NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4995-15T1
MIA M. WERNEGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EDWARD J. VOLPA,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted May 17, 2017 – Decided June 21, 2017
Before Judges Carroll and Farrington.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FM-08-844-94.
Mia M. Wernega, appellant pro se.
Nash Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for respondent (William A. Nash, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Mia M. Wernega appeals from portions of the Family
Part's June 10, 2016 post-judgment matrimonial order. Although
the order emancipated the parties' son, it required plaintiff to
contribute to the ongoing cost of health insurance premiums that
defendant Edward J. Volpa continues to pay for the son's medical insurance coverage. The order also directed plaintiff to reimburse
defendant $1175.22 for child support that defendant overpaid prior
to the effective date of the son's emancipation. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties were married in 1989 and have two children, a
daughter, born in 1991, and a son, born in 1993. An amended dual
final judgment of divorce was entered on October 18, 1994, which
incorporated the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA).
Pertinent to this appeal, the PSA provided that the parties would
have joint legal custody of the children, and designated plaintiff
as the primary residential custodial parent. Defendant agreed to
pay plaintiff $575 per week in child support until the children's
emancipation, as defined in the PSA. Defendant also agreed to
continue to provide his existing medical insurance coverage for
the children, with the parties equally sharing the cost of all
uninsured medical expenses.
Various disputes between the parties thereafter resulted in
a series of post-judgment orders. By consent order entered on
March 2, 2001, defendant's child support obligation for the two
children was modified to $500 per week. Plaintiff was required
to pay the first $250 per year per child for all unreimbursed
medical expenses pursuant to the New Jersey Child Support
2 A-4995-15T1 Guidelines1 (Guidelines). Thereafter, defendant was required to
pay eighty percent of such expenses and plaintiff the remaining
twenty percent. A June 24, 2005 order left these provisions
essentially unchanged.
In 2011, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary
residence of the parties' daughter, who was then living with him,
and to adjust child support based on her residency change. On
February 10, 2012, the court entered an order granting defendant's
motion and reducing his child support obligation to $177 per week.
Notably, the Guidelines worksheets attached to the order included
a $70 cost under the line item "[c]hild's share of health insurance
premium."
In 2014, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary
residence of the parties' son, to adjust child support accordingly,
and to compel plaintiff to contribute toward the children's health
insurance premiums and college expenses. On October 17, 2014, the
court designated defendant parent of primary residence, set
plaintiff's child support obligation at $50 per week for both
children pursuant to the Guidelines, and ordered plaintiff to pay
her share of the children's health insurance premiums and college
expenses. The order further provided that the parties' daughter
1 R. 5:6A.
3 A-4995-15T1 would be deemed emancipated effective January 1, 2015, at which
time plaintiff's child support obligation for the parties' son
would adjust to $40 per week.
In the motion under review, filed on April 14, 2016, plaintiff
sought the emancipation of the parties' son and consequential
termination of her child support obligation. Plaintiff certified
that her son was twenty-three years old and scheduled to graduate
from college on May 12, 2016. She also contended her son moved
out of her home in 2014, and in October 2015 he ceased all
communication with her. Defendant opposed the motion, and cross-
moved to enforce litigant's rights. In his supporting
certification, defendant stated he intended to provide health
insurance for his son until the son either turned age twenty-six2
or found employment that provided health insurance coverage.
Defendant thus sought to compel plaintiff to reimburse him twenty
2 We note that federal law bars insurers from preventing willing parents from adding a child under twenty-six – whether dependent or non-dependent – to family coverage. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, § 2714, 124 Stat. 119, 132 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a)) (stating that a health insurer offering group or individual coverage that provides support to a dependent child "shall continue to make such coverage available for an adult child (who is not married) until the child turns [twenty-six] years of age"); 45 C.F.R. § 147.120 (2013) (stating that an insurer may require proof of a child-parent relationship, and that the child is under the age of twenty-six, but may not consider the child's financial dependency, residency, student status, or employment status).
4 A-4995-15T1 percent of the cost of this continued coverage. Defendant further
certified that he overpaid plaintiff $1175.22 in child support,
and had sent her a proposed consent order to resolve this issue
that she refused to sign. Defendant also sought reimbursement for
plaintiff's unpaid share of the children's college expenses,
unreimbursed medical expenses, and health care coverage.
On June 10, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting
plaintiff's motion to emancipate the parties' son as of May 12,
2016, the date of his college graduation, and terminated her child
support obligation effective that date. The court granted
defendant's cross-motion in part. The order required plaintiff
to reimburse defendant twenty percent of the amount that he pays
for the son's health care coverage; $1175.22 for his overpayment
of child support; and $4415 in unpaid college expenses.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges the requirement that she
contribute to the continued cost of her son's medical insurance
coverage. She argues that the child's share of health insurance
was a component of child support as calculated under the
Guidelines, and consequently her obligation to contribute
terminated upon her son's emancipation. Plaintiff also argues
that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of
laches to bar defendant's claim for overpayment of child support.
