IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-20-00072-CR
MICHAEL THOMAS MILBURN, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 1 Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 18-01927-CRM-CCL1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael Thomas Milburn was found guilty by a jury of assault family violence.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004. In three issues,
Milburn contends: (1) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense
of consent; (2) the trial court erred by denying his request for a hearing on his motion for
new trial; and (3) he was denied reasonably effective assistance of counsel. We will
affirm. Background
In March 2018, Milburn and his wife were contemplating divorce when a dispute
arose. The incident escalated, and Milburn’s wife ultimately accused Milburn of assault.
Milburn was charged by information with “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
caus[ing] bodily injury to Melissa Day Milburn, a member of the defendant’s family or
household, by grabbing her hand and twisting it, pushing her into a wall and onto the
ground with his hands, and grabbing her in a bear hug with his arms.” The jury found
Milburn guilty and assessed his punishment at sixty days in the county jail. The trial
court rendered judgment and imposed sentence accordingly.
Issue One
In his first issue, Milburn asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to include an
instruction in the jury charge on the defense of consent.
AUTHORITY
A claim of jury-charge error is reviewed using the procedure established in
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g); see Barrios v.
State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). First, we must determine whether there
is error in the charge. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If we find
error, only then will we analyze that error for harm. Id. If there is no error, our analysis
ends. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Milburn v. State Page 2 It is well settled that a defendant has the right to an instruction on any defensive
issue raised by the evidence, whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or
contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may or may not think about the
credibility of the evidence. Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see
Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A defense is supported or
raised by the evidence “if there is some evidence, from any source, on each element of
the defense that, if believed by the jury, would support a rational inference that that
element is true.” Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The
defendant bears the burden of showing some evidence exists to support each element of
the defense. Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see Shaw, 243
S.W.3d at 657–58. When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a requested defensive
instruction, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant’s
requested submission.” Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A
trial court, however, may refuse an instruction on a defensive theory if the issue was not
raised by the evidence. See Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 657–58. Therefore, when the evidence
fails to raise a defensive issue, the trial court commits no error in refusing a requested
instruction. McGarity v. State, 5 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
The defensive issue of “mutual combat” is set forth in section 22.06 of the Penal
Code, titled “Consent as Defense to Assaultive Conduct.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.06.
Section 22.06 of the Penal Code provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he victim’s effective
Milburn v. State Page 3 consent or the actor’s reasonable belief that the victim consented to the actor’s conduct is
a defense to [the offense of assault] if . . . the conduct did not threaten or inflict serious
bodily injury.” Id. Consent is defined as “assent in fact, whether express or apparent.”
Id. § 1.07(a)(11).
“[T]he issue (of mutual combat) arises out of an antecedent agreement to fight.
The agreement must exist.” Lujan v. State, 430 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
(quoting Carson v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 342, 344, 230 S.W. 997, 998 (1921)) (internal quotes
omitted). When a party claims the defense of “mutual combat,” there must be evidence
of an antecedent agreement to fight. Davis v. State, 533 S.W.3d 498, 513–14 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Lujan, 430 S.W.2d at 514, and Miller v.
State, 312 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)).
MELISSA’S TESTIMONY
Melissa testified that during an ongoing argument, Milburn showed her that he
was typing up the terms of a potential divorce agreement on his cell phone. Melissa said
she wanted to see the phone better so she “reached out, not to hurt him” but to get a
better look. When she did, Milburn “roughly” grabbed her hand and said, “[D]on’t you
dare hurt me; the law is on my side.” Milburn did not let Melissa look at the phone and
read the agreement off to her. After Milburn read the terms, Melissa suggested a couple
of things that he had promised her be added to the agreement. Milburn stated that
Melissa did not deserve her request and spit in her face. The argument continued, and
Milburn v. State Page 4 Milburn demanded that Melissa turn over the keys to the car and a phone, which Melissa
refused to do. Melissa had the keys, phone, and a wallet in her pocket and was
“gripping” them with her hand. Melissa again refused to give Milburn the keys and
phone, and that is when Milburn “went after [her].” Milburn rushed her, grabbed her
hand, and grabbed at her pockets, causing her pocket to rip. Milburn did manage to get
her wallet out and tossed it aside because he was after the keys and phone. Milburn came
at her again for the keys and phone, and Milburn was being “relentless physically.”
