[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _____________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-12717 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _____________ JANUARY 9, 2013 JOHN LEY D.C. Docket No. 05-00369-CV-RH CLERK
MICHAEL DUANE ZACK, III,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. TUCKER, PAM BONDI,
Respondents-Appellees.
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ______________ (January 9, 2013)
Before: DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON, PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
DUBINA, Chief Judge: Petitioner Michael Duane Zack’s appeal from the district court’s order
denying him federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 presents this court
with the opportunity to revisit our precedent in Walker v. Crosby, 341 F.3d 1240
(11th Cir. 2003), and the rule it established with regard to the limitations period set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We now overrule Walker to the extent it holds
that § 2244(d)(1) provides a single statute of limitations that applies to the habeas
corpus application as a whole and that individual claims within an application
cannot be reviewed separately for timeliness. We conclude, based on the text and
structure of the statute, Supreme Court precedent, decisions of our sister circuits,
and Congressional intent, that the federal statute of limitations requires a claim-by-
claim approach to determine timeliness. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order denying Zack federal habeas relief.
I. BACKGROUND
A Florida jury convicted Zack of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and
robbery. After the sentencing phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death,
and the trial court imposed a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
Zack’s conviction and death sentence on direct review. Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9
(Fla. 2000). On October 2, 2000, Zack’s convictions and sentence became final
when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
2 Zack v. Florida, 531 U.S. 858, 121 S. Ct. 143 (2000). More than one year passed
before Zack filed post-conviction motions in state court. On December 26, 2001,
Zack filed his first state collateral motion, asking for an extension of time for filing
a motion for collateral review under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
The trial court granted the motion and extended the deadline to May 2002, when
Zack filed a Rule 3.850 motion raising numerous issues.
While Zack’s collateral motion was pending in state court, the United States
Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002)
(holding that the execution of a mentally retarded person is cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Shortly thereafter, Zack
amended his Rule 3.850 motion to include a claim based on Atkins. In June 2003,
the trial court denied Zack’s Rule 3.850 motion, and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed this ruling on appeal. Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2005).
Zack then proceeded to federal court, filing a federal habeas petition that
raised multiple claims for relief, including a claim under Atkins. The district court
dismissed all of Zack’s non-Atkins claims as untimely and denied the Atkins claim
on the merits. Zack filed a motion for a certificate of appealability, and the district
court granted it as to whether Zack’s non-Atkins claims were timely under the
habeas statute of limitations. A panel of this Court vacated and remanded the case.
3 Zack v. Tucker, 666 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2012). The panel stated that our prior
panel precedent in Walker requires courts to evaluate the timeliness of federal
habeas applications as a whole, and that limitations period begins to run from the
latest of the triggering events established in § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D). Id. at 1268. The
panel held that Zack’s timely assertion of his Atkins claim made timely all the
other claims asserted in his petition. Id. at 1269. We vacated the panel opinion
and reheard the case en banc. Zack v. Tucker, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012).
II. ISSUE
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides a single statute of limitations that
applies to the application as a whole or whether the timeliness of claims must be
evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Statute
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No.
104‒132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), sets forth a limitations period for state prisoners
filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.1 This statute of limitations “quite plainly serves
the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments.” Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2128 (2001); see also Jones v. United
1 AEDPA also establishes a one-year limitation period for federal prisoners in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). 4 States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the fixed time limit was
designed to further AEDPA’s “signal purpose” of bringing greater “finality [to]
criminal cases”). According to the statute, a one-year period of limitations applies
“to an application for a writ of habeas corpus,” and it runs “from the latest of”:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)‒(D).
Relying on the plain language of the statute, Zack argues that his habeas
petition was timely, under § 2244(d)(1)(C), because he filed it within one year after
the Supreme Court decided Atkins. Zack contends that this was the latest of the
four possible dates under the statute, and it marked the start of the one-year period
that applied to his application. Relying heavily on this court’s holding in Walker
that the one-year limitation period applies to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 5 as a whole, not to the separate claims in the petition, Zack contends that his
application as a whole was timely, and the district court erred in dismissing his
non-Atkins claims as untimely.
