OPINION
KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge.
The procedure to obtain attorney’s fees and costs under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) in a dismissed involuntary bankruptcy is in issue.
The question is whether one may seek such an award from fewer than all petitioners, the answer to which necessitates determining the nature of the liability. We conclude that § 303(i) liability is joint and several, that a debtor need not join all petitioners in a request for a § 303(i) award, and that, unless the court makes a specific apportionment, a petitioner is entitled seek contribution from other jointly and severally liable petitioners who were not joined in the debtor’s motion. Hence, [563]*563we AFFIRM the award of $42,257 against fewer than all of the petitioning creditors.
FACTS
The former involuntary alleged debtor, Maple-Whitworth, Inc., owns an apartment building in Beverly Hills, California, as to which two competing factions claimed corporate ownership and control: the Marlowe-Shlush Faction and the Mayman-Na-than Faction.
While the details, the skullduggery, and the dramatis personae are fascinating, all that matters for our purposes is that the involuntary bankruptcy case was an intermission in state-court litigation between the two factions over corporate control.
In the midst of that state-court litigation, appellant Sofris (Michael Sofris, APC, a professional law corporation owned by attorney Michael Sofris, which for convenience we refer to as an individual), who is aligned with the Mayman-Nathan Faction, joined by four individuals, filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition against Maple-Whitworth on October 28, 2004. Seven other petitioners holding small claims eventually, and in two phases, joined the petition pursuant to § 303(c).
The bankruptcy court recognized the Marlowe-Shlush Faction as being in control of the debtor corporation for purposes of the bankruptcy and dismissed the involuntary petition on October 11, 2005, making it explicit that the final determination of corporate ownership and control eventually would be made in the on-going litigation in state court.
After dismissal, the Marlowe-Shlush Faction moved on behalf of Maple-Whit-worth for an award of costs and fees of $42,257, and punitive damages of $100,000 against appellant Sofris but, viewing Sofris as a ringleader who should bear primary responsibility, did not name the other eleven petitioners in the motion.
Sofris objected that the motion was procedurally and substantively defective. Without asserting any claims for contribution, he contended that the phrase “the petitioners” in § 303(i) requires all petitioners to be served before the court can consider an award and that a court cannot pick and choose among petitioning creditors when making an award.
In addition, based on a release executed on the corporation’s behalf by a member of the Mayman-Nathan Faction, Sofris contended that Maple-Whitworth had waived its § 303(i) rights.
After continuing the initial hearing to permit service on all petitioners, the court awarded the requested $42,257 in fees and costs but, ruling that the petition was not filed in bad faith, rejected § 303(i)(2) damages. The court noted that the release executed by the Mayman-Nathan Faction would be effective if that faction later prevailed in the state-court litigation but did not at that time make further detailed findings regarding why it had previously recognized the Marlowe-Shlush Faction.2 Thus, in an order entered February 27, 2006, with accompanying findings that described the liability as “joint arid several,” the court awarded $42,257 against all of the petitioners who were served with the motion, without naming them. Sofris timely appealed.
On reconsideration, the court twice amended the order. The first amendment [564]*564named the ten of the twelve petitioners against whom the award was made. The second amendment deleted five of those ten petitioners because notice to them was defective. In the end, the $42,257 order was against only the five initial petitioners, each of whom was listed by name.
Neither of the amended orders was appealed.
ISSUES
1. Whether it was error to consider a § 303(i)(1) award without all petitioners having been named and served.
2. Whether it was error to award fees and costs under § 303(i)(1) against fewer than all the petitioners.
3. Whether the amount awarded under § 303(i) was correct.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review statutory construction questions de novo. Duffy v. Dwyer, 303 B.R. 437, 439 (9th Cir. BAP 2003), aff'd, 426 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.2005). Fee and cost awards under § 303(i) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir.2004) (“Vortex Fishing II").