Milburn shoved Melissa around and was “body slamming [her] around.” Milburn
“threw the full weight of his body and shoulders into [her] like a football player would .
. . .” Melissa recalled that Milburn hit her with his body more than once and pushed her
into a wall. Melissa stated she was able to keep the phone, but Milburn twisted and pried
the keys from her hand when he had her arm pinned down and had slammed her hand
on the pavement. Melissa guessed that her hand broke when Milburn twisted the keys
off her finger because that is when her hand weakened. Her hand began to swell after
the incident while talking with law enforcement officers. A fracture of the fourth
metacarpal bone was subsequently discovered after an X-ray. Melissa stated that she did
not hit, kick, or bite Milburn during the incident and added that she “wasn’t trying to do
anything to physically harm [Milburn].” Melissa stated she thought about punching
Milburn to defend herself but “purposefully held back because . . . if anything happens,
it’s evidence.” At the close of Melissa’s direct examination, she confirmed that Milburn
Milburn v. State Page 5 (1) grabbed and twisted her hand, (2) pushed her against the wall, (3) pushed her against
the ground, and (4) gave her a “bear hug.” Melissa added that she was injured as a result
and that she did not consent to “any of that happening.”
On cross-examination, Melissa admitted that she could have released the keys and
that she chose to struggle to keep the keys. Melissa denied that Milburn could have
reasonably believed that she was okay with struggling over the keys and consented to
the struggle. Melissa disagreed that by not releasing the keys, she consented. She added
that just because they struggled over the keys does not mean she was willing. Melissa
explained that during the struggle, Milburn had her hand with both of his hands and
slammed her hand to the ground full force, that her hand “simply broke,” and that that
is when she felt her hand “go weak.” Melissa agreed that Milburn intentionally hurt her
hand by slamming it into the ground.
MILBURN’S TESTIMONY
Milburn testified that he had personal property in the car and that he wanted the
keys so that he could lock up the car to secure the property and to keep Melissa from
destroying his possessions. Milburn stated that Melissa did not respond verbally when
he asked her for the keys and that she just looked at him angrily and clenched the keys
in her fist to make sure he did not get the keys. When Milburn was asked, “So at that
point you had a choice to make . . . ,” he responded, “Yes.” When asked what Milburn
chose, he stated, “I chose to engage.” Milburn further denied having “any fears that in
Milburn v. State Page 6 the process of forcibly obtaining the keys from [Melissa,] . . . she might be injured” or he
might hurt her. When Milburn was asked what he would have done if he had thought
he was injuring Melissa while trying to get the keys, he replied, “I would have stopped.”
Milburn characterized Melissa’s statement that he pushed her against a wall as
“completely untrue.” Milburn further denied he pushed Melissa to the ground or
slammed her hand on the asphalt. Milburn described his acts as follows:
So then my actions of trying to get the keys, the first thing that I did was I went over to her and I gave her a bear hug. I put my arms around her as a way to keep her arms from flailing around, and that would give me a better access of being able to hold her hand. I was then able to take her wrist; and I held it firm, did not twist it, jerk it, or anything, just held it where it would not move while I tried to pry her fingers off of the keys. In the middle of doing that, she kept pulling and struggling and jumping around; and at some point, from the angle of which, I ended up like crouching down, essentially, and she ended up losing her balance and fell on top of me.
Milburn testified that it was Melissa that was “doing all the hopping around, twisting
and turning and jumping.” When asked whether Melissa caused her injuries to herself,
Milburn answered affirmatively. Milburn agreed that during the incident he did not have
any intention of hurting Melissa. Milburn agreed, when asked, that what was going on
was a mutually consented to struggle over the keys.
