NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-99
MICHAEL C. STEWART, JR.
vs.
CALLAHAN, INC. & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This appeal stems from a physical altercation between two
workers at a construction jobsite. The plaintiff, Michael C.
Stewart, Jr., filed suit against both defendants, Callahan, Inc.
(Callahan) and Shawnlee Construction LLC (Shawnlee), for
negligence and against Shawnlee for battery. A Superior Court
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants after
concluding that Stewart's employment agreement (agreement)
barred him from suing the defendants for injuries covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act (act), G. L. c. 152. Stewart appeals
from the summary judgment entered on the negligence claim
1 Shawnlee Construction LLC. against Callahan and the battery claim against Shawnlee. We
affirm.
Background. In June 2019, Aerotek, a temporary staffing
agency, employed Stewart as a carpenter. Before starting his
temporary assignment, Stewart signed the agreement, which
included a waiver of liability provision (waiver) discussed in
further detail below.2 Aerotek assigned him to work on a
construction project beginning June 4, 2019. At the jobsite,
Callahan was the general contractor and Shawnlee was the framing
subcontractor. A Shawnlee employee would direct the workers and
assign tasks each day.
On June 7, 2019, a Shawnlee employee punched Stewart while
at work. After the incident, Stewart filed a workers'
compensation claim with Aerotek's insurer. On January 14, 2020,
Stewart entered into a lump sum workers' compensation agreement
pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 48, for Aerotek's insurer to pay him
$25,000.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the grant
of summary judgment de novo. See Le Fort Enters. v. Lantern 18,
LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 149 (2023). We view the record evidence,
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in
2 Stewart testified at his deposition that he did not recall signing the agreement. However, he stipulated that he does not dispute his signing for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment, and he has not raised the argument on appeal.
2 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, the
plaintiff. Blake v. Hometown Am. Communities, Inc., 486 Mass.
268, 272 (2020). "Summary judgment is appropriate where there
is no material issue of fact in dispute, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Berry v. Commerce
Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636 (2021), citing Kourouvacilis v.
General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).
2. The waiver clause. Stewart argues that the waiver
clause in the agreement is ambiguous as to whether the phrase
"Client's customer" applied to Callahan, and therefore the
agreement was insufficient to bar Stewart's negligence claim
against Callahan. We disagree.
"When contract language is unambiguous, it must be
construed according to its plain meaning." Balles v. Babcock
Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017). Contractual language is
ambiguous "only if it is susceptible of more than one meaning
and reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which
meaning is the proper one." Citation Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 426
Mass. 379, 381 (1998). "Finally, we construe a contract as a
whole, so as 'to give reasonable effect to each of its
provisions.'" James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy, 478
Mass. 664, 669 (2018), quoting J.A. Sullivan Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795 (1986).
3 The liability provision of the agreement states, in
relevant part, the following:
"18. Limitation of Liability - [1] To the extent permitted by law, you . . . waive any and all rights you have, or may have, to claim or assert a claim, suit, action or demand of any kind . . . against Client or Client's customers . . . arising directly or indirectly out of your employment with Aerotek, Inc, except as to any claims you assign to Aerotek, Inc under this Agreement. [2] You recognize and agree that Aerotek, Inc provides workers' compensation coverage for such things as on-the-job injuries or occupational diseases incurred while on Assignment for Aerotek, Inc, and to the extent permitted by law, you agree to look solely to Aerotek, Inc and/or its insurer for damages and/or expenses for any such claims, suits, actions, or demands relating to bodily injury, illness, or death incurred while on Assignment. [3] In furtherance of the foregoing and in recognition that any work related injuries which might be sustained by you are covered by state Workers' Compensation statutes, and to avoid the circumvention of such state statutes which may result from suits against the Client based on the same injury or injuries, and to the extent permitted by law, YOU HEREBY WAIVE AND FOREVER RELEASE ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT HAVE to make claims or bring suit against the Client for damages based upon injuries which are covered under such Workers' Compensation statutes." (Emphases added.)
The agreement defines Shawnlee as the "Client."
Stewart argues that each sentence addresses a different
limitation on liability and should be read individually, with
"one not affecting the other." First, he asserts that "Client's
customers" is an ambiguous phrase in the context of the
construction industry, where it is not common to refer to a
general contractor as the "customer" of a subcontractor, so the
first sentence does not apply to Callahan. Next, Stewart
contends the second sentence pertains only to workers'
4 compensation claims and does not bar other types of claims or
claims against anyone other than Aerotek. Lastly, he claims
that the third sentence only protects the "Client," which does
not include Callahan.
We disagree that the terms are ambiguous and that the
correct interpretation of the agreement isolates each sentence.
