OPALA, Chief Justice.
The questions to be decided are: (1) Before the 1988 amendment
of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,
were all records collected by the Oklahoma Tax Commission [Commission] in discharge of its responsibility under that act subject to disclosure mandated by the Oklahoma Open Records Act?
(2) Are the trial court’s decisions that (a) the Commission’s response to the plaintiff’s record request was prompt and (b) its copy fees reasonable clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to attorney’s fees? We answer all three questions in the negative.
I.
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
In 1987 Stephen J. Merrill, [Merrill], an attorney, sued the Commission in the District Court, Oklahoma County. He contended the Oklahoma Open Records Act [Open Records Act]
entitles him to copies of
all records generated by the Commission in the discharge of its duties under the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act
[Unclaimed Property Act]
rather than
only those the Commission considers “public.
” Merrill also urged the Commission’s response to his request for public records was too slow and its copy fees excessive.
He sought relief with at
torney’s fees. After a bench trial, the
nisi prius
court held that (a) all unclaimed property records are confidential, except those the Unclaimed Property Act requires to be published, (b) the Commission’s response time and proposed copy fees were reasonable and (c) the plaintiffs quest for attorney’s fees is legally unsupportable.
II.
THE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
The Unclaimed Property Act provides a comprehensive scheme for the report,
collection,
maintenance,
distribution
and escheat
of tangible and intangible property considered abandoned by its definitional text. All property presumed abandoned
must be reported
and, if not earlier claimed by the owner, delivered to the Commission by the holder.
Holders include banks,
life insurance companies,
utilities,
business associations,
fiduciaries
and the courts.
If the Commission has reason to believe that someone has failed to report “abandoned property,” it has authority to examine that person’s records.
The statute empowers the Commission to compel delivery of property
and provides penalties for failure to file reports or perform other duties required by the act.
Section 681
authorizes the Commission to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the act’s provisions.
The statute
requires
that the Commission make
certain data public,
After this suit was filed, the pertinent text was amended to provide that, except for
the public information, “[rjeports filed by a holder [of abandoned property] shall remain
confidential. ”
III.
THE CONTROVERSY
The question here is whether, before the 1988 amendment of the Unclaimed Property Act mandated their confidentiality, unclaimed property reports to the Commission were required to be disclosed by the Open Records Act. Merrill contends the Open Records Act allows access to all unclaimed property division records because they are not
specifically required by law to be
confidential.
The Commission argues that because of its very nature information concerning individuals must be treated as confidential. The data include financial reports, social security numbers, monetary amounts, property descriptions and other identifying information. According to the Commission, without an assurance of confidentiality, compliance would be difficult to secure. In response to these concerns, the Commission passed Regulation No. LX-8
making confidential all records in its custody except those made public by the unclaimed property statute.
IV.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE RECORDS
In
Lincoln Bank and Trust Company v. Oklahoma Tax Gommis-s
tem
we held financial information obtained from a
bank
in the course of enforcing the Unclaimed Property Act is not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Open Records Act.
This is so because the Financial Privacy Act
“clothes a bank customer’s records with a privacy interest”
and the Open Record Act excepts “records specifically required by law to be kept confidential.”
Lincoln
's teaching provides us with but a partial solution of this case because Merrill seeks not only bank records collected by the Commission but those of insurance companies, oil and gas companies,
county clerks and other classes of holder. In
Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Okl. Horse Racing
Com’n
we recognized that an affected agency has
authority to make the initial determination whether its records are exempt from the Open Records
Aci.
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OPALA, Chief Justice.
The questions to be decided are: (1) Before the 1988 amendment
of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act,
were all records collected by the Oklahoma Tax Commission [Commission] in discharge of its responsibility under that act subject to disclosure mandated by the Oklahoma Open Records Act?
(2) Are the trial court’s decisions that (a) the Commission’s response to the plaintiff’s record request was prompt and (b) its copy fees reasonable clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to attorney’s fees? We answer all three questions in the negative.
I.
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
In 1987 Stephen J. Merrill, [Merrill], an attorney, sued the Commission in the District Court, Oklahoma County. He contended the Oklahoma Open Records Act [Open Records Act]
entitles him to copies of
all records generated by the Commission in the discharge of its duties under the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act
[Unclaimed Property Act]
rather than
only those the Commission considers “public.
” Merrill also urged the Commission’s response to his request for public records was too slow and its copy fees excessive.
