Parskey, J.
These cases arise out of a transaction involving the sale of shares of stock of the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (CG) owned by Morton E. Cole (Cole). In one case (Merrill Lynch ease) the stock brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) brought an action against Cole for breach of contract by Cole to sell Merrill Lynch 5000 shares of CG stock. In the other case (Cole case) Cole sued Merrill Lynch in six counts for breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent breach of trust. The cases, which were tried simultaneously, the Merrill Lynch case being tried to the court and the Cole case to the jury, resulted in a judgment for damages in favor of Merrill Lynch in the court trial and a verdict and judgment for Merrill Lynch in the jury trial. Cole has appealed in both eases.
The trier could have found the following facts. Cole is the owner of 19,950 shares of CG common stock, which stock is generally traded in the over-the-counter market. Merrill Lynch is a broker-dealer member of the New York and other major stock exchanges. For many years Cole has been a customer of Merrill Lynch through its branch office in Hartford. Cole is also an attorney who has maintained an office in Hartford for many years.
On February 19, 1974, Cole informed Byrne Kinney, a registered representative of Merrill Lynch at its Hartford office and Cole’s account executive, that he wished to sell all of his shares of CG common stock. At that time CG shares were selling at $52 a share in the open market. The $52 price was for 100 share lots but not for large blocks such as Cole owned. Kinney informed Herbert H. Hedick, manager of the Hartford office, of Cole’s offer and thereafter arranged a meeting among . Cole, Kinney and Hedick on February 20. At that meeting Kinney and Hedick informed Cole that an attempt to dispose of the entire block on the open market would depress the market price to Cole’s detriment. They recommended that Cole give Merrill Lynch an opportunity to bid for the whole block as a principal for its own corporate account. At that time Merrill Lyneh in its capacity as broker-dealer “made a market”
for CG stock and retained an inventory in the stock for such purpose.
Over the telephone and in the presence of Cole and Kinney, Hediek sought a bid from Charles Truchan, Merrill Lynch’s block trader in New York, who extended an offer of $51 a share for the entire block at the same price which Cole rejected. Truchan then extended an offer to pay $51 for 5000 shares if Cole would give Merrill Lynch a thirty minute option to purchase the remainder of the block. Cole rejected this offer but agreed to sell 5000 shares outright to Merrill Lynch at $51.50 with an option in Merrill Lynch to purchase, by the end of the trading day, the remaining 14,950 shares at $51.75. Truchan accepted Cole’s proposal and attempted unsuccessfully during the balance of the trading day to place the remaining shares. Cole remained in Hediek’s office until the close of trading when Truchan called to state that he was unable to exercise the option for purchase of the remaining CGr shares. The proceeds from the sale of the 5000 CGr shares were credited to Cole’s account.
Shortly after Cole left Hedick’s office, Truchan called Hediek again with an offer to purchase the remaining shares at the expired option price of $51.75. This offer was immediately conveyed by telephone to Cole by Kinney, but Cole indicated that he was not interested in doing any more business that day.
The next morning, February 21, 1974, Cole called Hediek and asked to nullify the prior day’s trade because he felt the price for the 5000 shares was inadequate. A meeting among Cole, Kinney and
Hedick was arranged for that afternoon, at which Cole repeated his request that the sale of the 5000 CGr shares be nullified but Hedick refused to consider rescission of the transaction and informed Cole that he had an obligation to deliver the 5000 shares to Merrill Lynch by the settlement date of February 27, 1974.
Consistent with its usual practice after executing any stock transaction, Merrill Lynch mailed a confirmation notice to Cole on February 21, 1974, memorializing his sale of 5000 shares of CGr on February 20, 1974, at $51.50 a share. On February 22, 1974, also pursuant to its usual practice, Merrill Lynch mailed a “securities due” notice to Cole informing him that by the settlement date of February 27, 1974, the 5000 CGr shares sold to Merrill Lynch on February 20, 1974, would have to be delivered. Both of these communications were sent to Cole’s Hartford office address at One Constitution Plaza. Because of Cole’s avowed intent not to deliver the 5000 shares, Hedick sent him a telegram at his Hartford office late in the day on February 22, 1974, informing him of his obligation to deliver the shares. The telegram further advised that in the case of Cole’s failure to deliver the securities as requested, Merrill Lynch would purchase and charge to his account a number of shares equal to those he was obligated to deliver under the February 20 agreement.
