Michael Thomas Pace v. Casey Jordan, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: September 8, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-06654
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL THOMAS PACE, Plaintiff, 25-CV-6654 (LTS) -against- ORDER GRANTING IFP APPLICATION AND DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION CASEY JORDAN, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has filed an emergency motion requesting a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunctive relief, and the appointment of “conflict-free counsel,” and on September 2, 2025, he filed a second emergency motion seeking the same relief. (ECF 1, 12.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for in camera review and a remote hearing. (ECF 6.) Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application but denies Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order, injunctive relief, and the appointment of counsel. The Court also grants Plaintiff leave to file a complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. In the alternative, Plaintiff may move to withdraw this action. DISCUSSION To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits of his case or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in his favor. See UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W.V. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Wright v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2000). Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s submissions do not demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and

a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in his favor. Moreover, in a letter Plaintiff filed after he filed his emergency motion, Plaintiff references his property in New Milford, Connecticut, suggesting that this action did not arise within a county in the Southern District of New York. For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s requests for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunctive relief, and the appointment of counsel. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s emergency motions (ECF 1, 12) are denied without prejudice. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to terminate these motions and the motion at ECF 6 seeking “in- camera review disclosure and remote hearing.” The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: September 8, 2025 New York, New York /s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge