Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-0096 ____________
MICHAEL H. HUNT, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
December 18, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Michael Harrison Hunt appeals his first-degree murder
conviction and death sentence, raising six issues for our review. We
have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
A. Factual Background
The State’s evidence at trial established the following facts.
On April 4, 2019, Alexandra Elise Peck (Lexie) was at home with her
family in Panama City. Lexie lived with her mother Jenna, her stepfather Danny, and her brother Gabe. Gabe’s girlfriend, P.O.,
and two friends, Brentley and Izac, were also living at the home.
Around 10:30 p.m., a man knocked on the door claiming to have a
pizza delivery. Danny answered the door and told the man that no
one in the home had ordered a pizza. When Danny tried to shut the
door, the man pushed it in, nearly knocking him over. The man
entered the home, pulling a gun from his waistband and holding it
up to Danny’s chin. When the man did so, his face covering slipped
back and Danny recognized him as Michael Hunt. He also then
recognized Hunt’s “very distinctive” voice.
Once Danny saw the gun, he yelled “run” to the home’s other
occupants. Hunt snatched Danny’s cell phone from his hand and
shot him in the neck. After Danny fell to the floor, he heard a
second, “totally different” voice, which was later presumed to be the
voice of Hunt’s accomplice. 1 He heard several more gun shots
coming from the home’s back bedroom. He also heard Lexie say
“Dad, help me” and “Please don’t kill me” before several more shots.
1. At the time of trial, there had been no arrest for Hunt’s accomplice. There were suspects, and it was still an ongoing investigation.
-2- Knowing that Hunt would likely shoot him again, Danny crawled to
the neighbor’s house, where his neighbor called the police.
Meanwhile, Lexie had heard Danny’s warning and ran into the
home’s back bedroom, where Brentley and Izac were staying.
Hunt’s accomplice followed her into the bedroom, where he shot
Izac in the back before shooting Lexie in the back of the head. The
accomplice shot Lexie and Izac again before shooting Brentley and
running out of the room.
Danny, Brentley, and Izac survived with serious injuries.
Lexie died at the scene. Although they were home, Gabe and P.O.
were hiding on the other side of the house and were uninjured.
Jenna was at work and was also uninjured. When the police
arrived at the home, both Hunt and his accomplice had fled the
scene.
The Panama City Police Department suspected that this
murder was no random burglary and immediately identified Hunt
as a suspect. The Panama City Police Department recovered shell
casings and fired projectiles from the scene, which revealed that
Danny was shot with a .380 caliber handgun. Lexie, Brentley, and
Izac were shot with a .45 caliber handgun. Hunt was known to own
-3- both types of weapons. About nine months after the murder, a .380
caliber semi-automatic pistol was recovered in a neighbor’s bushes,
and the police determined it was the weapon used to shoot Danny.
At the scene, Danny told both his neighbor and several police
officers that Hunt had shot him. During the shooting, Gabe was in
the home’s bathroom and heard Hunt’s voice. But beyond the
physical evidence and visual and voice identifications, the Panama
City Police Department was already aware of the risk that Hunt
posed to the family because of their connection through Gabe’s
girlfriend, P.O.
About a year and a half before the murder, sixteen-year-old
P.O. met Hunt and began seeing him and his girlfriend, Kaitlyn
West, on a regular basis. P.O. learned that Hunt owned a “dance
studio” called “Polecats,” which was advertised as an event space
that people could rent out and throw parties. At some point in their
relationship, Hunt took pictures of Kaitlyn and put them on a
website without her consent to prostitute her. She did not say
anything or leave him because Hunt beat her, and she was scared
that he would do something to her or her family.
-4- Several months later, P.O.’s mother kicked her out of the
house, and P.O. began living with Hunt and Kaitlyn. One night
after Hunt sent Kaitlyn out, P.O. was at the house alone with Hunt.
She asked for ibuprofen for a headache, but Hunt gave her Xanax
instead. Hunt covered the living room cameras and raped P.O. She
did not report the incident to the police out of fear. Soon after,
Hunt asked P.O. if she wanted to receive money in exchange for
having sex with others. P.O. originally said no, but she “gave in”
out of both “peer pressure” and fear. She knew that Hunt was
doing the same with Kaitlyn. Hunt took P.O. and Kaitlyn
“wherever” to sell them. P.O. testified that on one occasion, she
was at Polecats with Hunt when he came up behind her and put a
knife to her throat and said that if she ever told anyone, he would
kill her. Much of the prostitution took place at Polecats. P.O.
testified that she was trafficked for about a year and a half.
