2025 IL App (1st) 241162-U No. 1-24-1162
FIRST DIVISION August 25, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION ) Appeal from the Circuit Court DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO, ) of Cook County, Illinois. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) No. 23 CH 322 v. ) INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ) ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 9, ) The Honorable ) Eve M. Reilly, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court erred in entering summary judgment denying the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago’s motion to vacate the arbitration award where the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ignoring pertinent terms of the collective bargaining agreements.
¶2 Plaintiff Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (MWRD) appeals
the circuit court’s granting of defendant International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
9’s (Union) motion for summary judgment denying MWRD’s motion to vacate an arbitration
award regarding payments to Union members during a period when MWRD operations were 1-24-1162
affected by COVID. On appeal, MWRD contends that (1) the circuit court erred in not vacating
the arbitration award because the arbitrator exceeded his authority by not defining the specific term
“paid time off” which was the trigger for the facility closure benefits ordered by the arbitrator, and
the award failed to draw its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreements (CBAs);
and (2) the award violated Illinois public policy. For the following reasons, we vacate the
arbitration award.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 MWRD is a unit of local government, which provides wastewater treatment and
stormwater management for Chicago and suburbs throughout Cook County. MWRD manages
seven wastewater treatment plants which operate continuously throughout the year. During the
relevant period of March through October 2020, MWRD had approximately 1740 employees, and
approximately 85 of those employees were members of the Union. The Union acted as the
exclusive bargaining representative for MWRD’s electrical operations, electrical instrumentation
and testing, and motor vehicle dispatcher groups.
¶5 A. The Collective Bargaining Agreements
¶6 MWRD and the Union were parties to three CBAs for the above groups which were
effective from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2020. The parties extended the effective dates of
these CBAs by agreement to June 30, 2021.
¶7 The CBAs each included the following relevant provisions:
“SECTION 2.01 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, the management of the plant and direction of the work force, including but not limited to *** the right to determine the methods, processes and means of operations are vested exclusively in [MWRD]. *** [The Union] recognizes that the nature of [MWRD’s] operations require some degree of flexibility in making work assignments to its employees to meet emergencies.
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***
SECTION 24.05 FACILITY CLOSURES. 1 When [MWRD] allows paid time off as a result of a facility closure or due to an emergency or other reasons, the following will apply:
1. Full Day District Designated Facility Closure a) Non-shift employees who are instructed not to report for work shall receive payroll code 0017—Employee Benefit for the workday. b) Non-shift employees who are not working due to a prescheduled paid day off will have their time sheet adjusted to reflect payroll code 0017—Employee Benefit for the workday if work is not available to them due to their work location being closed. c) Non-shift employees who are directed to report to work when their work location is closed shall be compensated at 1-1/2 times their hourly rate for all hours worked. Such employees will be coded 0017—Employee Benefit for any regularly scheduled hours not worked during their scheduled workday.
e) Shift employees who are scheduled to report to work and report to work shall receive their regular compensation in addition to payroll code 0026—Holiday Earned for the number of hours worked equal to the paid time off received by non-shift employees in the bargaining unit at their assigned work location, up to a maximum of eight (8) hours holiday earned credit.” 2
¶8 The CBAs also contained a section regarding procedures for submitting grievances before
the MWRD. The outlined policies provided for a three-step grievance procedure with MWRD,
where, if not settled at the third step, either party may request a final and binding arbitration
regarding the grievance.
1 This section is numbered 24.05 in the Electrical Operations and Motor Vehicle Dispatcher Group CBAs but is numbered 23.09 in the Electrical Instrumentation and Testing CBA. 2 This subsection is in the Electrical Operations and Electrical Instrumentation and Testing CBAs but not the Motor Vehicle Dispatched Group CBA. The evidence at the hearing on the grievance merits established that “[f]or the most part,” the motor vehicle dispatchers and the electrical instrumentation and testing group were non-shift employees, and the electrical operators were both shift and non-shift employees. -3- 1-24-1162
¶9 B. MWRD Operations During COVID
¶ 10 On March 13, 2020, MWRD’s Executive Director determined that MWRD would operate
at reduced on-site staffing levels in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Non-shift employees
were sent home, and shift workers who needed to maintain critical operations reported in. As a
result, MWRD began paying premium payments to the employees represented by the Union,
consistent with the Facility Closure provision of the CBAs. These employees continued to receive
premium payments until May 11, 2020, when MWRD ceased paying the facility closure
premiums.
