Meyer v. Construction Company

100 U.S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593, 10 Otto 457, 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1840

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: December 15, 1879
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Chief Justice Waite,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Three principal questions are presented by these cases. They are: —

1. Was the suit pending in the State court one which could by law be removed to the Circuit Court of the United States ?

2. If it could, was the application for removal made in time, and was it sufficient in form to effect a transfer ? and, ■

3. If the transfer was lawfully made, are the decrees of the Circuit Court, giving the mortgage priority over the mechanic’s lien and the title of the Delaware County Railroad Company, right ?

These will be considered in their order.

1. As to the right of removal.

The act of March 3, 1876 (18 Stat., part 3, 470), was in force when the application for removal was made, but not when the new trial was granted to Dennison. The second section of that act contains, among others, the following provision : “ That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending ... in any State court, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, ... in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States, . . . either party may remove said suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district.”

This we understand to mean that when the controversy about which a suit in the State court is brought is between eitizens of one or more States on one side, and citizens of other States on the other side, either party to the controversy may remove the suit to the Circuit Court, without regard to the position they occupy in the pleadings as plaintiffs .or defendants. For the purposes of a removal the matter in dispute may be ascertained, and the parties to the suit arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If in such arrangement it appears that those on one side are all citizens of different States from those on the other, the suit may be removed. Under the old law the pleadings only were looked at, arid the rights of the parties in respect to a removal were determined solely according to the position they occupied as plaintiffs or' defendants in the suit. Coal Company v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. 174. Under the new law the mere form of the pleadings may be put aside, and the parties placed on different sides of the matter in dispute according to the facts. This being done, when all those on one side desire a removal, it may be had, if the necessary citizenship exists.

In the present case, it appears that the suit was originally brought by a citizen of Iowa against' another citizen of Iowa and citizens of Pennsylvania and Ohio. There were then, according to the pleadings, two matters about which there might be dispute, — one between the construction company and the railroad company, both citizens of Iowa, as to the amount due the construction company and the actual existence of a mechanic’s lien, and the other between the construction company and the trustees of the mortgage, citizens of different States, as to the priority of the mortgage over the mechanic’s lien. But before the trustees of the mortgage were actually brought into court by service of process, the dispute between the construction company and the railroad company had been finally disposed of. The amount due the construction company had been ascertained so far as that company and the railroad company were concerned, the mechanic’s lien established, and the property sold under the lien to pay the debt. There was after that nothing left of the suit except that part which related solely and exclusively to the priority of the mortgage lien, and as to this the controversy was between the construction company on the one side, and the mortgage trustees on the other. If the railroad company still continued a party to the suit, it was a nomi nal party only, and its interests were in no way whatever connected with those of the trustees. It did .not, therefore, occupy.a position in the controversy on the same side with them. This being the case, it is apparent that in the then condition of the suit the only controversy to be settled was between the mortgage trustee's, citizens of Pehnsylvania and Ohio, on one side, and the construction company and railroad company, citizens of Iowa, on the other. As such, under the construction we have given this provision of the statute, the' suit was removable by reason of that provision. This makes it unnecessary to give an interpretation to that part of the same section of the act of 1875, which, for the purposes of .statement, "may be read as follows: —

“ That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State court, when the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, ... in which there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as ‘between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district.”

We reserve the consideration of this provision until a case requiring it arises. This suit, when the petition for removal was filed, was one in which the only controversy to be decided was between citizens of different States, and therefore provided for in the first clause. Necessarily a removal would take the whole suit to the Circuit Court, because, in its then condition, the suit related to a single controversy only. Whether, as argued, a removal could also have been had under the last clause, we do not decide.

2. As to the removal.

The third section of the act of 1875, so far as it is applicable to this case, reads as follows : —

“ That, whenever either party, . . . entitled to remove any suit mentioned in the next preceding section, shall desire to remove such suit from a State court to the Circuit Court of the United States, he or .they may make and file a petition in such suit in such State court before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried, and before the trial thereof for the removal of such suit into the Circuit Court, to be held in the district where such suit is pending, and shall make and file therewith a bond, with good and.sufficient surety, for his or their entering into such circuit court, on the first day of its then next session, a copy of the record in such suit, and for paying all costs that may be awarded by the said Circuit Court, if said court shall bold that suoli suit was wrongfully or improperly removed thereto, and also for their appearing and entering special bail iu such suit, if special bail was originally requisite therein, it shall then be the duty of the State court to accept said petition and bond, and proceed no further in such suit, and any bail that may have been originally taken shall be discharged ; and the said copy being entered as aforesaid in said Circuit Court of the United States, the cause shall then proceed in the same manner as if it had been originally commenced in said Circuit Court.”