Eventually P.O. started dating Gabe, and after Hurricane
Michael damaged Hunt and Kaitlyn’s home, Hunt, Kaitlyn, P.O.,
and Gabe evacuated to Biloxi, Mississippi, and stayed there for
about a month and a half. Sometime in the early months of 2019,
the group made their way back to Panama City. When they
-5- returned, Gabe stayed with Hunt, Kaitlyn, and P.O. for a short
period. Almost daily, Hunt made multiple threats to him and P.O.
about how he would “end” them if they told anyone about what was
going on. Gabe had seen Hunt with firearms. Gabe eventually
moved back in with his mother Jenna, his stepfather Danny, and
his sister Lexie. At some point, Gabe’s friends, Brentley and Izac,
who had lost their homes in Hurricane Michael, also began living at
the house. Hunt and Kaitlyn got to know the family during this
period, as they often dropped P.O. off at the house so that she could
spend time with Gabe.
Sometime in mid-February 2019, P.O., Kaitlyn, and Hunt went
to their rented storage unit to retrieve their belongings. At the
storage unit, Hunt and Kaitlyn got into a serious argument, and
they demanded that P.O. choose between them. P.O. decided that
she wanted to live with Gabe and his family, and Hunt did not
object.
Shortly after she moved in with Gabe’s family, P.O.’s
acquaintance informed the Panama City Police Department that she
knew of a “runaway juvenile” who was living with an adult. This
information prompted a Department of Children and Families
-6- investigation. Around the same time, P.O. confided in Gabe’s
mother Jenna about the sex crimes. 2 Up until this point, P.O. had
not confided in anyone else, including Gabe. Corporal Corinne
Clark of the Panama City Police Department met with P.O. at the
home. Though not forthcoming at first, P.O. ultimately signed
criminal complaints against Hunt.
After speaking with P.O., Clark developed a criminal case
against Hunt and applied for an arrest warrant. She learned that
Hunt had an upcoming court date for two unrelated criminal cases.
The plan was to serve Hunt with the warrant for the sex crimes
against P.O. and arrest him at the courthouse. When Hunt’s cases
were called, the assistant state attorney informed the trial judge
that there was a new active arrest warrant against Hunt. Hunt also
learned of the warrant against him at this time. The judge directed
Hunt to wait while the court sorted out the warrant, and then took
a recess because of unrelated noise in the gallery. When Hunt’s
2. The term “sex crimes” refers to Hunt’s alleged sexual battery of P.O. and the prostitution of P.O. and Kaitlyn.
-7- case was recalled for service of the warrant, he was not present in
the courtroom.
That afternoon, Hunt met up with Kaitlyn, and they went to
Atlanta. It was during this trip that Hunt began preparations to
murder P.O. Rather than taking Hunt’s black Ford Explorer, the
couple borrowed a family friend’s Ford Escape. The couple first
stopped in Dothan, Alabama, where they spent the night. There,
Hunt purchased window tint and tinted the Ford Escape. Over the
next two days, Hunt also purchased two untraceable phones, black
sweatpants, and a black hoodie. On the way to Atlanta, Kaitlyn
learned that P.O. had filed criminal charges against Hunt. Hunt
told her twice that he would “do what he ha[d] to do,” and “no
witness, no case.”
Meanwhile, while Hunt and Kaitlyn were in Atlanta, Clark
learned that the police were not successful in arresting Hunt at the
courthouse. The Panama City Police Department immediately
began looking for him at all his known addresses and his
acquaintances’ addresses. They put out a “be on the lookout” for
him. Danny and Jenna requested extra patrols at their home,
which the police were already conducting. Clark was also working
-8- with the Department of Children and Families to get P.O. into a
safer place, but she did not want to leave Gabe.
Then, as detailed above, Hunt returned from Atlanta and went
to P.O.’s home with an accomplice where they forced their way in,
murdered Lexie, and attempted to murder Danny, Brentley, and
Izac. They then fled to Atlanta. The day after the murder, the
United States Marshals Service apprehended Hunt, who was
wearing a woman’s wig and the black hoodie, driving the Ford
Escape toward Panama City.
B. Pretrial Proceedings
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice under section
90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes, of its intent to introduce evidence of
Hunt’s alleged sexual battery and prostitution of P.O. At the
hearing for the notice, the State explained that the evidence was
relevant to establish motive, identity, intent, and premeditation.
Defense counsel objected to the use of the evidence as similar fact
evidence but conceded that it was likely admissible because it was
“inextricably intertwined”3 with the allegation in this case. Defense
3. “[E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably
-9- counsel requested that any evidence deemed admissible be
“sanitized” so that it did not become a feature of the trial and was
not unduly prejudicial to Hunt. The State agreed that the evidence
was likely better classified as “inextricably intertwined” and
explained that it filed the notice “out of an abundance of caution.”
Ultimately, the parties agreed that this evidence was not
Williams 4 rule evidence. The trial court determined that this
evidence instead constituted “dissimilar fact evidence” under
section 90.402, Florida Statutes. The trial court ruled that it would
not allow the evidence to become a feature of the trial and
cautioned the parties against any unnecessary or in-depth
discussion.