JURISDICTION
Federal subject-matter jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) in this core proceeding under § 157(b). We have jurisdiction over this final order. 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) & (c).
DISCUSSION
The substantive nature of the liability of petitioning creditors affects the procedure for obtaining fee and cost awards under § 303(i) in dismissed involuntary cases. Sofris agrees that the liability is joint and several and so argued to the bankruptcy court. This comports with the statute, as we further explain before turning to the procedural implications of joint and several liability and the merits of the amount of the award.
I
Section 303(i) does not specify the nature of the award it authorizes to be made against petitioners when an involuntary petition is dismissed other than on consent of all petitioners and the debtor if the debtor has not waived the right to recovery.
Sofris argues that the term “the petitioners” in § 303(i)(1) means that a fee and cost award must be joint and several and may only be made against all petitioning creditors.
A
As all statutory analysis begins with the language of the statute, we look to § 303(i) and note that, where there is a dismissal without the debtor having waived compensation, the court “may” award attorney’s fees and costs against “the petitioners” and, as against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, may also award “damages proximately caused by such filing” and “punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(i).3
[565]*565This creates a compensation scheme that, in the precise words of the statute, provides for awards of an “attorney’s fee,” “costs,” “damages proximately caused,” and “punitive damages.” Fees and costs “may” be awarded against “the petitioners.”
The Supreme Court requires that statutes “be read as a whole,” especially when dealing with adjacent subparagraphs that were constructed together. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., — U.S. -, -, 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2336, 168 L.Ed.2d 28 (2007) (“Atl.Research”); King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991).
The § 303(i) scheme, then, is construed as an integrated whole in which each of its facets is assessed in the context of the remaining facets. Atl. Research, 127 S.Ct. at 2336; Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc. (In re Macke Int’l Trade, Inc.), 370 B.R. 236, 252 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Hence, § 303(i)(2) informs analysis of the meaning of § 303(f)(1).
The Atlantic Research rule is consistent with Supreme Court precedent that the construction of the Bankruptcy Code is a “holistic endeavor” in which “a provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme.” United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:5 (5th ed.1992) (“a subsection may not be considered in a vacuum”).
B
Three glosses from case law further inform our analysis of § 303(i). First, the verb “may” (“the court may grant judgment”) connotes the existence of discretion in the court’s decision whether to make an award based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Vortex Fishing II, 379 F.3d at 706-07; accord, Susman v. Schmid (In re Reid), 854 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir.1988).
Second, in exercising this discretion, the court begins with a rebuttable presumption that reasonable fees and costs are authorized. Vortex Fishing II, 379 F.3d at 707. In other words, any petitioning creditor in an involuntary case “should expect to pay the debtor’s attorney’s fees and costs if the petition is dismissed.” Id., 379 F.3d at 707 (quoting In re Kidwell, 158 B.R. 203, 217 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1993)).
Third, § 303(i), as a comprehensive compensation scheme, preempts state-law causes of action (e.g., malicious prosecution) and provides an exclusive federal source of recompense predicated upon the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Miles v. Okun (In re Miles), 430 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir.2005).
C
Although Congress did not detail how to apply the multiple liability feature of the § 303(i) scheme, its decision to couch the remedies in terms of tort concepts of “damages proximately caused” and “punitive damages” is significant for purposes of divining the nature of the liability.
In addition to award of an “attorney’s fee” and “costs” against “the petitioners,” Congress authorized award of “damages proximately caused” and “puni[566]*566tive damages” as to any petitioner filing in bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). As noted, we view the scheme as an integrated whole and do not consider the terms in § 303(i)(1) in isolation from § 303(i)(2).
Proximate causation and punitive damages are both familiar concepts in the common law of tort. Since Congress based its scheme of remedies on these general tort concepts, it follows that Congress expected the remedies to be applied under the same common-law principles that apply when more than one person is liable for the same harm. See Atl. Research, 127 S.Ct. at 2339.
