Michael Jeffries v. Steve Hargett

132 F.3d 42, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40049, 1997 WL 755147
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedDecember 4, 1997
Docket97-6229
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 132 F.3d 42 (Michael Jeffries v. Steve Hargett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Jeffries v. Steve Hargett, 132 F.3d 42, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40049, 1997 WL 755147 (10th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

132 F.3d 42

97 CJ C.A.R. 3117

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

Michael JEFFRIES, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Steve HARGETT, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 97-6229.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 4, 1997.

Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered submitted without oral argument.

Petitioner Michael Jeffries, appearing pro se, requests a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court's dismissal of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This court will issue a certificate of appealability when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We deny the request and dismiss the appeal.

Jeffries pleaded guilty to armed robbery after conviction of two or more felonies in 1988 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.1 Jeffries failed to withdraw his guilty plea within the ten-day period allowed by Oklahoma law, but on May 16, 1988, he filed a request to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied. On October 12, 1990, he sought review from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing the district court failed to inquire into the factual basis for his guilty plea and imposed an excessive sentence, which was denied. Jeffries filed a second request for review, arguing the information charging him with armed robbery was insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his claims and affirmed the district court's decision to deny post-conviction relief.

Jeffries filed his § 2254 petition on April 17, 1997, contending he was not advised of his right to withdraw his guilty plea or to appeal and that he was denied due process by the court's denial of his request to appeal out of time. The district court adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendation and denied the petition. As a basis for issuing a certificate of appealability, Jeffries contends his constitutional rights were violated when his prior convictions were used to enhance his present sentence because he was not advised of his right to withdraw his guilty plea or to appeal his conviction.

In-custody Requirement

Jeffries argues his prior convictions used to enhance his sentence are invalid. He acknowledges the sentences for the prior convictions have expired and that he is no longer "in custody" for purposes of the prior convictions. Nevertheless, he argues he is entitled to relief based on the expired convictions because they were used to enhance the sentence he is presently serving.

A habeas petitioner may not directly challenge a conviction where the sentence has fully expired. Maleg v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). Despite the collateral consequences of such a prior conviction, such a petitioner is no longer "in custody" for purposes of federal law. Id. However, a petitioner may challenge an unexpired conviction where the sentence has been enhanced by a fully-expired conviction by attacking the constitutionality of the underlying fullyexpired conviction. Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir.1990). Such an indirect attack on an expired conviction is permissible despite the fact that a direct attack on the expired sentence is prohibited. Id. When a pro se petitioner attacks the validity of an expired sentence and that expired sentence has been used to enhance the conviction for which petitioner is then in custody, this court liberally construes the petition as an attack on the unexpired sentence. See Collins v. Hesse, 957 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir.1992) (appropriate to liberally construe pro se petition "as challenging his present confinement even though the essence of his attack was the alleged unconstitutionality of the prior predicate convictions"). Because Jeffries' prior convictions were used to enhance his unexpired armed robbery conviction, Jeffries may challenge those prior convictions in his habeas petition.

Failure to Exhaust State Remedies

Although Jeffries is "in custody" for purposes of his armed robbery conviction and may therefore challenge the allegedly unconstitutional nature of his prior guilty pleas, he has not made such a challenge in state court. In state court, Jeffries has argued (1) the court committed error during the plea hearing in which he pleaded guilty to armed robbery; (2) he received an excessive sentence; (3) the information was insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Since Jeffries has not presented the instant claim in state court, he has failed to exhaust his available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir.1993).

Procedurally Barred

"On habeas review, we do not address issues that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, unless cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice is shown." Id. at 1521 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)). Oklahoma law requires Jeffries to present his claim regarding invalidity of his prior convictions in his first request for post-conviction relief. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1086 (all possible grounds for relief must be raised in original application for post-conviction relief); see also Castro v. State, 880 P.2d 387, 388 (Okla.1994). His sentence enhancement claim was defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state procedural ground when he failed to include it in his first request for post-conviction relief. See Steele, 11 F.3d at 1522, 1524.

Moreover, Jeffries has failed to show cause for the default, or actual prejudice resulting from violation of federal law, or that the federal court's failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See id. at 1522.

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Bluebook (online)
132 F.3d 42, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40049, 1997 WL 755147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-jeffries-v-steve-hargett-ca10-1997.