Michael A. Doyle v. Town of Falmouth

2014 ME 151, 106 A.3d 1145, 2014 Me. LEXIS 161
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedDecember 23, 2014
DocketDocket Cum-14-227
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 2014 ME 151 (Michael A. Doyle v. Town of Falmouth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michael A. Doyle v. Town of Falmouth, 2014 ME 151, 106 A.3d 1145, 2014 Me. LEXIS 161 (Me. 2014).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

[¶ 1] Michael A. Doyle appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) entered in favor of the Town of Falmouth and the Falmouth School Department, following the partial denial of Doyle’s request pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414 (2014), 1 for the unredacted cellular telephone records of the former Superintendent of Schools. Doyle contends that the court erred in permitting the School Department to redact from the records certain line telephone and cellular telephone numbers. 2 We affirm.

I. CASE'HISTORY

[¶ 2] The relevant facts are not in dispute. On or about October 30, 2018, Doyle submitted a FOAA request to the Town seeking to inspect and copy the July, August, and September 2013 cellular telephone bills of the School Department’s former Superintendent. The Superintendent and other Falmouth School Department employees are provided with school-issued cellular telephones, paid for by the School Department. There is no rule or policy preventing employees from using their school-issued cellular telephones for personal purposes.

[¶ 3] In response to Doyle’s FOAA request, the former Superintendent provided the Town with copies of her cellular telephone records for July, August, and September 2013, redacting the information she considered nonpublic and confidential,-exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Act, or beyond the scope of Doyle’s FOAA request. The Town then made copies of those redacted records available to Doyle.

[¶ 4] Doyle appealed from the Town’s and School Department’s actions to the Superior Court pursuant to 1 M.R.S. § 409(1). Doyle alleged that the Town and the School Department failed to comply with his FOAA request, and that he was entitled to receive unredacted copies of the cellular telephone records.

[¶ 5] The court directed the Town and School Department to submit unredacted records for the court’s in camera review and provide a copy of all such supporting papers to Doyle, “except for those that would disclose the records or information or portions thereof that the [Town and School Department] contend are not public records subject to disclosure.” The Town and School Department complied with the court’s order and filed a memorandum of law outlining the legal basis for each redaction, together with an affidavit by the former Superintendent, a spreadsheet identifying the nature of the call for each telephone number that was redacted, and the unredacted cellular telephone records for in camera review only. Doyle was *1148 provided with the same bills and supporting documentation except with the subject telephone numbers redacted. 3 The redacted copies of the cellular telephone records indicate the date, time, and duration of all calls placed or received by the former Superintendent, as well as the total amount charged to the School Department for the Superintendent’s use of the telephone.

[¶ 6] After full briefing by the parties regarding the legal bases for redaction, the Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the Town and School Department. The court concluded that (1) the cellular telephone numbers of School Department employees, including the former Superintendent, are exempt from the definition of “public records” pursuant to 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(O); (2) records of personal telephone calls — those made or received in connection with a school official’s personal matters — -are not public records pursuant to the Act; and (3) the telephone numbers of Falmouth students’ parents are confidential pursuant to the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and are therefore exempt from the definition of public records. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g.(West, Westlaw through P.L. 113— 185 approved 10-6-14); 20-A M.R.S. § 6001(1) (2014); 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A).

[¶ 7] Doyle filed this timely appeal pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2014), M.R. Civ. P. 80B(n), and M.R.App. P. 2(b)(3).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶ 8] Maine’s Freedom of Access Act establishes a general right of the public to inspect and copy public records. 1 M.R.S. § 408-A. The term “public records” is defined by the Act to include records that are in the “possession or custody of an agency or public official of this [sjtate or any of its political subdivisions” that have “been received or prepared for use in connection with the transaction of public or governmental business or [that] contain[ ] information relating to the transaction of public or governmental business.” 1 M.R.S. § 402(3). The Act lists a number of exceptions to the definition of “public records.” See 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A)-(T). “The burden of proof is on the agency or political subdivision from which the information is sought to establish just and proper cause for the denial of a FOAA request.” MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State, 2013 ME 100, 119, 82 A.3d 104.

[¶ 9] When a public record contains information that is not subject to disclosure under FOAA, the information may be redacted to prevent disclosure. See, e.g., Cyr v. Madawaska Sch. Dept., 2007 ME 28, ¶ 11, 916 A.2d 967; Wiggins v. McDevitt, 473 A.2d 420, 424 (Me.1984). Thus, redacting portions of cellular telephone records that are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the FOAA is permissible.

A. Personal Telephone Numbers of Public Employees

[¶ 10] The exceptions to the Act’s disclosure requirement are strictly construed to promote the Act’s underlying policies and purposes. Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340, 348 (Me.1979); see 1 M.R.S. § 401. The Act exempts from disclosure “personal contact information,” which is defined as a public employee’s “home address, home telephone number ... personal cellular telephone number and personal pager.” 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(O). To interpret the scope of this exception, we look to the plain meaning of the statutory language to give effect to the legislative intent. Hickson v. Vescom Corp., 2014 ME 27, ¶ 15, 87 A.3d 704. “If *1149 the plain meaning of the text does not resolve an interpretive issue raised, we then consider the statute’s history, underlying policy, and other extrinsic factors to ascertain legislative intent.” In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶4, 759 A.2d 217.

[¶ 11] In this case, the plain language of the Act does not establish whether a “personal cellular telephone number” must be exclusively personal in nature or whether a work-issued cellular telephone number that may be used for personal purposes falls within the ambit of the exception. The legislative history of 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(O), however, indicates that the exception for personal contact information was enacted to protect the privacy rights of public employees. See Final Report of the Committee to Study Compliance with Maine’s Freedom of Access Laws 2-3 (Nov. 2004).

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Bluebook (online)
2014 ME 151, 106 A.3d 1145, 2014 Me. LEXIS 161, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michael-a-doyle-v-town-of-falmouth-me-2014.