The idea that multiple parties may be liable for the same harm arises often in tort situations, and it is in tort that the basic doctrine regarding multiple liability has been forged. Tort doctrine is particularly apt because it is modulated by consideration of the effect of the precise conduct of different actors who have varying degrees of involvement in, and responsibility for, the operative facts.
The traditional tort solution is joint and several liability. Here, the bankruptcy court held, without analysis, that the § 303(i)(1) liability of the petitioners is joint and several. As noted above, Sofris agrees that § 303(i)(1) liability is joint and several, does not contend that he is only severally liable, and does not contend that initial apportionment is mandatory.
Courts that have touched on the question likewise agree that, at the first level of analysis, the basic § 303(i)(1) liability is joint and several. In re Johnston Hawks Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 366-68 (Bankr.D.Hawai'i 1987), aff'd, (D.Haw.1988), aff'd mem., 885 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.1989). Likewise, we have, by implication, treated such awards as joint and several. Jaffe v. Wavelength, Inc. (In re Wavelength, Inc.), 61 B.R. 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. BAP 1986).
Since this appeal presents only a question of joint and several liability in circumstances in which the court made an award against fewer than all petitioners and did not purport to apportion the award, we deal only with the consequences of joint and several liability in that setting.4 Thus, we treat § 303(i) liability as presumptively joint and several at each of its two tiers, i.e., joint and several among § 303(i)(1) awards and joint and several among § 303(i)(2) awards.
Under the settled doctrines of joint and several liability and contribution, we reject Sofris’ argument that he cannot be responsible for more than his pro rata share of liability and that all potentially liable parties must be joined.
Since we are dealing with federal law, we begin by confirming that the standard rule regarding torts over which federal law has cognizance—the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”) and admiralty—is one of joint and several liability. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 162-64, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261 (2003) (“Ayers”).
As a statement of the nature of the federal common law of joint and several liability in the tort context, we look to the Restatements, principally the Restatemen (Second) of Torts and, to the extent relevant, the Restatement (Third) of Torts. See Atl. Research, 127 S.Ct. at 2339.
[567]*567As hammered out in the tort arena, joint and several liability and its correlative doctrine of contribution permit adjustments for the purpose of taking into account the equities of a particular situation. There are two distinct concepts: who is liable; and who actually pays.
The basic rule of joint and several liability is that each such person is responsible for the entire award and, unlike several liability,5 bears the risk of uncollectability from co-obligors. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 10.6 Moreover, one may sue and collect from “any” of the jointly liable persons, leaving adjustments to the doctrine of contribution. Id.7 In other words, the risk of uncollectability among co-obligors is on the jointly liable persons rather than the plaintiff, who bears the risk only of total uncollectability.
In short, every jointly and severally liable person is presumed to be liable for the full amount even though there is no requirement that all potentially liable entities be joined as parties in a joint and several liability situation. Judgment can be obtained against one, or any number, of the jointly-liable parties for the full amount, and can be collected in full from any one of them, it being understood that there cannot be more than one satisfaction of the total award.8
[568]*568c
Applying these rules to joint liability under § 303(i), there is no merit to Sofris’ contention that all petitioners must be made party to a motion for a § 303(i) award. Such a position runs counter to fundamental rules regarding joint and several liability that permit suing fewer than all the obligors. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 163, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (“Nothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having suffered ... a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the wrongdoers, or any one of them, at his election;”) (quoting The “Atlas”, 93 U.S. 302, 315, 23 L.Ed. 863 (1876) (ellipsis in original)). While the bankruptcy court had discretion to decline to proceed without joinder of all petitioners, it was not required to do so and was entitled to proceed without such joinder.
In context, the provision in § 303(i) that “the court may grant judgment against the petitioners” is merely a permissive designation of the universe of persons who may be liable. If suing all jointly-liable parties is not required in tort, there is no reason to think that § 303(i) is any different.