As a result of Cole’s failure to deliver the 5000 CG- shares by the February 27 due date, Merrill Lynch “bought-in” 5000 shares of CGr stock in the market to eliminate the deficit in its corporate trading account inventory. The cost of these “buy-in” purchases exceeded by $8572.23 the amount Merrill Lynch had contracted to pay Cole for his shares.
Cole left for Florida on February 22 an<l returned on March 6, 1974. Upon his return Cole hand, delivered a letter to Hediek in which he noted his objection to the transaction involving the sale of 5000 CGr shares to Merrill Lynch.
The trial court found the issues for Merrill Lynch in its suit against Cole and rendered a judgment for Merrill Lynch in the amount of $8572.23 plus interest from February 27, 1974. In the suit by Cole against Merrill Lynch the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment in both cases Cole has appealed. "We affirm.
I
Factual Claims
Cole asserts a number of factual claims. First, he claims that his agreement with Merrill Lynch was to sell his entire block of CGr shares rather than a contract to sell 5000 shares accompanied, by a time limit option in Merrill Lynch to purchase the remaining shares at a stated price. He also claims that at the time of the transaction his mailing address was in Miami, Florida rather than his office at Hartford. The jury, in response to a specific interrogatory, found against Cole on the first claim and the court in its memorandum of decision specifically found against him on both claims. Since there was conflicting evidence on both claims, the resolution of these issues was for the determination of the trier.
Halperin
v.
Pine Plaza Corporation,
180 Conn. 85, 87-88, 428 A.2d 340 (1980). Cole’s challenge to the factual findings is nothing more than a request that we accept his version of the facts and this we cannot d.o because it is not our function to retry the case.
Edgewood
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Parskey, J.
These cases arise out of a transaction involving the sale of shares of stock of the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (CG) owned by Morton E. Cole (Cole). In one case (Merrill Lynch ease) the stock brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) brought an action against Cole for breach of contract by Cole to sell Merrill Lynch 5000 shares of CG stock. In the other case (Cole case) Cole sued Merrill Lynch in six counts for breach of contract, fraud, and fraudulent breach of trust. The cases, which were tried simultaneously, the Merrill Lynch case being tried to the court and the Cole case to the jury, resulted in a judgment for damages in favor of Merrill Lynch in the court trial and a verdict and judgment for Merrill Lynch in the jury trial. Cole has appealed in both eases.
The trier could have found the following facts. Cole is the owner of 19,950 shares of CG common stock, which stock is generally traded in the over-the-counter market. Merrill Lynch is a broker-dealer member of the New York and other major stock exchanges. For many years Cole has been a customer of Merrill Lynch through its branch office in Hartford. Cole is also an attorney who has maintained an office in Hartford for many years.
On February 19, 1974, Cole informed Byrne Kinney, a registered representative of Merrill Lynch at its Hartford office and Cole’s account executive, that he wished to sell all of his shares of CG common stock. At that time CG shares were selling at $52 a share in the open market. The $52 price was for 100 share lots but not for large blocks such as Cole owned. Kinney informed Herbert H. Hedick, manager of the Hartford office, of Cole’s offer and thereafter arranged a meeting among . Cole, Kinney and Hedick on February 20. At that meeting Kinney and Hedick informed Cole that an attempt to dispose of the entire block on the open market would depress the market price to Cole’s detriment. They recommended that Cole give Merrill Lynch an opportunity to bid for the whole block as a principal for its own corporate account. At that time Merrill Lyneh in its capacity as broker-dealer “made a market”
for CG stock and retained an inventory in the stock for such purpose.
Over the telephone and in the presence of Cole and Kinney, Hediek sought a bid from Charles Truchan, Merrill Lynch’s block trader in New York, who extended an offer of $51 a share for the entire block at the same price which Cole rejected. Truchan then extended an offer to pay $51 for 5000 shares if Cole would give Merrill Lynch a thirty minute option to purchase the remainder of the block. Cole rejected this offer but agreed to sell 5000 shares outright to Merrill Lynch at $51.50 with an option in Merrill Lynch to purchase, by the end of the trading day, the remaining 14,950 shares at $51.75. Truchan accepted Cole’s proposal and attempted unsuccessfully during the balance of the trading day to place the remaining shares. Cole remained in Hediek’s office until the close of trading when Truchan called to state that he was unable to exercise the option for purchase of the remaining CGr shares. The proceeds from the sale of the 5000 CGr shares were credited to Cole’s account.
