UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
MICHAEL ONISILE DOCKET NO. 2:26-cv-0296 REG. # 08372-506 SECTION P
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
WARDEN MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by pro se petitioner Michael Onisile. Doc. 4. Onisile is an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”). This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the following reasons IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I. BACKGROUND
Through the instant petition, Onisile challenges the BOP’s “categorial refusal to consider Petitioner for home confinement solely due to the presence of an ICE detainer, without an individual assessment.” Doc. 4, p. 2, ¶ 6. It appears that Onisile took the first step in appealing the decision but admittedly did not proceed to the second appeal, contending that “further administration appeals were impracticable due to imminent release date and the time required to exhaust the full BOP remedy process.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 8(b). II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions A district court may apply any or all of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed. B. Application
1. Exhaustion
A petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 “must first exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)); Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241 relief); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992). The BOP has a four-step administrative process for resolving complaints by prisoners. Initially, a prisoner must attempt to informally resolve the complaint with staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal attempts are unsuccessful, the prisoner must submit a written complaint to the warden on a prescribed form (BP-9). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the prisoner is not satisfied with the warden’s response, he may appeal to the Regional Director within twenty days after the warden’s response (BP-10). 28 U.S.C. § 542.15. If still unsatisfied, the prisoner may appeal to the Central Office (BP-11). Id. There are time limits for BOP officials to respond at each level of the administrative remedy process.
Onisile concedes he did not exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the petitioner proves that exhaustion would be futile. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The fact that it takes time to exhaust administrative remedies is not an extraordinary circumstance and does not excuse a prisoner from initiating and completing the process. Lockhart v. Edge, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50930, *3 (W.D. Tex. March 11, 2026). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate who may be entitled to immediate release must first exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973). And the Supreme Court has also noted that while exhaustion may take time, “there is no reason to assume that ... prison
administrators ... will not act expeditiously.” Id. Onisile fails to carry his burden of proving the futility of administrative review simply based on his claim that the administrative review process may take time. Consequently, the Court finds that Onisile has failed to exhaust. Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62 (explaining federal prisoners must exhaust “administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”). Dismissal on this basis alone is warranted. See Rivkin v. Tamez, 351 F. App’x 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). However, even if Onisile had properly exhausted, the Court would still not grant him the § 2241 relief he seeks. 2. Merit Onisile is entitled to § 2241 relief only to remedy a restraint on his liberty which violates
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 & n.11 (1952); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, it is well settled that “[a] necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief [to a petitioner] is a determination by the federal court that [his or her] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241). As such, a § 2241 habeas corpus petition is proper if the petitioner seeks release from custody— i.e., “if a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim would [] automatically entitle him to accelerated release.” Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
MICHAEL ONISILE DOCKET NO. 2:26-cv-0296 REG. # 08372-506 SECTION P
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
WARDEN MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by pro se petitioner Michael Onisile. Doc. 4. Onisile is an inmate in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Center at Oakdale, Louisiana (“FCIO”). This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the following reasons IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I. BACKGROUND
Through the instant petition, Onisile challenges the BOP’s “categorial refusal to consider Petitioner for home confinement solely due to the presence of an ICE detainer, without an individual assessment.” Doc. 4, p. 2, ¶ 6. It appears that Onisile took the first step in appealing the decision but admittedly did not proceed to the second appeal, contending that “further administration appeals were impracticable due to imminent release date and the time required to exhaust the full BOP remedy process.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 8(b). II. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions A district court may apply any or all of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed. B. Application
1. Exhaustion
A petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 “must first exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons.” Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47, 49 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Gabor, 905 F.2d 76, 78 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)); Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to § 2241 relief); United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84 (5th Cir. 1992). The BOP has a four-step administrative process for resolving complaints by prisoners. Initially, a prisoner must attempt to informally resolve the complaint with staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If informal attempts are unsuccessful, the prisoner must submit a written complaint to the warden on a prescribed form (BP-9). 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. If the prisoner is not satisfied with the warden’s response, he may appeal to the Regional Director within twenty days after the warden’s response (BP-10). 28 U.S.C. § 542.15. If still unsatisfied, the prisoner may appeal to the Central Office (BP-11). Id. There are time limits for BOP officials to respond at each level of the administrative remedy process.
Onisile concedes he did not exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the petitioner proves that exhaustion would be futile. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). The fact that it takes time to exhaust administrative remedies is not an extraordinary circumstance and does not excuse a prisoner from initiating and completing the process. Lockhart v. Edge, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50930, *3 (W.D. Tex. March 11, 2026). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate who may be entitled to immediate release must first exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494-95, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973). And the Supreme Court has also noted that while exhaustion may take time, “there is no reason to assume that ... prison
administrators ... will not act expeditiously.” Id. Onisile fails to carry his burden of proving the futility of administrative review simply based on his claim that the administrative review process may take time. Consequently, the Court finds that Onisile has failed to exhaust. Fuller, 11 F.3d at 62 (explaining federal prisoners must exhaust “administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”). Dismissal on this basis alone is warranted. See Rivkin v. Tamez, 351 F. App’x 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). However, even if Onisile had properly exhausted, the Court would still not grant him the § 2241 relief he seeks. 2. Merit Onisile is entitled to § 2241 relief only to remedy a restraint on his liberty which violates
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 & n.11 (1952); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, it is well settled that “[a] necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief [to a petitioner] is a determination by the federal court that [his or her] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241). As such, a § 2241 habeas corpus petition is proper if the petitioner seeks release from custody— i.e., “if a favorable determination of the prisoner’s claim would [] automatically entitle him to accelerated release.” Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020).
To the extent Onisile seeks home confinement, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held a prisoner has no constitutional right to confinement in any particular place. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (“[T]he Due Process Clause did not itself create a liberty interest in prisoners to be free from intrastate prison transfers.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (“The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.”). Section 3624(c) grants the BOP Director the discretion to place a prisoner in a residential reentry center for up to twelve months. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1); see also United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring). It further gives the Director the discretion “to place a prisoner in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of
imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). It also directs the BOP to issue new regulations to ensure that placements in community facilities are “(A) conducted in a manner consistent with section 3621(b) of this title; (B) determined on an individual basis; and (C) of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of successful reintegration into the community.” Id. § 3624(c)(6). A petitioner complaining about a discretionary assignment by the BOP is not entitled to judicial relief for an alleged “violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process because ‘the failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.’” Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mejia-Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 465 (1981))); cf. Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A] statute which ‘provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained . . . is not protected by due process.’”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)). After reviewing Onisile’s petition and the applicable statutes, the Court finds that, even if he had exhausted his administrative remedies, his claim would fail as the BOP has the exclusive authority and discretion to determine if and when to assign him to home confinement. The Court further finds Onisile has failed to identify in his petition any restraint on his liberty which violates the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. Hil. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the instant petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all pending motions be DENIED as MOOT. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of receipt shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429-30 (Sth Cir. 1996). THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 17th day of April, 2026.
UNITED SB¥TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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