[96]*96WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Michael Gorra filed suit against Troopers Floyd Hanson and Patrick Chase (the troopers) of the Minnesota State Highway Patrol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Hanson and Chase had arrested him without probable cause and thus deprived him of liberty without due process of law. Hanson and Chase appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Sometime after 4:00 a.m. on September 15, 1985, Trooper Chase discovered an abandoned, overturned vehicle (the Blazer) on the unpaved lane in a construction site on Interstate Highway 35W near Diamond Lake Road in Hennepin County. Trooper Hanson joined Chase at the scene. Although the troopers were unable to find the driver, they did discover that the Blazer was registered to either Richard Gorra or Michael Gorra. The troopers noticed blood on the Blazer's steering column. They also found several recently-issued traffic citations charging Richard Gorra with alcohol-related driving offenses. Based upon the hundreds of accidents that they had investigated, the troopers inferred that the driver was Richard, that his license had been revoked due to the driving offenses, and that he had fled the scene because he had been driving without a license.
Meanwhile, Richard called Michael Gorra to tell him about the accident and the Blazer’s approximate location and that his only injury was a scraped hand. Michael Gorra drove immediately to the accident site.
After Michael Gorra reached the accident, both troopers questioned him. Michael Gorra identified himself, identified his son as the owner and driver of the Blazer, and explained that he had come from his home in Chanhassen to retrieve some personal property. He stated that he had been home in bed when Richard called and told him about the accident. In response to further questioning by both troopers, Michael Gorra insisted that he did not know where Richard was. Michael Gorra did not tell the troopers that Richard’s grandmother and some of Richard’s friends lived in the immediate area, nor did he tell them that he, Michael, had an office within blocks of the accident scene. Instead, he continued for the next twenty minutes to collect keys and other items scattered over the area.
According to the troopers, Michael Gorra seemed much more concerned about picking up the property, which appeared to have little value, than about learning the condition or location of his son. The troopers also observed that Michael Gorra appeared nervous and evasive and that he trembled while speaking. Moreover, the troopers believed that the timing of Michael Gorra’s arrival at the accident scene was inconsistent with his story of coming from his home. The troopers therefore began to suspect that Michael Gorra did know where Richard was. They warned him several times that if he was lying or withholding information, they would arrest him for obstruction of justice.
As Michael Gorra drove away from the scene of the accident, Trooper Chase attempted to follow in his patrol car but lost sight of him. After obtaining an address from their dispatcher, the troopers found Michael Gorra and Richard at Michael Gor-ra’s office, a few blocks from the accident scene. Trooper Hanson arrested Richard and led him out to the patrol car. Michael Gorra followed and advised Richard to remain silent. Trooper Chase then arrested Michael for obstruction of legal process under Minn.Stat. § 609.50 (1984).1 The charges against Michael Gorra were eventually dismissed at the request of the prosecutor, but not upon the ground that probable cause was lacking for the arrest.
Michael Gorra brought an action against Hanson and Chase and the Minnesota State [97]*97Patrol2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that probable cause did not exist for his arrest and that he had therefore been deprived of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Depositions were taken of Hanson and Chase and of Richard and Michael Gorra. Thereafter, Hanson and Chase moved for summary judgment. The district court denied their motion, finding that it could not decide the applicability of the defense of qualified immunity without further development of the facts.
II. DISCUSSION
A law enforcement officer is shielded by qualified immunity from civil liability if the officer “[did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Under the “objective legal reasonableness standard,” courts are not to delve into the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39. Cf. Graham v. Connor, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
In reviewing an allegation that probable cause was lacking to make a warrantless arrest, the court should Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987) (quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (citations omitted)). In determining whether the defense of immunity exists, the issue is “not probable cause in fact but ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Id. (quoting Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)). Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers in cases in which they “reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present * * *.” Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. Actual probable cause, therefore, is not necessary for an arrest to be objectively reasonable. Under this standard, all public officials are protected except the “plainly incompetent” and those who are deemed to have “knowingly violate[d] the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
“consider whether the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed ... an offense. Probable cause is to be assessed in terms of the circumstances confronting a reasonably cautious police officer at the time of the arrest, and the arresting officer is entitled to consider the circumstances, including arguably innocent conduct, in light of his training and experience. ‘[T]he probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’ ”
Whether an official’s conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law, Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct.
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[96]*96WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Michael Gorra filed suit against Troopers Floyd Hanson and Patrick Chase (the troopers) of the Minnesota State Highway Patrol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Hanson and Chase had arrested him without probable cause and thus deprived him of liberty without due process of law. Hanson and Chase appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Sometime after 4:00 a.m. on September 15, 1985, Trooper Chase discovered an abandoned, overturned vehicle (the Blazer) on the unpaved lane in a construction site on Interstate Highway 35W near Diamond Lake Road in Hennepin County. Trooper Hanson joined Chase at the scene. Although the troopers were unable to find the driver, they did discover that the Blazer was registered to either Richard Gorra or Michael Gorra. The troopers noticed blood on the Blazer's steering column. They also found several recently-issued traffic citations charging Richard Gorra with alcohol-related driving offenses. Based upon the hundreds of accidents that they had investigated, the troopers inferred that the driver was Richard, that his license had been revoked due to the driving offenses, and that he had fled the scene because he had been driving without a license.
