Michael Lamar Robinson v. State of Missouri

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 15, 2022
• Docket: ED110094
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL LAMAR ROBINSON, ) No. ED110094 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the City of St. Louis vs. ) 1722-CC11450 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Honorable Joseph P. Whyte ) Respondent. ) Filed: November 15, 2022

Michael Lamar Robinson (“Movant”) appeals the judgment denying his amended Rule

24.035 1 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Movant raises three

points on appeal arguing the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion because he

established by a preponderance of the evidence that he received ineffective assistance of plea

counsel at his guilty plea hearing and he was prejudiced thereby. We dismiss the appeal without

reaching its merits, pursuant to the escape rule, because Movant absconded for almost three years

after failing to appear at his sentencing hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Movant was charged as a prior and persistent drug offender with the class C felony of

possession of a controlled substance (Count I) and the class A misdemeanor of possession of a

controlled substance (Count II). Movant pleaded guilty to both counts on May 7, 2014. On that

1 All references to Rule 24.035 are to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035 (2017) (effective beginning July 1, 2017), which was the version of the Rule in effect at the time Movant’s pro se motion for post-conviction relief was filed on October 3, 2017. same date, the trial court agreed to defer sentencing and allow Movant to remain free on bond

until August 29, 2014 to permit Movant to complete an employment opportunity. Movant

agreed he would return for sentencing on August 29, and the trial court warned Movant that

should he fail to appear, he would be “look[ing] at the maximum sentence.”

Movant failed to appear for sentencing on August 29, 2014, prompting the trial court to

issue a capias warrant. Movant was arrested on the capias warrant on August 16, 2017, after

being at large for nearly three years.

After Movant’s capture, the trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 8, 2017.

At the hearing, the trial court noted that it was especially problematic Movant had failed to

appear at his sentencing hearing on Counts I and II and absconded because Movant was already

on probation in an unrelated case. Movant waived a probation revocation hearing and admitted

he violated the conditions of his bond by absconding. The trial court revoked Movant’s

probation in the unrelated case; ordered Movant’s sentences in that case to be executed; and told

Movant the court would “take [ ] into consideration” the fact that Movant “didn’t pick up any

more cases” when imposing Movant’s sentences on Counts I and II. The trial court ultimately

sentenced Movant as a prior and persistent drug offender to ten years of imprisonment on Count

I, to a term of ten days in a medium security institution with credit for time served on Count II,

and to a total term of fifteen years of imprisonment in the unrelated case, with all of the

sentences to run concurrently.

Movant subsequently filed a pro se and an amended Rule 24.035 motion for post-

conviction relief alleging he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel at his guilty plea

hearing and that he was prejudiced thereby. The motion court subsequently entered a judgment

denying Movant’s amended Rule 24.035 motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding Movant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. This appeal followed.

2 II. DISCUSSION

Movant raises three points on appeal arguing the motion court clearly erred in denying

his amended Rule 24.035 motion because he established by a preponderance of the evidence that

he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel at his guilty plea hearing and he was prejudiced

thereby. The State urges us to dismiss this appeal pursuant to the escape rule.

The escape rule is a judicially-created doctrine that allows our Court to dismiss a post-

conviction appeal of a criminal defendant who escapes justice. Terry v. State, 647 S.W.3d 78,

80-81 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). We may invoke the escape rule whether the motion court reached

the merits of a movant’s post-conviction motion or the motion court itself applied the escape

rule. Conn v. State, 590 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

There is no threshold amount of time a criminal defendant must have escaped justice

before dismissal of his appeal is allowed under the escape rule. Terry, 647 S.W.3d at 81.

Instead, the fundamental inquiry is whether the defendant’s escape “adversely affected the

criminal justice system.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, the decision whether to apply the

escape rule to a particular appeal rests within an appellate court’s sound discretion. Id.

There are multiple justifications for dismissal of a criminal defendant’s appeal based on

the escape rule, including:

(1) the need for a court to have control over the defendant before making a decision on appeal; (2) curtailment of administrative problems caused by the defendant’s long absence; (3) preventing prejudice to the State in the event of remand for a new trial; (4) preventing the defendant from selectively abiding by court decisions; (5) discouraging escape; (6) encouraging voluntary surrender; (7) preserving respect for the criminal justice system; and (8) promoting the dignified operation of the appellate courts.

Id. Ultimately, the escape rule reinforces the principle that persons seeking the protection of our

legal system must be willing to abide by its rules and decisions; absconding criminal defendants

will not be rewarded for their actions. Id.

3 A criminal defendant’s willful failure to appear at a sentencing hearing constitutes an

“escape” under the rule, and the escape rule applies to errors which are alleged to have occurred

before the escape. State v. Freeman, 619 S.W.3d 550, 552, 553 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021); Williams

v. State, 526 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).

In this case, the trial court deferred sentencing to permit Movant to complete an

employment opportunity and warned Movant he would be “look[ing] at the maximum sentence”

if he failed to appear for sentencing. If Movant had successfully completed the employment

opportunity and appeared at his sentencing hearing as he agreed to do, the court may have taken

that into consideration in imposing Movant’s sentences on Counts I and II. However, Movant

failed to appear at his sentencing hearing; absconded for almost three years; violated the

conditions of his bond; caused his probation in an unrelated case to be revoked; and caused his

sentence in the unrelated case to be executed. As a result, the trial court sentenced Movant as a

prior and persistent drug offender to a total of fifteen years of imprisonment on Count I, on

Count II, and in the unrelated case.

We hold the circumstances of this case justify application of the escape rule and the

dismissal of Movant’s appeal. No evidence in the record suggests, much less supports, that

Movant’s failure to appear at his sentencing hearing, i.e., his “escape,” was for any reason other

than a willful attempt to avoid serving his sentence. See Freeman, 619 S.W.3d at 553 (similarly

finding); see also Williams, 526 S.W.3d at 369. In addition, because the errors alleged in

Movant’s points on appeal concern the effectiveness of his plea counsel during Movant’s guilty

plea hearing which occurred before his escape, the escape rule is applicable. See Conn, 590

S.W.3d at 889-90 (similarly finding); see also Freeman, 619 S.W.3d at 552; Williams, 526

S.W.3d at 369.

4 Moreover, we conclude Movant’s almost three-year escape from justice after failing to

appear at his sentencing hearing adversely affected the criminal justice system. See State v.

Troupe, 891 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. banc 1995) (“a delay of more than eight months necessarily

has an adverse impact on the criminal justice system”); Williams, 526 S.W.3d at 369-70 (finding

a movant’s approximate two-year escape from justice adversely impacted the criminal justice

system); see also Terry, 647 S.W.3d at 81. Finally, invoking the escape rule to dismiss this

appeal furthers the stated goals of discouraging escape, encouraging voluntary surrender, and

preserving respect for the criminal justice system. See Terry, 647 S.W.3d at 81, 82.

Based on the foregoing, we exercise our discretion to dismiss Movant’s appeal pursuant

to the escape rule. See id.

III. CONCLUSION

The appeal is dismissed.

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, Judge

Angela T. Quigless, P.J., and Sherri B. Sullivan, J., concur.