1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Leslie A. Merritt, Jr., No. CV-17-04540-PHX-DGC
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 State of Arizona, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 16 The Court has ruled that Plaintiff’s damages on his state law false arrest and 17 imprisonment claims are limited to the six-day period between his arrest and the 18 indictment. Doc. 278 at 34-35. Plaintiff has filed a motion challenging this ruling, which 19 is in effect a motion for reconsideration although Plaintiff does not style it so. Doc. 342. 20 Defendant State of Arizona has filed a response. Doc. 366. For reasons stated below, the 21 Court will deny the motion. 22 I. Legal Standard. 23 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and rarely granted. See Northwest 24 Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988); 25 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 873 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (D. Ariz. 1994). 26 A motion for reconsideration will be denied absent a showing of manifest error or a 27 showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the Court’s 28 attention earlier with reasonable diligence. LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 1 Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009). The motion may not repeat 2 previously made arguments. LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1); see Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. 3 Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003) (reconsideration cannot “be used to ask 4 the Court to rethink what it has already thought”). Mere disagreement with an order is an 5 insufficient basis for reconsideration. Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM, 2008 6 WL 1776502, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2008). 7 II. Discussion. 8 Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of his request for reconsideration. 9 Doc. 342. None has merit. 10 A. An Indictment’s Effect on a False Arrest Claim. 11 Plaintiff contends that the Court never addressed in its summary judgment order 12 how the indictment applies to his state law false arrest claim. Doc. 342 at 1. Plaintiff is 13 mistaken. 14 Defendants argued that the grand jury’s probable cause finding defeats all of 15 Plaintiff’s claims, including his false arrest claims. Doc. 264 at 11. The Court disagreed 16 because “[p]robable cause to arrest Plaintiff was required six days before the grand jury 17 indictment – when Defendants arrested Plaintiff without a warrant.” Doc. 278 at 6 (citing 18 Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (probable cause for an 19 arrest must be evaluated by “the facts as they existed at the time of the arrest, and not 20 afterward”)). The Court made clear, however, that absent a showing that the indictment 21 was procured fraudulently, “a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, and 22 thus damages, stemming from a false arrest[.]’” Id. (quoting Jones v Cannon, 174 F.3d 23 1271, 1286 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999)).1
24 1 See also Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “false arrest does not permit damages incurred after an indictment”); Caraffa v. Tempe (AZ) 25 Police Dep’t, No. CV-19-05492-PHX-MTL (ESW) 2019 WL 6841743, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2019) (“Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention 26 without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process[.]”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original); Pierre v. City of Rochester, 27 No. 16-CV-6428 CJS, 2018 WL 10072453, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018) (“[A] claim for false arrest only pertains to the period between arrest and arraignment or indictment, 28 whichever occurs first.”); Mohajerin v. Pinal Cty., No. CV-07-1746-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4358254, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007) (“The operative word in this context is ‘false,’ not 1 Because Plaintiff’s evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on whether the 2 indictment was procured by fraud or bad faith, the Court held that “damages on the arrest- 3 related claims . . . will be limited to the period between Plaintiff’s arrest on September 18, 4 2015, and his indictment on September 24, 2015.” Doc. 278 at 34-35. The Court 5 accordingly granted “summary judgment on the state law false arrest and imprisonment 6 claims (Counts 5 and 6) with respect to any pre-indictment damages[.]” Id. at 42. Contrary 7 to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court addressed in its summary judgment order how the 8 indictment applies to the state law false arrest claim. See id.; see also Doc. 382 at 11 (“The 9 parties should seek to agree on a stipulation that can be read to the jury to explain that 10 Plaintiff’s false arrest claim extends only from the date of his arrest to September 24, 2015 11 (the date of his indictment), and should present it to the Court before the final pretrial 12 conference.”). 