Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell

405 S.E.2d 869, 261 Ga. 427, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 364
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJuly 16, 1991
DocketS91G0043
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 405 S.E.2d 869 (Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Boswell, 405 S.E.2d 869, 261 Ga. 427, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 364 (Ga. 1991).

Opinions

Bell, Justice.

In Boswell v. MARTA, 196 Ga. App. 902 (397 SE2d 165) (1990), the Court of Appeals held that in a tort suit the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) may be held liable for punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. Id. at 903. The Court of Appeals based the holding on its finding that the legislation creating MARTA, Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2243, 2275, Sec. 22, as amended by Ga. L. 1971, pp. 2092, 2102 (hereafter, the MARTA Act), authorizes the imposition of punitive damages in MARTA’s capacity as a tortfeasor. Id. at 902-903. Because we find that, as a matter of law, an award of punitive damages against MARTA would violate public policy, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This case arose when a passenger on a MARTA train, plaintiff Boswell, suffered injuries from a criminal attack while at a MARTA station. He sued MARTA for compensatory and punitive damages, and moved for partial summary judgment on whether MARTA could be held liable for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of his motion, holding that the MARTA Act operates in tort suits to waive MARTA’s immunity from punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. Boswell, supra, 196 Ga. App. at 903.

We find that public policy demands that MARTA not be subject to awards of punitive damages, since such awards would seriously damage the public interest. The issue whether an award of punitive damages in a suit against a governmental entity violates public policy was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U. S. 247 (101 SC 2748, 69 LE2d 616) [428]*428(1981), as follows:

In general, courts [have] viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. [Id. at 263.]
[A]n award of punitive damages against a [governmental entity] “punishes” only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party. Thus, there is no question here of equitably distributing the losses resulting from official misconduct. [Cit.] Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a [governmental entity] are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers. [Fn. omitted.]
Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts knowingly and maliciously to [injure others], he may become the appropriate object of the community’s vindictive sentiments. [Cits.] A [governmental entity], however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself. [Emphasis in original.] [Id. at 267.]

The expression of public policy articulated in City of Newport is in accordance with the public policy of Georgia.1 We hold that an award of punitive damages against MARTA would violate the public policy of Georgia, and therefore is impermissible as a matter of law.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, P. J., who dissents.

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Bluebook (online)
405 S.E.2d 869, 261 Ga. 427, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/metropolitan-atlanta-rapid-transit-authority-v-boswell-ga-1991.