Mia Christman v. State of Nevada, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 2:23-cv-01695
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 Mia Christman, Case No.: 2:23-cv-01695-GMN-NJK

6 Petitioner, Order

7 v.

8 State of Nevada, et al.,

9 Respondents. 10 Petitioner Mia Christman filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2254. ECF No. 1. Respondents move to dismiss the Amended Petition as untimely and to 12 dismiss Grounds 1 and 2 as unexhausted in part. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 13 denies Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. 14 I. Background 15 Christman pled guilty to Robbery with Use of a Deadly Weapon and Stop Required on 16 Signal of Police Officer. The state district court entered the judgment of conviction in July 2017 17 and sentenced Christman to an aggregate term of 10 to 30 years. On November 19, 2018, the 18 Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. On June 24, 2019, Christman filed a state post-conviction 19 habeas Petition, which the state district court granted. In August 2022, the Nevada Supreme 20 Court, however, reversed and remanded on appeal finding that the state district court erred. The 21 Nevada Supreme Court denied Christman’s Petition for Rehearing and denied en banc 22 reconsideration. 23 On remand, the state district court scheduled a second evidentiary hearing. On January 1 25, 2023, the State filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus, which the Nevada Supreme Court 2 granted on October 12, 2023, directing the state district court to vacate its evidentiary hearing 3 and enter judgment in favor of the State. The State filed motions with the Nevada Supreme 4 Court seeking enforcement of the Writ of Mandamus, but the Nevada Supreme Court rejected

5 the State’s motions because the State failed to initiate contempt proceedings. The Nevada 6 Supreme Court ordered reassignment of the postconviction habeas case to a new state district 7 court judge because the Nevada Supreme Court was “not convinced the respondent district court 8 judge [would] comply.” ECF No. 34-5 at 4. 9 On May 6, 2024, following reassignment to a new state district court judge, the state 10 district court entered judgment in favor of the State and vacated the order granting Christman’s 11 state habeas Petition. The state district court ordered Christman to surrender to the Nevada 12 Department of Corrections on May 7, 2024. 13 On October 18, 2023, Christman initiated the instant federal habeas proceedings pro se. 14 ECF No. 1. Following appointment of counsel, on January 2, 2025, Christman filed an Amended

15 Petition. ECF Nos. 6, 20. 16 II. Discussion 17 a. Timeliness—AEDPA Statute of Limitations 18 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year 19 limitation period for state prisoners to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 20 The one-year limitation period, i.e., 365 days, begins to run from the latest of four possible 21 triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner’s judgment of 22 conviction became final by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or the expiration of 23 the time for seeking such review. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 1 The AEDPA limitations period is tolled while a “properly filed” state postconviction 2 proceeding or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A “properly filed 3 application” is one in which the “delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable 4 laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 1 (2000); see also Pace v.

5 DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (an untimely petition is not “properly filed”). 6 If an application for collateral review tolls the one-year period of limitations, the 7 application remains pending “until the application has achieved final resolution through the 8 State’s post-conviction procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). While the 9 ordinary state collateral review process is in continuance, an application is pending under § 10 2244(d)(2). Id. Section 2244(d)(2) interacts with state procedural rules by considering whether 11 the collateral review process of the state in which the matter is pending is in continuance. Id. 12 When a court applies a federal statute that interacts with state procedural rules, it must look to 13 how the state procedure functions. Id. at 223. 14 b. Christman’s Federal Petition is Timely

15 The parties agree that the AEDPA statute of limitations began running on February 19, 16 2019.1 Christman’s state habeas Petition was filed on June 24, 2019, tolling the AEDPA clock. 17 As a result, 125 days elapsed between the finality of judgment and the filing of Christman’s state 18 habeas Petition. The remaining 240 days of the AEDPA limitations period were statutorily 19 tolled during the pendency of all proceedings related to the state habeas petition. 20 Respondents argue that Christman’s Petition should be dismissed as untimely because the 21 Nevada Supreme Court issued remittitur, reversing and remanding the state district court’s grant 22

