Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJuly 13, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00373
StatusUnknown

This text of Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC (Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC, (D. Nev. 2020).

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 SANDRA M. MEZA-PEREZ, Case No.: 2:19-cv-00373-APG-NJK 7 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 8 v. (Docket No. 138) 9 SBARRO LLC, et al., 10 Defendant(s). 11 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel against Defendant Zachary 12 Ceballes. Docket No. 138. Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to provide complete responses to 13 deposition questioning and interrogatories. Id. at 1. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s motion, 14 Defendant’s response, and Plaintiff’s reply. Docket Nos. 138, 140, 143. The motion is properly 15 resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons stated below, the motion is 16 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 This case arises from, inter alia, allegations of sexual harassment and hostile work 19 environment. See Docket No. 7 at 6–44. On February 26, 2020, Defendant testified at his 20 deposition that he and Plaintiff had engaged in sexual relations at their place of work, Sbarro, while 21 he was her manager. Docket Nos. 138 at 2, 138-2 at 11, 12. Defendant also testified that Plaintiff 22 was not the only Sbarro employee with whom he had engaged in sexual relations while he was a 23 manager. Docket Nos. 138 at 2, 138-2 at 11, 12. On his counsel’s instruction, Defendant refused 24 to disclose the identity of any other employees due to privacy concerns. See Docket No. 138-2 at 25 3–4. On March 20, 2020, Defendant refused to identify, in response to Plaintiff’s interrogatories, 26 any other Sbarro employee with whom he had engaged in sexual relations while he was employed 27 at Sbarro, again due to privacy concerns. See Docket No. 138-3 at 3. Defendant similarly refused 28 to identify any employees of the Monte Carlo Hotel or the food court with whom he had engaged 1 in sexual relations while he was employed at Sbarro. Id. 3–4. Discovery closed March 25, 2020. 2 See Docket No. 147. Plaintiff filed her motion to compel that same day. Docket No. 138. 3 II. ANALYSIS 4 This Court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery. Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 5 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). The scope of discovery is limited to nonprivileged matter relevant to a 6 party’s claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The 7 party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing why the discovery should not be 8 allowed. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). The party that resists 9 discovery must detail, through “specific examples and articulated reasoning,” why each discovery 10 request is objectionable, and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory, or speculative 11 arguments. See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006); see also 12 F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev. 2013). 13 Plaintiff’s motion focuses on interrogatories rather than the questions asked at Defendant’s 14 deposition. See Docket No. 138 at 4–7. Thus, the Court’s analysis does the same. See Kor Media 15 Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013) (noting that Courts address only 16 sufficiently developed arguments). Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant to “supplement his 17 responses to [Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Nos. 11 and 12] by revealing the identity of the other 18 employee at Sbarro that he engaged in sexual relations with.” See Docket No. 138 at 2. 19 “An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” 20 Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(2). Interrogatories are intended “to enable a party to prepare for trial, to narrow 21 the issues, and thus help determine what evidence will be needed at the trial, and to reduce the 22 possibility of surprise at the trial.” 8B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2162 (3d ed.). “Toward [those 23 ends], Rule 26(b) is liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information even [if] 24 the information may not be admissible at the trial.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 635 25 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Court analyzes the two disputed interrogatories in turn. 26 A. Interrogatory No. 11 27 Please state whether you had any sexual relations with any employee of Sbarro Pizza during the duration of your employment with Sbarro 28 Pizza. If so, please state the number of employees you had sexual relations with, the names of the employees, the number of times you 1 had sexual relations with each employee, whether the sexual encounters were consensual, and where the sexual encounters took 2 place. 3 Docket No. 138 at 3. Defendant partially answered this interrogatory, stating that he had “had 4 regular sexual relations . . . with Plaintiff” but objecting to the part relating to other employees “on 5 the grounds that it is not calculated to lead to the discovery of information relevant” to this case 6 and because it “seeks disclosure of personal and private information of third parties” not implicated 7 in Plaintiff’s allegations. Docket No. 138-3 at 3. 8 Defendant submits two lines of argument. First, Defendant submits that the information 9 sought by this interrogatory is not relevant because it is “delv[ing] into the private affairs of persons 10 not a party to this case.” Docket No. 140 at 4. Second, Defendant submits that he and “Ann Riko 11 aka Elizabeth Riko” and “Ana Romero”—two witnesses listed in Plaintiff’s initial disclosures but 12 who have never been deposed1—or any other third party “has the right to maintain private whom 13 they have had sex with in [or] outside of the workplace.” Id. at 3. Defendant further submits that 14 (1) to require Defendant “to disclose who he had sex with at work,” other than with Plaintiff, 15 “would unnecessarily encroach on those privacy rights of persons not a party to this case” and (2) 16 that “requiring disclosure could . . . expose [Defendant] to legal claims by those same person(s) 17 alleging he breached their expected privacy rights.” Id. (emphasis removed). 18 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s motion requests only that the Court compel Defendant to 19 supplement his responses by revealing the identity of the other employee at Sbarro with whom he 20 engaged in sexual relations. Docket No. 138 at 4. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no argument, let 21 alone a sufficiently developed one, about the relevance of the information sought by this 22 interrogatory beyond identity. Thus, the Court will limit its analysis to the request for the identity. 23 See Kor Media Grp., 294 F.R.D. at 582 n.3. 24 The Court finds that Defendant has failed to sufficiently demonstrate why he should not 25 have to respond to the identity request in this interrogatory. Stating only that the information 26

27 1 Although Plaintiff listed these names in her initial disclosures as two separate people, Plaintiff now uses these names in her reply as if she is a single person with multiple possible 28 names. See Docket No. 143 at 2–3. 1 sought by this interrogatory is not relevant because it would delve into the private affairs of third 2 parties makes little sense and is unpersuasive. It is at least plausible that learning the identities of 3 other Sbarro employees who engaged in sexual relations with Defendant while he was employed 4 there could reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Oppenheimer Fund v.. 5 Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation omitted).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Meza-Perez v. Sbarro LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meza-perez-v-sbarro-llc-nvd-2020.