Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Leascend Technology Co., Ltd.

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

META PLATFORMS, INC.; No. 25-4855 INSTAGRAM, LLC, D.C. No.

3:19-cv-07071-SI

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v. MEMORANDUM*

LEASCEND TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., Defendant - Appellant.

and

ONLINENIC, INC., DOMAIN ID SHIELD SERVICE CO., LTD,

Defendants,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 13, 2026** San Francisco, California

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Before: LEE, MENDOZA JR., and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

This appeal arises from Leascend Technology Co., Ltd.’s breach of a civil contempt order and the subsequent enforcement of that order with sanctions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the district court.

We review “a district court’s contempt finding and imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion. However, we review a district court’s factual findings in connection with a contempt order for clear error.” Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 161 F.4th 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation modified) (first citing Stone v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh'g (Aug. 25, 1992); and then citing Coleman v. Newsom, 131 F.4th 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2025)). A district court “has wide latitude in determining whether there has been contemptuous defiance of its order.” Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1984).

Leascend failed to comply with the district court’s order and does not contend that it has complied. Instead, it argues compliance was impossible, as the order required actions contrary to Chinese law. Leascend bears the burden of “demonstrating that the foreign law bars compliance with the order.” In re Grand Jury Procs., 40 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). But this argument is forfeited, as it is based on foreign law assertions that were not presented to the district court. See Int'l Petro. Prods. & Additives Co. v. Black Gold S.A.R.L., 115 F.4th 1202, 1215 (9th Cir.

2 25-4855

2024).

In any event, the district court did not clearly err in determining that Leascend did not take “all reasonable steps” to ensure compliance with its order. Stone, 968 F.2d at 856 (quoting Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396, 404 (9th Cir. 1976)). The single attempt to transfer the required escrow funds does not amount to exhaustion of all possible avenues, as Leascend’s own submissions suggest. Even if compliance were impossible, Leascend could have sought accommodation from the district court before failing to comply. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); See In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that parties “subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order”). It did not do so.

Accordingly, the district court did not commit clear error in its factual determinations or abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions for civil contempt.

AFFIRMED.

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