Shortly after Cole left Hedick’s office, Truchan called Hediek again with an offer to purchase the remaining shares at the expired option price of $51.75. This offer was immediately conveyed by telephone to Cole by Kinney, but Cole indicated that he was not interested in doing any more business that day.
The next morning, February 21, 1974, Cole called Hediek and asked to nullify the prior day’s trade because he felt the price for the 5000 shares was inadequate. A meeting among Cole, Kinney and
Hedick was arranged for that afternoon, at which Cole repeated his request that the sale of the 5000 CGr shares be nullified but Hedick refused to consider rescission of the transaction and informed Cole that he had an obligation to deliver the 5000 shares to Merrill Lynch by the settlement date of February 27, 1974.
Consistent with its usual practice after executing any stock transaction, Merrill Lynch mailed a confirmation notice to Cole on February 21, 1974, memorializing his sale of 5000 shares of CGr on February 20, 1974, at $51.50 a share. On February 22, 1974, also pursuant to its usual practice, Merrill Lynch mailed a “securities due” notice to Cole informing him that by the settlement date of February 27, 1974, the 5000 CGr shares sold to Merrill Lynch on February 20, 1974, would have to be delivered. Both of these communications were sent to Cole’s Hartford office address at One Constitution Plaza. Because of Cole’s avowed intent not to deliver the 5000 shares, Hedick sent him a telegram at his Hartford office late in the day on February 22, 1974, informing him of his obligation to deliver the shares. The telegram further advised that in the case of Cole’s failure to deliver the securities as requested, Merrill Lynch would purchase and charge to his account a number of shares equal to those he was obligated to deliver under the February 20 agreement.
As a result of Cole’s failure to deliver the 5000 CG- shares by the February 27 due date, Merrill Lynch “bought-in” 5000 shares of CGr stock in the market to eliminate the deficit in its corporate trading account inventory. The cost of these “buy-in” purchases exceeded by $8572.23 the amount Merrill Lynch had contracted to pay Cole for his shares.
Cole left for Florida on February 22 an<l returned on March 6, 1974. Upon his return Cole hand, delivered a letter to Hediek in which he noted his objection to the transaction involving the sale of 5000 CGr shares to Merrill Lynch.
The trial court found the issues for Merrill Lynch in its suit against Cole and rendered a judgment for Merrill Lynch in the amount of $8572.23 plus interest from February 27, 1974. In the suit by Cole against Merrill Lynch the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment in both cases Cole has appealed. "We affirm.
I
Factual Claims
Cole asserts a number of factual claims. First, he claims that his agreement with Merrill Lynch was to sell his entire block of CGr shares rather than a contract to sell 5000 shares accompanied, by a time limit option in Merrill Lynch to purchase the remaining shares at a stated price. He also claims that at the time of the transaction his mailing address was in Miami, Florida rather than his office at Hartford. The jury, in response to a specific interrogatory, found against Cole on the first claim and the court in its memorandum of decision specifically found against him on both claims. Since there was conflicting evidence on both claims, the resolution of these issues was for the determination of the trier.
Halperin
v.
Pine Plaza Corporation,
180 Conn. 85, 87-88, 428 A.2d 340 (1980). Cole’s challenge to the factual findings is nothing more than a request that we accept his version of the facts and this we cannot d.o because it is not our function to retry the case.
Edgewood
Construction Co., Inc.
v.
West Haven Redevelopment Agency,
170 Conn. 271, 272, 365 A.2d 819 (1976).
II
Evidential Claims
Cole called Hedick as a witness. During direct examination Cole offered Hedick’s notes as full exhibits. On cross-examination the court properly permitted inquiry into these notes. While it is settled Connecticut law that inquiry upon cross-examination is limited by the scope of the direct examination;
Grievance Committee
v.
Dacey,
154 Conn. 129, 150, 222 A.2d 339 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683, 87 S. Ct. 1325, 18 L. Ed. 2d 404, reh. denied, 387 U.S. 938, 87 S. Ct. 2048, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1006 (1967); that scope is determined by all of the evidence offered during direct examination. An exhibit offered and received as a full exhibit is in the ease for all purposes. If admitted during direct examination it is as much a part of that examination as the testimony of witnesses. If Cole wished to preclude cross-examination with respect to the contents of the notes, he should not have offered them in evidence during the direct examination.
Robinson
v.
Faulkner,
163 Conn. 365, 373, 306 A.2d 857 (1972). He could have had the notes marked for identification only and withheld the offer until Merrill Lynch presented its case.
Shulman
v.