He sought relief with at
torney’s fees. After a bench trial, the
nisi prius
court held that (a) all unclaimed property records are confidential, except those the Unclaimed Property Act requires to be published, (b) the Commission’s response time and proposed copy fees were reasonable and (c) the plaintiffs quest for attorney’s fees is legally unsupportable.
II.
THE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
The Unclaimed Property Act provides a comprehensive scheme for the report,
collection,
maintenance,
distribution
and escheat
of tangible and intangible property considered abandoned by its definitional text. All property presumed abandoned
must be reported
and, if not earlier claimed by the owner, delivered to the Commission by the holder.
Holders include banks,
life insurance companies,
utilities,
business associations,
fiduciaries
and the courts.
If the Commission has reason to believe that someone has failed to report “abandoned property,” it has authority to examine that person’s records.
The statute empowers the Commission to compel delivery of property
and provides penalties for failure to file reports or perform other duties required by the act.
Section 681
authorizes the Commission to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the act’s provisions.
The statute
requires
that the Commission make
certain data public,
After this suit was filed, the pertinent text was amended to provide that, except for
the public information, “[rjeports filed by a holder [of abandoned property] shall remain
confidential. ”
III.
THE CONTROVERSY
The question here is whether, before the 1988 amendment of the Unclaimed Property Act mandated their confidentiality, unclaimed property reports to the Commission were required to be disclosed by the Open Records Act. Merrill contends the Open Records Act allows access to all unclaimed property division records because they are not
specifically required by law to be
confidential.
The Commission argues that because of its very nature information concerning individuals must be treated as confidential. The data include financial reports, social security numbers, monetary amounts, property descriptions and other identifying information. According to the Commission, without an assurance of confidentiality, compliance would be difficult to secure. In response to these concerns, the Commission passed Regulation No. LX-8
making confidential all records in its custody except those made public by the unclaimed property statute.
IV.
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE RECORDS
In
Lincoln Bank and Trust Company v. Oklahoma Tax Gommis-s
tem
we held financial information obtained from a
bank
in the course of enforcing the Unclaimed Property Act is not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Open Records Act.
This is so because the Financial Privacy Act
“clothes a bank customer’s records with a privacy interest”
and the Open Record Act excepts “records specifically required by law to be kept confidential.”
Lincoln
's teaching provides us with but a partial solution of this case because Merrill seeks not only bank records collected by the Commission but those of insurance companies, oil and gas companies,
county clerks and other classes of holder. In
Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Okl. Horse Racing
Com’n
we recognized that an affected agency has
authority to make the initial determination whether its records are exempt from the Open Records
Aci.
That agency decision may, of course, be reviewed by the district court in a suit for injunctive and/or declaratory relief.
Although both the agency and the reviewing court must consider the Open Records Act’s intention to favor disclosure of information over its withholding,
if the release of information in a public body’s custody would invade an individual’s privacy
or damage an affected party’s commercial interests, the Section 24A.5(l)a. exemption would apply.
The Commission determined that except for the Income Tax Filers Index and the Unclaimed Property Division’s Desk List, the documents sought by Merrill contain financial information about individuals and holders that may not be released.
The district court agreed with this position. Because when the trial court considered Merrill’s suit for declaratory and injunctive relief it was sitting in equity,
the standard of review applicable to the ruling is whether it is clearly contrary to the weight of the
evidence,
While in a chan-
eery case an appellate court may weigh the evidence, it will neither disturb the trial court’s findings nor its decree unless the chancellor’s decision fails to pass muster under this well-known standard of review.
Absent the standard’s breach, the appellate court must indulge in the presumption that the decree is correct.
Our review of the record yields ample proof in support of the
nisi prius
decision. A witness testified that the Commission considers confidential social security numbers, holders’ federal identification numbers, and the names of estate administrators and heirs. It withholds from the public lease owner as well as other financial records, including bank account numbers. Since audits are frequently protested, the release, during a contest, of even an owner’s name and address could create problems. According to a Commission witness, approximately one hundred ten items of information about either the holder or owner of unclaimed property are part of the Commission’s new data base. In sum, the evidence establishes privacy claims and concerns that
compel confidentiality
under the
Tulsa Tribune
guidelines.
This is so because the reports contain individual financial information of the type that would ordinarily be subject to a court’s protective order because it has the potential to harm unclaimed property reporters’ commercial interests.
Merrill presented nothing that would outweigh these privacy considerations.
If Merrill’s request had come seventeen months later, the records he now seeks would undoubtedly be deemed confidential by statutory command.
