Michael Salvo, App. V. Washington Criminal Justice Training Commission, Et Ano, Resp.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 12, 2026
• Docket: 87146-3
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MICHAEL SALVO, No. 87146-3-I

Appellant, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION WASHINGTON CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COMMISSION (WCJTC); and the STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondents.

SMITH, J. — In November 2020, Salvo enrolled as a recruit in the Basic

Law Enforcement Academy run by the Criminal Justice Training Commission

(CJTC). In December that same year, Salvo complained to his supervisors about

the behavior of fellow recruits. In January 2021, BLEA suspended Salvo. In

June 2022, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) terminated Salvo’s

employment. Salvo initiated suit against CJTC, asserting retaliation claims under

the Washington Law Against Discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW. CJTC moved

for dismissal under CR 12(c), claiming immunity under RCW 43.101.390, which

the trial court granted. Salvo appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

In November 2019, SPD hired Michael Salvo. At the time, Salvo was

63 years old. A year later, Salvo entered the Washington Criminal Justice

Training Center’s (“CJTC” or “Commission”) Basic Law Enforcement Academy No. 87146-3-I/2

(BLEA). In February 2020, Salvo was injured during work at BLEA and was

temporarily removed from his current BLEA class. In October 2020, Salvo

returned to work and renewed his participation in BLEA.

On December 21, 2020, Salvo lodged a verbal complaint with his two

supervisors at BLEA concerning inappropriate behavior by some of his fellow

recruits. Salvo was dissatisfied with the supervisors’ response to his complaint.

Salvo claimed the supervisors “made age-based comments and supported the

few recruits’ behavior as acceptable ‘Police Culture.’ ” Less than two weeks after

Salvo complained to his supervisors (sometime between December 21, 2020 and

December 31, 2020), he filed two additional complaints: one to the Office of

Police Accountability (OPA) and the other to his supervisor at the City of Seattle.

On December 31, Salvo met with CJTC staff to discuss his concerns about other

recruits.

On January 6, 2021, Salvo e-mailed a complaint titled “the treatment of

people” to Sue Rahr, the executive director of CJCT. That same day, two CJTC

commanders, Commander Alexander and Assistant Commander Hicks,

requested memos from the individuals who were the subject of Salvo’s

complaints. On January 11, 2021, CJTC suspended Salvo from training. Two

months later, in March 2021, CJTC sent an e-mail to SPD notifying it that CJTC

was starting an investigation into Salvo’s complaints.

SPD terminated Salvo’s employment in June 2022, with the caveat that he

could reapply for employment in the future. In January 2024, Salvo initiated suit

against CJCT for damages and injunctive relief. CJTC moved for dismissal

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under CR 12(c), claiming CJTC was immune pursuant to RCW 43.101.390. The

court set a hearing date of July 26, 2024. On July 22, 2024, Salvo submitted his

reply, contending the immunity granted pursuant to RCW 43.101.390 did not

extend to intentional torts. Salvo also moved the court for additional time to

amend his case, even though the deadline had passed. In his motion to amend,

Salvo did not attach a proposed amended complaint. In its surreply, CJTC

requested the court not consider Salvo’s reply because it was untimely. CJTC

also claimed Salvo’s request to amend his complaint was futile. On July 26,

2024, the court heard the party’s arguments, including Salvo’s motion to amend,

and subsequently issued an order granting CJTC’s motion to dismiss. Salvo

appeals.

ANALYSIS

Immunity

Salvo contends the trial court erred when it granted CJTC’s motion to

dismiss because his claims of retaliation and discrimination fall outside the

statutory immunity of RCW 43.101.390. Because we do not find an exception for

retaliation claims in the language of RCW 43.101.390, we affirm.

We review a trial court’s dismissal under CR 12(c) de novo. P.E. Sys.,

LLC v. CPI Corp., 176 Wn.2d 198, 203, 289 P.3d 638 (2012). We also review

issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Ent v. Wash. State Crim. Just.

Training Comm’n, 174 Wn. App. 615, 618, 301 P.3d 468 (2013).

Our primary objective when interpreting the meaning of a statute is to

carry out the legislature’s intent. State v. Gray, 174 Wn.2d 920, 926, 280 P.3d

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1110 (2012). First, we review the plain language of the statute. Gray, 174

Wn.2d at 926. “Plain meaning ‘is to be discerned from the ordinary meaning of

the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found,

related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ ” Lake v. Woodcreek

Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010) (quoting State v.

Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)). While we may “look to the

broader statutory context for guidance, we ‘must not add words where the

legislature has chosen not to include them.’ ” Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526 (quoting

Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003)).

If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry ends.

Killian v. Seattle Pub. Schs., 189 Wn.2d 447, 463, 403 P.3d 58 (2017). But if the

language of the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,

“we may then look to legislative history as a further indication of legislative

intent.” State v. B.O.J., 194 Wn.2d 314, 323, 449 P.3d 1006 (2019).

