Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Johnson

18 S.E.2d 35, 66 Ga. App. 520, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 541
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedDecember 5, 1941
Docket29172.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 18 S.E.2d 35 (Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Johnson, 18 S.E.2d 35, 66 Ga. App. 520, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

Stephens, P. J.

Ernest P. Johnson instituted six suits in the civil court of DeKalb County against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, to recover for disability benefits alleged to be due him under two lile policies, each containing a disability clause, for the month of August, 1940, and for a number of preceding months. • The defendant generally denied liability. The defendant’s main contention was that the plaintiff, if he had suffered a disability in the past, had recovered therefrom and was not disabled in the terms of the policy, and therefore not entitled to recover in any of the suits. The six suits were tried together, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff in each suit. The defendant obtained a writ of certiorari in each suit, but only the judgment overruling the certiorari in the suit applying to the August, 1940, disability was appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was agreed between the parties that the disposition of this case would control the others. It appeared from the evidence that the policy in the particular case under consideration was issued to the plaintiff August 10, 1935, and contained the usual disability clause which provides that, after providing for the method of proof etc., where the insured has “become totally and permanently disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, and that such disability has already continued uninterrupted for a period of at least three months,” the company will pay to the insured a monthly income of $10 per $1000 of insurance, etc. It further appeared that the plaintiff, who had been operating and working in a grocery store, had ceased such work about 1938; that *521 he had suffered from tuberculosis, and that the company, upon proof satisfactory to itself, had paid to the plaintiff such benefits until the last of the year 1936, when the company ceased to pay benefits and also afterwards exacted premiums of the plaintiff; that about the time when the company ceased to pay the benefits the plaintiff became associated with the Elks Club in Decatur and began drawing $100 a month; that afterwards the plaintiff instituted suits against the company in which he alleged that he had a continuous disability and was entitled to the benefits under the policies, and sought to recover such benefits and premiums which had been paid. It appeared that some of these suits resulted in favor of the plaintiff and that the company, satisfactorily to the plaintiff, settled all of such suits, but refused to pay any further benefits. For subsequently accruing alleged benefits the plaintiff has instituted the six suits hereinbefore referred to of which the present suit is one.

As has been held by the Supreme Court of this State, in Cato v. Ætna Life Insurance Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 (138 S. E. 787), and Prudential Insurance Co. v. South, 179 Ga. 653 (177 S. E. 499, 98 A. L. R. 781) : “Total disability exists when one is wholly disabled from pursuing the usual and customary duties of his employment on which he must depend for a living. . . ‘Total disability5 is inability to do substantially all of the material acts necessary to the transaction of the insured’s . . occupation, in substantially his customary and usual manner.55 “If the insured is so incapacitated that substantially all of the material activities of any such employment are reasonably closed to him, he is totally disabled within the meaning of the policy." See Wheeler v. Fidelity &c. Insurance Co., 129 Ga. 237 (58 S. E. 709); Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Snow, 51 Ga. App. 280 (180 S. E. 241); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Daniel, 61 Ga. App. 90, 93 (5 S. E. 2d, 681); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Howard, 63 Ga. App. 865, 869 (12 S. E. 2d, 394). Therefore, if the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the plaintiff, since the issuance of the policy and during the periods covered in the. six suits referred to, and in August, 1940, and several preceding months thereto, had become so incapacitated that he could not do “substantially all of the material activities55 of his employment, which was that of operating and working in a grocery store, or duties of a similar nature, he was entitled to recover.

*522 It appears from the evidence that sometime previous to the periods covered by the suits involved in this case, and before the company began to pay him the disabilities which it paid him, the plaintiff had suffered from tuberculosis which necessitated the cessation of his employment in the grocery store and incapacitated him from following this occupation. It is clearly inferable from the evidence that the company ceased to pay the benefits, which it had been paying on account of the plaintiff’s total disability to follow his occupation and while he was unemployed, because the plaintiff had gone with the Elks Club and was there receiving $100 per month, which, as claimed by the company, was for services performed for the Elks Club. While it is necessary to examine the evidence to ascertain if it is sufficient to show that the plaintiff was permanently disabled to perform the duties of his occupation during the periods covered by these suits, it is also necessary to inquire whether the duties which he had assumed at the Elks Club were duties of a nature similar to those required of him in his occupation as operator and worker in a grocery store, which was his occupation at the time of the issuance of the policy.

While there was considerable evidence to the effect that the plaintiff had not suffered from tuberculosis, there was evidence to the effect that he had received compensation from the United States government in payment of disability caused by tuberculosis. Dr. Stewart, who had attended the plaintiff as physician for some time and was inferentially well acquainted with his condition, testified as follows: “I believe Mr. Johnson was first my patient about 1938. . . I did examine him for life insurance. I examined him for the Metropolitan. . . I testified in this case when it was tried before. I examined Mr. Johnson last week [the case was being tried on October 9, 1940]. As to whether there' was any material change in Mr. Johnson’s condition since the last trial of this ease—there was not a very noticeable change. He had a little fresh cold that morning he came down, last week. As to whether I examined him at the last trial, August a year ago, I guess I did; I have been examining him about every month. As to whether there has been any material change in his condition for the better, so far as the tuberculosis is concerned, since the last trial—I did not notice any material change; I noticed that he is quiescent. In his present condition he is not, I don’t think, *523 able to do manual labor. I wouldn’t advise him to. As to whether he has an arrested case of tuberculosis now—in my opinion it is arrested. . . I say that Mr. Johnson’s lung condition is what I call quiescent—I think that is a very good word-—I mean by that, subsided but not entirely well. . .

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 S.E.2d 35, 66 Ga. App. 520, 1941 Ga. App. LEXIS 541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metropolitan-life-insurance-v-johnson-gactapp-1941.