Meanwhile, Richard called Michael Gorra to tell him about the accident and the Blazer’s approximate location and that his only injury was a scraped hand. Michael Gorra drove immediately to the accident site.
After Michael Gorra reached the accident, both troopers questioned him. Michael Gorra identified himself, identified his son as the owner and driver of the Blazer, and explained that he had come from his home in Chanhassen to retrieve some personal property. He stated that he had been home in bed when Richard called and told him about the accident. In response to further questioning by both troopers, Michael Gorra insisted that he did not know where Richard was. Michael Gorra did not tell the troopers that Richard’s grandmother and some of Richard’s friends lived in the immediate area, nor did he tell them that he, Michael, had an office within blocks of the accident scene. Instead, he continued for the next twenty minutes to collect keys and other items scattered over the area.
According to the troopers, Michael Gorra seemed much more concerned about picking up the property, which appeared to have little value, than about learning the condition or location of his son. The troopers also observed that Michael Gorra appeared nervous and evasive and that he trembled while speaking. Moreover, the troopers believed that the timing of Michael Gorra’s arrival at the accident scene was inconsistent with his story of coming from his home. The troopers therefore began to suspect that Michael Gorra did know where Richard was. They warned him several times that if he was lying or withholding information, they would arrest him for obstruction of justice.
As Michael Gorra drove away from the scene of the accident, Trooper Chase attempted to follow in his patrol car but lost sight of him. After obtaining an address from their dispatcher, the troopers found Michael Gorra and Richard at Michael Gor-ra’s office, a few blocks from the accident scene. Trooper Hanson arrested Richard and led him out to the patrol car. Michael Gorra followed and advised Richard to remain silent. Trooper Chase then arrested Michael for obstruction of legal process under Minn.Stat. § 609.50 (1984).1 The charges against Michael Gorra were eventually dismissed at the request of the prosecutor, but not upon the ground that probable cause was lacking for the arrest.
Michael Gorra brought an action against Hanson and Chase and the Minnesota State [97]*97Patrol2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that probable cause did not exist for his arrest and that he had therefore been deprived of liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Depositions were taken of Hanson and Chase and of Richard and Michael Gorra. Thereafter, Hanson and Chase moved for summary judgment. The district court denied their motion, finding that it could not decide the applicability of the defense of qualified immunity without further development of the facts.
II. DISCUSSION
A law enforcement officer is shielded by qualified immunity from civil liability if the officer “[did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Under the “objective legal reasonableness standard,” courts are not to delve into the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39. Cf. Graham v. Connor, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
In reviewing an allegation that probable cause was lacking to make a warrantless arrest, the court should Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987) (quoting Hannah v. City of Overland, 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (citations omitted)). In determining whether the defense of immunity exists, the issue is “not probable cause in fact but ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Id. (quoting Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1985)). Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officers in cases in which they “reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present * * *.” Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. Actual probable cause, therefore, is not necessary for an arrest to be objectively reasonable. Under this standard, all public officials are protected except the “plainly incompetent” and those who are deemed to have “knowingly violate[d] the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
“consider whether the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed ... an offense. Probable cause is to be assessed in terms of the circumstances confronting a reasonably cautious police officer at the time of the arrest, and the arresting officer is entitled to consider the circumstances, including arguably innocent conduct, in light of his training and experience. ‘[T]he probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’ ”
Whether an official’s conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law, Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, and should be decided at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6. Under the undisputed facts established by the depositions, a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Michael Gorra for obstruction of legal process in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.50. The troopers could reasonably have believed that Michael Gorra was lying when he stated that he did not know where Richard could be. His staying to pick up the scattered property was inconsistent with the actions of a father who does not know the location of a son who has been involved in a serious accident. Michael Gorra’s appearance with his son at his office soon after leaving the accident could reasonably be construed as a planned rather than a coincidental meeting, giving lie to his earlier denial of any knowledge of Richard’s whereabouts.
The objective legal reasonableness of the troopers’ conduct must be evaluated in [98]*98light of law that was clearly established when the arrest occurred. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. At the time of the arrest, September 1985, the Minnesota courts had not yet defined the conduct that would violate section 609.50.3 In the absence of any judicial interpretation to the contrary, a reasonable officer could have concluded that lying about the whereabouts of a suspect constituted “obstructing” or “hindering.” Because the law had not been construed at the time of the arrest, and because the troopers’ interpretation was not inconsistent with common understanding, we cannot say that the troopers’ interpretation of the statute was unreasonable. Accordingly, Hanson and Chase are entitled to be shielded from liability under the defense of qualified immunity.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment of dismissal.