In short, it was permissible for the motion for a § 303(i) award to have been directed solely against Sofris. Moreover, even if it had been directed against all petitioners, the entire $42,257 award could be collected from Sofris.
The potential harshness of permitting collection of all of a joint and several liability debt from only one of the obligors is ameliorated by the contribution and indemnity doctrines.
Contribution is an equitable remedy that protects the jointly-liable party who pays an inequitably disproportionate share of the liability by requiring others who are also liable to reimburse the party who paid. It is founded on principles of equity, assists in fair and just division of losses, and prevents unfairness and injustice. 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 1 (1985); Restatement of Restitution § 81 (1937); accord, Atl. Research, 127 S.Ct. at 2339.
Contribution is also an independent right that is contingent and does not become enforceable until the one seeking contribution has paid a disproportionate share of the liability. Asdar Group v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 295 (9th Cir.1996)
(citing 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 11, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2), and Restatement of Restitution § 82(1)).
In addition, contribution is a personal right that may be assigned. Even though the common liability is joint, the liability of each joint obligor to contribute a proportionate share is several. 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution §§ 3 & 11.
As an equitable remedy, contribution is governed by equitable principles and is not apodictic. Rather, it may be [569]*569applied only in a manner that comports with equity and notions of fairness.9
The underlying premise is that the person entitled to payment (be it a debtor under § 303(i) or a tort victim) does not bear the credit risk of not being able to collect against any particular joint obligor (an unsuccessful petitioner under § 303(i) or a tortfeasor). Thus, the full amount of a judgment can be collected against any one joint obligor, who then can then equilibrate the loss among the other joint obligors by using the muscle of contribution.
Two threshold rules are that there is no right of contribution until one has paid more than one’s equitable share of a common liability and that contribution cannot exceed the amount paid by that party in excess of that party’s equitable share. Although the entire judgment may be collected from one obligor, no co-obligor can be required to make a contribution in excess of his own equitable share of the liability. Atl. Research, 127 S.Ct. at 2339 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 886A(2)); Compare Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23(a)-(b), with Restatement (Second) of Touts § 886A(2).10
Determining what constitutes the equitable share is not always easy. While the maxim that “equality is equity” provides the presumptive starting point, adjustments are permitted. Problems arise when a joint obligor is insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The classic solution has been to divide the loss only among the solvent joint obligors against whom contribution awards may be expected to be effective. Thus, when there are three joint obligors, one of whom is insol[570]*570vent or beyond the jurisdiction, “the amount of contribution fairly allowable between the other two may reasonably be affected and the court may be expected to do what is fair and equitable under the circumstances.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment c; accord, Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23 comment g.
Unequal allocations that reflect comparative degrees of culpability are also permitted. Under the traditional view, unequal apportionment is permitted to avoid inequity, which entails a finding that equal allocation would be inequitable; the modern trend toward comparative fault does not require a focus on whether equal division would be inequitable. Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment c, with Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23(b) comments e & g; cf. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410-11, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) (adopting comparative negligence in admiralty).11 Thus, in either a traditional joint and several liability regime or a modern comparative liability regime, the court has authority to make adjustments based on the circumstances in order to assure that contribution does not work an injustice.
Since in this appeal we are merely noting the general availability of contribution, we are not presented with any issue of whether there should be an unequal allocation in this instance or which method (traditional or comparative responsibility12) should be employed if unequal allocation is later determined to be appropriate. Those are questions better left to the future.
The indemnity doctrine applies in § 303(i) situations when a petitioning creditor has been promised, typically as an inducement to sign the petition, that all expense or liability of the involuntary petition will be borne by another person. Such promises are enforceable. Oakview Treatment Ctrs. of Kansas, Inc. v. Garrett, 53 F.Supp.2d 1184, 1191-92 (D.Kan.1999) (indemnity on § 303(i) liability); Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22.13
[571]*571Since indemnity and contribution are mutually exclusive, one with a right of indemnity has no right of contribution against the indemnitor. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23(c).14
There could be indemnity issues here if Sofris or someone else used promises of indemnity to induce the various individual creditors holding small claims who joined as petitioners in two phases after the petition was filed.