Also at this hearing, the trial court heard motions made by the
defense about Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. Hunt had
moved to declare multiple sections of Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme unconstitutional. In part, Hunt alleged that Florida’s
intertwined with the crime charged . . . is admissible under section 90.402 . . . .” Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 1994).
4. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
- 10 - scheme violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The trial court
denied the motions.
Before trial, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill 450 (SB
450), which amended Florida’s death penalty statutes. Ch. 2023-
23, Laws of Fla. (effective Apr. 20, 2023; codified at § 921.141, Fla.
Stat. (2023)). SB 450 removed the requirement for a jury to be
unanimous in recommending a death sentence. See ch. 2023-23,
§ 1, Laws of Fla. Under the new sentencing scheme, a jury must
recommend a sentence of death to the court if at least eight jurors
(i.e., a supermajority) determine a defendant should be sentenced to
death. Id. If fewer than eight jurors make that determination, the
jury’s recommendation must be a life sentence. Id. Prior to trial,
the State moved to utilize the amended version of the statute. Hunt
objected, arguing that allowing a nonunanimous jury
recommendation was both unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida,
577 U.S. 92 (2016), and an ex post facto change of the law.
Following a separate hearing, the trial court rejected those
objections and granted the State’s motion.
- 11 - C. Guilt Phase
The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial. The State
presented the testimony of twenty-nine witnesses, while the defense
presented one witness. The State’s evidence at trial established the
facts as explained above. The defense focused on (1) the
undisputed fact that a second, unidentified man killed Lexie; (2)
attacking Danny and Gabe’s visual and voice identifications; and (3)
highlighting the lack of forensic evidence.
Relevant to the issues on appeal, the defense objected several
times to testimony about the sex crimes. Six of the State’s twenty-
nine witnesses testified about the sex crimes, some more briefly
than others. During P.O.’s testimony, when the State asked her
whether the prostitution took place in the shared hotel room in
Biloxi, defense counsel objected, stating that this testimony was
unnecessary to proving motive. The State responded that the
purpose of P.O.’s testimony about Mississippi was to corroborate
Gabe’s testimony. The trial court stated that it would allow P.O. to
answer the question but requested that the State then move on to
the murder. Also, prior to Kaitlyn’s testimony, defense counsel
objected to any testimony by her that did not relate to the trip to
- 12 - Atlanta and back. The trial court reiterated that her testimony
about the sex crimes was relevant “for the limited purpose of
[Hunt’s] motive and to corroborate the testimony of [P.O.]”
At the preliminary charge conference, the State requested a
transferred intent instruction for the first-degree murder charge.
The defense objected, arguing that the facts did not support the
instruction. The trial court ultimately approved the transferred
intent instruction, and the jury convicted Hunt on all counts.
D. Penalty Phase
The penalty phase began after trial with the same jury. The
State presented victim impact evidence but otherwise relied on
evidence from the trial. Defense counsel intended to call two expert
witnesses as mitigating evidence, but Hunt requested that neither
expert testify. Hunt’s older sister, Wanda, who was his legal
guardian during his teenage years, testified about his childhood
and their “close knit” family. Hunt’s father ran a nightclub and had
eleven children with multiple women. Hunt did not interact much
with his father; the only thing they enjoyed together was fishing.
Wanda testified that the family tried to “make up for what [Hunt]
lost” when his father died during his childhood. She also testified
- 13 - that Hunt did well in school and was raised to know right from
wrong. Wanda explained how after their father died, their mother
worked during the day as a teacher and ran the nightclub at night,
leaving one of Hunt’s older sisters to run the household.
About five years after Hunt’s father’s death, the nightclub and
the family’s home were destroyed in fires on the same night. Three
years after the fires, when Hunt was fourteen years old, his mother
died of stomach cancer. At that time, Hunt went to live with Wanda
and her husband. Wanda testified that her husband ran a
recreation center and was a “strong force” in Hunt’s life. Once he
graduated high school, Hunt joined the United States Army, from
which he eventually received a dishonorable discharge. After Hunt
left the military, he pursued a career in rapping, and Wanda
maintained infrequent contact with him. Hunt’s niece testified
about his community involvement and a rap that he performed on
behalf of a recreation center.
The State sought to prove five aggravators.5 The jury
unanimously found that the State had proven all five aggravating
5. The five aggravators were (1) there was a contemporaneous conviction of attempted first-degree murder; (2) the murder was
- 14 - factors beyond a reasonable doubt, considered the mitigating
circumstances, 6 and weighed them with the aggravators. The jury
then concluded by a vote of 10-2 that Hunt should be sentenced to
death.
The trial judge followed the jury’s recommendation and
sentenced Hunt to death for his first-degree murder conviction.
This direct appeal follows.
committed while engaged or an accomplice in the commission of a burglary; (3) the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or enforcement of laws; (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner with no pretense of moral or legal justification.