Shulman,
150 Conn. 651, 659, 193 A.2d 525 (1963).
Cole, who appeared pro se, called himself as a witness and was duly sworn. While on the stand he used certain notes in connection with his testimony. On cross-examination counsel for Merrill Lynch was permitted, over objection, to examine
these notes. Cole claims that since he acted in the dual capacity of an attorney and party litigant he had a right as an attorney to keep confidential his trial brief notes. The ruling permitting the notes to be examined was correct. If a witness, when testifying, uses a document to refresh his recollection, that document thereby becomes available for examination by the opposing party.
State
v.
Grimes,
154 Conn. 314, 323, 228 A.2d 141 (1966);
Neff
v.
Neff,
96 Conn. 273, 280-81, 114 A. 126 (1921). A pro se party who takes the witness stand is treated like any other witness. The fact that he is also an attorney does not ensconce him in a professional immunity blanket.
Cole’s further claim that exhibits in the Merrill Lynch (court) case should not have been shown to the jury is without merit in view of the stipulation of the parties that “all evidence in both cases will be considered as evidence in both cases . . . .” Parties are not obliged to stipulate with regard to the reception and use of evidence but when they do they are bound by their action.
Ill
Juey Insteuctions
Cole argues that the charge was erroneous because it was delivered in a low monotone voice thus making it difficult to hear, it was not adapted to the issues, and it did not include his requested instructions. Cole having taken no exception to the substance of the charge nor to the manner of its delivery we do not consider these points nor do we consider whether the court erred in failing to give the requested instructions because of Cole’s
failure to observe the rules of practice in this regard.
Duley
v.
Plourde,
170 Conn. 482, 488, 365 A.2d 1148 (1976).
IY
Interrogatories
“The power of the trial eourt to submit proper interrogatories to the jury, to be answered when returning their verdict, does not depend upon the consent of the parties or the authority of statute law. In the absence of any mandatory enactment, it is within the reasonable discretion of the presiding judge to require or to refuse to require the jury to answer pertinent interrogatories, as the proper administration of justice may require.”
Freedman
v.
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,
81 Conn. 601, 612, 71 A. 901 (1909). Although ordinarily the submission of interrogatories rests within the court’s discretion, where the complaint contains two or more counts, or when two or more causes of action are incorporated in a single count a party has the right to save himself from the implication of a general verdict by seeking from the jury answers to apt and proper interrogatories.
Gaulton
v.
Reno Paint & Wallpaper Co.,
177 Conn. 121, 126, 412 A.2d 311 (1979);
Sheeler
v.
Waterbury,
138 Conn. 111, 114-15, 82 A.2d 359 (1951). In this case the court did submit interrogatories and therefore the question is whether the questions submitted adequately protected Cole against a general verdict.
Cole’s complaint is in six counts. The court directed a verdict on counts two, five and six
and submitted the case to the jury on counts one, three and four. The first count is based on a claimed breach of contract by Merrill Lynch to sell at bid market price Cole’s block of CGr shares of stock. In regard to this count the court submitted to the jury the following interrogatories: “1. Do you find that the plaintiff, Morton E. Cole, on February 20, 1974, gave an order to sell a 19,950 share block of CGf stock at the ‘bid market price’ on February 20 or 21, 1974 to the defendant, Merrill Lynch, as alleged in the First Count? Yes-No-; 2. If so, do you find that Merrill Lynch accepted that order on those terms? (If interrogatory 1 is answered “No,” this interrogatory need not be answered.) Yes-No-; 5. Do you find that the plaintiff, Morton E. Cole, agreed to sell to Merrill Lynch 5000 shares of CGr at 51% on February 20,1974, as alleged in the defendants’ Special Defense? Yes - No -.” Cole presses three interrogatories (Nos. 1, 7, and 8) pertaining to the first count all of which rely on an alleged agreement respecting a block sale of his CGI- stock.
The court’s interrogatories covered this area adequately. Any additional interrogatories would have been redundant.
In the third count Cole charged Merrill Lynch and its employees Hedick and Kinney with fraud and deceit. In connection with this charge the court submitted to the jury the following interrogatory : “Do you find that Merrill Lynch, through Mr. Hedick or Mr. Kinney or both, made fraudulent representations to the plaintiff, known by them at the time to be untrue, with the intention of having the plaintiff rely on them; and that the plaintiff did so rely on them to his injury, as alleged in the Third Count? Yes -— No -.” In his brief Cole does not contend that the interrogatory submitted by the court was deficient in any respect. His argument is that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to submit his interrogatory on this issue. An examination of his proposed interrogatory (No. 9) discloses that it is merely repetitious in that it asks whether Merrill Lynch through its employees committed fraud on Cole in connection with his efforts to sell his CGr stock.
