Michael Janitz v. State of Indiana (NFP

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 10, 2014
Docket49A02-1403-CR-197
StatusPublished

This text of Michael Janitz v. State of Indiana (NFP (Michael Janitz v. State of Indiana (NFP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Janitz v. State of Indiana (NFP, (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of Nov 10 2014, 9:44 am establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MICHAEL JANITZ, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1403-CR-197 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable David M. Hooper, Judge Cause No. 49F08-1309-CM-63832

November 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Michael Janitz appeals his conviction for battery, as a Class A misdemeanor,

following a jury trial. He presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the

State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his self-defense claim.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2013, Janitz and his father were living in Indianapolis in a residence across the

street from the residence of Mark Young and his fiancée, Cathy Hicks. Janitz and Young

did not get along. Conner McQuade, a friend of Janitz’s, routinely parked his car on the

street directly in front of Young’s house when he visited Janitz, and, on more than one

such occasion, Young made it clear to Janitz and McQuade that he did not want

McQuade to park in front of his house.

On September 26, 2013, Young was standing on his front porch when he saw

McQuade park his car on the street in front of Young’s house. Young asked McQuade to

move his car, and McQuade responded, “Well, what if I don’t?” Tr. at 148. Young told

McQuade that he would call the police if he did not move the car. McQuade then moved

his car and parked it across the street in front of Janitz’s house.

After McQuade parked his car, he got out and said to Young, “There, I moved it,

are you happy?” Id. Young said, “Yeah.” Id. Then McQuade “cussed” at Young, and

McQuade approached Janitz, who was standing outside. Id. At that point, Janitz “came

running across the street into [Young]’s driveway” and Janitz “started swinging and

kicking” at Young. Id. at 149. At one point, Janitz struck Young in the face with a

2 closed fist. Eventually, Janitz’s father, who had been working on a car across the street,

came over and “grabbed him and took him back across the street.” Id. at 154. Two

neighbors witnessed the confrontation, and Young, who had a surveillance camera

mounted outside of his house, made a video recording of the incident. Hicks called

police, and a responding officer talked to the witnesses and watched the surveillance

video before he arrested Janitz for battery.

The State charged Janitz with battery, as a Class A misdemeanor. At trial, Janitz

testified that, after McQuade moved his car, he saw Young “charging down the

driveway” towards McQuade and threatening to “kick [McQuade’s] ass.” Id. at 274.

Janitz testified that he hit Young in an effort to prevent harm to McQuade. A jury found

Janitz guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment and sentence accordingly. This

appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Janitz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence contending the State failed to

rebut his claim of self-defense. As our supreme court has explained:

A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a); Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). In order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind. 1998). When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Id. If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999). . . . The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence 3 claim. Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the [judgment] will not be disturbed. Id.

Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ind. 2002) (emphases added).

We agree with the State that Janitz’s self-defense claim fails because his claim did

not find support in the evidence. See id. In particular, Janitz did not present evidence

that he was in a place where he had a right to be at the time of the battery. The

undisputed evidence shows that Young had posted a “No Trespassing” sign at the end of

his driveway and that Young had repeatedly told Janitz to stay off of his property. Thus,

Janitz, who was standing on Young’s private driveway when he struck Young, was not in

a place where he had a right to be.

Moreover, even if Janitz were in a place where he had a right to be, the State

presented sufficient evidence to negate the other two elements of his claim. In particular,

the State presented evidence that Young did not charge at or otherwise pose a threat to

McQuade’s safety at the time Janitz struck Young. And, because the State presented

evidence that Young posed no threat to McQuade’s safety, the evidence supports a

conclusion that fear for McQuade’s safety was unfounded. Thus, Janitz’s contentions on

appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The

State presented sufficient evidence to support Janitz’s conviction.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wilson v. State
770 N.E.2d 799 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2002)
Wallace v. State
725 N.E.2d 837 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2000)
Taylor v. State
710 N.E.2d 921 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1999)
McEwen v. State
695 N.E.2d 79 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1998)
Sanders v. State
704 N.E.2d 119 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Michael Janitz v. State of Indiana (NFP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-janitz-v-state-of-indiana-nfp-indctapp-2014.