Mertins v. Kijakazi

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedSeptember 18, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00973
StatusUnknown

This text of Mertins v. Kijakazi (Mertins v. Kijakazi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mertins v. Kijakazi, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LISA MERTINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-973

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Lisa Mertins seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. For the reasons explained below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed, and the case is dismissed. BACKGROUND On December 1, 2014, Mertins filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning August 17, 2014 due to depression, anxiety, lupus, extreme fatigue, and polyarthralgia. (Tr. 209.) The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 13.) Mertins filed a request for a hearing, and a hearing was held on March 28, 2017. (Tr. 29–78.) Mertins, represented by counsel, testified, as did Kristin Panella, a vocational expert (“VE”). In a decision issued October 27, 2017, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Chad Gendreau denied Mertins’ disability claim. (Tr. 13–22.) The Appeals Council denied Mertins’ request for review on July 17, 2018 (Tr. 1–5) and Mertins subsequently filed a complaint in federal court, Mertins v. Berryhill, Case No. 18-CV-1472 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 20, 2019) (Tr. 847–49). The parties jointly agreed to remand the case for further proceedings and the case was returned to ALJ Gendreau. (Tr. 857–61.) ALJ Gendreau held a new hearing on January 21, 2020. (Tr. 809–42.) Mertins, again represented by counsel, testified, as did VE Charlotte Ewers. (Id.) ALJ Gendreau again denied Mertins’ disability

claim on March 25, 2020, and Mertins filed written exceptions to that decision on April 29, 2020. (Tr. 899–12, 923.) The Appeals Council found error and remanded the case to a different ALJ. (Tr. 923–25.) A third hearing was held on June 22, 2021 before ALJ William Shenkenberg. (Tr. 771–808.) Mertins, represented by counsel, testified, as did VE James Breen and Medical Expert Dr. Steven Golub. (Id.) In a decision issued November 18, 2021, ALJ Shenkenberg found that Mertins had the severe impairments of undifferentiated connective tissue disease, systemic lupus erythematosus, fibromyalgia, anemia, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 745.) He found that Mertins did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (the “Listings”). (Tr. 746–48.) ALJ Shenkenberg found that Mertins had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following limitations: occasional pushing or pulling with the upper extremities; occasional climbing of ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; frequent overhead reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling bilaterally; avoiding all exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, and hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights; avoiding concentrated exposure to excessive vibration; understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions, and performing simple routine tasks, in a position with only occasional changes; maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace for simple tasks in two-hour increments; and occasional interaction with the public and supervisors. (Tr. 748- 59.) ALJ Shenkenberg found that Mertins was unable to perform her past relevant work as a teacher’s aide; however, given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform. (Tr. 759.) As such, ALJ Shenkenberg found Mertins was not disabled from her alleged onset date of August 17, 2014, through June 30, 2020, her date last insured.' (Tr. 760-61.) While Mertins again filed written exceptions to the ALJ’s finding, the Appeals Council found no error with the ALJ’s November 18, 2021 decision. Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 733.) It is this denial that Mertins now appeals. DISCUSSION 1. Applicable Legal Standards The Commissioner’s final decision will be upheld if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and supported his decision with substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is not conclusive evidence; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schaafv. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Although a decision denying benefits need not discuss every piece of evidence, remand is appropriate when an ALJ fails to provide adequate support for the conclusions drawn. Jelinek, 662 F.3d at 811. The ALJ must provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence and conclusions. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).

Because Mertins applied for disability insurance benefits she must prove that she was disabled by June 30, 2020, known as her “date last insured”—the date when she exhausted her earned quarters of coverage. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.140).

The ALJ is also expected to follow the SSA’s rulings and regulations in making a determination. Failure to do so, unless the error is harmless, requires reversal. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the entire record, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reconsidering facts, reweighing

evidence, resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, judicial review is limited to the rationales offered by the ALJ. Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 2010)). 2. Application to this Case Mertins raises a single ground for remand—that the ALJ failed to conduct a proper subjective symptoms analysis of Mertins’ chronic fatigue. (Pl.’s Br. at 22–24, Docket # 10.) 2.1 Relevant Medical History The records indicate that as far back as 2007, Mertins complained of polyarthralgia

and excessive fatigue. (Tr. 447–48.) In 2012, Mertins’ treating providers opined that she had a mild case of systemic lupus; however, her manifestation of the disease was “unusual” because it predominantly manifested as neuropathy, numbness, tingling, and fatigue. (Tr. 687.) In August 2012, Mertins was referred to rheumatologist Dr. Alvin Wells for a second opinion as to lupus. (Tr. 696.) Mertins treated with Dr.

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Related

Schaaf v. Astrue
602 F.3d 869 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.
318 U.S. 80 (Supreme Court, 1943)
Campbell v. Astrue
627 F.3d 299 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Jelinek v. Astrue
662 F.3d 805 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Shauger v. Astrue
675 F.3d 690 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Parker v. Astrue
597 F.3d 920 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Margaret Grotts v. Kilolo Kijakazi
27 F.4th 1273 (Seventh Circuit, 2022)

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Mertins v. Kijakazi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mertins-v-kijakazi-wied-2023.