Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJune 28, 2012
DocketE2011-01497-CCA-R3-HC
StatusPublished

This text of Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee (Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE April 25, 2012 Session

MICHAEL PANZINI v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 92222 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Special Judge

No. E2011-01497-CCA-R3-HC - Filed June 28, 2012

The Petitioner, Michael Panzini, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 100%. The record contains two judgments of conviction, one provided by the State and one provided by the Petitioner. The judgment form in the official court file indicates the box on the judgment form showing the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life as checked. The judgment submitted by the Petitioner does not contain that check mark. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence was illegal because he was not sentenced to community supervision for life. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his original judgment of conviction did not include community supervision for life as required by statute and that his judgment was modified without notice, a hearing, or an order. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which N ORMA M CG EE O GLE and D. K ELLY T HOMAS, J R., JJ., joined.

Joshua D. Hedrick, Knoxville, Tennessee for the appellee, Michael Panzini.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; Randall Nichols, District Attorney General; and Joanie Stewart, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

1 I. Facts and Procedural History

A Knox County grand jury indicted the Petitioner for rape of a child. On August 2, 2001, the Petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery. For this conviction, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to ten years, to be served at 100% pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(i)(2006). The judgment of conviction offered by the Petitioner indicates that box next to the requirement that the Petitioner be sentenced to community supervision for life was not marked.

On July 29, 2009, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. In it, he alleged that his judgment of conviction was void because it did not, as a part of his sentence, include the community supervision for life requirement. The Petitioner averred that, on or about July 16, 2008, a Tennessee Department of Correction officer amended his judgment to include the community supervision for life requirement.

The habeas corpus court appointed counsel for the Petitioner and held a hearing on the petition. At the hearing, the State posited that the Petitioner had not met his burden of showing that his judgment was void. The State informed the habeas corpus court that the court’s file contained only one judgment of conviction, which reflected that the Petitioner had, in fact, been sentenced to community supervision for life. The State asserted that it could find no evidence that the judgment of conviction omitting this requirement had ever been part of the court’s file. The only copy of that document, it stated, was the one presented by the Petitioner.

Petitioner’s counsel conceded that there was only one judgment of conviction in the court’s file and that it indicated that the Petitioner had been sentenced to community supervision for life. He asserted, however, that the box was marked in pen rather than typed, which showed that this requirement was added at a subsequent date. Petitioner’s counsel contended that there was no motion filed to have the judgment corrected and that there was no proceeding undertaken to correct the judgment. Petitioner’s counsel identified this as an unusual situation because there were two judgments of conviction that differed, with no indication as to how the judgment was modified or changed. Petitioner’s counsel contended that it was the Petitioner’s position that the original judgment of conviction was illegal and gave the Petitioner the right to habeas corpus relief.

The State countered that the fact that the box was marked in pen did not prove that the mark was not made as part of the original guilty plea proceeding. The State asserted that there was but one judgment of conviction included in the court’s file and that it indicated that the Petitioner had been sentenced to community supervision for life. As further support for the State’s contention, it noted that the transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflected that the

2 Petitioner was advised of the terms of his plea agreement, which included a term of ten years incarceration, to be followed by placement on community supervision for life.

By written order, the habeas corpus court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. The habeas corpus court stated:

The first argument raised by [the] Petitioner is that Judgment entered in this case is void. In support of this argument, [the] Petitioner holds the lifetime community supervision requirement on the Judgment was marked after the initiation of his sentence by person or person(s) unknown and unauthorized in violation of law. In further support of this argument, [the] Petitioner introduces an alleged Certified Copy of Judgment in which the operation for lifetime community supervision is unchecked and left blank. This is the only evidence [the] Petitioner produces to prove his claim.

[The] Petitioner’s argument regarding Judgment being void is unpersuasive. The original Judgment contained in the court record is facially valid because it reflects the lifetime community supervision requirement was imposed to Petitioner’s original sentence. No other versions of the Judg[]ment, showing a blank option for the lifetime community supervision requirement, are contained in the record or the file. Additionally, the Judgment is not void because the trial court possessed the statutory authority to impose such a sentence.

....

The imposition of lifetime community supervision is explicitly governed and authorized by a sentencing statute. As such, the sentence requirement does not evidence any jurisdictional defect with the Judgment, nor does the requirement directly contravene a governing statute. To the contrary, the governing statute requires it. [The] Petitioner ple[d] guilty to aggravated sexual battery and is subject to the mandatory sentence of community supervision for life. The Judgment of conviction in this matter reflects the same and the plea bargained sentence was lawfully imposed pursuant to governing law. Accordingly, Judgment in this matter is not void and habeas corpus relief is unavailable.

It is from this judgment that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

3 On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition for habeas corpus relief. He maintains on appeal that his original judgment of conviction did not include the lifetime supervision requirement, as required by statute. He asserts that the judgment was modified without notification or an opportunity to be heard and that it is the modified judgment that is in the record. The State counters that the only judgment of conviction contained in the court file is the one showing that the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life. This judgment, the State asserts, is facially valid. Further, the State contends that even if this requirement were, in fact, added at a later time the Petitioner would still not be entitled to habeas corpus relief. We agree with the State.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-panzini-v-state-of-tennessee-tenncrimapp-2012.