13 B. The Presumption of Probable Cause from an Indictment. 14 Plaintiff further contends that Arizona law does not recognize a presumption of 15 probable cause from an indictment. Doc. 342 at 2 (citing Reams, 701 P.2d at 601). Based 16 on the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 644(2), decisions from other jurisdictions, and 17 Arizona’s grand jury statute (A.R.S. § 21-413), the Court concluded in its previous order 18 “that the Arizona Supreme Court would hold that an indictment creates a presumption of 19 probable cause[.]” Doc. 278 at 18. Plaintiff provides no basis to reconsider this ruling. 20 C. Liability and the Chain of Causation for False Arrest. 21 Plaintiff asserts that to avoid liability for false arrest, “a defendant must break the 22 chain of causation by showing that the legal process (or some other event) was not only an 23 intervening cause but also a ‘superseding cause.’” Doc. 342 at 3. But the indictment in 24 this case does not render Defendant immune from liability on the false arrest claim. The 25 Court has made clear that “[w]hile a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, 26 ‘imprisonment’ – a false imprisonment claim ends when the detention is validated by legal 27 process, not when the imprisonment itself ends.”); Gurley v. Nat’l Wholesale Liquidator Warehouse, No. CIV.05-5405 (KSH), 2007 WL 2509672, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) 28 (“[D]amages for a false arrest claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process, i.e., indictment, arraignment or a preliminary hearing, but not more.”). 1 and thus damages, stemming from a false arrest, the indictment does not absolve 2 [Defendant] from liability for an initial arrest made without probable cause.’” Doc. 278 3 at 6 (quoting Jones, 174 F.3d at 1286 n.8). 4 Plaintiff’s reliance on Reams is misplaced. Doc. 342 at 2. The court of appeals held 5 in Reams that the indictment was not relevant to whether the police had probable cause to 6 arrest the plaintiff because “[a]fter-the-fact judicial participation cannot validate an 7 unlawful arrest.” 701 P.2d at 602. As noted, the Court did not conclude that the indictment 8 validated Plaintiff’s arrest. Rather, the Court held that damages stemming from the arrest 9 are limited to the period between the arrest and the indictment, absent evidence of fraud in 10 the indictment’s procurement. Doc. 278 at 6, 18. Reams did not address whether a 11 subsequent indictment cuts off damages from a false arrest.2 12 D. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims. 13 Plaintiff claims that the Fourth Amendment permits post-indictment damages where 14 the ongoing detention was based on fabricated or false evidence. Doc. 342 at 4 (citing 15 Manuel v.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Leslie A. Merritt, Jr., No. CV-17-04540-PHX-DGC
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 State of Arizona, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 16 The Court has ruled that Plaintiff’s damages on his state law false arrest and 17 imprisonment claims are limited to the six-day period between his arrest and the 18 indictment. Doc. 278 at 34-35. Plaintiff has filed a motion challenging this ruling, which 19 is in effect a motion for reconsideration although Plaintiff does not style it so. Doc. 342. 20 Defendant State of Arizona has filed a response. Doc. 366. For reasons stated below, the 21 Court will deny the motion. 22 I. Legal Standard. 23 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and rarely granted. See Northwest 24 Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988); 25 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 873 F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (D. Ariz. 1994). 26 A motion for reconsideration will be denied absent a showing of manifest error or a 27 showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to the Court’s 28 attention earlier with reasonable diligence. LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 1 Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009). The motion may not repeat 2 previously made arguments. LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1); see Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. 3 Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003) (reconsideration cannot “be used to ask 4 the Court to rethink what it has already thought”). Mere disagreement with an order is an 5 insufficient basis for reconsideration. Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM, 2008 6 WL 1776502, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2008). 7 II. Discussion. 8 Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of his request for reconsideration. 9 Doc. 342. None has merit. 10 A. An Indictment’s Effect on a False Arrest Claim. 11 Plaintiff contends that the Court never addressed in its summary judgment order 12 how the indictment applies to his state law false arrest claim. Doc. 342 at 1. Plaintiff is 13 mistaken. 