5 A-4995-15T1 Clear standards guide our limited review. "We 'do not disturb
the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4995-15T1
MIA M. WERNEGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EDWARD J. VOLPA,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted May 17, 2017 – Decided June 21, 2017
Before Judges Carroll and Farrington.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FM-08-844-94.
Mia M. Wernega, appellant pro se.
Nash Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for respondent (William A. Nash, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Mia M. Wernega appeals from portions of the Family
Part's June 10, 2016 post-judgment matrimonial order. Although
the order emancipated the parties' son, it required plaintiff to
contribute to the ongoing cost of health insurance premiums that
defendant Edward J. Volpa continues to pay for the son's medical insurance coverage. The order also directed plaintiff to reimburse
defendant $1175.22 for child support that defendant overpaid prior
to the effective date of the son's emancipation. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The parties were married in 1989 and have two children, a
daughter, born in 1991, and a son, born in 1993. An amended dual
final judgment of divorce was entered on October 18, 1994, which
incorporated the parties' Property Settlement Agreement (PSA).
Pertinent to this appeal, the PSA provided that the parties would
have joint legal custody of the children, and designated plaintiff
as the primary residential custodial parent. Defendant agreed to
pay plaintiff $575 per week in child support until the children's
emancipation, as defined in the PSA. Defendant also agreed to
continue to provide his existing medical insurance coverage for
the children, with the parties equally sharing the cost of all
uninsured medical expenses.
Various disputes between the parties thereafter resulted in
a series of post-judgment orders. By consent order entered on
March 2, 2001, defendant's child support obligation for the two
children was modified to $500 per week. Plaintiff was required
to pay the first $250 per year per child for all unreimbursed
medical expenses pursuant to the New Jersey Child Support
2 A-4995-15T1 Guidelines1 (Guidelines). Thereafter, defendant was required to
pay eighty percent of such expenses and plaintiff the remaining
twenty percent. A June 24, 2005 order left these provisions
essentially unchanged.
In 2011, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary
residence of the parties' daughter, who was then living with him,
and to adjust child support based on her residency change. On
February 10, 2012, the court entered an order granting defendant's
motion and reducing his child support obligation to $177 per week.
Notably, the Guidelines worksheets attached to the order included
a $70 cost under the line item "[c]hild's share of health insurance
premium."
In 2014, defendant moved to be designated parent of primary
residence of the parties' son, to adjust child support accordingly,
and to compel plaintiff to contribute toward the children's health
insurance premiums and college expenses. On October 17, 2014, the
court designated defendant parent of primary residence, set
plaintiff's child support obligation at $50 per week for both
children pursuant to the Guidelines, and ordered plaintiff to pay
her share of the children's health insurance premiums and college
expenses. The order further provided that the parties' daughter
1 R. 5:6A.
3 A-4995-15T1 would be deemed emancipated effective January 1, 2015, at which
time plaintiff's child support obligation for the parties' son
would adjust to $40 per week.
In the motion under review, filed on April 14, 2016, plaintiff
sought the emancipation of the parties' son and consequential
termination of her child support obligation. Plaintiff certified
that her son was twenty-three years old and scheduled to graduate
from college on May 12, 2016. She also contended her son moved
out of her home in 2014, and in October 2015 he ceased all
communication with her. Defendant opposed the motion, and cross-
moved to enforce litigant's rights. In his supporting
certification, defendant stated he intended to provide health
insurance for his son until the son either turned age twenty-six2
or found employment that provided health insurance coverage.
Defendant thus sought to compel plaintiff to reimburse him twenty
2 We note that federal law bars insurers from preventing willing parents from adding a child under twenty-six – whether dependent or non-dependent – to family coverage. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, P.L. 111-148, § 2714, 124 Stat. 119, 132 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a)) (stating that a health insurer offering group or individual coverage that provides support to a dependent child "shall continue to make such coverage available for an adult child (who is not married) until the child turns [twenty-six] years of age"); 45 C.F.R. § 147.120 (2013) (stating that an insurer may require proof of a child-parent relationship, and that the child is under the age of twenty-six, but may not consider the child's financial dependency, residency, student status, or employment status).
4 A-4995-15T1 percent of the cost of this continued coverage. Defendant further
certified that he overpaid plaintiff $1175.22 in child support,
and had sent her a proposed consent order to resolve this issue
that she refused to sign. Defendant also sought reimbursement for
plaintiff's unpaid share of the children's college expenses,
unreimbursed medical expenses, and health care coverage.
