Michael Carr v. Cross Keys Bank

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 18, 2020
Docket19-30553
StatusUnpublished

This text of Michael Carr v. Cross Keys Bank (Michael Carr v. Cross Keys Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael Carr v. Cross Keys Bank, (5th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

Case: 19-30553 Document: 00515349900 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/18/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

No. 19-30553 FILED March 18, 2020 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk In re: PADCO PRESSURE CONTROL, L.L.C.,

Debtor,

MICHAEL RAY CARR,

Appellant,

v.

CROSS KEYS BANK; JOHN W. LUSTER,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:18-CV-1643

Before JONES, ELROD, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Michael Ray Carr challenges a bankruptcy court’s sanctions judgment. “In reviewing cases originating in bankruptcy, we ‘perform the same function as did the district court: Fact findings of the bankruptcy court are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and issues of law are reviewed de novo.’ ”

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 19-30553 Document: 00515349900 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/18/2020

No. 19-30553 See In re Soileau, 488 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berryman Prods. (In re Berryman), 159 F,3d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1998)). Carr first argues that the bankruptcy court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he was not properly served with the motion for sanctions or notice of hearing. The Supreme Court has held that “personal jurisdiction is a waivable right,” such that a party may give “express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)). By attending his hearings and contesting the imposition of sanctions, Carr consented to the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him. Carr also challenges the bankruptcy court’s calculation of sanctions and argues that newly discovered evidence calls into question the credibility of a witness. His motion for relief from the sanctions order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9024. We have held that a Rule 60(b) motion is “not a substitute for the ordinary method of redressing judicial error—appeal.” McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon, 699 F.3d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1983)). Having carefully considered Carr’s arguments, we are not persuaded that the bankruptcy court erred in denying the motion. AFFIRMED.

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Related

McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A.
4 F.3d 362 (Fifth Circuit, 1993)
Texas v. Soileau (In Re Soileau)
488 F.3d 302 (Fifth Circuit, 2007)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)

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Bluebook (online)
Michael Carr v. Cross Keys Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-carr-v-cross-keys-bank-ca5-2020.