II
The procedures to implement joint and several liability, contribution, and indemnity all oblige a defendant who is being singled out to take action. Sofris’ contention that the debtor should, at the threshold, bear the risk of procedural difficulties in naming, locating, and serving all of the petitioners and that an award cannot be made against him unless the debtor does so turns the theory of joint liability on its head.
Procedures through which Sofris may protect himself from disproportionate liability are available both before and after a § 303(i) award is made.
First, Sofris could have made a motion within the contested matter to join the other petitioners as parties to the § 303(i) motion.15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which permits joinder of additional parties on motion of a party, applies in bankruptcy “contested matters.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7021 & 9014.16
Although Rule 21 permits the court to add parties on its own authority, the burden to make such a motion was on Sofris. That he elected to forego this pro[572]*572cedural opportunity should not be held against the debtor. Having sat on his rights, he is in no position to complain on appeal about his own litigation choice.
Sofris could also have commenced a third-party action against other petitioners to obtain judgments against them in the event that a judgment was rendered against him.17 This could have been accomplished as of right by way of an adversary proceeding separate from the § 303(i) motion. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7001. Or, if the court had been persuaded to exercise its authority under Rule 9014(b) to direct that Rule 7014 apply to the § 303(i) “contested matter” motion (which Sofris could have requested by motion), it could have been done under the third-party procedure of Civil Rule 14. Compare Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9014(b), with id. 7014, incorporating Fed.R.Civ.P. 14.
Finally, if Sofris pays a disproportionate share of the $42,257, the independent equitable action in the bankruptcy court for contribution that we have described becomes available. This vestigal remnant of the old distinction between law and equity is still the traditional method of obtaining the equitable remedy of contribution. The action requires, as an essential element for relief, that the party requesting contribution has paid more than its equitable share of the judgment.
As a matter of federal common law, independent contribution actions continue to be available in FELA actions. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 162-63, 123 S.Ct. 1210. Similarly, contribution actions are permitted among joint tortfeasors who cause injury to longshoremen. Cooper Stevedoring Co., 417 U.S. at 113, 94 S.Ct. 2174.
To the extent that the remedial scheme created by § 303(i) does not implicate “uniquely federal interests” of the kind that oblige court to formulate federal common law, the question is whether Congress expressly or by clear implication envisioned a contribution right to accompany the § 303(i) remedies or whether Congress intended that the court could supplement the remedies enacted. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 290-92, 113 S.Ct. 2085, 124 L.Ed.2d 194 (1993); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-45, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981).
As we have already explained, the choice by Congress to employ traditional tort remedies in the § 303(i) award scheme warrants the conclusion that Congress by clear implication either envisioned a contribution right to accompany § 303(i) remedies or intended that the courts could supplement the remedies with a right of contribution.
There are, to be sure, practical disadvantages to a separate action for contribution. In addition to the obvious inefficiencies of redundant litigation, if the joint and several obligors were not parties to the action in which the judgment was rendered, then that judgment’s claim and issue preclusive effect on the unnamed parties may be clouded and could complicate subsequent contribution litigation by permitting them to litigate underlying liability. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50.
Sofris could, however, have averted these inconveniences by taking direct action when confronted with the motion that [573]*573was not directed at all petitioners. His earlier inaction now constrains his alternatives.
This appeal illustrates the latitude a bankruptcy court has when dealing with multiple petitioners under § 303(i). In the end, a fee and cost award was made against only five of the twelve petitioners.