In the fourth count Cole claimed a fraudulent breach of trust. He specified a number of claimed misrepresentations and a concealment of a contemporaneous “short sale”
of CGr stock. On this count
the court submitted the following interrogatory: “4. Do you find that Merrill Lynch, through Mr. Hediek or Mr. Kinney, conspired to deceive the plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentations or fraudulent non-disclosures, as alleged in the Fourth Count? Yes-— No- — .” Here again, Cole does not question the appropriateness of the interrogatory submitted. His claim is that the court should have submitted three additional interrogatories (Nos. 2, 3, and 23).
Two of these relate to the fact of the “short sale” about which there is no dispute and the third pertains to the claimed violation of fiduciary duties with respect to the sale or purchase of Cole’s entire block of CG- stock. The court having submitted a proper interrogatory on the subject matter, whether additional interrogatories should have been submitted was within
the court’s discretion. The court did not abuse its discretion by failing to include the proposed questions.
Y
Statute of Frauds
In the Merrill Lynch case Cole alleged as a special defense the applicable statute of frauds provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. General Statutes § 42a-8-319.
Merrill Lynch concedes that since the transaction respecting the 5000 CG shares was a sale between principals the statute is applicable. See
Lindsey
v.
Stein Bros. & Boyce, Inc.,
222 Tenn. 149, 433 S.W.2d 669 (1968);
F. C. Adams
v.
Elmer F. Thayer Estate,
85 N.H. 177, 155 A. 687 (1931) (pre-Code) aff’d, 86 N.H. 555, 156 A. 697 (1934) (interpreting Massachusetts law). It asserts, however, that the sending of the confirmation notice and Cole’s failure to send a written objection within ten days of the receipt of this notice satisfied the requirements of the statute. We agree.
The confirmation notice complied with the statute. It described the securities, stated the quantity of shares sold and the stated price. It was “signed” within the definition of $ 42a-l-201 (39) which includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing. In the present circumstances a letterhead or billhead satisfies the signature requirement.
Shpilberg
v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
535 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Ky. 1976).
The confirmation slip so signed was sufficient to bind the broker. Id. That being so, unless the contract was objected to by Cole within the statutory time limit, its enforceability could not be avoided by Cole on the ground of the statute of frauds.
The court found that the confirmation slip was mailed to Cole on February 21, 1974, at his office and mailing address at One Constitution Plaza and arrived there on February 22, 1974. The court was justified in so finding. There was evidence that the confirmation, slip was mailed on February 21. There was also evidence that a confirmation slip sent to a Hartford address on February 21
would,
in the ordinary course of mail, be delivered overnight or on February 22. The court in arriving at its conclusion of fact was justified in presuming that the confirmation slip was received in the due course of mail.
Console
v.
Torchinsky,
97 Conn. 353, 356, 116 A. 613 (1922);
Pitts
v.
Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
66 Conn. 376, 384, 34 A. 95 (1895); MeCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 343, pp. 807-808. It is undisputed that Cole’s written objection was not delivered until March 6, 1974, too late to enable him to rely on the defense of the statute of frauds.
VI
Impact of Securities Act
In his fourth special defense Cole claimed that Merrill Lynch’s action was barred by General Statutes § 36-346 (f) because of Merrill Lynch’s violation of §36-338 (a) (Rev. to 1975). The trial court ruled that § 36-346 protected only buyers of securities and therefore was unavailable to Cole as a seller. It also found that Cole had failed to sustain his burden of proof on this defense. Both the ruling and the finding raise issues which require further discussion.
Section 36-346,
entitled “Civil liability for sales
in violation of law” provides a variety of protections against security transactions made in violation of law. Subsection (a) gives a buyer a right of action against any person who offers or sells a security in violation, inter alia, of § 36-338. Subsection (f) bars an action by any person who has made a contract in violation of any provision of the chapter. This would include § 36-338. Subsec
tion (h) provides that the rights and remedies of this statute are in addition to any rights and remedies that exist at law or in equity “but this chapter shall not create any cause of action not specified in this section.” While it may be said that § 36-346 (a) provides only a buyer with a sword, subsection (f) provides both buyer and seller with a shield.
Section 36-338 prohibits certain activities in connection with the sale or purchase of any security. Because this statute is modeled after § 10 (b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, we may look to decisions under the federal law for guidance.
