Michael Alexander Lajeunesse v. Iowa Board of Medicine

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-1354
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1354 Filed October 29, 2025

MICHAEL ALEXANDER LAJEUNESSE, Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA BOARD OF MEDICINE, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,

Judge.

A petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review.

AFFIRMED.

Michael A. Lajeunesse, Anamosa, Iowa, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Jennifer Klein, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2

GREER, Judge.

Inmate Michael Lajeunesse appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial

review under Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2024). This is the fourth time in a half-

decade that Lajeunesse has filed a pro se petition challenging the Iowa Board of

Medicine’s refusal to investigate Dr. Gregory Schmunk, the medical examiner who

testified at Lajeunesse’s criminal trial. We affirmed dismissal of similar requests

for relief in three prior appeals. See Lajeunesse v. Iowa Bd. of Med., No. 20-1295,

2021 WL 5918403, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2021) (petition for mandamus);

Lajeunesse v. Iowa Bd. of Med., No. 21-1071, 2022 WL 1100910, at *1 (Iowa Ct.

App. Apr. 13, 2022) (petition for judicial review); Lajeunesse v. Iowa Bd. of Med.

(Lajeunesse III), No. 23-0349, 2024 WL 707292, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21,

2024) (petition for mandamus).

In his last case, Lajeunesse filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to

compel the Board’s review of medical records allegedly suppressed during his

criminal proceedings. See Lajeunesse III, 2024 WL 707292, at *1. He claimed

that review of these records was necessary “for their use in other legal proceedings

against [Dr. Schmunk].” Id. The district court dismissed, finding a petition for

judicial review was Lajeunesse’s exclusive means to relief and that the Board

decision at issue—“to not pursue an investigation or disciplinary proceeding”—was

insulated from review. Id. A panel of our court affirmed on exclusivity grounds.

Id. at *2. Although reviewability was not at issue in that case, we explained that

the Board’s decision not to investigate Dr. Schmunk “is not subject to judicial

review.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 272C.3(1)(d)). 3

Lajeunesse was undeterred. Days after we filed Lajeunesse III, he sent a

letter to the Board incorrectly asserting “[t]he Iowa Court of Appeals has just . . .

ruled you have to review the medical records under Iowa Code § 17A.2(2).” When

the Board declined to take action, Lajeunesse filed a petition for judicial review.

The Board moved to dismiss, contending Lajeunesse was barred from relitigating

the same issues raised in his mandamus action and that judicial review was

unavailable in any event. The district court agreed on both fronts, reasoning

Lajeunesse’s petition was an “attempt to repackage” his unsuccessful mandamus

claim and noting “that any attempt to obtain judicial review . . . would be barred.”

Once again, Lajeunesse appeals. He argues that issue preclusion does not

apply because none of his “prior proceedings qualify as an adjudication on the

merits.” And he contends the district court should not have entertained the Board’s

motion in the first place. According to Lajeunesse, the Board was in default after

it missed its deadline to respond under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1602. Our

review is for correction of errors at law. Irland v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 939 N.W.2d 85,

89 (Iowa 2020).

On the question of preclusion, we decline to grapple with a technical

analysis. Preclusive or not, what we said in Lajeunesse III remains just as true

today: judicial review of the Board’s decision not to investigate Dr. Schmunk is

expressly foreclosed by statute. Iowa Code § 272C.3(1)(d) (“Notwithstanding the

provisions of chapter 17A, a determination by a licensing board that an

investigation is not warranted or that an investigation should be closed without

initiating a disciplinary proceeding is not subject to judicial review pursuant to

section 17A.19.”); see also Lewis Cent. Educ. Ass’n v. Iowa Bd. of Educ. Exam’rs, 4

625 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 2001) (recognizing “the legislature may, by statute,

make agency action unreviewable” provided it does so by express reference to

chapter 17A). We also find no merit to Lajeunesse’s procedural argument.

Because judicial review proceedings are appellate in nature, delays by the

responding agency do not entitle a petitioner to “default judgment” or similar

automatic relief. See Hartvigsen v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 426 N.W.2d 399, 402

(Iowa 1988) (explaining that section 17A.19 makes “no provision for summary

reversal as a sanction for an appellee’s failure to abide by the rules”). The district

court did not err in dismissing Lajeunesse’s petition.