DISCUSSION
There is no evidence that Melissa dared, enticed, or induced Milburn to assault
her. Indeed, Milburn acknowledged that Melissa said nothing to him when he requested
the keys and cell phone from her. Milburn did not testify that Melissa challenged him to
Milburn v. State Page 7 a fight or rushed at him. Milburn testified that he stood still, and that Melissa was the
one who flailed about and fell. Milburn noted that when Melissa refused to hand him
the keys to the vehicle, it was he who “chose to engage.” Milburn’s position that the
incident was a mutually consented to struggle over the keys does not amount to evidence
or raise the issue that Melissa consented to Milburn causing bodily injury to her.
Milburn was not charged with struggling with Melissa but with intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury.
In our review of the record, we find no evidence of an antecedent agreement by or
between Melissa and Milburn to engage in an altercation and no evidence that Melissa
ever consented to being assaulted. The fact that Melissa acknowledged she struggled
over the keys does not amount to evidence of an antecedent agreement to engage in the
altercation or struggle; at most, it is only evidence that she and Milburn were mutually
engaged in the struggle once it began. See Carson, 89 Tex. Crim. at 344, 230 S.W. at 998;
see also Reed v. State, No. 02-15-00173-CR, 2016 WL 4491518, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We find no evidence
that Melissa, by her words or actions, expressly or impliedly consented to Milburn
assaulting her or that Milburn held a reasonable belief that Melissa consented to Milburn
assaulting her. See Agbor v. State, No. 02-12-00401-CR, 2013 WL 1830679, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 2, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(finding no consent when defendant and complainant immediately started arguing when
Milburn v. State Page 8 they saw each other, complainant pushed defendant’s finger out of the way during
argument, and complainant hit appellant first). Without evidence of an express or
implied antecedent agreement, we need not reach the question of whether Milburn’s
testimony impliedly supported the charged conduct. See Rodriguez v. State, 629 S.W.3d
229, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying
Milburn’s request for an instruction in the jury charge on the defense of consent. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(11), 22.06; Bufkin, 207 S.W.3d at 782; Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743;
Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Accordingly, we overrule Milburn’s first issue.
Issue Two
In Milburn’s second issue, he complains that the trial court erred by denying his
request for a hearing on his motion for new trial based on an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim.
We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse
of discretion; we reverse only if the decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the
zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A hearing on a motion for new trial is to (1) determine whether
the case should be retried and (2) prepare a record for presenting issues on appeal if the
motion is denied. Id. at 338. A hearing on a motion for new trial is not an absolute right.
Milburn v. State Page 9 Id. A hearing is not required when the matters raised in the motion for new trial are
subject to being determined from the record. Id. But a trial court does abuse its discretion
by failing to hold a hearing on a motion for new trial when the motion and accompanying
affidavits (1) raise matters that are not determinable from the record and (2) establish
reasonable grounds showing that a defendant could potentially be entitled to relief.
Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
To establish the existence of reasonable grounds showing that a defendant could
be entitled to relief, a defendant is required to support a motion for new trial with an
affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis
for the claim. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339. The affidavit need not establish a prima facie case,
or even reflect every component legally required to establish relief. Id. It is sufficient if a
fair reading of it gives rise to reasonable grounds in support of the claim. Id. However,
affidavits that are conclusory in nature and unsupported by facts do not provide the
requisite notice of the basis for the relief claimed; thus, no hearing is required. Id.
“Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant seeking to challenge counsel’s
representation must establish that his counsel’s performance (1) was deficient, and (2)
prejudiced his defense.” Id. at 340 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To show deficiency, a defendant must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation objectively fell below
the standard of professional norms. Id. To show prejudice, a defendant must show there
Milburn v. State Page 10 is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Id. “’Reasonable probability’ is a ‘probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,’ meaning ‘counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2068). Before a defendant “will
be entitled to a hearing on his motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must allege sufficient facts from which a trial court could reasonably
conclude both that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney and that, but
for counsel’s failure, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would
have been different.” Id. at 340–41.