6. There was no mitigation presented based on the specific circumstances delineated in section 921.141(7)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes. Rather, Hunt’s mitigation evidence was entirely premised on section 921.141(7)(h), which allows mitigation based on “[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty.” § 921.141(7)(h), Fla. Stat. The trial court found the following factors in Hunt’s background to be mitigation: (1) his family dynamic; (2) his childhood trauma; and (3) his mental health. The trial court afforded Hunt’s childhood trauma some weight and his family dynamic and mental health little weight. In addition to the mitigation discussed in open court, the trial court’s written order considered but afforded no weight to the following mitigating evidence: Hunt’s childhood and adult achievements; his military career, including numerous commendations and other recognition; his physical health; his conduct while awaiting trial; and his potential for rehabilitation.
- 15 - II.
A. Guilt Phase
On appeal, Hunt raises two issues related to the guilt phase of
his trial.
1.
First, Hunt argues that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence that P.O. and Kaitlyn were prostituted as “inextricably
intertwined” with the charged acts. Hunt concedes that the
evidence was relevant but argues that it exceeded the scope of what
was necessary to provide an adequate description of the charged
offenses. The nature of the evidence, he argues, ensured that it
would be a feature of the trial. We review this claim for abuse of
discretion. Kirkman v. State, 233 So. 3d 456, 467 (Fla. 2018) (citing
McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786 (Fla. 2010)).
We have long held that evidence of “inextricably intertwined
acts” is relevant and admissible at trial. Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d
966, 968 (Fla. 1994). Collateral crimes evidence is “inextricably
intertwined” if it is “necessary to (1) adequately describe the deed;
(2) provide an intelligent account of the crime(s) charged; (3)
establish the entire context out of which the charged crime(s) arose;
- 16 - or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the charged
crime(s).” Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912, 918 (Fla. 2011) (citing
Dorsett v. State, 944 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). Even when
evidence is inextricably intertwined, it cannot become a feature of
the trial. Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 293 (Fla. 2009) (citing
Morrow v. State, 931 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)); see
also Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988). Relevant
evidence of collateral crimes becomes a feature of the trial when it
“ ‘transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried’
and the prosecution ‘devolves from development of facts pertinent to
the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the
character of the defendant.’ ” Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 146, 155
(Fla. 2009) (alternation in original) (quoting Conde v. State, 860 So.
2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003)).
Our evaluation of whether the trial court abused its discretion
is a case-specific one. See Pitts v. State, 263 So. 3d 834, 840-41
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (explaining that whether evidence becomes a
feature of the trial is a fact-dependent determination, made on a
case-by-case basis). In doing so, we have considered factors such
as the number of references made to the evidence, whether the
- 17 - evidence was a focus of the State’s closing argument, and how the
jury was instructed on the collateral crimes evidence. Id. (first
citing Wright, 19 So. 3d at 293-94; and then citing Peterson, 2 So.
3d at 156).
Based on a complete review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s admission of evidence. The trial court
was vigilant in ensuring that the collateral crimes evidence did not
become a feature of the trial. Only six of the State’s twenty-nine
witnesses testified about the sex crimes. Most of those witnesses
only mentioned the crimes as they related to the criminal
investigation. P.O. and Kaitlyn both testified that they were
prostituted but did not dwell on the topic. During closing
argument, the State only briefly mentioned that P.O. “hid behind
the door . . . because she was worried [that] she was going to be
raped and killed by men that were there for her.” The State did not
mention the sexual battery or prostitution. Throughout trial, the
trial court continuously limited the scope of the evidence to ensure
that it only served its necessary purpose.
Overall, the record supports a conclusion that the State
referenced the collateral crimes for the purposes of (1) establishing
- 18 - that Hunt was criminally charged and there were pending arrest
warrants when the murder took place and (2) establishing Hunt’s
identity, motive, intent, and premeditation to murder P.O., resulting
in Lexie’s death and the attempted murder of three others. See
Wright, 19 So. 3d at 292 (concluding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a separate burglary
because it “(1) linked [the defendant] to one of the murder weapons
and explained his possession of this weapon; (2) provided a
geographical nexus for each event; and (3) established the context
of [the defendant’s] three-day crime spree”). Although the State
mentioned these crimes during trial to establish the necessary
context for the murders, the State was limited to introducing
relevant evidence that did not transcend the bounds of the charges
being tried. See Cannon v. State, 51 So. 3d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2011) (holding that evidence of a collateral crime became a
feature of the trial when it was discussed for approximately half of
the opening and closing statements, two-thirds of the witnesses
testified about it, and video of the crime was shown to the jury
twice); Ballard, 66 So. 3d at 918 (explaining that collateral crimes
evidence is “inextricably intertwined” and therefore relevant when it
- 19 - establishes context for the charged crimes). P.O. and Kaitlyn’s
testimony, for instance, provided context for the jury to understand
Hunt’s motive for wanting to murder P.O. The sex crimes evidence
here appropriately “paint[ed] an accurate picture of the events
surrounding the crimes charged” and provided context for the
criminal conduct. Campbell v. State, 271 So. 3d 914, 932 (Fla.