Elida, Inc.
v.
Harmor Realty Corporation,
177 Conn. 218, 226, 413 A.2d 1226 (1979).
We begin with an analysis of the relationship between a broker-dealer and his customer. As a broker he acts as an agent with all of the responsibility to his customer that such status implies. But even when, as a dealer in his own securities, he acts as a principal in relation to his customer he is not free to operate under the principle of
caveat venditor.
“Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is the vital representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with the standards of the profession.”
Duker & Duker, 6
S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939). “The theory is that even a dealer at arm’s length impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he will deal fairly with the public.” 3 Loss, Securities Regulation (2d Ed. 1961) p. 1483. The “shingle” theory, first recognized by the federal courts in the case of
Charles Hughes & Co., Inc.
v.
S.E.C.,
139 F.2d 434, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786, 64 S. Ct. 781, 88 L. Ed. 1077
(1944), has become a well established doctrine in the securities field. Loss, op. eit., 1487. See
S.E.C.
v.
Capital Gains
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186, 84 S. Ct. 275, 11 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1963).
Section 36-338 (a) (2) imposes upon a dealer in securities a special duty not to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading . . . .” Cole claims that, at the very time Merrill Lynch was offering to buy from Cole 5000 CG shares at $51.50, Merrill Lynch had already sold short 11,000 CG shares at more than $52' a share and that, by failing to disclose this short sale transaction, Merrill Lynch violated § 36-338 and therefore is barred from recovering for breach of contract by virtue of §36-346 (f). It is undisputed that Merrill Lynch did not disclose the short sale to Cole. If this sale, or any significant part of it, occurred before the 5000 share transaction then Merrill Lynch’s duty to disclose is clear and its failure to do so would bar any suit to recover any losses resulting from the breach of contract. General Statutes §§ 36-338, 36-346 (f).
In this ease, however, Merrill Lynch in answer to Cole’s motion for disclosure asserted that “[o]n 2-20-74, after it had agreed to purchase such [5000] shares from the defendant [Cole], the plaintiff [Merrill Lynch] sold 2000 shares to Shield & Co., and 3000 shares (as part of an 8000 share order) to Investment Company of America. Both transactions were as principal.” At the trial the parties stipulated to the same effect. Although Cole maintained that, at all times, the transaction involved only the sale of his entire block of CG shares, the
court was not obliged to accept his version of the facts. The court having found that the agreement was for the purchase by Merrill Lynch as principal of 5000 shares together with a time limit option to purchase the remainder, the stipulation of the parties established the time frame of that purchase and the subsequent short sale. In these circumstances, even under the “shingle” theory, there was nothing for Merrill Lynch to disclose. Obviously, had Merrill Lynch exercised its option to purchase the remaining shares it would have also been obligated to disclose the earlier short sale.
Cole’s further contention that the amount of damages was incorrectly calculated is without merit. The court awarded Merrill Lynch the difference between the cost of purchasing 5000 CG shares in the open market and the contract price. This represented Merrill Lynch’s loss which resulted from Cole’s breach of contract and was the correct measure of damages. It is analogous to the damages which the Uniform Commercial Code makes available to a buyer of goods who, because of a seller’s breach, is obliged to “cover” the contract by procuring substitute goods. General Statutes § 42a-2-712.
White
&
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (2d Ed.) § 6-3 p. 216ff.
vn
Vexatious Suit
In the Merrill Lynch case Cole filed a cross complaint against Merrill Lynch alleging that its action constituted a vexatious suit. The trial court found that Cole had failed to prove the allegations of his cross complaint and rendered judgment for the defendant Merrill Lynch. We agree. To establish a cause of action for vexatious suit requires proof that a civil action has been prosecuted not only without probable cause but also with malice.
Bridgeport Hydraulic Co.
v.
Pearson,
139 Conn. 186, 194, 91 A.2d 778 (1952);
Calvo
v.
Bartolotta,
112 Conn. 396, 397, 152 A. 311 (1930). It must also appear that the litigation claimed to be vexatious terminated in some way favorable to the defendant therein.
Frisbie
v.
Morris,
75 Conn. 637, 639, 55 A. 9 (1903). If, as in this case, such litigation terminates in favor of the plaintiff therein such judgment is as a general rule conclusive of the existence of probable cause for the institution of the suit. Id., 639-40.
Cole’s remaining claims whether legal or factual do not require discussion. It is sufficient to note that we have examined these claims carefully and conclude that they are without merit.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.