The legislature created CJTC to “provide programs and standards for the

training of criminal justice personnel.” Former RCW 43.101.020 (1974).1 CJTC

has broad authority to establish and implement standards for the training and

acceptance of its recruits. See RCW 43.101.080. For example, CJTC has the

authority to “establish rules and regulations prescribing minimum standards

relating to physical, mental, and moral fitness which shall govern the recruitment

1 The statutory language for RCW 43.101.020, .080, .200, and .390 was revised effective June 25, 2021, subsequent to the incidents at issue in this opinion. The citations here are to the version in effect at the time of the underlying events during Salvo's enrollment at BLEA. The revisions have no impact on the outcome of this case.

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of criminal justice personnel where such standards are not prescribed by statute

or constitutional provision.” RCW 43.101.080(18).

Under RCW 43.101.390, “[t]he commission and individuals acting on

behalf of the commission are immune from suit in any civil or criminal action

contesting or based upon proceedings or other official acts performed in the

course of their duties in the administration and enforcement of this chapter.”

(Emphasis added.)

Only one Washington case, Ent, has addressed the immunity provision of

chapter 43.101 RCW. In Ent, Scott Ent was a student at BLEA. 174 Wn. App.

at 617. Ent was ordered by academy staff to stand at attention during an

inspection and then to stand at “parade rest” for a graduation ceremony. Id.

After over an hour of standing motionless, “Ent fainted, struck his head on the

floor, and lost consciousness.” Id. Ent filed a complaint against CJTC alleging a

breach of reasonable care. Id. CJTC moved for judgment on the pleadings,

alleging statutory immunity under RCW 43.101.390. Id. at 618. The court

granted CJTC’s motion and Ent appealed to this court. Id. at 622.

On appeal, we affirmed the trial court, noting under RCW 43.101.390,

“[i]immunity unambiguously applies to chapter 43.101 RCW in its entirety.” Id. at

619. We acknowledged broad immunity may lead to troubling scenarios,

including that “CJTC might be immunized when an instructor embezzles funds or

commits manslaughter, because RCW 43.101.390 protects it from both civil and

criminal liability.” Id. at 621. But, we also recognized that these scenarios “result

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from a legislative policy choice” and “[w]hether or not we agree with broad

immunity for the CJTC as a matter of public policy is irrelevant.” Id.

The Ent court also addressed the scope of immunized activity after Ent

argued inspection and ceremony were not enumerated duties within the CJTC’s

administration and enforcement powers. Id. at 622. The court concluded

requiring attendance at special events is well within CJTC’s discretion, because

CJTC has wide latitude in their curriculum decisions. Id.

Here, Salvo contends Ent is not analogous because retaliation, unlike

requiring attendance at a graduation ceremony, is not considered an “act[]

performed in the course of their duties” as contemplated by RCW 43.191.390.

But, similar to Ent, we must give deference to CJTC’s decisions concerning the

hiring, training, and termination of personnel, because these decisions are within

CJTC’s broad authority.2 The plain language of RCW 43.191.390 does not carve

out exceptions, and we cannot add words to the statute where the legislature has

chosen not to include them. As the court stated in Ent, and we reiterate now,

2 In Cruz v. City of Spokane, the Ninth Circuit discussed Ent and the scope of immunity granted to CJTC by RCW 43.101.390. 66 F.4th 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2023). The court noted, “[e]ven assuming that Ent holds that RCW 43.101.390(1) confers absolute immunity, the Washington Supreme Court has never held that such immunity extends to egregious or intentional conduct.” Id. at 1198. The Cruz court certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court: “What is the scope of immunity provided by RCW 43.101.390? Specifically, does the provision grant immunity for intentional torts committed in the course of administering the [BLEA]?” Id. Before the Washington Supreme Court could address the question, the parties settled and the Ninth Circuit withdrew the certified question. Cruz v. City of Spokane, 88 F.4th 1299 (9th Cir. 2023).

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“any challenge to the wisdom of such broad immunity is an issue to be taken to

the legislature.” 174 Wn. App. at 621.

Motion to Amend

Salvo contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to amend

his complaint because new evidence proved retaliation. We agree with CJTC

that Salvo failed to produce new evidence or show how his amended complaint

would be different from the original.

We review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion.

Karlberg v. Otten, 167 Wn. App. 522, 529, 280 P.3d 1123 (2012). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision is “manifestly unreasonable or was

exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.” Cambridge

Townhomes, LLC v. Pac. Star Roofing, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 475, 484, 209 P.3d 863

(2009).

A plaintiff may amend their pleading once before a responsive pleading is

served; otherwise, a party may amend their pleading “only by leave of

court . . . and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” CR 15(a). In

addition to considering any prejudice amendment would impose on the

nonmoving party, the court may also consider whether amendment is futile.

Larson v. Snohomish County, 20 Wn. App. 2d 243, 286, 499 P.3d 957 (2021).

