Michael A. Walker, Jr. v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

District Court, E.D. Arkansas·Decided June 12, 2026·No. 3:25-cv-00162·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL A. WALKER, JR. PLAINTIFF

V. No. 3:25-CV-00162-ERE

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Commissioner DEFENDANT

ORDER1

Plaintiff Michael A. Walker, Jr. appeals the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for disability benefits. For the reasons set out below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. I. Background In 2008, Mr. Walker filed an application for benefits due to a back injury. Tr. 125, 129. Since then, his case has been remanded by either the Appeals Council or the federal district court several times. Tr. 428-33, 461-63, 816-21, 1128-29, 1210- 11, 1238-39, 1268-70, 1300-02. Mr. Walker is seeking a closed period of disability from April 2008 to January 2017. Tr. 1159-60. Following the most recent remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on April 10, 2024, where Mr. Walker appeared with his lawyer, and the ALJ heard testimony from Mr. Walker and a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr.

1 The parties consented in writing to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. 7. 1157-1171. On June 3, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Mr. Walker was not disabled. Tr. 1128-1144. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Walker’s request for

review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 1118-24. Mr. Walker, who was almost forty-eight years old at the time of the April 2024 hearing, has a GED and had no past relevant work experience due to the

remoteness of his past work. Tr. 125, 1167, 1177. II. The ALJ’s Decision2 The ALJ found that Mr. Walker had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date of April 1, 2008 through January 11, 2017.3 Tr.

1132. The ALJ also concluded that Mr. Walker had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, and anxiety. Id. However, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Walker did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.

2 The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). 3 However, the ALJ found that Mr. Walker has engaged in substantial gainful activity since 2017. Tr. 1132. According to the ALJ, during the relevant period of April 2008 to January 2017, Mr. Walker had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light

work, with the following limitations: (1) occasional climbing, balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling; and (2) occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. Tr. 1134.

In response to hypothetical questions incorporating the above limitations, the VE testified that a substantial number of potential jobs were available in the national economy that Mr. Walker could perform, including collator operator, price tagger, and stock checker apparel. Tr. 1168. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Mr.

Walker was not disabled. III. Discussion A. Standard of Review

In this appeal, the Court must review the Commissioner’s decision for legal error and determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Substantial evidence” in

this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find [the evidence] adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must consider

not only evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision, but also evidence that supports a contrary outcome. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision, however, “merely because

substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). B. Mr. Walker’s Arguments for Reversal

Mr. Walker contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ: (1) failed to properly assess Dr. Pratapji Thakor’s opinion; and (2) found that Mr. Walker could perform three jobs that do not exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Doc. 11 at 43, 55.

C. Analysis 1. Dr. Thakor’s Opinion Mr. Walker alleges that the ALJ erred when assessing the opinion of Dr.

Pratapji Thakor, Mr. Walker’s primary care physician. Doc. 11 at 43. Dr. Thakor’s September 26, 2016 opinion asserted that Mr. Walker: is unable to work considering his diagnosis of lumbar radiculopathy with disk herniation. It is difficult for patient to stand and walk for a long time. The patient needs reevaluation in 6 months for functional capacity.

Tr. 1023. Mr. Walker argues that “Dr. Thakor’s opinion directly contradicts the ALJ’s finding that [he] can engage in the prolonged standing and walking required for light work.” Doc. 11 at 43. Before March 2017, which covers the relevant period in this case, an ALJ was to “[g]enerally . . . give more weight to medical opinions from [a claimant’s]

treating sources . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. When a treating source’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the length of relationship between the provider and claimant, the frequency of examinations, supportability

of the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, specialization of the treatment provider, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6); 416.927(c)(2)-(6). A treatment provider’s statement may be discounted if it is inconsistent with

the overall assessment of the treatment provider or the opinions of others, especially where the other opinions are supported by more or better medical evidence. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2007); House v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 741,

744 (8th Cir. 2007) (an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician if the opinion is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record). Here, the ALJ gave Dr. Thakor’s 2016 opinion “little weight” after

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