Meyer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided August 16, 2021·No. 18-484·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: July 21, 2021

* * * * * * * * * * * * * BETTE M. MEYER, as personal * representative of the estate of * DONALD D. MEYER, deceased, * UNPUBLISHED * Petitioner, * No. 18-484V * v. * Special Master Dorsey * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Kathleen Margaret Loucks, Lommen Abdo Law Firm, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner. Debra A. Filteau Begley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On April 3, 2018, Bette M. Meyer (“petitioner”), as personal representative of the estate of Donald D. Meyer, deceased, filed a petition in the National Vaccine Injury Program2 alleging that as a result of a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine administered on July 26, 2017, Mr. Meyer developed Guillain-Barré Syndrome and died on August 26, 2017. Petition at ¶¶ 1, 6 (ECF No. 1).

1 Because this unpublished Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioners have 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. 2 The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is set forth in Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All citations in this Decision to individual sections of the Vaccine Act are to 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa.

1 On June 18, 2021, petitioner filed a motion for interim attorney’s fees and costs, requesting compensation for the attorney and paralegals who worked on her case. Petitioner’s Application for Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Pet. Mot.”), filed June 18, 2020 (ECF No. 72). Petitioner’s request can be summarized as follows:

Attorney’s Fees – $44,096.20 Attorney’s Costs – $24,304.073 Petitioner’s Costs – $1,617.364

Petitioner thus requests a total of $70,017.63. Respondent filed his response to petitioner’s application on July 13, 2021, stating that he “respectfully requests that the Court exercise its discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Respondent’s Response to Pet. Mot., filed July. 13, 2021, at 3 (ECF No. 73).

This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned GRANTS IN PART petitioner’s motion and awards $69,246.63 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. DISCUSSION

Under the Vaccine Act, the special master shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for any petition that results in an award of compensation. § 15(e)(1). When compensation is not awarded, the special master “may” award reasonable fees and costs “if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” Id. If a special master has not yet determined entitlement, she may still award attorneys’ fees and costs on an interim basis. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Such awards “are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” Id. Similarly, it is proper for a special master to award interim fees and costs “[w]here the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and that there exists a good faith basis for the claim.” Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

The claim appears at this point to have been brought in good faith and built on a reasonable basis. Moreover, the undersigned finds that an award of interim attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate here where there are significant expert fees to be paid.

3 Dr. Gershwin requested a total of $17,000.00 for his expert fees. See Pet. Mot., Ex. 3. After a review of Dr. Gershwin’s invoices, however, he billed a total of 34.75 hours at a rate of $500.00 per hour, equaling $17,375.00. See id. Thus, petitioner’s motion requesting $23,929.07 for counsel’s costs has been increased by $375.00. 4 Although petitioner’s motion requests $1,617.37 for petitioner’s costs, petitioner’s declaration and Ms. Mitzi Mellot’s declaration indicate petitioner paid $1,617.36. See Pet. Mot., Exs. 4-5.

2 A. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. Using the lodestar approach, a court first determines “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. Id. at 1348.

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316-18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing the petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729(Fed. Cl. 2011). Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Act and its attorneys to determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19, 1991), rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . .

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Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Blum v. Stenson
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Avera v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
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Shaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
609 F.3d 1372 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
Savin v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
85 Fed. Cl. 313 (Federal Claims, 2008)
Broekelschen v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
102 Fed. Cl. 719 (Federal Claims, 2011)
Rochester v. United States
18 Cl. Ct. 379 (Court of Claims, 1989)