14 Defendants argued that the grand jury’s probable cause finding defeats all of 15 Plaintiff’s claims, including his false arrest claims. Doc. 264 at 11. The Court disagreed 16 because “[p]robable cause to arrest Plaintiff was required six days before the grand jury 17 indictment – when Defendants arrested Plaintiff without a warrant.” Doc. 278 at 6 (citing 18 Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (probable cause for an 19 arrest must be evaluated by “the facts as they existed at the time of the arrest, and not 20 afterward”)). The Court made clear, however, that absent a showing that the indictment 21 was procured fraudulently, “a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, and 22 thus damages, stemming from a false arrest[.]’” Id. (quoting Jones v Cannon, 174 F.3d 23 1271, 1286 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999)).1
24 1 See also Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that “false arrest does not permit damages incurred after an indictment”); Caraffa v. Tempe (AZ) 25 Police Dep’t, No. CV-19-05492-PHX-MTL (ESW) 2019 WL 6841743, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2019) (“Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention 26 without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process[.]”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original); Pierre v. City of Rochester, 27 No. 16-CV-6428 CJS, 2018 WL 10072453, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018) (“[A] claim for false arrest only pertains to the period between arrest and arraignment or indictment, 28 whichever occurs first.”); Mohajerin v. Pinal Cty., No. CV-07-1746-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 4358254, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007) (“The operative word in this context is ‘false,’ not 1 Because Plaintiff’s evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on whether the 2 indictment was procured by fraud or bad faith, the Court held that “damages on the arrest- 3 related claims . . . will be limited to the period between Plaintiff’s arrest on September 18, 4 2015, and his indictment on September 24, 2015.” Doc. 278 at 34-35. The Court 5 accordingly granted “summary judgment on the state law false arrest and imprisonment 6 claims (Counts 5 and 6) with respect to any pre-indictment damages[.]” Id. at 42. Contrary 7 to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court addressed in its summary judgment order how the 8 indictment applies to the state law false arrest claim. See id.; see also Doc. 382 at 11 (“The 9 parties should seek to agree on a stipulation that can be read to the jury to explain that 10 Plaintiff’s false arrest claim extends only from the date of his arrest to September 24, 2015 11 (the date of his indictment), and should present it to the Court before the final pretrial 12 conference.”). 13 B. The Presumption of Probable Cause from an Indictment. 14 Plaintiff further contends that Arizona law does not recognize a presumption of 15 probable cause from an indictment. Doc. 342 at 2 (citing Reams, 701 P.2d at 601). Based 16 on the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 644(2), decisions from other jurisdictions, and 17 Arizona’s grand jury statute (A.R.S. § 21-413), the Court concluded in its previous order 18 “that the Arizona Supreme Court would hold that an indictment creates a presumption of 19 probable cause[.]” Doc. 278 at 18. Plaintiff provides no basis to reconsider this ruling. 20 C. Liability and the Chain of Causation for False Arrest. 21 Plaintiff asserts that to avoid liability for false arrest, “a defendant must break the 22 chain of causation by showing that the legal process (or some other event) was not only an 23 intervening cause but also a ‘superseding cause.’” Doc. 342 at 3. But the indictment in 24 this case does not render Defendant immune from liability on the false arrest claim. The 25 Court has made clear that “[w]hile a post-arrest indictment ‘cuts off the length of detention, 26 ‘imprisonment’ – a false imprisonment claim ends when the detention is validated by legal 27 process, not when the imprisonment itself ends.”); Gurley v. Nat’l Wholesale Liquidator Warehouse, No. CIV.05-5405 (KSH), 2007 WL 2509672, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007) 28 (“[D]amages for a false arrest claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process, i.e., indictment, arraignment or a preliminary hearing, but not more.”). 1 and thus damages, stemming from a false arrest, the indictment does not absolve 2 [Defendant] from liability for an initial arrest made without probable cause.’” Doc. 278 3 at 6 (quoting Jones, 174 F.3d at 1286 n.8). 4 Plaintiff’s reliance on Reams is misplaced. Doc. 342 at 2. The court of appeals held 5 in Reams that the indictment was not relevant to whether the police had probable cause to 6 arrest the plaintiff because “[a]fter-the-fact judicial participation cannot validate an 7 unlawful arrest.” 