2018) (quoting Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 945 (Fla. 2017));
see also Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 753 (Fla. 1996). Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not allow the evidence to become a
feature of the trial and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
2.
Next, Hunt argues that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. Hunt argues that the
trial court erred because the doctrine of transferred intent typically
applies when a defendant shoots at his intended target, but instead
misses and kills someone else. Hunt posits that because his
accomplice shot his intended target, but was mistaken about the
identity of the victim, a transferred intent instruction does not
apply. We review this issue for abuse of discretion. Armstrong v.
- 20 - State, 73 So. 3d 155, 173 (Fla. 2011) (citing Green v. State, 907 So.
2d 489, 498 (Fla. 2005); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.410).
We disagree with Hunt because his view of when a transferred
intent instruction applies is too narrow. To be sure, we have said
that “[t]he usual case involving the doctrine of transferred intent is
when a defendant aims and shoots at A intending to kill him but
instead misses and kills B.” Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177,
1180 (Fla. 1986) (citing Pressley v. State, 395 So. 2d 1175, 1177
(Fla. 3d DCA 1981)). But we have also noted that transferred intent
is not limited to this specific factual scenario. Id. at 1180-81; see
also Coston v. State, 190 So. 520, 522 (Fla. 1939). In addition, we
have long held that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to
cases where a person is killed through “mistaken identity or
accident.” Lee v. State, 141 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1962) (citing Hall
v. State, 69 So. 692, 693 (Fla. 1915); Pinder v. State, 8 So. 837, 841
(Fla. 1891); McCray v. State, 102 So. 2d 831, 831 (Fla. 1925)).
Here, the evidence at trial showed that Hunt and his
accomplice went to the house with the intent to kill P.O. Although
Hunt’s “intricate design to effectuate death went awry” and P.O.
survived, his accomplice still murdered Lexie. Provenzano, 497 So.
- 21 - 2d at 1181. In fact, the State’s evidence showed that Hunt’s
accomplice thought that he was shooting P.O. because of Lexie’s red
hair. See id. at 1180 (holding that even though Provenzano knew
that he was shooting the bailiffs instead of his intended victims,
transferred intent was still an appropriate instruction). Because
the factual scenario here supports the doctrine of transferred
intent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
instruction. Lee, 141 So. 2d at 259; see also Yates v. Evatt, 500
U.S. 391, 409 (1991); Coston, 190 So. at 522 (“The law, as well as
reason, prevents plaintiff in error from taking advantage of his own
wrong doing, or excusing himself when this unlawful act, if
committed by plaintiff in error, strikes down an unintended
victim.”). 7
B. Penalty Phase
Hunt next raises several constitutional claims related to the
penalty phase and his death sentence, which are arguments we
7. We also reject Hunt’s argument that the transferred intent instruction had the potential to confuse the jury about whose intent was transferred and how, because of the concurrent instruction on the law of principals and the fact that Hunt denied any involvement in the murder.
- 22 - review de novo. Jackson v. State, 191 So. 3d 423, 426 (Fla. 2016)
(citing Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 747 (Fla. 2010)).
First, Hunt argues that the trial court denied Hunt due
process of law by failing to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify the death
penalty. Hunt acknowledges his argument is foreclosed by
precedent. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 505 (Fla. 2020)
(reiterating that our prior holding requiring the reasonable doubt
standard “was based on a mistaken view”); McKenzie v. State, 333
So. 3d 1098, 1105 (Fla. 2022) (declining to revisit the issue); Orme
v. State, 361 So. 3d 842, 845-46 (Fla. 2023) (same). Even so, he
raises it now to preserve the issue for federal review. However, he
does not offer a substantive reason for us to retreat from our
precedent. We therefore decline to revisit this issue. See Bevel v.
State, 376 So. 3d 587, 597 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting the same claim
when it was raised solely to preserve for federal review); Wells v.
State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1014 (Fla. 2023) (rejecting this claim when
the defendant provided “no substantial reason” for us to revisit our
prior holdings).
- 23 - 2.
Next, Hunt asserts that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is
constitutionally deficient for several reasons. We focus our analysis
on just one of his arguments. 8 Specifically, Hunt argues that
although we have previously determined that the Sixth Amendment
does not require a unanimous jury to recommend a death sentence,
see Poole, 297 So. 3d at 504, we should reevaluate our precedent in
light of the United States Supreme Court holding in Ramos v.
Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020). In Ramos, the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional right to a jury requires a unanimous verdict
as to all “essential elements” of a crime. Id. at 92.