The Commission satisfactorily met its burden of showing that all unclaimed property records not statutorily required to be made public are exempt from the purview of the Open Records Act.
V.
DISPUTE OVER THE PUBLIC RECORDS
Merrill made a
“media-specific”
demand for certain
public
records. He pressed for a
microfilm copy
of the “Income Tax Filers Index” [the Index], an annual record of the names and addresses of approximately 1.3 million persons who file tax returns. He also wanted a copy of the Unclaimed Property Division’s “Desk List” [the Desk List] on a “computer-readable” medium. The list contains information the Unclaimed Property Act requires to be published.
Merrill knew these two items were available for inspection and copying at the office of the Oklahoma Tax Com-' mission during regular business hours and had, in fact, used the Index.
After several months of correspondence and phone conversations with Merrill, the Commission quoted fees for microfiche copies of Index and a computer-readable copy of the Desk List. Merrill contends the offer came too late and the proposed copying charges were excessive. The Commission responds that because Merrill’s request for microfilm and computer-tape copies was so
unique,
its legal staff and computer services division had to decide whether compliance was possible, and if so, the procedure to be used in providing the services and its costs. The
nisi prius
conclusion was that under all of the revealed circumstances the Tax Commission did act promptly in giving Merrill access to the records and that its proposed copy charges were not excessive.
A review of the record is necessary for our decision on whether this trial court’s conclusion is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Merrill testified his initial inquiry to the Income Tax Division was made November 25, 1987; its response came on December 29, 1987. At about the same time he wrote the Management Information Systems [MIS] Director requesting a computer-readable copy of the Desk List. The Director notified him that he had forwarded the letter to the Unclaimed Property Division. Both divisions later referred Merrill’s letters to the Commission’s legal department. Written responses indicate both the Commission’s willingness to honor the public-records requests and these records’ availability in the Commission office during normal business hours. Merrill concedes he had access to the records but never made any copies. The Commission’s witness testified that this was the first and only time the Commission had received a request for
computer-readable
copies and there is a five-year backlog in developing computer jobs and systems. To comply with Merrill’s request, the Director would have to divert staff from their regular jobs. Nothing adduced in these proceedings demonstrates the Commission engaged in dilatory practices. Ample proof supports the
nisi prius
conclusion that the agency’s response-time was reasonable.
The Commission informed Merrill that it would provide a microfiche copy of the Index for $350.00 and a computer tape copy of the Desk List for $258.00. The charges include labor and administrative costs. The Open Records Act permits such fees to be charged if the request is “solely for commercial purposes” or would cause “excessive disruption of the public body’s essential functions.”
According to the trial court, both factors were present here. Merrill contends his
uncontroverted
testimony that he intended to conduct an independent audit of the Commission to detect any wrongdoing on the agency’s part mandates a finding that the record request is not
solely
for commercial purposes.
If it is insufficient to induce belief under all the facts and circumstances, the trier of facts is not bound by the testimony of interested parties, even when it is undisputed by other proof.
It is within the trial court’s province to weigh the witnesses’ credibility and assess the effect and value their testimony is to be given. Even if upon the evidence presented, the trial court might have been equally correct in reaching a different conclusion, the judgment is nonetheless free from infirmity.
When Merrill was first asked his reason for requesting the documents, he wrote that he wanted to use them in his law practice. He testified later that he intended to become a “private attorney general” and conduct an audit of approximately 1.3 million names on the Index. He planned to use the information about the approximately 125,000 persons who may own abandoned property to test the Commission’s job performance. The trial court’s conclusion that Merrill intended to use the information solely for commercial purposes has ample evidentiary support.
The Commission’s witness testified that the copy charge was based upon the cost of materials
cum
labor needed for providing the computer program and service to produce the requested data. Because of the heavy work-load, it would be disruptive of the Commission’s day-to-day critical functions to pull someone off their
job to fill Merrill’s request for a computer tape. According to the record, many persons make copies of Commission records without incurring cost by using their own copying materials in the Commission office. From our examination of the record we cannot say the decision that the costs quoted to Merrill are reasonable is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. Since the Open Records Act provides for attorney’s fees only to those who
successfully challenge the agency’s denial of access to a public record,
Merrill’s claim of error in the district court’s failure to award him attorney’s fees is meritless.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
HODGES, V.C.J., and HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur;
LAVENDER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part;
SIMMS and KAUGER, JJ., concur in result.