As a subcontractor, Shawnlee contracted only with Callahan and
had no relationship with the property owner, so "Client's
customers" could not refer to anyone other than Callahan.
Moreover, even if individual phrases were ambiguous in
isolation, the contract should be read as a whole. See James B.
Nutter & Co., 478 Mass. at 669. The first sentence, waiving
liability against Aerotek's "Client" and "Client's customers,"
plainly relates to the second sentence, which acknowledges that
Aerotek provides workers' compensation and requires Stewart to
look only to Aerotek for "any such claims, suits, actions, or
demands" relating to personal injury. The third sentence
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-99
MICHAEL C. STEWART, JR.
vs.
CALLAHAN, INC. & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This appeal stems from a physical altercation between two
workers at a construction jobsite. The plaintiff, Michael C.
Stewart, Jr., filed suit against both defendants, Callahan, Inc.
(Callahan) and Shawnlee Construction LLC (Shawnlee), for
negligence and against Shawnlee for battery. A Superior Court
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants after
concluding that Stewart's employment agreement (agreement)
barred him from suing the defendants for injuries covered by the
Workers' Compensation Act (act), G. L. c. 152. Stewart appeals
from the summary judgment entered on the negligence claim
1 Shawnlee Construction LLC. against Callahan and the battery claim against Shawnlee. We
affirm.
Background. In June 2019, Aerotek, a temporary staffing
agency, employed Stewart as a carpenter. Before starting his
temporary assignment, Stewart signed the agreement, which
included a waiver of liability provision (waiver) discussed in
further detail below.2 Aerotek assigned him to work on a
construction project beginning June 4, 2019. At the jobsite,
Callahan was the general contractor and Shawnlee was the framing
subcontractor. A Shawnlee employee would direct the workers and
assign tasks each day.
On June 7, 2019, a Shawnlee employee punched Stewart while
at work. After the incident, Stewart filed a workers'
compensation claim with Aerotek's insurer. On January 14, 2020,
Stewart entered into a lump sum workers' compensation agreement
pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 48, for Aerotek's insurer to pay him
$25,000.
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review the grant
of summary judgment de novo. See Le Fort Enters. v. Lantern 18,
LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 149 (2023). We view the record evidence,
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in
2 Stewart testified at his deposition that he did not recall signing the agreement. However, he stipulated that he does not dispute his signing for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment, and he has not raised the argument on appeal.
2 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, the
plaintiff. Blake v. Hometown Am. Communities, Inc., 486 Mass.
268, 272 (2020). "Summary judgment is appropriate where there
is no material issue of fact in dispute, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Berry v. Commerce
Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636 (2021), citing Kourouvacilis v.
General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).
2. The waiver clause. Stewart argues that the waiver
clause in the agreement is ambiguous as to whether the phrase
"Client's customer" applied to Callahan, and therefore the
agreement was insufficient to bar Stewart's negligence claim
against Callahan. We disagree.
"When contract language is unambiguous, it must be
construed according to its plain meaning." Balles v. Babcock
Power Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017). Contractual language is
ambiguous "only if it is susceptible of more than one meaning
and reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which
meaning is the proper one." Citation Ins. Co. v. Gomez, 426
Mass. 379, 381 (1998). "Finally, we construe a contract as a
whole, so as 'to give reasonable effect to each of its
provisions.'" James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy, 478
Mass. 664, 669 (2018), quoting J.A. Sullivan Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795 (1986).
3 The liability provision of the agreement states, in
relevant part, the following:
"18. Limitation of Liability - [1] To the extent permitted by law, you . . . waive any and all rights you have, or may have, to claim or assert a claim, suit, action or demand of any kind . . . against Client or Client's customers . . . arising directly or indirectly out of your employment with Aerotek, Inc, except as to any claims you assign to Aerotek, Inc under this Agreement. [2] You recognize and agree that Aerotek, Inc provides workers' compensation coverage for such things as on-the-job injuries or occupational diseases incurred while on Assignment for Aerotek, Inc, and to the extent permitted by law, you agree to look solely to Aerotek, Inc and/or its insurer for damages and/or expenses for any such claims, suits, actions, or demands relating to bodily injury, illness, or death incurred while on Assignment. [3] In furtherance of the foregoing and in recognition that any work related injuries which might be sustained by you are covered by state Workers' Compensation statutes, and to avoid the circumvention of such state statutes which may result from suits against the Client based on the same injury or injuries, and to the extent permitted by law, YOU HEREBY WAIVE AND FOREVER RELEASE ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT HAVE to make claims or bring suit against the Client for damages based upon injuries which are covered under such Workers' Compensation statutes." (Emphases added.)
