP’s tax matters partner (TMP). Copies of the FPAA also were

mailed to each of DIP’s other partners.

We decide the following issues:2

1. Whether section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) makes the deficiency

procedures of subchapter B of chapter 63 (deficiency procedures)

applicable to respondent’s disallowance of petitioners’ claim to

a passthrough loss from DMD Investments, Inc. (DII), an S

corporation in which petitioner (through his grantor trust) was a

1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the applicable versions of the Internal Revenue Code. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 2 We decide these issues with the aid of extensive briefing by the parties. The briefing was in the form of petitioners’ memorandum, respondent’s response, petitioners’ reply, and respondent’s response to reply. After the Court filed respondent’s response to reply, petitioners moved the Court to allow them to make their arguments at a hearing. We shall deny that motion. The parties have adequately advanced their legal arguments, and further arguments would not significantly aid our decision process. See Rule 50(b)(3). - 4 -

20-percent shareholder.3 Petitioners argue that the deficiency

procedures do not apply to this item. Respondent argues to the

contrary, asserting that a partner-level determination was

required as to this item. We agree with respondent.

2. Whether respondent’s determination of the

accuracy-related penalties is subject to the deficiency

procedures. The parties agree that it is not. So do we.4

Background

Petitioners are husband and wife, and they resided in

Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, when their petition was filed with

the Court. They filed a joint 1999 Form 1040, U.S. Individual

Income Tax Return, on or before August 18, 2000.

Petitioner was a 20-percent shareholder of CTA Acoustics

(CTA) when CTA was sold on April 30, 1999, at a gain to the

shareholders of approximately $30 million. Petitioner’s portion

3 DII’s other shareholders were the two other partners in DIP. Each of those other shareholders owned a 40-percent interest in DIP and a 40-percent interest in DII. 4 Petitioners’ motion states in part that the Court lacks jurisdiction over both issues because the applicable periods of limitation for assessment of the deficiency and penalties have expired. Because the expiration of the period of limitation is an affirmative defense and does not affect this Court’s jurisdiction, see Davenport Recycling Associates v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-347; Columbia Bldg., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 607, 611 (1992); cf. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, , 126 S. Ct. 1675, 1681 (2006) (“A statute of limitations defense * * * is not ‘jurisdictional’”), we reject without further discussion the portion of petitioners’ arguments dealing with the period of limitation. - 5 -

of the gain was $5,831,772, and he implemented a plan promoted by

BDO Seidman and Jenkens & Gilchrist to create a $5,858,801 “loss”

to report as an offset to that gain. As discussed in more detail

infra, the “loss” was reportedly generated by using a

partnership, an S corporation, and a short sale of U.S. Treasury

notes to create a basis of approximately $29.3 million in

publicly traded stock purchased at a relatively minimal cost.5

The transaction was similar to the transactions described in

Notice 2000-44, supra.

Under the plan, DIP was formed on April 30, 1999, with

petitioner as a 20-percent partner and two other individuals (at

least one of whom was a 40-percent shareholder of CTA) each with

a 40-percent interest.6 On July 7, 1999, petitioner entered into

a short sale of U.S. Treasury notes with a face value of

$5,800,000.7 The U.S. Treasury notes matured on May 31, 2001,

5 As we recently explained in Kligfeld Holdings v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 192, 195 n.6 (2007):

A short sale is the sale of borrowed securities, typically for cash.

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