¶ 11 The Union filed grievances on behalf of the three groups under the procedures of the CBA,
challenging MWRD’s decision to stop paying the facility closure premiums. The grievances were
processed through the CBA grievance procedures, and were denied at the third step on October
12, 2020. The Union then requested the grievances be advanced to a final and binding arbitration
on October 15, 2020.
¶ 12 C. January 27, 2021, Arbitration Hearing
¶ 13 On January 27, 2021, the dispute progressed to an arbitration hearing before Arbitrator
Brian Clauss regarding the merits of the grievance. The parties agreed that Arbitrator Clauss would
first decide the merits of the grievance, and would conduct a separate hearing regarding the remedy
if the parties were unable to reach an agreement.
¶ 14 At the hearing on the merits, Union counsel argued that the CBAs established three
“triggers” for premium payments under the Facility Closures sections: (1) a facility closure, (2) an
emergency, or (3) another reason. Under the contracts, when non-shift employees report to work
where their work location is otherwise closed, they will be paid a premium rate of one-and-a-half
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times their hourly rate. Similarly, shift employees would get additional holiday pay for reporting
to work when their work location is closed.
¶ 15 Union counsel contended that in mid-March, MWRD operated at minimum staffing levels,
and employees received premium pay. These premium payments stopped on May 11, 2020, but
MWRD operations hadn’t changed because most employees were still not reporting to the work
site, and were classified as “on call, waiting to be called in by [MWRD], or working remotely.”
Union members, however, were required to come in to work. During this time, employees who
were “on call” or working remotely were being paid using payroll code 17A, which is a code used
“for early dismissal due to weather or other special case conditions.” The Union presented an office
memorandum from April 28, 2020, which stated that as of late April, approximately 15 percent of
trades employees were reporting to work each day.
¶ 16 The Union further presented several emails from March 2020, wherein representatives of
MWRD defined a facility closure as “minimum staffing” and referenced the language from the
CBA provisions regarding Facility Closures regarding employee compensation. When MWRD
ceased premium payments, it did so by stating that it was ending the “facility closure
compensation.” Although some employees returned to the workplace in late May and early June
2020, as of June 5, 2020, 50 percent of trades employees were staying home. As of December
2020, more than 800 employees did not report to work and were paid using pay code 17A.
¶ 17 In December 2019, MWRD had issued a business continuity plan in the event of a public
health emergency, wherein essential personnel, such as the Union members, were to be
compensated at a premium rate for the entire emergency closing period. However, the plan also
noted that for closings longer than one week, “other guidelines may be established.” MWRD never
attempted to negotiate other guidelines with the Union.
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¶ 18 MWRD presented the testimony of Ted Kosowski, MWRD’s Assistant Director of Human
Resources. Kosowski testified that on March 13, 2020, MWRD’s Executive Director worked with
the Board of Commissioners to implement a “proactive” approach to quarantine periods in order
to protect the workforce, namely, to operate under reduced staffing. At that point, shift workers
remained at work. When MWRD first determined they would send employees home, the facility
closure language of the CBAs was triggered because they had used that provision in the past during
emergency situations. Employees required to physically report to an MWRD worksite were given
extra compensation. MWRD was working quickly to implement telecommuting protocols, because
few employees prior to March 2020 had access to telecommuting. However, Kosowski testified
that the MWRD wastewater treatment facilities never stopped operating during this time and, thus,
MWRD “never closes.”
¶ 19 On March 13, 2020, MWRD issued a press release telling the public that MWRD
wastewater plants were operating and manned “24/7” while the remainder of MWRD employees
would be “on call” or telecommuting. On March 16, 2020, the Director of Human Resources sent
employees an email regarding compensation. Kosowski described payroll code 17 as a “paid-time-
off benefit” for non-shift employees to vote during their working hours, and payroll code 17A
allowed employees to have pay under different circumstances, directed by the Executive Director,
while other employees were required to be at work. Code 17A was traditionally used for pre-
holiday early leave for Thanksgiving or Christmas, and it had also been used to direct employees
to stay home during a weather event or to allow employees to leave work early due to a contentious
trial which could have caused civil unrest.