The State also relies on the plain language of the statute, contending that
there is no ambiguity and the district court properly dismissed Zack’s untimely
claims—the non-Atkins claims. The State urges this court to view the entire
statutory context, not look at one word or term in isolation. See Harrison v.
Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). It contends that this court, like the Supreme Court in Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 415‒16, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2005), should analyze
the statute in a subsection by subsection manner rather than analyzing only the
word “application” in subsection (d)(1). When carefully considering each
subsection, the State asserts that the clear textual indication is that Congress meant
for courts to determine timeliness based on a claim-by-claim basis. For example,
subsection (C)’s reference to “the constitutional right” is clearly a reference to a
singular right, § 2244(d)(1)(C) (emphasis added), and subsection (D)’s reference to
“claim or claims” indicates that Congress meant for courts to determine timeliness
on a claim-by-claim basis, id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Furthermore, the State argues that
the phrase “from the latest of” is the introduction to four separate time periods.
6 See id. § 2241(d)(1). The State contends that the statute provides for one time
limitation for the judgment as a whole, and has three exceptions to that time
period, each of which also has a time limitation. The State asserts that these “time
limitations within time limitations” address the realities of habeas litigation, such
as the effect that newly found evidence and rights newly recognized by the
Supreme Court have on a habeas petitioner’s quest for relief.
Alternatively, assuming that this court perceives ambiguity in the statute, the
State posits that this court should interpret the statute based on practice and policy
within the civil realm, of which habeas corpus is a remedy. The normal practice in
the civil litigation arena is for courts to apply statutes of limitations on a claim-by-
claim basis, and the policy promoted by Congress with the passage of AEDPA was
finality in criminal cases. See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th
Cir. 2011) (observing that “Congress’s overriding purpose in enacting AEDPA . . .
[was] to achieve finality in criminal cases, both federal and state” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The State contends that, in light of the stated purpose
behind AEDPA and the ordinary application of statutes of limitation, the Walker
interpretation that the statute of limitations should be applied to the application as a
whole cannot be correct. This interpretation would create a “loophole” in habeas
jurisprudence “which is contrary to the legislative intent of insuring a greater
7 degree of finality” in criminal cases. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the State proffers that such an interpretation would not comport with the
practicalities of habeas litigation. Hence, the State urges this court to adopt a
claim-by-claim approach for timeliness determinations in habeas litigation and to
affirm the district court’s order dismissing Zack’s untimely claims in his habeas
petition.
B. Walker v. Crosby
As stated previously, Zack posits that his petition is timely under our Walker
interpretation of the habeas statute of limitations. In Walker, the petitioner
received a new sentence during state post-conviction proceedings and, after
exhausting state remedies, filed a federal petition challenging aspects of both his
original conviction and his new sentence. Walker, 341 F.3d at 1241‒42. The court
framed the question as “whether individual claims within a single habeas petition
may be reviewed separately for timeliness.” Id. at 1241. The court began its
analysis by looking to the words of the statutory provision and noted that the
statute “provides a single statute of limitations, with a single filing date, to be
applied to the application as a whole.” Id. at 1243. The court then considered
language in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000), to draw a
distinction between the word “application” in § 2244(d)(1) and the word “claims”
8 as used in the statute. Id. The court reasoned that, because the statute directs
courts to look at whether an “application” is timely, not whether the individual
“claims” within the application are timely, “[t]he statute of limitations in §
2244(d)(1) applies to the application as a whole; individual claims within an
application cannot be reviewed separately for timeliness.” Id. at 1244‒45.
The Walker court stated a broader rule than was necessary to decide that
appeal. The petitioner in Walker filed a habeas petition that included a claim
challenging his new sentence, which was timely, and other claims challenging his
original conviction that, when viewed in insolation, were not timely. Id. at 1241–
42. The narrow legal question presented in Walker involved the meaning of the
word “judgment” in subsection 2244(d)(1)(A), and whether the timely assertion of
the challenge to the new sentence revived the claims as to the original conviction.