Milburn’s affidavit attached to his motion for new trial reads as follows:
My name is Michael Thomas Milburn. I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit. I am the defendant [in] Brazos County cause number 18-01927-CRM-CCLl.
I hired Larry Fatheree to represent me in presenting a defense. I met with Mr. Fatheree concerning the case on several occasions. The only potential witnesses we discussed were present at the time of the events on which the charge was based. Mr. Fatheree never asked me for the names of any other witnesses who could testify for me at the guilt or punishment phase of trial. My parents and grandparents were willing and available to testify for me to refute several of the claims made by Melissa Milburn. If Mr. Fatheree had discussed potential witnesses for the punishment phase of trial I would have had my parents and grandparents contact him to discuss the testimony they could provide.
Milburn v. State Page 11 Mr. Fatheree did review the original police reports with me but as far as I know he did not file any formal discovery requests or requests for notice. He did not discuss any other investigation of the facts of the case beyond the report and documents filed with the court. At trial he did not know that Melissa had surgery after the initial police report.
Milburn’s factual allegations that could potentially support a claim of ineffective
assistance are that (1) Fatheree never asked Milburn about other potential witnesses for
either phase of trial, (2) Milburn’s family members were available but not called to testify
to refute the claims of Melissa, (3) Fatheree did not discuss any other investigation of the
facts of the case beyond the report and documents filed with the court, and (4) Fatheree
did not know Melissa had surgery after the initial police report.
We will first address the factual allegation that Fatheree never asked Milburn
about other potential witnesses for either phase of trial. Other than Milburn’s parents
and grandparents, Milburn fails to identify other potential witnesses that he wanted to
call at the guilt phase, for what purpose they would have testified, and how the outcome
would have differed if the witnesses would have testified. Milburn does acknowledge
that he and Fatheree did discuss the witnesses that were present when the assault
occurred. Next, we address the factual allegation that Milburn’s parents and
grandparents were available to testify to “refute several of the claims” made by Melissa.
Here, Milburn fails to identify the claims they would have been called on to refute and
how the outcome would have differed if the witnesses would have testified and refuted
the unidentified claims of Melissa. Next, we look to the factual allegation that Fatheree
Milburn v. State Page 12 did not discuss any other investigation of the facts of the case beyond the report and
documents filed with the court. This allegation is only that Fatheree did not discuss with
Milburn any additional investigation Fatheree may have conducted, not that Fatheree did
not conduct an additional investigation. Again, Milburn fails to identify any new
evidence that was undiscovered because of a failure by Fatheree to investigate the case
and how the outcome would have differed because of the alleged failure to investigate.
Milburn acknowledges that Fatheree did review the police reports with him. Milburn
additionally states that “as far as I know,” Fatheree did not request formal discovery or
request for notice. The phrase “as far as I know” is analogous to the words “to the best
of my knowledge,” and when such is used in an affidavit, it is no evidence of the facts
asserted. In re Estate of Wilson, 252 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.);
Shindler v. Mid–Continent Life Ins. Co., 768 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ) (citing Campbell v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 705 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ)). Finally, regarding the factual allegation that Fatheree
did not know that Melissa had surgery after the initial police report, Milburn fails to
demonstrate how the outcome of his trial would have differed if Fatheree knew about the
surgery. The record does show that Fatheree had seen the medical records from a medical
provider Melissa had seen shortly after the assault and that Fatheree was aware Melissa
had a “mildly displaced fracture of the metacarpal.”
Milburn v. State Page 13 Even if Milburn’s assertion did amount to evidence, there are no factual assertions
that a failure to request discovery resulted in an unfair surprise during the trial. There
are also no factual assertions that a failure to request notice of other crimes, wrongs, or
bad acts resulted in unfair surprise and no factual allegations identifying other crimes,
wrongs, or bad acts that were admitted in evidence. There is nothing in Milburn’s
affidavit that indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial
would have been different but for Fatheree’s alleged failures. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at
340–41.