¶ 20 On April 17, 2020, MWRD’s Director of Human Resources emailed all employees to
inform them that non-represented, non-shift employees were to be returned to regular straight-time
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pay beginning on April 20, 2020. This decision was made because the pandemic had a longer
duration than initially anticipated, and likely would be inconsistent with protocols developed in
the 2019 business continuity plan. At this time, a significant portion of MWRD employees were
teleworking, so the situation did not resemble a traditional facility closure event, where staff was
“not expected to report to work.” On May 8, 2020, MWRD determined that on May 10, 2020, the
premium pay compensation for all employees, including the represented employees, would cease
because plans were made to bring more workers back into the workplace, and more of the
workforce had been showing up on site. MWRD made plans to break work groups into two teams,
who reported to work on alternating weeks. During that time, the employees who were coded under
17A were on call, needed to be available to come in to work, and were not on paid benefit time.
MWRD chose 17A as a payment mechanism rather than the telecommuting time codes because
the telecommuting time code “would have required employees to be able to punch in and punch
out,” and many workers did not have the ability to clock in and out remotely.
¶ 21 Kosowski testified that the distinction between workers who teleworked and those on call
arose because some jobs did not “lend themselves to the ability to telework.” He commented that
the facility closure provision of the CBAs only applied when MWRD allowed paid time off during
a facility closure or other emergency, and nobody was getting paid time off unless they used their
own personal or vacation time. MWRD’s granting of this compensation from March 13 to May
11, 2020, was it “being overly generous to employees” as it determined its response to the
pandemic. Kosowski testified that MWRD had the ability to decide when the facility closure began
and ended under Section 2.01 of the CBAs. Kosowski did not know who other than a MWRD
manager could make the decision about when a facility closed, and because COVID was “an
unknown,” years could pass before workers stopped being coded using 17A.
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¶ 22 MWRD settled with two other unions that filed grievances regarding pay, and extended the
settlement agreement to 14 unions. The Union was the only one that did not accept the settlement.
If the grievance were sustained, MWRD would have to move money from “critical-funded
programs” in order to continue paying the Union employees at the premium rate. Kosowski
testified that the 2019 business continuity plan included protocols regarding absenteeism triggered
based on workers who would become sick, but the MWRD response to COVID caused MWRD to
“scrap” the plan “immediately” because it took the employees out of the workplace before they
became sick.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Kosowski stated that the facility closure provision of the CBAs had
historically been applied “for periods of time where there would be an employee benefit awarded
to other employees, and employees that were required to still report to work would then be entitled
to this additional compensation or premium.” Kosowski specified that such cases would be of
“short” duration, such as holiday time and weather emergencies, “where there is a beginning and
an end.” Kosowski acknowledged, however, that the CBA contained no reference to duration, and
his understanding of the provision came from its historical application.
¶ 24 D. June 7, 2021, Arbitration Award
¶ 25 On June 7, 2021, Arbitrator Clauss issued his award, sustaining the Union’s grievance. He
found that MWRD “changed operations” as a result of the pandemic when it ordered many
employees not to report to work in order to protect the workforce and MWRD operations.
Accordingly, most employees were not in the workplace, and remained outside the workplace until
at least October 2020. Although MWRD argued that a long-term emergency was not contemplated
by the emergency closure sections of the CBAs, Arbitrator Clauss noted that the relevant
provisions addressed emergency closures “without limitation on duration” and that the December
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2019 Business Continuity Plan did not address employee payments, “suggesting that [MWRD]
would rely on the language of the CBAs.”
¶ 26 Arbitrator Clauss commented that employees “continued to telework, be on call, and to
work altered shifts during spring of 2020,” and were compensated with payroll code 17A, which
did not “distinguish between an employee who [was] telecommuting, an employee on standby,
and an employee who [was] working a week on/ week off schedule.” MWRD had a separate
telecommuting payroll code. Employees continued to be compensated with payroll code 17A after
May 11, 2020, although bargaining unit members who reported to work no longer received
premium pay after May 11, 2020.