All the Walker panel had to do was construe whether the petitioner’s limitations
period under that subsection began anew when his corrected sentence became
final. In Ferreira v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 494 F.3d 1286, 1293
(11th Cir. 2007), we decided that narrower question and held that the statute of
limitations under subsection 2244(d)(1)(A) “begins to run from the date both the
conviction and the sentence the petitioner is serving at the time he files his
application become final because judgment is based on both the conviction and the
9 sentence.” In the light of Ferreira, the Walker court reached the right result for the
wrong reason. In Walker, the challenges to both the original conviction and the
new sentence were timely because the limitations period on both sets of claims
presented ran from the date that both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner
was serving became final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
C. Grounds for Overruling Walker
In the light of the text and structure of the statute, Supreme Court case law,
other circuits’ interpretations, and Congress’s intent in enacting AEDPA, we
conclude that the Walker interpretation is incorrect. The present case is a perfect
example of why the Walker rule is not viable. By raising one meritless claim of
mental retardation based on a constitutional right newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,
Zack attempts to resurrect eight other untimely claims. Following the Walker
interpretation and allowing such an interpretation negates the purpose of the habeas
statute of limitations by increasing delays in criminal cases, which, in turn,
impedes the state’s interest in the finality of state court judgments. This result is
contrary to Congress’s purpose in enacting AEDPA. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 179,
121 S. Ct. at 2128; see also Day v. Crosby, 391 F.3d 1192, 1194 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“Congress enacted the AEDPA statute of limitations as the principal tool to serve
10 the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments.” (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted)). We cannot let stand a rule that
undermines “the finality of criminal convictions” and gives “slim significance” to
the limitation period enacted by Congress. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662, 125
S. Ct. 2562, 2573‒74 (2005).
1. Text of the Statute
The text and structure of the statute suggest that the statute of limitations of
§ 2244(d)(1) should be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. The only way to make
sense of the statutory scheme is to read the statute as applying on a claim-by-claim
basis. The Walker interpretation of § 2244(d)(1) reads the statute in such a way that
under certain circumstances it will be impossible for courts to identify the
applicable statute of limitations.
Consider a circumstance where an applicant presents a petition for relief that
seeks review under two separate constitutional rights newly recognized by two
separate Supreme Court decisions. The statute provides that the one-year
limitations period begins to run “from the latest of” four possible dates identified in
subsections (A) through (D). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Subsection (C) — the
subsection at issue in this case —provides that the statute of limitations on an
application for habeas relief runs from “the date on which the constitutional right
11 asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C). The
Walker interpretation states that a single statute of limitations applies to the
application as a whole, but it does not tell a court how to identify the relevant date
from which the statute of limitations begins to run. Does the one-year statute of
limitations run from the date of the earlier Supreme Court decision, or the later
one? Nothing in the text of subsection (C) resolves that question.
The Walker interpretation suggests that the limitations period runs from the
date of the later Supreme Court decision, but this result is not what the statute
provides. As the Third Circuit has explained, the reference to “the latest” date in
the statute “tells a court how to choose from among the four dates specified in
subsection (A) through (D) once those dates are identified,” but the statute does
not tell a court how to identify the date specified in subsection (C) in an application
that contains multiple claims based on multiple newly discovered constitutional
rights. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2004). “It would be just as
consistent with the statutory language to pick the earliest date” on which a new
constitutional right was recognized. Id. Under the Walker reading, subsection (C)
does not even contemplate a scenario in which multiple new constitutional rights
may be asserted in the same application.
12 But if § 2244(d)(1) applies on a claim-by-claim basis, none of these
problems exists. The statute of limitations on each claim runs from the date of each
relevant Supreme Court decision. For this reason, the text and structure of the
statute suggests that timeliness must be evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.
2. Supreme Court Cases
The first case that casts doubt on the Walker rule is Pace v. DiGuglielmo, in
which the Supreme Court considered whether a state application for collateral
review was “properly filed” under § 2244(d)(2) so as to toll the federal one-year
statute of limitations. 544 U.S. at 410, 125 S. Ct. at 1810. Under the law of
Pennsylvania, where the petitioner filed his application, courts determined
timeliness on a claim-by-claim basis, instead of the application as a whole. See id.