The agreement defines Shawnlee as the "Client."
Stewart argues that each sentence addresses a different
limitation on liability and should be read individually, with
"one not affecting the other." First, he asserts that "Client's
customers" is an ambiguous phrase in the context of the
construction industry, where it is not common to refer to a
general contractor as the "customer" of a subcontractor, so the
first sentence does not apply to Callahan. Next, Stewart
contends the second sentence pertains only to workers'
4 compensation claims and does not bar other types of claims or
claims against anyone other than Aerotek. Lastly, he claims
that the third sentence only protects the "Client," which does
not include Callahan.
We disagree that the terms are ambiguous and that the
correct interpretation of the agreement isolates each sentence.
As a subcontractor, Shawnlee contracted only with Callahan and
had no relationship with the property owner, so "Client's
customers" could not refer to anyone other than Callahan.
Moreover, even if individual phrases were ambiguous in
isolation, the contract should be read as a whole. See James B.
Nutter & Co., 478 Mass. at 669. The first sentence, waiving
liability against Aerotek's "Client" and "Client's customers,"
plainly relates to the second sentence, which acknowledges that
Aerotek provides workers' compensation and requires Stewart to
look only to Aerotek for "any such claims, suits, actions, or
demands" relating to personal injury. The third sentence
clarifies further that the purpose of the waiver is to prevent
an employee from circumventing the act's exclusivity provisions
by seeking workers' compensation from Aerotek and then suing the
Client for the same injuries. Each sentence is not a separate
limitation on liability. Instead, the paragraph as a whole
defines the scope of the waiver and from what sources an injured
employee can and cannot seek damages. We conclude that when
5 read as a whole, the agreement unambiguously constituted a
waiver by Stewart of his claims against both Callahan and
Shawnlee. The judge thus properly granted summary judgment for
Callahan on Stewart's negligence claim.
3. Waiver for intentional torts not precluded by public
policy. Stewart also argues that the agreement cannot preclude
liability for the battery claim against Shawnlee because waivers
of liability for intentional torts are unenforceable on public
policy grounds. Again, we disagree.
Under the act, workers may receive compensation for
intentional torts committed in the workplace, including physical
assaults by coemployees. See Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422
Mass. 563, 566-567 (1996) (act applies to rape and assault).
The system contemplated by the act is designed to replace, not
augment, piecemeal tort litigation. Estate of Moulton v.
Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478, 483 (2014). Thus, the exclusivity
provision of the act precludes any additional tort action for
claims covered by workers' compensation, absent waiver by the
employee. See G. L. c. 152, §§ 23-24; Estate of Moulton, 467
Mass. at 483-484 (employee may opt out of act only by notifying
employer in writing, at time of hiring contract, that employee
is not waiving right to bring common-law tort suits). This
statutory scheme represents "the Legislature's balance of
competing societal interests," protecting injured employees with
6 a quick, guaranteed recovery while limiting traditional remedies
(citation omitted). Molina v. State Garden, Inc., 88 Mass. App.
Ct. 173, 178 (2015). Here, if Stewart were to try to recover
against his direct employer, Aerotek, his suit clearly would be
barred by the exclusivity provision of the act because he did
not waive his right to workers' compensation at the time of his
hiring.
We are unpersuaded by Stewart's argument that, although the
act barred him from suing Aerotek for an intentional tort, his
contractual waiver of liability for third party Shawnlee was
unenforceable. It is not against public policy to enforce
contractual releases mirroring the scheme of the act, by
providing an employee with an avenue for workers' compensation
and precluding additional recovery against third parties. See
Molina, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 181-182 (enforcing staffing agency
employment contract, which released customers and clients of
staffing agency from liability). The waiver does not shield the
employer, but instead acts "as protection for [the staffing
agency's] customers for those risks assumed by its employees
who, in turn, are covered by workers' compensation insurance."
Horner v. Boston Edison Co., 45 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 142 (1998).
The act itself, which represents the Legislature's balancing of
policy interests, contemplates the scenario where the employee
has both a "general" and "special" employer, and the employee is
7 barred from suing one while receiving workers' compensation from
the other. See G. L. c. 152, § 18; Molina, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at
180-181 (section 18 applicable when staffing agency, the general
employer, immunizes its client, the special employer, from
suit). Because the act covered the type of workplace injury
Stewart suffered, and he had the ability to recover through
Aerotek, the agreement barring him from seeking additional
recovery from Aerotek's clients was enforceable. We therefore
conclude that the judge properly granted summary judgment for
Shawnlee on Stewart's battery claim.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Grant, Brennan & Smyth, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: December 19, 2025.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.