8. Hunt makes two other arguments. First, he argues that by eliminating proportionality review, this Court has removed a necessary safeguard against arbitrary and inconsistent sentencing. Second, he argues that Florida has significantly expanded the number of offenses eligible for a death sentence since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the scheme no longer serves the constitutional mandate of narrowing the class of people subject to a death sentence. This Court has repeatedly considered and rejected these arguments. See Loyd v. State, 379 So. 3d 1080, 1097-98 (Fla. 2023) (“[W]e have ‘repeatedly rejected the argument that the death- penalty statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.’ [Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015.] Eliminating proportionality review did not change that analysis.” (citing Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1015)). We do so again here.
- 24 - We reject Hunt’s argument. The holding in Ramos does not
apply to a jury’s recommendation of death in a capital case because
a jury’s recommendation is not equivalent to a verdict. Poole, 297
So. 3d at 504. Instead, it is a capital jury’s finding of an
aggravating factor that is equivalent to a verdict. Id. at 503. It is
that finding that must be found by the jury. McKinney v. Arizona,
589 U.S. 139, 145 (2020). And as amended, Florida’s capital
sentencing scheme requires aggravating factors to be found by a
unanimous jury. See § 921.141(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat.
As for Hunt’s claim that eliminating the unanimous jury
recommendation violates the Eighth Amendment, it also fails. For a
capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, there
must be an aggravating circumstance to narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 877 (1983). In imposing a death sentence, the trial court must
be permitted to consider the defendant’s individual circumstances,
background, and crime. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460
(1984) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978)). There
must also be safeguards in place to ensure that there are no “wholly
arbitrary, capricious, or freakish sentences.” Pulley v. Harris, 465
- 25 - U.S. 37, 45 (1984). We hold that Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme meets those requirements and does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 9
Together, Florida’s death penalty provisions 10 establish the
constitutionally required safeguards to ensure that there are no
9. To the extent that Hunt contends that Ramos supports this argument, that case involved the Sixth Amendment right-to-a-jury- trial provision and did not invoke the Eighth Amendment. 590 U.S. at 88-89.
10. Unless the defendant has waived his or her right to such, there must be a full-length penalty phase hearing before a death sentence may be imposed. § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.780. The jury must then deliberate and determine if the State has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of an aggravating factor. § 921.141(2)(a), Fla. Stat. The jury must then “return findings identifying each aggravating factor found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b), Fla. Stat. “A finding that an aggravating factor exists must be unanimous.” Id. For a defendant to be eligible for a sentence of death, the jury must unanimously find at least one aggravating factor. § 921.141(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. If it makes such a finding, the jury must make a recommendation to the court as to whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or to death. § 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. In making that recommendation, the jury must weigh “[w]hether sufficient aggravating factors exist” and “[w]hether aggravating factors exist which outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.” § 921.141(2)(b)2.a.-b., Fla. Stat. Section 921.141 establishes the relevant aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. § 921.141(6), (7), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.202. Based on those considerations, the jury recommends to the court “whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or
- 26 - “arbitrary, capricious, or freakish” death sentences. See Pulley, 465
U.S. at 45 (holding that a capital sentencing scheme with
“bifurcated proceedings, [a] limited number of capital crimes, [a]
requirement that at least one aggravating circumstance be present,
and the consideration of mitigating circumstances minimized the
risk of wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish sentences”);
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 466 (holding that Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme, which contained many of the same provisions it still has
to death. § 921.141(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. “If at least eight jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court must be a sentence of death.” § 921.141(2)(c), Fla. Stat. And “[i]f fewer than eight jurors determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the jury’s recommendation to the court must be a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. If the jury opts for a life sentence, the court is bound by that recommendation and cannot impose death. § 921.141(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. But if the jury recommends death, the court must consider “each aggravating factor found by the jury and all mitigating circumstances” and may then either impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or a sentence of death. § 921.141(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The trial court “may consider only an aggravating factor that was unanimously found to exist by the jury.” § 921.141(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. The trial court must also enter a written order in support of the imposed sentence. § 921.141(4), Fla. Stat. Finally, judgments of conviction and sentences of death are subject to automatic review by this Court. § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat.; see also art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
- 27 - today, did not violate the Eighth Amendment). Thus, there is no
support for the argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a
unanimous jury recommendation.
3.
Finally, Hunt argues that application of section 921.141 as
amended in 2023 violates the ex post facto clauses of the United
States and Florida Constitutions because it increases the criminal
punishment Hunt is exposed to by making it more likely the death
penalty will be imposed. For several reasons, we disagree.
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits
a state from passing any ex post facto law. Art. I, § 9, U.S. Const. 11
To be ex post facto, a law must either alter the definition of criminal
conduct or increase the criminal punishment. Victorino v. State,
241 So. 3d 48, 50 (Fla. 2018) (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,
441 (1997)); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (defining
11. The Florida Constitution also contains a prohibition on ex post facto laws. Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”). Although Hunt cites both provisions, he does not make a distinct argument related to the state constitution and instead primarily relies on federal precedent.