The petition filed in this case was sufficient in form. Enough appeared on its face to entitle the petitioner to his removal. While it included a statement of belief that, from prejudice or local influence, justice could not be secured by a trial in the State court, no affidavit to that effect was filed; and this statement could be rejected as surplusage, leaving still good cause for the removal on account of the citizenship of the parties. Although Meyer’s name was included as a petitioner, that of Dennison was included also; and, as Meyer was not a party to the suit, his name could be rejected as surplusage, and the petition left to stand as that of Dennison alone. The paper was evidently drafted and put on file under the belief that Meyer would be substituted for Thompson as a party to the suit. This having been unexpectedly refused, it was presented to the court by the counsel of Dennison, without amendment, as in legal effect the petition of Dennison alone. This, we think, might lawfully be done. Under the circumstances, it was the duty of the court to treat the application as coming from Dennison only.

The petition was not signed. No objection was made on this account in the State court; and it came too late in the Circuit Court. If it had been made in the State court, the defect— if in fact there was one — would, no doubt, have been cured at once by the signature of counsel. The petition was in writing. On its face, it purported to be the petition of Meyer and Dennison; and it was in fact the petition of Dennison. This the court knew, because it was actually presented by the counsel of Dennison, and was accompanied by a bond purporting also to be signed in the name of Meyer and Dennison. In short, every thing in the whole proceeding showed that it was in fact what, under the circumstances, it purported to be, — the application of Dennison, made in good faith, for the removal of the cause.

The bond was sufficient in form. The condition was such as the statute required. There was no special bail in the case. Nothing was, therefore, to be secured by the bond but the filing of the transcript in the Circuit Court, on the first day of its then next term, and the payment of any costs that might be awarded by that court, in case it should hold that the suit had been- wrongfully or improperly removed. No objection was made to the sufficiency of the surety. The only complaint seems to have been that one of the persons who signed the bond as a surety was an attorney of the court, which was forbidden by the laws of Iowa and the practice of the State court.Without determining whether this would have justified the court in not accepting the bond, if he had been the only surety, it is sufficient to say that the act of Congress does not make it necessary that two persons should sign the bond as sureties'. “ Good and sufficient surety ” is all that is required ; and this is satisfied if there is one surety able to respond to the condition of the bond. The question here is not whether the court below had the right to pass upon the sufficiency of the surety, but whether, upon the facts as they appear in this record, it was justified in refusing to accept this bond. We are now examining the case after judgment below in reference to errors which are alleged to have occurred in the progress of' the cause. If, the State court refuses to accept a bond offered by a petitioner for removal which has “ good and sufficient surety ” in law, it is error that may be reviewed here. That court has no discretion in such a matter. , Its action is governed by fixed rules. Here,_as no objection was made to the pecuniary responsibility of the one person who signed as surety, and was competent under the laws of Iowa to do so, it was clearly error for the court to refuse to accept the bond because a second surety was an attorney of the court. Such being the case, we are clearly of opinion that, so far as the form of the application was concerned, the State court was not justified in refusing to accept the petition and bond, and in proceeding further in the cause.

We think also the application was made in time. It is con ceded that the petition was filed during the first term of the court at which the suit could- be tried, after the act of 1875 went into operation. It has, so far, as we know, been uniformly held on the circuit, and to our minds correctly, that, in suits pending when the act was passed, the' application was in time, if made at the first term of the court thereafter. Baker v. Peterson, 4 Dill. 562; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 3 Saw. 553; Andrews v. Garrett, 2 Cent. Law Jour. 797; The Merchants’ & Manufacturers’ National Bank v. Wheeler, 13 Blatch. 218; Crane v. Reeder, 15 Alb. Law Jour. 103. This disposes of one objection made to the time when the petition was filed.

It has, however, been argued with great earnestness that the petition for removal was not actually presented' to the court “ before trial.” We agree that, as a general rule, the petition must be filed in a way that it may be said to have been in law presented to the court before the trial is in good faith entered upon. There may be exceptions to this rule; but we think it clear that Congress did not intend, by the expression “ before trial,” to allow a party to experiment on his case in the State court, and, if he met with unexpected difficulties, stop the proceedings, and take his suit to another tribunal. But, to bar the right of removal, it must appear that the trial had actually begun and was in progress in the orderly course of proceeding when the application was made. No mere attempt of one party to get himself on tbe record as having begun the trial will be enough. The case must be actually on trial by tbe court, all parties acting in good faith, before the right of removal is gone.