¶ 27 Arbitrator Clauss agreed with the Union position that MWRD was operating under a
closure where employees were teleworking, on call, and working week on/week off schedules, and
MWRD paid its employees pursuant to the emergency closures provision of the CBAs. Arbitrator
Clauss noted that MWRD’s communications to employees throughout March through June 2020
acknowledged MWRD’s “altered operations” because many employees were not reporting to the
workplace, even after the May 2020 return to regular pay. The payroll records did not show which
employees remained at home and which employees teleworked, although both categories were
paid using payroll code 17A. Although the Business Continuity Plan established that MWRD had
the ability to track employees working remotely, it chose not to code them that way, “thereby
making them indistinguishable from employees who were ordered not to report to work and
entitled to a 17A paycode.” Arbitrator Clauss also commented that “[o]f course,” MWRD had the
right to determine its operations, but the management rights section of the CBAs did not establish
that it could define a closure. According to the CBAs, premium payments occur when MWRD
“allows paid time off as a result of a facility closure due to an emergency, or other reason.” Here,
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the evidence showed MWRD employees “were allowed paid time off after May 11, 2020, due to
the pandemic.”
¶ 28 By agreement of the parties, Arbitrator Clauss remanded the matter to the parties for
remedy, but he retained jurisdiction for 90 days “in order to resolve any remedy dispute.”
¶ 29 E. April 13, 2022, Remedy Hearing
¶ 30 The parties did not agree on a remedy, so the matter proceeded to a remedy hearing on
April 13, 2022, before Arbitrator Clauss. The parties also submitted post-hearing briefs to address
the issue. MWRD argued that facility closure benefits should be awarded through May 29, 2020,
the same date through which the other unions agreed to receive premium payments pursuant to the
settlement agreements. Otherwise, MWRD argued that benefits should cease on July 6, 2020,
because 100 percent of maintenance and operations trades employees had returned to work at the
plants and were no longer on call. The Union argued that damages be awarded through June 7,
2021, which is the date that Arbitrator Clauss issued his award, and requested that MWRD be
ordered to properly code teleworking employees using the telework pay code, rather than under
17A.
¶ 31 On October 14, 2022, Arbitrator Clauss rejected both proposed positions regarding a
remedy, and instead ordered that MWRD pay facility closure benefits to Union members through
October 1, 2020. Arbitrator Clauss came to this conclusion, because the evidence established that
many employees remained outside the workplace and received pay under pay code 17A until that
date. Arbitrator Clauss also commented that the matter of using the telework pay code rather than
17A was “a matter best resolved in negotiations,” but noted that MWRD “has seen the cost of
ignoring the Facility Closure language and the repercussions of an imperfect Facility Closure
Policy.”
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¶ 32 F. Circuit Court Proceedings
¶ 33 On January 12, 2023, MWRD filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit
court of Cook County. MWRD argued that Arbitrator Clauss’s interpretation of the CBAs was
“not possible,” as it ignored the trigger of “paid time off” for facility closure benefits because the
MWRD did not allow employees paid time off as of May 11, 2020. MWRD further argued that
Arbitrator Clauss exceeded his authority by changing the terms of the CBAs, such that the award
did not “draw its essence” from the CBAs. MWRD alternatively contended that the award violated
public policy where the award provided a salary windfall to the Union members that they did not
earn.
¶ 34 On March 13, 2023, the Union answered MWRD’s petition and argued that the petition
was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the June 7, 2021, arbitration award. The
Union also argued that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
¶ 35 On September 11, 2023, the Union filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1)
MWRD’s challenge to the June 7, 2021, arbitration award is untimely, and (2) Arbitrator Clauss
acted within the scope of his authority and the award drew its essence from the CBAs. The Union
argued that, accordingly, the circuit court was “duty bound” to enforce the award. The Union
contended that MWRD’s motion to vacate constituted an attempt to relitigate the issues presented
to Arbitrator Clauss, which was an improper expansion of the circuit court’s review of the award,
and MWRD’s public policy argument was baseless.
