Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. David B. Clayton

488 F.2d 974, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10479
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 21, 1974
Docket72-3639
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 488 F.2d 974 (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. David B. Clayton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. David B. Clayton, 488 F.2d 974, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10479 (5th Cir. 1974).

Opinions

BELL, Circuit Judge:

In this diversity action appellee seeks to recover the proceeds of sale by appellant of stock received, held and sold as an innocent gratuitous transferee. The principal issue on appeal is whether Section 204 of the Restatement of Restitution1 entitles appellee to recover not merely the value of the stock at the time it was received by appellant, but rather its value when sold by appellant. The difference amounts to some $14,000.2

Appellant’s argument arises from the failure of Section 204(b) to specify clearly whether “the value of the property which he originally received” is determined as of the date of receipt or the date of sale. In supporting the latter interpretation he quotes from Comment a to Section 204: “If the innocent donee makes a profit, he can keep the profit; if he incurs a loss, he need not make it good.”

We think it clear that appellant misreads Section 204(b), and has taken the quoted sentence out of context. As stated in Comment a, the theory of recovery under Section 204 is that an innocent gratuitous transferee should be liable to the extent of his unjust enrichment or the true owner’s loss, whichever is less. Should he be able to compensate the owner for his loss, without exhausting the proceeds of selling the property, he could retain the surplus.3 It is this “profit” which is referred to in appellant’s quoted sentence, and not the appreciation in value between receipt and sale.4 Since no such “profit” is present in this case, and since the appellant was unjustly enriched to the extent of the sum he received upon sale of the stock, the district court judgment is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
488 F.2d 974, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 10479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/merrill-lynch-pierce-fenner-smith-inc-v-david-b-clayton-ca5-1974.