Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Molina

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 11, 2025·No. 1:23-cv-01553·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Case No. 1:23-cv-01553-CDB COMPANY, 12 ORDER DENYING CROSS-DEFENDANT’S Plaintiff, RENEWED MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT 13 OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND COUNSEL 14 v. (Doc. 58) AMENDED ORDER FINDING CROSS- 16 Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff, DEFENDANT INCOMPETENT TO PURSUE THIS ACTION PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. 17 v. P. 171 18 LUPE C. FLORES, ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS AND Defendant/Cross-Defendant. MANAGEMENT REPORTS 20

21 90-Day Deadline

22 23 On January 17, 2025, the Court held a competency hearing as to Cross-Defendant Lupe C. 24 Flores. Thereafter, the Court took the matter under submission. On March 10, 2025, the Court 25 issued its order finding Cross-Defendant Lupe C. Flores incompetent to pursue this action and 26 staying the case. The Court hereby issues an amended order finding Lupe C. Flores incompetent 27 1 to pursue this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, staying the case, and directing 2 periodic case management reports. 4 The standard for determining competency is supplied by the law of the individual’s 5 domicile. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1). The complaint provides that Cross-Defendant Lupe Flores 6 is domiciled in North Carolina. (Doc. 1 at 2). Additionally, her correspondence with the Court 7 contains an address located in North Carolina (Docs. 31 at 3; 39 at 1) as do medical records she 8 has attached to her filings with the Court (see, e.g., Doc. 58 at 3). Accordingly, for purposes of 9 evaluating competency, the Court concludes Lupe Flores is domiciled in North Carolina. See 10 Tarlton v. Town of Red Springs, No. 5:15-CV-451-BO, 2017 WL 4782641, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 11 23, 2017) (“Although the record is limited on this issue, the Court will presume for the purposes 12 of its determination that at the time this suit was filed in 2015 McCollum was domiciled in North 13 Carolina where he was living at the time.”). 14 North Carolina law defines an incompetent adult as someone “who lacks sufficient 15 capacity to manage the adult’s own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions 16 concerning the adult’s person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental 17 illness, intellectual disability, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, 18 or similar cause or condition.” Matter of M.S.E., 378 N.C. 40, 44 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A- 19 1101(7)). To find an individual incompetent, “the finder of fact in a state court incompetency 20 adjudication must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the individual is 21 incompetent.” Nicholson v. Zimmerman, No. 1:19CV585, 2020 WL 5518701, at *5 (M.D.N.C. 22 Sept. 14, 2020) (quotations omitted; citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1112(d)). 23 The North Carolina Supreme Court interprets “the word [a]ffairs to encompass a person’s 24 entire property and business and recognizes that [i]ncompetency to administer one’s property 25 obviously depends upon the general frame and habit of mind … it is not enough to show that 26 another might manage a man’s property more wisely or efficiently than he himself.” Id. 27 (quotations omitted). 1 Although a district court must use the law of an individual’s domicile when determining 2 their capacity, it need not adopt any procedures required by state law and must meet only the 3 requirements of due process. In re Ivers, No. 19-20026-E-13, 2019 WL 6033198, at *8 (Bankr. 4 E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019); see Tarlton, 2017 WL 4782641, at *5 (“As discussed above, this Court 5 need not use North Carolina’s procedures for determining competency, so long as its procedures 6 comport with due process.”). Under Rule 17(c), a district court must hold a competency hearing 7 “when substantial evidence of incompetence is presented.” Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 8 1153 (9th Cir. 2005); see Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 9 2003) (explaining that “due process considerations attend an incompetency finding and the 10 subsequent appointment of a guardian ad litem”); Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th 11 Cir. 1990) (observing that the appointment of a guardian ad litem implicates due process concerns 12 because it deprives a litigant of the right to control litigation and subjects them to possible 13 stigmatization). 14 The Ninth Circuit has not clearly stated what constitutes “substantial evidence” of 15 incompetence warranting such a hearing. See Hoang Minh Tran v. Gore, No. 10cv464–GPC 16 (DHB), 2013 WL 1625418, at *3 (S.D. Cal. April 15, 2013). However, the Ninth Circuit has 17 indicated that sworn declarations from the allegedly incompetent litigant, sworn declarations or 18 letters from treating psychiatrists or psychologists, and medical records may be considered in this 19 regard. See Allen, 408 F.3d at 1152–54; see also Hoang Minh Tran, 2013 WL 1625418, at *3. 20 Such evidence must speak to the court’s concern as to whether the person in question is able to 21 meaningfully take part in the proceedings. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Yeager, 143 F. Supp. 3d 22 1042, 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 23 “A[n] incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by 24 a next friend or by guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue 25 another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an 26 action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2). As opposed to a determination of competency, “a district court's 27 decision whether to appoint a guardian ad litem is purely procedural and wholly uninformed by 1 Within its obligation of assessing competency, a district court has broad discretion to 2 determine the suitability of appointing a guardian ad litem. See United States v. 30.64 Acres of 3 Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, “[if] the court determines that a pro se litigant is 4 incompetent, the court generally should appoint a guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c).” Davis v. 5 Walker, 745 F.3d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 2014). “If another order would sufficiently protect the 6 incompetent person’s interests in the litigation in lieu of a guardian, the court may enter such an 7 order.” Id. 8 “[N]otwithstanding the incompetency of a party, the guardian may make binding contracts 9 for the retention of counsel and expert witnesses and may settle the claim on behalf of his ward.” 10 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d at 805. However, a guardian ad litem who is not an attorney must 11 be represented by counsel in order to litigate a case on another’s behalf. See Johns v. Cnty. of San 12 Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 13 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the right to proceed pro se is personal to the litigant). 15 a. Cross-Defendant Lupe Flores’ Filings and Declarations 16 On March 25, 2024, Lupe Flores filed a motion for appointment of guardian ad litem. 17 (Doc. 31). The motion attached a letter, dated January 15, 2024, from physician Peter Thomas 18 Leistikow in Winston Salem, North Carolina, explaining that Lupe Flores was seen on December 19 22, 2023, in regards to memory changes from a “possible neurocognitive disorder. She is pending 20 additional testing and workup.” Id. at 5.

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