¶ 36 That same day, MWRD filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that
Arbitrator Clauss disregarded that the CBA facility closure provision only authorized premium
pay where MWRD allowed paid time off. Additionally, MWRD argued that because Arbitrator
Clauss failed to construe the meaning of the term “paid time off,” and “ignored” MWRD’s right
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to determine the end of the facility closure, his award did not draw from the essence of the CBAs.
MWRD also argued that Illinois public policy supported vacatur because the award produced an
“enormous financial windfall” to Union employees, putting the onus on the taxpayers.
¶ 37 The matter proceeded to a hearing on November 30, 2023. The circuit court took the matter
under advisement, and issued its order granting the Union’s motion for summary judgment and
denying MWRD’s motion on May 1, 2024. The court found that Arbitrator Clauss was
“empowered” by the CBAs to interpret and apply the following undefined terms: “allows paid
time off,” and “facility closure.” The court noted that although Arbitrator Clauss failed to explicitly
define the terms in his ruling, his ruling applied the terms to the given facts. The court found that
in interpreting “paid time off,” Arbitrator Clauss “analyzed employees’ work status ***, as well
as the use of the 17A payroll code” for employees who did not work onsite from March 13, 2020,
through October 1, 2020. Arbitrator Clauss acknowledged that MWRD was operating under a
facility emergency closure and paid premium pay until May 2020, and noted that employees
worked week on/week off schedules but still received pay. The court concluded that MWRD
simply disagreed with Arbitrator Clauss’s construction and application of the CBA terms, and
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he exceeded his authority in interpreting the
CBAs. Additionally, the court found that Arbitrator Clauss did not disregard MWRD’s managerial
rights in determining his award, and MWRD failed to show that the award violated public policy.
¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 39 On appeal, MWRD argues that (1) Arbitrator Clauss exceeded his authority by failing to
define and apply the term “paid time off,” and ordering MWRD to pay facility closure benefits
through October 1, 2020, and (2) the award failed to draw its essence from the CBAs because
Arbitrator Clauss relied upon sources outside off the CBAs. Alternatively, MWRD contends that
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the award violated Illinois public policy by requiring MWRD to pay employee wages and salaries
which were not “lawfully due.”
¶ 40 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, so they agreed “that only a question
of law is involved and invite[d] the court to decide the issues based on the record.” Pielet v. Pielet,
2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. We review the circuit court’s decision regarding cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo. City of Country Club Hills v. Charles, 2020 IL App (1st) 200546, ¶ 20.
¶ 41 A. Timeliness
¶ 42 As an initial matter, the Union argues that MWRD untimely filed its petition to vacate the
arbitration award, which barred the circuit court from considering the merits of MWRD’s petition
to vacate. The Union contends MWRD filed its petition to vacate the arbitration award on January
12, 2023, well beyond 90 days after the issuance of the June 7, 2021, arbitration award. MWRD
contends that the June 7, 2021, award only determined liability and not the remedy, and so the
ruling was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, MWRD argues that it timely filed its petition to
vacate the award within 90 days of Arbitrator Clauss’s October 14, 2022, remedy award. We agree
with MWRD.
¶ 43 The Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (Act) provides the procedure for the limited
circumstances under which a court may modify or vacate an arbitration award. Kenny v. Kenny
Industries, Inc., 406 Ill. App. 3d 56, 62 (2010). Under the Act, a party may apply to vacate the
final arbitration award in the circuit court “within 90 days after delivery of a copy of the award to
the applicant.” 710 ILCS 5/12(b) (West 2020). However, “the Act does not provide a mechanism
for review of interlocutory orders by the arbitrators.” Klehr v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,
2013 IL App (1st) 121843, ¶ 8.
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¶ 44 “Given the common origins of the Federal and uniform statutes, courts interpreting State
arbitration statutes patterned after the Uniform Arbitration Act look for guidance to Federal court
decisions interpreting similar provision[s] of the Federal Arbitration Act.” Radiant Star
Enterprises, LLC v. Metropolis Condominium Association, 2018 IL App (1st) 171844, ¶ 58, n. 8
(quoting J&K Cement Construction, Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d 663, 668
(1983)). Additionally, the Act is “to be construed so as to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it,” so opinions of courts of other jurisdictions are shown greater than usual deference.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1979)).