1 Respondents first argued the one-year time period began running on February 17, 2019, but 23 then conceded in their reply that February 17, 2019, was a Sunday, finality did not attach until February 19, 2019. ECF No. 50 at fn 2. 1 of habeas relief, and resolved Christman’s state habeas Petition on January 17, 2023. They assert 2 because Christman filed her original federal habeas Petition 274 days later, on October 18, 2023, 3 her federal habeas Petition is untimely. 4 Christman argues that the state habeas postconviction proceedings were ongoing as she

5 remained out of custody pursuant to the state district court’s order granting habeas relief and 6 releasing her on bond. She asserts that the state habeas Petition was not resolved until May 6, 7 2024, when the state district court entered judgment in favor of the State and vacated the order 8 granting Christman’s state habeas Petition. 9 Although the state appellate court reversed and remanded the state district court’s grant 10 of habeas relief on January 17, 2023, the state district court did not comply with the appellate 11 court’s instructions and Christman’s state habeas Petition did not achieve final resolution until 12 May 6, 2024. Respondents argue that the state district court’s Writ of Mandamus proceedings 13 are not part of the collateral review of a judgment of conviction under Nevada law. 14 Respondents’ argument is not persuasive because Christman’s state habeas Petition remained

15 pending until the state district court’s order entering judgment in favor of the State and vacating 16 the order granting Christman’s state habeas Petition. 17 As such, the AEDPA clock started on May 7, 2024, and expired 240 days later on 18 January 2, 2025. Because Christman’s original pro se federal habeas Petition was initiated on 19 October 18, 2023, and her counseled Amended Petition was filed on January 2, 2025, 20 Respondents’ Motion to Dimiss Christman’s Petition as untimely is denied. 21 c. Exhaustion 22 A state prisoner first must exhaust state court remedies on a habeas claim before 23 presenting that claim to the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This exhaustion 1 requirement ensures that the state courts, as a matter of comity, will have the first opportunity to 2 address and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees. Coleman v. 3 Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1991). “A petitioner has exhausted his federal claims when 4 he has fully and fairly presented them to the state courts.” Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109,

5 1129 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844–45 (1999). To satisfy the 6 exhaustion requirement, a claim must have been raised through one complete round of either 7 direct appeal or collateral proceedings to the highest state court level of review available. 8 O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844–45; Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 9 banc). 10 A properly exhausted claim “‘must include reference to a specific federal constitutional 11 guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Woods, 764 12 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996)) and Davis v. Silva, 511 13 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Fair presentation requires that the petitioner ‘describe in the 14 state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based

15 so that the state courts have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts 16 bearing upon his constitutional claim.’”)). “A claim has not been fairly presented in state court if 17 new factual allegations either ‘fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state 18 courts,’ or ‘place the case in a significantly different and stronger evidentiary posture than it was 19 when the state courts considered it.’” Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1318 (9th Cir. 2014). 20 i. Ground 1 is Exhausted. 21 In Ground 1, Christman alleges that the state district court violated her Sixth Amendment 22 right to counsel when it failed to properly consider and decide her motion to terminate her 23 counsel before she pled guilty. ECF No. 20 at 13. Respondents argue that Ground 1 is partially 1 unexhausted because Christman failed to provide the Nevada Court of Appeals with the 2 transcripts from hearings. Respondents assert that under Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 3 (2011), federal habeas review should be limited to the state court record for each ground for 4 relief as presented to the Nevada appellate court.

5 Christman contends that all of the records at issue are nonetheless a part of the state court 6 record. She further argues that Ninth Circuit precedent determined that Pinholster does not 7 forbid a federal court from considering evidence that was not presented to the state appellate 8 court if that evidence has been presented to the state district court. Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 9 F.3d 1218, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2013). 10 The Court finds that Christman’s current allegations do not render Ground 1 unexhausted 11 because they do not fundamentally alter or strengthen her claims. Christman relies on the same 12 evidence presented to the state court and state appellate court. While the state appellate court 13 was not provided with a copy of transcripts on appeal, current Ninth Circuit law is clear that the 14 record that must be considered on federal habeas review, while applying deferential review under