- 28 - an ex post facto law). Additionally, the statute in question must
apply to events that occurred before its enactment and
disadvantage the affected defendant. Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (statutes must disadvantage the affected
defendant (citing Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-92)); Victorino, 241 So. 3d at
50 (statute must be retrospective (citing Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441)).
Importantly, however, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not give the
defendant the “right to be tried . . . by the law in force when the
crime charged was committed.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
293 (1977) (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590
(1896)).
Hunt argues that the amended statute violates the ex post
facto clauses because by decreasing unanimity requirements for
penalty phase juries, the chance that the death penalty will be
imposed increases. The State, on the other hand, argues that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbert demonstrates
Hunt’s argument is without merit. We agree with the State.
In Dobbert, a defendant was convicted of murdering his two
children and was sentenced to death. Id. at 284-85, 287. At the
time of the murders, state law provided that a defendant convicted
- 29 - of a capital felony was to receive a death sentence unless a majority
of the jury recommended life. Id. at 288. Later that year, based on
the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Florida Legislature amended its death
penalty statute. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288-92. The changes
included new requirements for a full penalty phase hearing, an
advisory death recommendation by a majority of the jury, the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and an
automatic review by this Court. Id. at 290-92. Because his penalty
phase occurred after these changes, Dobbert was sentenced to
death under the parameters of the amended statute. Id. at 287.
Dobbert argued that sentencing him under Florida’s amended
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 292. But the
Court concluded that these changes merely altered the methods
used to determine the applicability of a death sentence rather than
the “quantum of punishment” attached to the crime. Id. at 293-94.
Therefore, the Court held, these changes were “clearly procedural”
and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
We agree with the State that Dobbert guides our analysis here.
As Judge Nardella explained in State v. Lobato, 394 So. 3d 1219,
- 30 - 1224 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024), applying the United States Supreme
Court’s analytical framework in Dobbert to the amended statute
compels the conclusion that the amended statute too contains
merely procedural changes that do not alter the quantum of
punishment. As a result, the statute does not violate Ex Post Facto
Clause protections. See id.
Hunt argues that any procedure versus substance distinction
that Dobbert established has since been undermined by the Collins
decision, when the United States Supreme Court admonished that
“by simply labeling a law ‘procedural,’ a legislature does not thereby
immunize it from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Collins,
497 U.S. at 46 (citing Gibson, 162 U.S. at 590). Hunt further
argues that as a result of Collins, the only remaining aspect of
Dobbert’s rationale is that the statute at issue in Dobbert was not an
ex post facto law because it was ameliorative.
However, as Judge Nardella also explained in Lobato, Collins
does not undermine our conclusion. See Lobato, 394 So. 3d at
1224-25. Collins overruled portions of Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343 (1898). In Thompson, the defendant committed a capital crime
when state law guaranteed him a jury of twelve people. Id. at 344.
- 31 - By the time of his trial, the legislature had modified the law to only
require a jury of eight people for conviction. Id. at 344-45. The
Court held in Thompson that this change in law violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Id. at 352-53. But the Court overruled that holding
in Collins, reasoning that the right to a jury trial is based on the
Sixth Amendment and has nothing “to do with the definition of
crimes, defenses, or punishments, which is the concern of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.” 497 U.S. at 51. In other words, the Court held
that even reducing the number of jurors needed to convict a
defendant does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. Thus, as
Judge Nardella put it, “surely reducing the number of votes needed
to provide a ‘recommendation’ of death also fails.” Lobato, 394 So.
3d at 1225.
Finally, Hunt argues that even considering Dobbert, Peugh v.
United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013), which applied a risk analysis,
should control our analysis. In Peugh, the United States Supreme
Court explained that to determine whether there is an ex post facto
violation, the relevant inquiry is “whether a given change in law
presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment
attached to the covered crimes.’ ” 569 U.S. at 539 (quoting Garner
- 32 - v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)); see also Miller v. Florida, 482
U.S. 423, 424-25 (1987) (addressing an ex post facto claim
pertaining to sentencing guideline changes in Florida). The Court
applied that test to a claim related to changes in federal sentencing
guidelines and parole. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533-34.