¶ 45 Federal cases interpreting this issue have determined that “if the arbitrator himself thinks
he’s through with the case, then his award is final and appealable.” Smart v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 702, 315 F. 3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2002). To that end, a
court should only confirm a final and binding arbitration award, which is “intended by the
arbitrator to be his complete determination of every issue submitted to him.” Ameritech Services,
Inc. v. Local Union No. 336, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 96 C 5897, * 5
(Apr. 30, 1997). See also McKinney Restoration Co., Inc., et al. v. Illinois District Council No. 1
of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers, AFL-CIO, et al., 392 F. 3d 867,
871-72 (2004) (discussing Smart and Ameritech with respect to the “complete arbitration” rule).
This rule exists to forestall piecemeal litigation and ensure finality between the parties. Ameritech,
No. 96 C 5897, * 7.
¶ 46 Here, Arbitrator Clauss’s June 7, 2021, arbitration award was not a final award as it did not
determine the remedy. Instead, the parties agreed to resolve the matter of the remedy, with
Arbitrator Clauss retaining jurisdiction for 90 days in order to resolve any remedy dispute that
arose. This scenario played out as the parties could not come to a resolution themselves, so
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Arbitrator Clauss ultimately determined the remedy. Clearly, Arbitrator Clauss did not believe that
the June 7, 2021, award was “final” as he otherwise would not have retained jurisdiction to address
the remedy. See Smart, 315 F. 3d at 725; see also Ameritech, No. 96 C 5897, * 5 (finding the
arbitration award not final where the arbitrator deferred determination of the remedy in the hope
that the parties could resolve the issue among themselves). It would have been premature for
MWRD to appeal the June 7, 2021, award. Accordingly, MWRD’s petition to vacate the arbitration
award was timely filed within 90 days from the entry of the October 14, 2022, remedy award. We,
thus, proceed to the merits of the appeal.
¶ 47 B. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
¶ 48 Judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is “extremely limited.” Griggsville-Perry
Community Unit School District No. 4 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL
113721, ¶ 18. “[W]e must enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator acts within the scope
of his or her authority and the award draws its essence from the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 2017 IL App (1st) 161499, ¶ 19. There is a presumption
that the arbitrator has not exceeded his or her authority and, thus, a reviewing court must construe
the award as valid, if possible. Western Illinois University v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board, 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 56. We will not overrule the arbitrator’s construction of the contract
merely because our interpretation differs from that of the arbitrator. AFSCME, AFL-CIO v.
Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 305 (1996). “Nonetheless, a court
may vacate an award if a gross error of law or fact appears on the face of the award.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) First Health Group Corp. v. Ruddick, 393 Ill. App. 3d 40, 52-53 (2009).
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Whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority is a question of law which we review de novo.
Western Illinois University, 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 56.
¶ 49 An arbitrator may only interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, rather than
“dispense his own brand of industrial justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Griggsville-
Perry, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19. An arbitrator may look for guidance from other sources, but his or
her award “is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.” Id. Finding that an arbitrator has failed to interpret the collective bargaining agreement
is a “high hurdle,” and it is not enough to show that he or she committed “a serious error,” but it
must be shown that “there is no interpretative route to the award, so a noncontractual basis can be
inferred and the award set aside. [Citations.] The zanier the award, the less plausible it becomes to
ascribe it to a mere error in interpretation rather than to a willful disregard of the contract.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 20. In other words, the award will be overturned “where the
arbitrator based his award on a body of thought, feeling, policy, or law outside of the contract.”
(Emphasis in original.) Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. Chicago Transit Authority, 342
Ill. App. 3d 176, 180 (2003).
¶ 50 C. Whether Arbitrator Clauss exceeded his authority
¶ 51 Here, Arbitrator Clauss exceeded his authority in determining that MWRD was operating
under a closure from May through October 2020 and, thus, ordering MWRD to pay premium pay
to Union employees during that time. As noted, finding that an arbitrator has failed to interpret the
collective bargaining agreement is a “high hurdle,” but it is one that has been met under the
circumstances of this case. See Griggsville-Perry, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 20.