Upon the facts in this case it is apparent, to our minds, that the trial had in no sense begun when Dennison presented his petition formally to the court for a removal. It is equally apparent that the counsel for the construction company attempted to get up a race of diligence with his adversary, in which he should come out ahead. As soon as the court decided not to admit Meyer as a party to the suit, he seems to have offered the contract sued on in evidence ; but, unfortunately for him, in so doing he did not keep himself inside the "Orderly course of proceedings. It is evident that at that time the cause was not up for hearing on its merits; and it nowhere appears that the court accepted then the offer of the counsel to put in his evidence. Before any action was taken by the court on that subject, Dennison presented his petition, which had been on file ready to be presented, as soon as the motion of Meyer was decided.. Immediately after the application of Dennison was disposed Of, the court adjourned until the next day; and, when it again met, Dennison renewed his application. This being refused, the construction company asked leave to file a reply, which up to that time had not been doné,'and which was necessary to complete the pleadings, and make up the issues for trial. That being done, and a motion by Dennisón for leave to amend his answer overruled, the court proceeded “ with the trial of said cause on the ■ issues joined therein.” A statement of these facts is'sufficient to show that, when Dennison presented his petition in form to the court, the trial had in no just sense begun. As in the case of Yulee v. Vose (99 U. S. 539), “the most that can be said is, that preparations were being made for trial.”

It is further claimed that the citizenship of Dennison in 'Ohio was not proved. As in the case of the sufficiency of the bond, the question here is not whether, if the statements of the petitioner in that particular had been denied, it would have been competent for the State court to institute an inquiry on that subject, but whether, on the facts as they appear on the face of this record, which also shows how they should have appeared to the court below, that court was justified in proceeding further in the suit. We fully recognize the principle heretofore asserted in many cases, that the State court is not required to let go its jurisdiction until a case is made which, upon its face, shows that the petitioner can remove the cause as a matter of right. But here, to say nothing of the statements in the petition which were not disputed, the record is full of evidence that Dennison was a citizen of Ohio. In the mortgage Thompson is described as of Pennsylvania, and Dennison as of Ohio. In addition to this, in order to bring them into court, the affidavit of the counsel for the construction company was put on file, in which it is directly stated, under date of April 6, 1874, that personal service of process could not be made on them within the State, and that they were non-residents. Under these circumstances, it was certainly error for the State court to retain the cause because it was not shown that the citizenship of the adverse parties was in different States.. The citizenship of the two corporations in Iowa is averred by the construction company in its own pleadings.

It is still further claimed that even though the lower court ought to have accepted the petition and bond and withheld all further proceedings in the suit, that error was waived by the subsequent appearance of Dennison and going to a hearing, and that for this reason it was right for the Supreme Court not to reverse the judgment because of the original fault. This question is settled by .the case of Insurance Company v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, where it is distinctly held that if a party failed in his efforts to obtain a removal and was forced to trial, he lost none of his rights by defending against the action. This record is full of protests on the part of Dennison against going on with the suit, and of exceptions to the ruling which kept him in court. Indeed, it is difficult to see what more he could have done than he did do to get out of court and take his suit with him. He remained simply because he was forced to remain, and is certainly now in a condition to have the original error of which he complained corrected in any court having jurisdiction for that purpose. In addition to this, we now know that he did take his suit to the Circuit Court and carried his adversaries with him. It is true, by reason of the fault of the clerk of the State court, he was unable to file his transcript of the record in the Circuit Court on the first day of the term, but he did so on the second, and had the cause regularly docketed, after which a trial was had, all parties appearing. It is also true that the construction company objected to the delay, but that objection was, as we think, properly overruled. While the act of Congress requires security that the transcript shall be filed on the first day, it nowhere appears that the Circuit Court is to be deprived of its jurisdiction if, by accident, the party is delayed until a later day in the term. If the Circuit Court, for good cause shown, accepts the transfer after the day and during the term, its jurisdiction will, as a general rule, be complete and the removal properly effected.

We must, therefore, hold that the Supreme Court of the State erred in not reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of the county and sending the cause back with instructions to that court to proceed no further with the suit.

3. As to the priority of liens.

It is conceded that by the laws of Iowa a mechanic’s lien for work done under a contract takes precedence of all incumbrances put on the property by mortgage or otherwise after the work was commenced. Such has been the uniform course of decisions by the highest court of the State.