The second affidavit attached to Milburn’s motion for new trial is from Milburn’s
grandfather, Jim Jamison. In Jamison’s affidavit, he makes the factual assertion that
Fatheree never contacted him, nor did he contact Fatheree because he did not know he
could have testified. All other factual assertions by Jamison in his affidavit relate to his
testimony had he been called to testify.
Because Milburn’s motion for new trial asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
fails to explain how Fatheree’s allegedly unprofessional errors prejudiced Milburn,
Milburn has failed to show that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result would have been
different. Milburn is therefore not entitled to a nondiscretionary hearing on his motion
for new trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting a hearing on
the motion. Accordingly, we overrule Milburn’s second issue.
Milburn v. State Page 14 Issue Three
In Milburn’s last issue, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
did not conduct an independent investigation or interview other potential witnesses,
respectively.
Our review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and we will find
ineffective assistance only if an appellant overcomes the strong presumption that his
counsel’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The right to “reasonably effective assistance
of counsel” does not guarantee errorless counsel whose competency is judged by perfect
hindsight. Saylor v. State, 660 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (per curiam).
“Isolated instances in the record reflecting errors of commission or omission do not cause
counsel to become ineffective, nor can ineffective assistance of counsel be established by
isolating or separating out one portion of the trial counsel’s performance for
examination.” Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions
before being denounced as ineffective. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). When the record is silent, as in this case, regarding the reasons for counsel’s
conduct, a finding that counsel was ineffective requires impermissible speculation by the
appellate court. Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996,
Milburn v. State Page 15 no pet.). Thus, absent specific explanations for counsel’s decisions, a record on direct
appeal will rarely contain sufficient information to evaluate or decide an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
“[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus is the more appropriate vehicle to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110. To warrant reversal
without affording counsel an opportunity to explain his actions, “the challenged conduct
must be ‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts
v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d
390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
Milburn filed his motion for new trial alleging, among other things, that his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to: (1) adequately investigate the
facts of the case to prepare for trial; (2) request discovery from the State under article
39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (3) request notice of the State’s intent to offer
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts under Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609 and
article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and (4) ask Milburn for any potential
punishment phase witnesses. In support of his motion for new trial, Milburn attached
two affidavits, one from him and one from Milburn’s grandfather.
Milburn’s own affidavit undermines some of the contentions made in the motion
for new trial that counsel was ineffective. Specifically, Milburn admitted that his trial
Milburn v. State Page 16 counsel reviewed “the original police reports” and “documents filed with the court” with
him. Moreover, the State contends on appeal that Milburn’s trial counsel requested and
was provided with discovery. Milburn acknowledged in his affidavit that trial counsel
discussed with him potential witnesses that were present at the time of the assault.
Milburn also asserted that trial counsel did not speak with him about potential witnesses
for the punishment phase of trial. But the record reflects that Milburn testified during
punishment, and he could have testified to the same information regarding his church
activities and his Boy Scout membership that his grandfather allegedly would have.
Milburn also complains about trial counsel’s failure to request notice of the State’s
intent to offer evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts under Rules of Evidence
404(b) and 609 and article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, he does
not explain how he was prejudiced by this omission. Nor does he identify specific
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts that were admitted during trial.
To the extent that Milburn argues that the trial court’s denial of a hearing on his
motion for new trial deprived him of an opportunity to develop the record on his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the affidavits attached to Milburn's motion for
new trial, as we noted above, did not allege sufficient facts from which a trial court could
reasonably conclude both that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney
and that, but for counsel’s failure, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his
trial would have been different. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 341.
Milburn v. State Page 17 The record before us is completely silent as to counsel’s strategy on all of the
grounds raised by Milburn. A record such as this cannot adequately reflect the failings
of trial counsel sufficiently enough for an appellate court to fairly evaluate the merits of
such a serious allegation. See Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Accordingly, on this record, we cannot say that Milburn has established that his
trial counsel was ineffective. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339–41. We therefore overrule
Milburn’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
MATT JOHNSON Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Johnson, and Justice Smith Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed April 6, 2022 Do not publish [CR25]
Milburn v. State Page 18