at 411‒12, 125 S. Ct. at 1810‒11. The Pace petitioner argued that because §
2244(d)(2) refers to a “properly filed application,” any condition that must be
applied on a claim-by-claim basis, like a time limitation, cannot be a condition of
filing. Id. at 415‒16, 125 S. Ct. at 1813. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s
argument and cited several provisions in AEDPA where a reference to an
“application” nevertheless requires a claim-by-claim analysis. Id. at 415‒16, 125
S. Ct. at 1813. The Supreme Court explained that subsection 2244(d)(1)(C), the
provision at issue in the present case, is one example that “require[s] claim-by-
13 claim consideration.” Id. at 416 n.6, 125 S. Ct. at 1813 n.6. Noting that §
2244(d)(1) provides for a one-year limitation period for a habeas corpus
application, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he subsection then provides one
means of calculating the limitation with regard to the ‘application’ as a whole, §
2244(d)(1)(A) (date of final judgment), but three others that require claim-by-claim
consideration, § 2244(d)(1)(B) (governmental interference); § 2244(d)(1)(C) (new
right made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D) (new factual predicate).” Id. Although
this language was not the Court’s holding, but rather was dicta, we note that “dicta
from the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Peterson v.
BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997).
Mayle v. Felix also casts doubt on our ruling in Walker. In Mayle, the Ninth
Circuit had permitted the petitioner, who had timely filed a habeas petition, to later
amend his petition under Rule 15(c)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
include claims that would have otherwise been untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A).
545 U.S. at 653, 125 S. Ct. at 2568. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision undermined the purpose of Congress in enacting “AEDPA
to advance the finality of criminal convictions.” Id. at 662, 125 S. Ct. at 2573.
The Court acknowledged “Congress’[s] decision to expedite collateral attacks by
placing stringent time restrictions on them.” Id. at 657, 125 S. Ct. at 2570 (internal
14 quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Court reasoned that “[i]f claims
asserted after the one-year period could be revived simply because they relate to
the same trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA’s limitation
period would have slim significance.” Id. at 662, 125 S. Ct. at 2573‒74. Because
Congress enacted the limitations period in AEDPA “as the principal tool to serve
the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments,” Day, 391 F.3d
at 1194 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted), Mayle intimates that
courts should construe § 2244(d) narrowly.
3. Other Circuit Decisions
Several of our sister circuits have rejected the Walker interpretation. See
Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2012); Mardesich v. Cate, 668
F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 654 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011); Bachman v. Bagley, 487 F.3d 979
(6th Cir. 2007); Fielder, 379 F.3d 113. In fact, no circuit has agreed with our
reasoning in Walker or adopted the rule we established in that case.
The Fielder opinion, authored by then-Judge Alito, criticized our Walker
rule, noting that it “fails on its own terms,” and held that the statute of limitations
in § 2244(d)(1) requires a claim-by-claim approach to determine timeliness. 379
F.3d at 118. The Third Circuit noted that our court “actually disregard[ed]” the
15 language contained in § 2244(d)(1)(D), which refers to “the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 117 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(D)). The court stated although the Walker interpretation implicitly
read subsection (D) to refer to “the latest date on which the factual predicate of
any claim presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence,” id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted), this is not what the
language of subsection (D) says, and in fact “[i]t would be just as consistent with
the statutory language to pick the earliest date” on which the factual predicate of
any claim accrued, id. Instead, the Fielder court stressed that subsection (D) did
not say that and found that “[t]he reference to ‘the latest’ date in § 2244(d)(1) tells
a court how to choose from among the four dates specified in subsections (A)
through (D) once those dates are identified.” Id.
Fielder looked beyond the words of § 2244(d)(1) and considered how courts
ordinarily apply statutes of limitations. Explaining that statutes of limitations are
applied typically on a claim-by-claim basis in civil and criminal cases, the Third
Circuit reasoned that nothing indicated “that Congress intended to make a radical
departure from this approach in § 2244(d)(1).” Id. The Fielder court also
considered the practical implications of the Walker interpretation, reasoning that
16 “the Walker interpretation has the strange effect of permitting a late-accruing
federal habeas claim to open the door for the assertion of other claims that had
become time-barred years earlier.” Id. at 120. After providing a persuasive
example to illustrate its reasoning that Congress did not intend the statute of
limitations to resurrect previously barred claims, the Fielder court surmised that
Congress would not have wanted the statute of limitations to “miraculously
revive[]” formerly barred claims. Id.