701 P.2d at 602. As noted, the Court did not conclude that the indictment 8 validated Plaintiff’s arrest. Rather, the Court held that damages stemming from the arrest 9 are limited to the period between the arrest and the indictment, absent evidence of fraud in 10 the indictment’s procurement. Doc. 278 at 6, 18. Reams did not address whether a 11 subsequent indictment cuts off damages from a false arrest.2 12 D. Fourth Amendment False Arrest Claims. 13 Plaintiff claims that the Fourth Amendment permits post-indictment damages where 14 the ongoing detention was based on fabricated or false evidence. Doc. 342 at 4 (citing 15 Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 914 (2017)). But the remaining false arrest 16 claim is brought “pursuant to Arizona common law,” not under the Fourth Amendment. 17 Doc. 8 ¶ 135 (Count 5). The Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth 18 Amendment false arrest claim on qualified immunity grounds. Doc. 278 at 35-37; see 19 Doc. 8 ¶¶ 106-12 (Count 6). Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that his state 20 law false arrest claim “continues under the Fourth Amendment[.]” Doc. 342 at 5.3 21 The Supreme Court explained in Manuel that pretrial detention can be unlawful 22 “when legal process itself goes wrong – when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause 23 2 Cf. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that 24 “subsequent acts of independent decision-makers (e.g., prosecutors, grand juries, and judges) may constitute intervening superseding causes that break the causal chain between 25 a defendant-officer’s misconduct and a plaintiff’s unlawful seizure”); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The intervening acts of the . . . grand jury . . . break the 26 chain of causation unless plaintiff can show that these intervening acts were the result of deception or undue pressure by the defendant policemen.”). 27 3 Plaintiff’s citation to State v. Hernandez, 417 P.3d 207 (Ariz. 2018), is inapposite 28 because the case involved a motion to suppress, not the common law tort of false arrest. 1 determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.” 137 S. Ct. at 918. 2 Plaintiff asserts that Detective Baroldy misled the grand jury about the bullet having lodged 3 in the BMW’s tire before Plaintiff’s gun was in the pawn shop. Doc. 342 at 6; see Doc. 270 4 at 14. But “the grand jury was clearly told when and where the [BMW’s] tire deflated and 5 that Plaintiff’s gun was in the pawn shop more than three hours earlier.” Doc. 278 at 26. 6 No jury reasonably could “find that Defendants deliberately lied to the grand jury, 7 particularly when they had ballistics evidence – which had not been challenged at the time 8 of the grand jury proceeding – that Plaintiff’s gun had fired the bullet that hit the BMW.” 9 Id. at 27. Plaintiff has failed to meet his high burden of showing that “the grand jury’s 10 indictment was induced through fraud, malice, or bad faith.” Id. And it is well established 11 that “[t]he validity of an indictment is ‘not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand 12 jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence.’” Id. at 28 (quoting United 13 States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974)); see United States v. Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 14 669 (9th Cir. 1996) (a defendant “may not properly challenge an indictment, sufficient on 15 its face, on the ground that the allegations are not supported by adequate evidence”). 16 III. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion. 17 Absent good cause, a motion for reconsideration must be filed no later than 14 days 18 after the filing of the order that is the subject of the motion. LRCiv 7.2(g)(2). Plaintiff 19 filed the present motion more than three months after the Court issued its summary 20 judgment order, and Plaintiff presents no good cause for the delay. The motion also will 21 be denied as untimely. See Sullivan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. CV-16-02608-PHX- 22 DJH, 2017 WL 6029577, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2017) (denying the plaintiffs’ motion for 23 reconsideration as untimely under LRCiv 7.2(g)(2) where they did not establish the 24 requisite good cause). 25 IV. Conclusion. 26 Plaintiff has not shown that the Court manifestly erred in limiting his damages on 27 the state law false arrest and imprisonment claims to the period between his arrest and the 28 indictment. Nor has Plaintiff identified new facts or legal authority that could not have □□ been brought to Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. His motion is also 2|| untimely. 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for post-indictment damages (Doc. 342) 4|| is denied. 5 Dated this 17th day of September, 2020. 6 Dau 6 Co Daud &, phe 9 . David G. Campbell Senior United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28