15 AEDPA, consists of all material in the lower court record, even if not actually in the appeal 16 record. See McDaniels v. Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Jamerson, 17 713 F.3d at 1226-27. For these reasons, the Court finds that Ground 1 is exhausted. 18 ii. Ground 2 is Exhausted. 19 In Ground 2, Christmas alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for 20 failure to present significant mitigating evidence at sentencing. ECF No. 20 at 17. Respondents 21 argue that Ground 2 is partially unexhausted because Christman failed to provide the Nevada 22 Supreme Court with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) police report or 23 LVMPD probable cause arrest documents. ECF Nos. 23-1, 23-2. Respondents assert that 1 Pinholster bars the Court from considering the LVMPD police report and probable cause arrest 2 documents because those records were not included by Christman in the record before the 3 Nevada Supreme Court. 4 Christman asserts that the probable cause records are part of the state court record.

5 Although the LVMPD report does not appear to be part of the state court record, Christmas 6 provides that she cited to the LVMPD report for context only and it is not essential to the claim’s 7 resolution. 8 Similar to its reasoning in Ground 1, the Court finds that the records do not 9 fundamentally alter or place Ground 2 in a significantly different or stronger evidentiary posture 10 than it was when the Nevada courts considered it. Although the LVMPD report appears to have 11 been presented to this Court in the first instance, it merely provides additional details of 12 uncontested fact that Christman was directed by her co-defendant to arrange the robbery and was 13 not present when the victim was assaulted. The addition of the LVMPD records do not render 14 Christman’s claim unexhausted. The Court finds that Ground 2 is exhausted.

15 To the extent that any of the factual arguments in the records were not properly 16 developed in state court in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, 17 596 U.S. 366, 378 (2022), the Court at this time does not determine whether any of such material 18 will ultimately be admissible under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) to support Christman’s claims. Further, 19 the Court does not make any comment about the merit of any of her claims. These issues will be 20 addressed in due course. 21 d. Ground 1 is Not Barred Under Tollett. 22 In Tollett v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “when a 23 criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense 1 with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 2 deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” 411 U.S. 3 258, 267 (1973). A petitioner may only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the guilty 4 plea. Id.

5 An exception to this general rule is “that a habeas petitioner may ‘attack the voluntary 6 and intelligent character of the guilty plea’ based on pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel 7 ‘by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the ‘range of competence 8 demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Mahrt v. Beard, 849 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) 9 (citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267-69). The Court in Mahrt clarified that this exception to the 10 Tollett bar is not limited to incompetent advice from counsel and extends to instances in which 11 “the action, or inaction of counsel prevent[ed] petitioner from making an informed choice 12 whether to plead.” Id. 13 In Ground 1, Christman alleges that the state district court violated her Sixth Amendment 14 right to counsel when it failed to properly consider and decide her motion to dismiss counsel

15 before she entered her guilty plea. “Given the commands of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, a 16 state trial court has no discretion to ignore an indigent defendant’s timely motion to relieve an 17 appointed attorney.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). It is arguable that 18 Christman alleges that the state district court’s failure to consider her motion to dismiss counsel 19 undermined her ability to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. Under those circumstances, 20 Tollett would arguably not bar Christman’s claim asserted in Ground 1. The Court does not 21 grant Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Ground 1 as barred by Tollett at this stage of the 22 proceedings. After the parties have addressed Ground 1 on the merits, the Court may revisit this 23 if Respondents raise it in their Answer. At this point, however, Ground 1 is not dismissed 2||as barred by Tollett. 3 HI. Conclusion 4 It is therefore ordered that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) is DENIED. Respondents may reassert their argument that Ground 1 should be dismissed as barred under 6|| Tollett in their Answer. 7 It is further ordered that Respondents have until April 27, 2026, to file and serve an Answer addressing the claims in Christman’s Amended Petition. 9 It is further ordered that Christman will have 30 days from the date of service of the 10|| Answer to file and serve a Reply. 11 DATED: | February 25, 2026 12 13 GLORI □ -NAVARRO UNIT ATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23