The Tenth, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits have also held that the one-year period
of limitation should be applied on a claim-by-claim basis. Most recently, the Tenth
Circuit rejected our Walker approach and noted that Walker “creates a perverse
incentive for potential habeas petitioners with otherwise time-barred constitutional
claims to violate the terms of their sentence.” Prendergast, 669 F.3d at 1187. In
Mardesich, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier statement in Souliotes that the
statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1) applies on a claim-by-claim basis. 668 F.3d
at 1170‒71. The Mardesich court aptly stated that “[s]tretched to its logical
extreme, Walker’s application-based approach would hold that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations never completely runs on any claim so long as there is a possibility of a
timely challenge for one claim.” Id. at 1171. Hence, it joined the Third Circuit in
embracing a claim-by-claim approach to the statute of limitations in a multiple
17 trigger date case. Id. The Sixth Circuit also expressly rejected the Walker
interpretation of § 2244(d)(1). Bachman, 487 F.3d at 984. Now, having the
opportunity to consider the issue again, we reject the Walker interpretation of the
statute of limitations and agree with our sister circuits that a claim-by-claim
approach to the statute of limitations in a multiple trigger case is more reasoned.
4. Congressional Intent
We agree with the State that the Walker interpretation is also inconsistent
with Congressional intent. Congress enacted AEDPA to “reduce[] the potential for
delay on the road to finality by restricting the time that a prospective federal
habeas petitioner has in which to seek federal habeas review.” Duncan, 533 U.S.
at 179, 121 S. Ct. at 2128. Courts should not interpret statutes in a manner that
undermines the purpose of the statute. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667, 17
S. Ct. 677, 680 (1897) (stating that “nothing is better settled than that statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion”). Our
court has strictly interpreted the habeas statute of limitations “to avoid creating a
loophole which is contrary to the legislative intent of insuring a greater degree of
finality.” Murphy, 634 F.3d at 1309 (internal quotation marks omitted) (giving
strict interpretation to statute of limitations in Rule 35(b) modification of sentence
18 context). The Supreme Court has also observed that the purpose of the habeas
statute of limitations is to end delays in criminal cases. See Woodford v. Garceau,
538 U.S. 202, 206, 123 S. Ct. 1398, 1401 (2003) (observing that “Congress
enacted AEDPA to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
sentences, particularly in capital cases”); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 69,
128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the “seemingly endless
proceedings that have characterized capital litigation”).
In light of the clear intent of Congress in enacting the habeas statute of
limitations, the Walker interpretation is not viable. This interpretation frustrates
congressional intent with respect to finality because it allows a habeas petitioner to
revive otherwise untimely claims by filing a habeas petition based on either (1) a
state imposed impediment to filing a claim, or (2) a new rule that applies
retroactively on collateral review, or (3) the discovery of a factual predicate for a
new claim. It allows for the resuscitation of otherwise dormant claims and
effectively rewards petitioners for waiting years after their convictions become
final to file federal habeas petitions that mix new and timely claims with stale and
untimely claims. Such a result contradicts the well-recognized interest in the
finality of state court judgments that Congress sought to achieve in enacting the
habeas statute of limitations.
19 Moreover, the logic of Walker extends with equal force to the one-year
limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for federal prisoners, and the finality
concerns are particularly acute in this context. Unlike state prisoners, who can
capitalize on a new constitutional right, federal prisoners have another “new right”
trigger in § 2255(f)(3). In this provision, the “new right” trigger applies to
Supreme Court decisions recognizing new, retroactively applicable statutory
rights. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1149‒50 (11th Cir.
2002). The breadth of this provision poses a far greater threat to the finality of
federal prisoner convictions than state prisoner convictions. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions that narrowly construe a wide
range of statutes defining federal crimes, all of which are retroactive to appeals on
collateral review. See, e.g., Fowler v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2045
(2011) (federal witness tampering statute); Skilling v. United States, ___ U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (honest services fraud statute); Chambers v. United States,
555 U.S. 122, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (violent felony under Armed Career Criminal
Act); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008) (violent felony
under Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.