On June 10, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting
plaintiff's motion to emancipate the parties' son as of May 12,
2016, the date of his college graduation, and terminated her child
support obligation effective that date. The court granted
defendant's cross-motion in part. The order required plaintiff
to reimburse defendant twenty percent of the amount that he pays
for the son's health care coverage; $1175.22 for his overpayment
of child support; and $4415 in unpaid college expenses.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges the requirement that she
contribute to the continued cost of her son's medical insurance
coverage. She argues that the child's share of health insurance
was a component of child support as calculated under the
Guidelines, and consequently her obligation to contribute
terminated upon her son's emancipation. Plaintiff also argues
that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of
laches to bar defendant's claim for overpayment of child support.
5 A-4995-15T1 Clear standards guide our limited review. "We 'do not disturb
the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge
unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported
by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]'"
Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 213 (App. Div. 2015)
(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invr's Ins. Co. of Am., 65
N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); accord N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). "Also, '[b]ecause of the family
courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters,
appellate courts should accord deference to family court
factfinding.'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 213 (quoting
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Accordingly, when
a reviewing court concludes there is satisfactory evidentiary
support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is complete and
it should not disturb the result, even though it has the feeling
it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial
tribunal.'" Id. at 213-14 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496
(1981)).
However, we confer no deference upon a trial court's
interpretation of the law, which is subject to plenary review.
See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.
366, 378 (1995). We may also exercise more extensive review of
6 A-4995-15T1 trial court findings that do not involve a testimonial hearing or
the opportunity to assess witness credibility. Cf. N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009) (stating
that deference to Family Court conclusions is not required where
"no hearing takes place, no evidence is admitted, and no findings
of fact are made"). Nevertheless, "[r]eversal is reserved only
for those circumstances when we determine the factual findings and
legal conclusions of the trial judge went 'so wide of the mark
that a mistake must have been made.'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J.
Super. at 214 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M.,
189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).
The application of emancipation is a legal concept, imposed
when "the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and
child" ends. Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div.
2006). "It is not automatic and 'need not occur at any particular
age[.]'" Llewelyn, supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 216 (quoting Newburgh
v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982)). "When the circumstances
surrounding the parent-child relationship support a finding the
child is emancipated, 'the parent relinquishes the right to custody
and is relieved of the burden of support, and the child is no
longer entitled to support.'" Ibid. (quoting Filippone v. Lee,
304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997)).
7 A-4995-15T1 In the present case, there is no challenge to the trial
court's decision emancipating the parties' son. The issue, then,
is whether a party has a legal duty to bear a share of a child's
medical insurance premium following his or her emancipation. While
no doubt commendable, we find no such legal duty compels an
unwilling parent, such as plaintiff, to do so here.3 Rather, as
we recently reaffirmed, "the court's authority to impose support
obligations is circumscribed; it terminates with a child's
emancipation." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 571 (App.
Div. 2017). Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the June 10,
2016 order that requires plaintiff to reimburse defendant twenty
percent of the amount defendant pays for the son's health insurance
coverage.
Plaintiff next argues that defendant's claim for
reimbursement of child support that he overpaid prior to the son's
emancipation is barred by the doctrine of laches. We find this
3 We recognize that a court, upon application of a parent or child, may convert (on the basis of exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to a mental or physical disability) a child support obligation to another form of financial maintenance for a child who has reached age twenty-three. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67e. Our decision is not intended to preclude either defendant or the parties' son from seeking to convert plaintiff's child support obligation to a contribution toward health insurance premiums upon a showing of "exceptional circumstances," which we are unable to conclude exist based on the present record.
8 A-4995-15T1 argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following.
"Laches is an equitable doctrine, operating as an affirmative
defense that precludes relief when there is an 'unexplainable and
inexcusable delay' in exercising a right, which results in
prejudice to another party." Fox v. Millman, 210 N.J. 401, 417
(2012) (quoting Cty. of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 105 (1998)).
"Laches may only be enforced when the delaying party had sufficient
opportunity to assert the right in the proper forum and the
prejudiced party acted in good faith believing that the right had
been abandoned." Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 181 (2003). "The
key factors to be considered in deciding whether to apply the
doctrine are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,
and the 'changing conditions of either or both parties during the
delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 152
(1982)). "[W]hether laches should be applied depends upon the
facts of the particular case and is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179
N.J. 425, 436 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
The doctrine of laches is applicable to divorce proceedings.
Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 572 (1960). However, laches
"cannot validly be used to sponsor an inequitable result." Linek
9 A-4995-15T1 v. Korbeil, 333 N.J. Super. 464, 475 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
165 N.J. 676 (2000).
Guided by these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the trial court's failure to apply laches to bar defendant's
claim for overpayment. The record reflects that defendant sought
to resolve this issue amicably, first by contacting the Probation
Department, and then by way of a proposed consent order that
plaintiff chose not to sign. Any delay by defendant in seeking
this relief in his cross-motion is thus explainable and excusable,
and plaintiff lacks any reasonable basis to believe defendant
abandoned this claim.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
10 A-4995-15T1