¶ 52 First, Arbitrator Clauss has made a gross error of judgment on the face of the award by
ignoring the term “paid time off” in the facility closure provisions of the CBAs. See First Merit
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Realty Services, Inc. v. Amberly Square Apartments, L.P., 373 Ill. App. 3d 457, 462 (2007) (finding
an error in judgment apparent on the face of the award where the arbitrators ignored the plain
language of the contract). According to the CBAs, a non-shift employee who reports to work
during a facility closure will receive premium pay only when MWRD allows paid time off as a
result of that closure or due to an emergency or other reasons. Arbitrator Clauss did not interpret
this provision correctly, as he ignored this necessary trigger. The evidence established that after
May 11, 2020, MWRD employees were either (1) working on site, including on altered schedules,
(2) working remotely, or (3) available “on call.” Kosowski testified at the January 27, 2021,
arbitration hearing that after May 11, 2020, no employees were receiving paid time off unless they
used their own personal or vacation time. Arbitrator Clauss conclusorily noted in his arbitration
award that MWRD employees received paid time off, but the evidence presented at the arbitration
hearing belied that conclusion, as the employees were working or “on call,” rather than on
vacation.
¶ 53 Arbitrator Clauss also exceeded his authority by determining that the MWRD facilities
remained closed in May 2020, when the evidence established that MWRD was implementing its
plan for continued operations during the pandemic. It is undisputed that from March through early
May 2020, MWRD provided premium pay to its Union employees working in person as the
workforce was operating at minimum staffing levels. During the next two months, however,
MWRD established its pandemic protocols and began transitioning workers back to the workplace.
As the management rights section of the CBAs establishes, “the management of the plant and
direction of the work force, including *** the right to determine the methods, processes and means
of operations are vested exclusively in [MWRD].” Further, The Union “recognizes that the nature
of [MWRD’s] operations require some degree of flexibility in making work assignments to its
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employees to meet emergencies.” That is what happened here. MWRD implemented a “generous”
compensation scheme from March 13 to May 11, 2020, before it developed its policies regarding
COVID. Kosowski testified at the hearing that MWRD had the ability to decide when the facility
closure began and ended under the CBAs. A plain reading of the language from the CBAs supports
this conclusion.
¶ 54 In his arbitration award, Arbitrator Clauss noted that “[o]f course” MWRD had the
management right to determine its operations, but the CBAs did not support MWRD’s conclusion
that it could define a closure. However, Arbitrator Clauss did not acknowledge the language of the
CBAs, including the Union’s recognition that flexibility in making work assignments be required
during emergencies. The arbitrator’s use of the phrase “altered operations,” to define the status of
MWRD facilities provides support for its continued, albeit altered, operations during this time. In
determining that facilities remained “closed,” Arbitrator Clauss ignored the relevant management
provisions of the CBAs and, thus, dispensed “his own brand of industrial justice” in continuing
premium payments to Union employees. See Griggsville-Perry, 2013 IL 113721, ¶ 19.
¶ 55 The Union contends that Arbitrator Clauss acted within the scope of his authority and the
awards drew their essence from the CBAs, and so we are “duty bound” to confirm the award. In
arguing this, the Union emphasizes the extremely limited circumstances under which an arbitration
award may be vacated. It argues that MWRD merely disagrees with Arbitrator Clauss’s
construction and application of the relevant terms, which is an impermissible basis for vacatur.
See AFSCME, 173 Ill. 2d at 305. However, despite the Union’s position, Arbitrator Clauss made
a gross error in judgment apparent on the face of the award by ignoring pertinent terms in the
CBAs, as outlined above. Such errors in judgment establish that Arbitrator Clauss exceeded his
authority as the arbitration award was not grounded on the parties’ CBAs. See First Merit Realty
-18- 1-24-1162
Services, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 462-63. As such, we are compelled to vacate the arbitration
award. See Griggsville-Perry, 2013 IL 113721, ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 56 MWRD alternatively argues that the arbitration award did not draw its essence from the
parties CBAs where it relied on sources and terms contained outside the CBAs, and the award was
against Illinois public policy. As we have found a basis to vacate the award due to Arbitrator Clauss
exceeding his authority, we need not address these alternative arguments.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment
to the Union and denying summary judgment to MWRD. We vacate the June 7, 2021, arbitration
award and October 14, 2022, remedy award.
¶ 59 Reversed and vacated.
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