Such an award against fewer than all petitioners is consistent with other § 303(i) decisions. For example, a close examination of the facts in Vortex Fishing reflects that Ninth Circuit affirmed an award that was made against only some of the petitioners. Compare Liberty Tool & Mfg., Inc. v. Vortex Fishing Sys. Inc. (In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc.), 277 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir.2002) (more than four petitioners), with Vortex Fishing II (award against four petitioners); cf. Val Poterek & Sons, Inc., 169 B.R. at 905-06 (zero percent allocation to one petitioner).
We conclude that it neither was error for the court to have made a § 303(i) award without joining all potentially liable petitioners, nor was it error for the award to have been against fewer than all petitioners.
III
Sofris also challenges the merits of the award of attorney fees and costs as being unreasonable.
As noted, the amount of an award of an attorney’s fee and costs under § 303(f)(1) is a matter of discretion to be assessed on the “totality of the circumstances” in a context in which the debtor has the burden to demonstrate that the amount requested is reasonable, subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of entitlement to an award. Vortex Fishing II, 379 F.3d at 707.18
The “totality of circumstances” approach under § 303(i)(1) is different from the analysis of requests for compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 330 because the language of the two sections differs. All § 303(i)(1) requires is that the fee be “reasonable.” In contrast, § 330 speaks of “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services” subject to an elaborate set of statutory criteria. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(a)(3)-(6). In effect, a § 303(i)(1) attorney’s fee is an element of damages. Wavelength, Inc., 61 B.R. at 622-22; accord, Val Poterek & Sons, Inc., 169 B.R. at 907; In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 413 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1989); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 303.15[4] (Henry J. Sommer & Alan N. Resnick eds. 15th ed. rev.2006).
The debtor’s evidence in support of the amount requested demonstrated attorney fees of $40,250 based on records of 161 hours billed at a rate of $250 per hour, $2,007 in documented costs, and the declaration of counsel. The court was persuaded that the debtor had carried its burden to demonstrate, over Sofris’ objection in which he presented no counter-evidence, [574]*574that $42,257 was a “reasonable” amount to award.
Nor was the court persuaded that Sofris carried his burden to establish that the totality of the circumstances rebut the presumption in favor of the award. Pertinent circumstances include: (1) the merits of the petition; (2) the conduct of the alleged debtor; (3) reasonableness of the actions by petitioning creditors; (4) the motivation and objectives behind filing the petition; and (5) other case-specific matters. Vortex Fishing II, 379 F.3d at 707-08. Sofris made no such showing.
We cannot say that the court abused its discretion as to the amount of the award or the appropriateness of making an award in light of the totality of the circumstances.
IV
Nor do we perceive material error in the court’s treatment of the putative § 303(i) release that was executed by Robert Nathan posing as president of the debtor. Although it would have been better if there had been precise findings, the court’s reason for disregarding the putative release was not ambiguous. In the procedural posture of the case in which the court had recognized the Marlowe-Shlush Faction as being in control of the debtor, Mr. Nathan was an imposter. The court had recognized the Marlow-Shlush Faction as legitimate. The court correctly noted that the agreement would be effective only if it later was determined by state court that the Mayman-Nathan Faction controlled the debtor.
As a matter of procedure, the court’s recognition of the contingency that the Mayman-Nathan Faction might ultimately prevail in its quest for control of Maple-Whitworth constitutes a recognition that relief could become appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or (6) on the basis that the release was validly executed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5)-(6), incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9024. A motion under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) need only be made “within a reasonable time,” which necessarily depends upon the factual context. Id. On such a motion, the prospect of which appears increasingly remote because the state court judgment appears to be final, the $42,257 judgment could be vacated and any sums collected could be recovered on a theory of money had and received.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the § 303(i) liability of petitioners in a dismissed involuntary bankruptcy case is joint and several. There is no requirement that all petitioners be named in, and served with, a § 303(i) motion. Among other procedures, equitable rights of contribution and indemnity are available to protect a petitioner who is unfairly singled out in such a motion. There having been no abuse of discretion in the award, it is AFFIRMED.