Ct. 2020 (2008) (money laundering statute); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74,
128 S. Ct. 579 (2007) (firearm statute). These decisions have spawned extensive
20 federal prisoner post-conviction litigation, and the Walker interpretation
compounds this complex litigation and contradicts the purpose of the statute of
limitations in AEDPA: finality of judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
We overrule Walker to the extent that it holds that § 2244(d)(1) provides a
single statute of limitations that applies to the application as a whole and that
individual claims within an application cannot be reviewed separately for
timeliness. We are “confident Congress did not want to produce” a result in which
a timely claim “miraculously revive[s]” untimely claims. Fielder, 379 F.3d at 120.
Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limitations in AEDPA applies on a claim-
by-claim basis in a multiple trigger date case. We see no reason why a habeas
petitioner who allows his judgment to become final should be permitted, by the
happenstance of an intervening decision or the discovery of new evidence, to
reopen claims that he could have raised earlier but did not. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s judgment dismissing Zack’s non-Atkins claims as time-barred.
AFFIRMED.
21 CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I fully concur in the Chief Judge’s opinion for the Court and write separately
to elaborate on what will-o’-the-wisp, tissue-thin, non-bars the AEDPA statute of
limitations provisions would be if the Court did not hold as it does today.
During oral argument, petitioner’s counsel was asked these questions and
gave these answers:
The Court: Let me ask you one thing that concerns me about your position, Mr. McClain, and I didn’t really see it addressed much in the briefs. And that is the unlocking claim, in this case, the Atkins claim. How much merit does it have to have to unlock the statute as to the other claims?
Counsel: Well, under the statutory language, it’s whether the claim— when does the claim arise?
The Court: No. No. I mean, suppose—you don’t like the Mensa hypothetical—let’s give you another one. Suppose, under Miller v. Alabama, someone who was twenty-one years old according to the birth certificate at the time they committed the murder got a mandatory life without parole. Twenty years later, after Miller comes out, they file a Miller claim and eight other claims that have nothing to do with Miller. And the state responds, “He was twenty-one.” And the guy says, “No I wasn’t.” Judge holds a hearing; he was clearly twenty-one at the time. Miller is inapplicable. The claim has no merit. Do the other eight claims still get under the fence for the statute of limitation purposes?
Counsel: Under the text of the statute, the merits are not at issue.
The Court: Okay, so any time any Supreme Court decision comes out, anybody—particularly somebody on death row, let’s say, or 22 serving life without parole, got nothing to lose—they file a false and frivolous claim as to that new decision and then everything else comes in under the statute of limitations for it?
Counsel: Under the text, that’s correct.
Counsel’s answers show that at the frontier of the absurd there are no border
guards.
Adopting the petitioner’s interpretation of the statutory language
would mean that every time the Supreme Court issued a decision
recognizing a new, retroactively applicable constitutional right, the statute of
limitations bar would be lifted for any and all other claims a petitioner
wished to bring. And that would be true no matter how old those other
claims were, no matter how unrelated they were to the new law claim, and
no matter how baseless the new law claim was in that case.
Two examples illustrate the absurdity of the petitioner’s
interpretation. Under it, any petitioner could have used the decision in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002), to lift the statute of
limitations bar on any and all non-Atkins claims, even if the petitioner had
an IQ in the genius range and even if he were not under a sentence of death,
making the Atkins claim doubly frivolous. And the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), could be used by any
23 petitioner to lift the statute of limitations bar for any and all otherwise time-
barred, non-Miller claims he wants to assert, even if he is not serving a life
imprisonment without parole sentence and even if he was not a juvenile
when he committed his crimes, making the Miller claim doubly frivolous.
The petitioner’s position is contrary to “the common mandate of
statutory construction to avoid absurd results,” Rowland v. California Men’s
Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 200, 113 S.Ct. 716,
200 (1993); see Corley v. United States, 55 U.S. 303, 317, 129 S.Ct. 1558,
1568 (2009) (interpreting a statute to avoid “the absurdities of literalism that
show that Congress could not have been writing in a literalistic frame of
mind”); E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120-
121, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 1674 (1988) (rejecting an interpretation that would lead
to “absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole, which this Court need not and should not
countenance”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527 (1981) (“[A]bsurd results are to be
avoided” in statutory construction.); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d
1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006) (It is a “venerable” principle that “statutory
24 language should not be applied literally if doing so would produce an absurd
result.”).
There is enough unavoidable absurdity in life. We should avoid
absurdity in the law. Today’s decision does.