Michael Richard Boswell v. State
This text of Michael Richard Boswell v. State (Michael Richard Boswell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________
NO. 09-17-00258-CR ____________________
MICHAEL RICHARD BOSWELL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee __________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 16-09-10821-CR __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant Michael Richard Boswell, who was
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, contends that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to pursue a hearing and obtain a
ruling on a motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Boswell was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a third-
degree felony, and his charge was enhanced by two prior felony convictions,
1 subjecting Boswell to the punishment range for a habitual offender. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2017); id. § 46.04(a)(1) (West 2011). Boswell’s
trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence resulting from an illegal arrest,
which included a pistol and contents of a safe, but counsel did not to set a hearing
and obtain a ruling on the motion. Boswell pleaded “guilty” to the indicted offense
and also pleaded “true” to the two enhancement paragraphs.
The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, during which Detective Justin
Schutzenhofer of the Montgomery County Narcotics Enforcement Team testified
that he was conducting surveillance on Boswell’s apartment based on information
that methamphetamine was being distributed from that address. Schutzenhofer
testified that after observing suspicious activity, he stopped a vehicle with an expired
registration leaving Boswell’s apartment. Schutzenhofer identified Boswell as one
of the individuals in the vehicle, and he placed Boswell in custody for an active
warrant. According to Schutzenhofer, Boswell gave the police consent to search his
apartment, in which police found methamphetamine and a firearm. Schutzenhofer
testified that he arrested Boswell for the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Boswell admitted to possessing the firearm the police found in his apartment. The
trial court sentenced Boswell to imprisonment for a term of twenty-five years.
Boswell appealed.
2 ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, Boswell claims his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to set a hearing and obtain a ruling on the motion to
suppress. According to Boswell, there is no explanation in the record reflecting any
justifiable reason why his trial counsel failed to have the trial judge rule on the
motion to suppress. Boswell maintains that this Court should grant him a new trial
to pursue his motion to suppress.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must
satisfy a two-pronged test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Hernandez v. State,
726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An appellant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been
different. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Appellate
review of defense counsel’s representation is highly deferential and presumes that
3 counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional
assistance.” Id.
Boswell must prove that there was no professional reason for specific acts or
omissions of his counsel. See id. at 836. Furthermore, “[a]ny allegation of
ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must
affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d
808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). The bare record on direct appeal is usually insufficient to
demonstrate that “counsel’s representation was so deficient . . . as to overcome the
presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and professional.” Bone, 77
S.W.3d at 833 (citation omitted). Before being denounced as ineffective, counsel
must be allowed an opportunity to explain his actions. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d
107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to
pursue a motion to suppress, Boswell must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the motion to suppress would have been granted and that the remaining evidence
would have been insufficient to support his conviction. See Jackson v. State, 973
S.W.2d 954, 957, 961 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Ex parte Jones, 473 S.W.3d 850, 854
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Boswell must also produce
4 evidence defeating the presumption of proper police conduct. See Jackson, 973
S.W.2d at 957.
Boswell did not file a motion for new trial, so the record is silent as to why
counsel did not set a hearing and obtain a ruling on the motion to suppress. See
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. With a silent record, we must
presume that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. We cannot
presume that counsel’s conduct constituted ineffective assistance. See Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 813; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. In addition, Boswell has failed to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the
outcome would have been different. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833; see also Jackson,
973 S.W.2d at 957; Ex parte Jones, 473 S.W.3d at 854. Accordingly, we overrule
Boswell’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
______________________________ STEVE McKEITHEN Chief Justice
Submitted on April 30, 2018 Opinion Delivered July 11, 2018 Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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