Hunt argues that eliminating the unanimity requirement
makes it more likely that a death sentence will be imposed, thereby
violating the Ex Post Facto Clause under Peugh. But we are again
persuaded by the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s reasoning on this
issue. See Lobato, 394 So. 3d at 1225-26. The Sixth District
explained that in Peugh, the “detrimental change in the guidelines
virtually guarantee[d] an increase in the measure of punishment
the defendant [would] face.” Id. at 1226. The change to the statute
here does not have a similar guarantee. Id. As the Sixth District
explained, the legislature maintained the “essential framework” of
the three-phase death penalty scheme in requiring a supermajority
to offer a recommended sentence. Id. at 1227. It remains that a
unanimous jury must find a statutory aggravating factor for a
defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. Id. (citing Poole, 297
So. 3d at 503). Further, even if a jury recommends death, the trial
- 33 - judge may opt for a life sentence. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 435
(finding an ex post facto violation where the judge did not have the
discretion to opt for a more lenient sentence). These changes did
not alter or increase the punishment. Lobato, 394 So. 3d at 1227
(citing Peugh, 569 U.S. at 530-31). The penalty remains death
regardless of how many jurors are required to make the
recommendation. See id. (“The two procedural changes . . . concern
the question of mercy, which works only to abrogate, not to
augment the punishment which can be imposed.”).12
Overall, we apply the well-settled test and conclude that the
recent changes to the death penalty scheme do not alter the
definition of criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which the
crime of first-degree murder is punishable. Victorino, 241 So. 3d at
50 (citing Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441). Thus, the statute does not
constitute an ex post facto law.
12. Hunt also argues that this law violates ex post facto because unlike the statute in Dobbert, the change here was not “ameliorative.” But the Supreme Court has been clear that a procedural change need not be “ameliorative” to not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292 n.6 (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)).
- 34 - III.
Finally, we turn to our independent obligation to review the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Colley v. State, 310 So. 3d 2, 19
(Fla. 2020) (“[E]ven where the defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court has a mandatory obligation in
death penalty cases to determine whether competent, substantial
evidence supports a murder conviction.” (citing Kirkman, 233 So. 3d
at 469; Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5))). “In conducting this review, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla.
2006) (citing Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).
Hunt was convicted based on theories of both premeditated and
felony murder. His conviction can be upheld if the evidence is
sufficient to support either theory. Colley, 310 So. 3d at 19 (citing
Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019)).
We conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports
Hunt’s first-degree murder conviction. The evidence at trial showed
that Hunt was set to be arrested for the human trafficking and
- 35 - sexual battery of P.O. Upon learning of his pending arrest warrant
at a separate court hearing, Hunt defied the trial judge’s instruction
to remain at the courthouse and fled to another state with Kaitlyn.
Tracking on Hunt’s primary cellphone, as well as license plate
readers, confirmed this trip. There, he formed the premeditated
intent and plan to kill P.O. He borrowed an unrecognizable vehicle
and tinted the vehicle’s windows. He purchased two nontraceable
phones, black sweatpants, and a black hoodie. During the trip,
Hunt told Kaitlyn about the criminal charges against him and that
he would “do what he had to do” and “no witness, no case.” Once
Hunt made his preparations, he returned to Panama City, where he
was observed in the vehicle on business security camera recordings
near the victim’s home immediately before the murder.
Hunt then forcibly entered the victim’s home, using a pizza
delivery ruse, with an accomplice. Danny, the victim’s stepfather,
identified Hunt visually and through his “very distinctive” voice.
After he was shot, Danny informed both police and his neighbor
that Hunt was the perpetrator. Gabe, who was hiding during the
murder, also identified Hunt’s voice. Although there was no DNA or
latent fingerprint evidence linking Hunt to the scene, a spent casing
- 36 - from a .380 caliber pistol was recovered from the home’s living
room. Hunt owned this type of weapon. A .380 caliber semi-
automatic was later found in a neighbor’s bushes, and the
recovered casing was matched to that weapon. When law
enforcement apprehended Hunt, he was driving the vehicle and
wearing the same black sweatshirt purchased with Kaitlyn and
observed on the night of the murder. He also attempted to disguise
his identity by wearing a woman’s wig.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is
competent, substantial evidence to support Hunt’s first-degree
murder conviction.
IV.
We affirm Hunt’s first-degree murder conviction and death
sentence, as well as his convictions for attempted murder and
armed burglary of a dwelling.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
- 37 - LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
Today’s decisions in Hunt v. State, No. SC2024-0096 (Fla.
Dec. 18, 2025), and Jackson v. State, No. SC2023-1298 (Fla.
Dec. 18, 2025), reject various challenges to the 2023 statutory
amendment that requires only eight members of a twelve-person
capital jury to vote to recommend the death penalty. I concur in
the result to the extent that these decisions are consistent with
what this Court has held since State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla.
2020).
However, as I explain in my concurring in result opinion in
Jackson, the statutory amendment requiring only an 8-4 jury vote
to recommend that a defendant be sentenced to death renders
Florida’s requirement the least demanding nationally and
establishes Florida as the state with the least rigorous requirement
among states that impose the death penalty.
I believe that the use of the death penalty in Florida and the
integrity of the process benefit from safeguards such as the
requirement of jury unanimity, and I believe that such safeguards
are constitutionally permissible. I also continue to adhere to the
views expressed in my dissent in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544
- 38 - (Fla. 2020) (receding from the decades-long practice of conducting
proportionality review in direct appeals of sentences of death).
For these reasons, I can only concur in the result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County, Shonna Young Gay, Judge Case No. 032019CF002281XXAXMX
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 39 -