It is also conceded that, by a statute of the State (Code 1874, sect. 385), there can be no mechanic’s lien in favor of one who takes collateral security on the contract under which he does his work.

Such being the law, it is cle'ar that as the mortgage was not recorded until June 4, 1872, and work under the contract of the construction company was commenced Sept. 29, 1870, the mechanic’s lien must have precedence, unless the construction company took collateral security on their contract, or something equivalent was done.

It is contended that the words, “ all the money for the work hereinbefore specified to be paid by the citizens of Delaware County,” which appear above the signature of the president of the railroad company to the contract, give the construction company collateral security, and thus vitiate the lien. We cannot so interpret the contract. In' the body of the instrument the'obligation of the railroad company to pay is absolute and unconditional. The additional clause does not purport to transfer to the construction company the moneys that are due or that may become due from the citizens of Delaware County. No control is given the construction company over these moneys. The most that can be said of the clause is that it contains an implied obligation on the part of the railroad company to use the money which came into its hands from the citizens of Delaware County to discharge its obligations under the contract, and a corresponding obligation on the part of the construction company to wait a reasonable time for the collection of these moneys before putting the railroad company in default for non-payment.

In Christmas v. Russell (14 Wall. 69), we said: “An agreement to pay out of a particular fund, however clear its terms, is not an equitable assignment; a covenant in the most solemn form has no greater effect. . . . The assignor must not retain ány control over the fund, any power to collect, or any power of revocation. If he do, it is fatal to the claim of the assignee.” It seems to us that this is conclusive of the present case. The railroad company has nowhere by its agreement given the construction company any power to collect. The amount due is nowhere specified; neither does it appear from the instrument itself what was the nature of the obligations the citizens of Delaware County were under to make the payment. It is not even said that the payments thus to be made grew out of any obligations of the citizens of Delaware County to the railroad company. According to the construction claimed, the addition of these somewhat indefinite wqrds at the end of the contract, and after a part of the signatures had been affixed, must have the effect of changing the whole tenor of the contract as set out in the body of the instrument, and substituting the citizens of Delaware County as obligors and bound absolutely for the payment of the work to be performed, instead of the railroad company. Such we cannot believe was the intention of the parties, and every thing which occurred afterwards is entirely inconsistent with any such idea. It now appears from the evidence that there had been very considerable subscriptions to the capital stock of the railroad, company by the citizens of Delaware County, and that taxes had been levied by the county, or some of the townships in the county, to aid in the construction of the railroad. It also appears that all. of this money was collected by and paid to the railroad company. In no single instance, so far as we can discover, was it paid to the construction company. The full amount subscribed and levied was not sufficient to pay all that was due that company. Much of it was paid over, but all of it was not. Of the amount paid the construction company by the railroad company a very considerable portion was collected •from other sources.

Without pursuing the subject further, it is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the construction company has done nothing to waive or deprive it of the right to assert-a mechanic’s lien, and that the decrees of the Circuit Court establishing the superiority of the lien of the mortgage were wrong and must be reversed. As the sale under the execution from the State court, by which the Delaware County Railroad Company now holds and claims title was made in a suit to -which the trustees of the mortgage were not at the time parties served with process, the sale did not cut off their interest as mortgagees of the property sold. Neither are they bound by the decree in the State court finding the amount due the construction company. The Delaware County Railroad Company took by its purchase only such title-as the construction company had to convey, and as the interest of the mortgagees was not cut off by the sale to the construction company, it is not cut off by the transfer to the Delaware County Company.

We, therefore, order and adjudge as follows: —

1. That the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa be reversed with costs, and that the cause be remanded, with instructions to reverse the decree of the Circuit Court of Delaware County, and direct that court to proceed no further with the suit.

2. That the decree of the Circuit Court of .the United States in the second of these cases be reversed with costs, and that the cause be remanded with instructions to ascertain the amount due the Construction Company under its contract, and to enter a decree establishing the lien of that company as prior in right to that of thé mortgage, and in default of payment of the amount due by a day to be named, directing the sale of that part of the railroad company which lies in Delaware County, to pay the debt. Such provision for redemption' is to be made as is allowed in such cases by the laws of Iowa.

.3. The decree of the Circuit Court in the remaining case is also reversed with costs, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter a - decree establishing the . lien of the Construction Company as superior to that of the mortgage, and declaring the title of the Delaware County Railroad Company, by reason of the sheriff’s sale in the State court to be invalid and not sufficient to pass title as against the lien of the mortgage, and for such other proceedings as justice requires.