Here, despite Salvo not attaching a copy of his proposed pleading to his

motion to amend, as required by CR 15, or timely filing the motion, the court

considered his motion. When the court asked Salvo to provide “an offer of proof”

as to what his proposed amendment would allege differently, Salvo replied that

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the main claim would remain the same but he had “so much evidence” that he

wanted to add.

Because Salvo’s allegations in his amended complaint would have been

the same as his original complaint, they would have remained subject to

dismissal under CR 12(c). Accordingly, amendment would have been futile and

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Salvo’s motion to

amend.

Newly Discovered Evidence

Salvo contends that the trial court erred by not considering newly

discovered evidence, and that he has acquired public records after the dismissal

which prove CJTC acted in bad faith. Salvo’s claim fails because he presented

no new evidence for the trial court to consider and his motion to this court to

consider additional evidence did not meet the requirements of RAP 9.11(a).3

We review a trial court’s decision to consider evidence for abuse of

discretion. Est. of McCartney v. Pierce County, 22 Wn. App. 2d 665, 676-77, 513

P.3d 119 (2022). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is

“manifestly unreasonable or was exercised on untenable grounds or for

untenable reasons.” Cambridge Townhomes, 166 Wn.2d at 484.

Generally, a trial court may only consider “the allegations contained in the

complaint and may not go beyond the face of the pleadings.” Rodriguez v.

3 Salvo moved to submit additional evidence on appeal on October 18, 2025. We denied Salvo’s motion on November 18, 2025, because he failed to satisfy the requirements of RAP 9.11(a) or to show that waiving the requirements of that rule would be in the interests of justice.

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Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 725, 189 P.3d 168 (2008). But, a trial court

may take judicial notice of public records if “their authenticity cannot be

reasonably disputed in ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Rodriguez, 144 Wn. App.

at 725-26; ER 201.

Salvo now maintains on appeal that he has records “which conspicuously

show collusion and retaliation” against him by CJTC. Notably, Salvo does not

contend he had knowledge of these records at the time the trial court ruled on

CJTC’s motion to dismiss. In addition to not providing the actual records or their

source, Salvo does not articulate how the newly discovered public records

support his claim. Even if the evidence did tend to support Salvo’s discrimination

claim, Salvo does not address how the evidence would affect CJTC’s immunity

under RCW 43.191.390.

The trial court could not have considered records that it did not know

existed and, even if the records did exist, they had not been authenticated.

Additionally, Salvo cannot meet the requirements of RAP 9.11(a), allowing us to

review newly discovered evidence on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to consider Salvo’s additional

evidence.

Constitutional Claims

Salvo contends CJTC’s actions violated his due process and equal

protection rights because its actions lacked procedural safeguards, were done in

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bad faith, and were the product of systemic discrimination.4 CJTC maintains

these issues are not preserved for appeal and, even if we do address the issues,

Salvo cannot show that a violation of his constitutional rights occurred.

Generally, this court will not review claims of error raised for the first time

on appeal. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 97-98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

RAP 2.5 provides exceptions for when a party may raise an issue for the first

time on appeal, including “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” Only if

the defendant can show actual prejudice is the error “manifest,” thus allowing

review. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 927, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). We may

decline to consider arguments “that are unsupported by pertinent authority,

references to the record, or meaningful analysis.” Cook v. Brateng, 158 Wn.

App. 777, 794, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010) (citing Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v.

Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992)).

Here, in his assignment of errors, Salvo claims the trial court misclassified

CJTC’s operational negligence and due process violations as “discretionary acts”

and disregarded evidence of systemic institutional bad faith. While these claims

raise apparent constitutional issues, Salvo’s claims are unsupported by the

record or any meaningful analysis. Salvo makes broad assertions in his

argument, such as CJTC failed to enforce anti-harassment policies and

conducted a “sham investigation,” but provides no evidence or citations to the

record to support these claims. Notably, Salvo stated in his complaint that CJTC

4 Salvo also raises claims against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). How those claims are relevant to the current appeal is not clear, as EEOC is not a party to this action; thus, we do not address them.

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did investigate his concerns and the executive director, Rhar, communicated to

Salvo that she was satisfied with the investigation. Salvo also contends he was

not afforded notice or a hearing before he was suspended, but, again, cites no

support for these allegations.5

Because Salvo provides insufficient support and analysis for his

arguments and has not shown any that CJTC’s actions were outside of its

statutory authority, we find no error.

Additional Claims

For the first time on appeal, Salvo makes claims of vicarious liability,

defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and religious

discrimination. Because Salvo did not raise these arguments below, they are not

properly before this court. Additionally, Salvo presents no evidence with these

claims to overcome CJTC’s broad immunity under RCW 43,191.390, as

discussed supra. Accordingly, we decline to address these issues.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

5 Under RCW 43.101.105, CJTC would only be required to conduct a hearing if one was timely requested by Salvo. Salvo does not contend he requested a hearing.